anxa 

92-B 

17538 


No.  2. 


Translations  and  Reprints 


FROM  THE 


Be? 


Original  Sources  of  European  History 


PROTEST  OF  THE  COUR  DES  AIDES 
OF  PARIS — April  10,  1775. 

Edited  by  James  Harvey  Robinson,  ph.  d. 
Professor  of  History  in  Columbia  University. 

With  an  English  Version  by 
Grace  Reade  Robinson 


— 


published  by 


The  Department  of  History  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania. 


Philadelphia,  Pa.,  1912. 

English  Agency  :  P.  S.  KING  &  SON,  2  &  4  Great  Smith  St.,  Westminster, 

London,  S.  W. 

Price ,  80  Cents . 


Vol.  V. 


No.  2. 


Translations  and  Reprints 

FROM  THE 


Original  Sources  of  European  History 


PROTEST  OF  THE  COUR  DES  AIDES 
OF  PARIS— APRIL  io,  i77j. 


EDITED  BY  JAMES  HARVEY  ROBINSON,  PH.  D., 
Professor  of  History  in  Columbia  University 


With  an  English  Version  by 

GRACE  READE  ROBINSON 


PUBLISHED  BY 

The  Department  of  History  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania 

PHILADELPHIA,  1912. 


Sold  by  the  Department  of  History  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  « 

Philadelphia;  or  Longmans,  Green  &  Co., 

Fifth  Avenue,  New  York 


Price ,  60  Cents 


I 


Copyright,  1899, 

By  DANA  C.  MUNRO. 


INTRODUCTION. 


The  rare  pamphlet  here  reprinted  furnishes  us  with  a  singularly  clear 
and  authentic  picture  of  the  French  government  before  the  Revolu¬ 
tion.  It  describes  with  admirable  lucidity  and  insight  the  whole 
oppressive  system  of  taxation  which  prevailed  under  the  Anciett  Regime, 
and  frankly  exposes  many  of  the  notorious  abuses  which  it  was  the 
great  achievement  of  the  Revolution  to  destroy  forever.  It  is  a  sort  of 
official  report  presented  to  the  young  king  Louis  XVI.,  about  a  year 
after  his  accession  to  the  throne,  by  one  of  the  superior  tribunals  of 
France,  in  the  hope  that  the  monarch  might  remedy  the  evils  por¬ 
trayed  therein.  As  Louis  was  then  but  twenty  years  old,  and  presum¬ 
ably  unacquainted  with  the  technicalities  of  legal  procedure  and  public 
administration,  the  magistrates  adopted  a  simple,  elementary  style  of 
presentation,  which  greatly  enhances  the  value  of  the  document  for 
students  of  to-day. 

During  the  few  months  he  had  been  on  the  throne  the  king  had 
given  many  proofs  of  a  real  solicitude  for  the  welfare  of  his  people ; 
he  was  evidently  conscientious  and  well-meaning.  He  had  early 
dismissed  the  unscrupulous  and  discredited  advisers  of  his  grand¬ 
father,  Louis  XV.,  and  replaced  them  by  better  men.  Among  the  new 
ministers  the  most  distinguished  was  the  well  known  economist  and 
experienced  government  official,  Turgot,  who  was  put  at  the  head  of 
the  finances,1  and  immediately  began  his  wide-reaching  reforms.  There 
is  no  reason,  however,  to  suppose  that  Turgot  inspired  the  Remontrances 
or  “  Protest  ”  of  which  we  are  speaking,  although  a  denunciation  by 
one  of  the  king’s  highest  tribunals  of  the  iniquitous  system  of  taxation 
and  administration  which  weighed  so  heavily  upon  the  people,  could 
hardly  fail  to  forward  his  plans. 

The  Remontrances  were  drawn  up  by  the  First  President  of  the 
court,  the  upright  Malesherbes,  who  is  perhaps  best  known  on  account 

1  Louis  XVI.  came  to  the  throne  May  io,  1774,  and  Turgot  was  appointed  Con¬ 
troller  General  on  August  24  of  the  same  year. 

(iii) 


f 


IV 


INTRODUCTION. 


of  his  heroic  defense  of  Louis  XVI.  when  the  king  came  to  be  tried  by 
the  Convention  in  1792.  Malesherbes  was  a  staunch  friend  and  sup¬ 
porter  of  Turgot,  and  doubtless  consulted  him  in  the  preparation  of 
the  elaborate  report  before  us ;  but  it  had  fallen  to  his  lot  to  draft  a 
good  many  remontrances  since  he  had  become  First  President,  twenty- 
five  years  before,  and  while  none  of  his  earlier  ones  are  so  extensive  as 
these  of  1775,  some  of  them  are  very  like  them  in  scope,  and  in  the 
character  and  frankness  of  their  criticisms.1 

The  Cour  des  aides  of  Paris/  in  whose  name  the  report  was  sub¬ 
mitted  to  the  sovereign,  was  an  ancient  tribunal,  the  functions  of  which 
had  been  clearly  defined  early  in  the  fifteenth  century.  Its  jurisdic¬ 
tion  included,  first  and  foremost,  those  cases  to  which  the  taxes — e.  g., 
the  excise  (aides),  the  salt  tax,  the  faille,  etc. —  gave  rise.  It  tried 
suits  involving  the  farmers  of  the  revenue  and  their  contracts  with  the 
government,  as  well  as  cases  which  concerned  the  privileges  and  ex¬ 
emptions  of  the  nobility  and  clergy  in  the  matter  of  taxation.  Con¬ 
sequently  it  speaks  as  one  having  authority  when  it  calls  the  young 
king’s  attention  to  the  scandalous  abuses,  connected  with  the  taxes. 

The  right  of  the  superior  courts  of  France,  especially  of  the  parle- 
ments,  to  remonstrate  with  the  king  when  he  presented  an  edict  for 
their  registration  was  a  privilege  of  long  standing,  and  one  of  which 
they  frequently  took  advantage  in  order  to  hamper  the  king’s  ministers. 
Louis  XIV.  had  finally  commanded  the  courts  to  register  edicts  without 
any  delay  whatever,  but  their  right  of  protest  had  been  restored  to 
them  by  the  Regent.  Toward  the  end  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XV.  the 
repeated  interference  of  the  parlements  and  the  protests  of  the  Cour 
des  aides  led  the  king,  at  the  instigation  of  the  chancellor,  Maupeou, 
to  abolish  these  tribunals  altogether  (in  1771)  and  substitute  in  their 
place  a  different,  and  in  many  ways  better,  judicial  organization.  But 
Louis  XVI.,  against  the  advice  of  Turgot,  Vergennes  and  other  thought¬ 
ful  men,  was  induced  to  reinstate  the  former  tribunals,  in  November, 
1774.  Pains  were  taken,  however,  in  the  decree  re-establishing  them 
to  place  certain  restrictions  upon  them,  which  it  was  hoped  might 
prevent  in  the  future  their  interference  with  legislation.  It  was  in 

1  Some  of  these  are  reprinted  by  Eugene  de  Vignaux  in  his  Memoires  sur  Lamoi - 
gnon  de  Malesherbes ,  Paris,  1876. 

2  Cours  des  aides  had  been  established  in  the  provinces  from  time  to  time,  but  only 
one,  that  of  Montpellier,  continued  in  independent  existence  down  to  1789;  the 
others  had  been  suppressed  or  united  with  other  tribunals. 


INTRODUCTION. 


V 


connection  with  a  protest  against  these  restrictions  that  the  long 
Remontrances  which  we  reproduce  were  sanctioned  by  the  Cour  des 
aides.  The  three  years  during  which  the  action  of  the  old  tribunals  had 
been  suspended  were  naturally  viewed  by  the  re-established  magistracy 
as  a  dark  and  mournful  period,  “  when  the  absence  of  the  ministers  of 
justice  and  the  silence  of  the  law  left  unrestrained  the  avidity  of  the 
tax-gatherer  and  the  tyranny  of  the  ministers.”  The  reader  will  note 
frequent  references  in  the  Remontrances  to  the  despotic  conduct  of  the 
king’s  ministers,  with  whom  the  courts  were  generally  on  very  bad 
terms.  While  some  allowance  must,  of  course,  be  made  when  the  court 

r 

dwells  upon  its  own  particular  grievances,  the  conduct  of  Louis  XV. ’s 
last  cabinet,  made  up  of  L’abb£  Terray,  Maupeou,  the  Due  d’Aiguillon 
and  others,  probably  merited  all  the  reprobations  of  the  magistrates. 

Malesherbes  read  the  Retnontratues,  which  it  had  taken  him  some 
months  to  prepare,  to  his  court  April  io,  1775,  and  about  the  middle 
of  May  they  were  laid  before  the  king.  The  ministers,  upon  learning 
the  nature  of  the  document,  were  naturally  fearful  lest  it  might  be  made 
public.  The  precautions  which  they  took  to  prevent  this  have  usually 
been  ascribed  to  the  malign  influence  of  the  courtiers,  who  were  ready 
to  check  even  the  most  salutary  reforms.  But  let  us  give  the  devil  his 
due.  The  Cour  des  aides ,  it  should  be  observed,  contents  itself  with 
denouncing  the  oppression  and  unfairness  of  the  existing  taxes,  and 
discreetly  excuses  itself  from  suggesting  any  substitutes,  by  declaring 
that  it  is  not  its  business  to  invent  new  forms  of  taxation.  Now  it 
may  well  be  that  even  Turgot  himself  was  fearful  lest  this  long  list  of 
abuses,  drawn  up  by  a  body  which  passed  as  the  most  expert  judges  in 
such  matters,  might,  if  published,  greatly  hamper  the  collection  of  the 
revenue  and  so  increase  the  existing  deficit.  Anxious  as  he  was  for  a 
speedy  regeneration  of  the  state,  he  may  have  co-operated  with  con¬ 
servative  ministers,  like  Maurepas  and  Miromesnil,  the  keeper  of  the 
seals,  in  the  attempt  to  prevent  the  possible  printing  of  the  Renion- 
trances .'  However  this  may  have  been,  the  keeper  of  the  seals 
requested  the  representatives  of  the  Cour  des  aides  to  bring  with  them 
the  minutes  of  the  Retnontrances,  that  is,  the  record  which  the  court 
kept  of  its  own  resolutions.  This  he  retained  with  the  hope  of  securing 
its  secrecy,  explaining  the  king’s  views  as  follows : 

“  His  Majesty  is  well  aware  that  the  excessive  taxation  is  one  of  the 

1  Cf.  Gomel,  Histoire  Financiere  de  la  Revolution  Franfaise,  Paris,  1892, 1.,  473. 


vi 


INTRODUCTION. 


worst  misfortunes  of  his  subjects,  and  he  regards  as  his  first  duty  the 
lightening  of  his  people’s  burdens,  whether  by  reducing  the  taxes,  or  by 
correcting  the  abuses  which  may  exist  in  either  their  assessment  or 
collection.  But  the  king  knows,  too,  that  if  abuses  really  exist  they 
ought  not  to  be  made  public  until  the  time  comes  to  remedy  them,  and 
that  it  is  dangerous  to  increase  the  ill  feeling  of  the  taxpayer  against 
those  whose  co-operation  is  necessary  to  the  levying  of  the  taxes.  His 
Majesty  does  not  doubt  that  you  have  made  the  same  reflections,  and 
that  in  drawing  up  these  Remontrances  your  intention  was  assuredly  not 
to  make  them  public,  but  simply  to  second  *his  Majesty’s  wisdom. 
You  will  not,  therefore,  be  surprised  by  the  unusual  measures  that  the 
king  has  taken  to  avoid  their  publication.”  1 

These  precautions  did  not,  however,  prevent  the  public  from  getting 
wind  of  the  matter  and  learning  the  general  character  of  the  Protest. 
Mairobert  — who  kept  a  careful  diary  of  occurrences,  important  and 
unimportant — reports  as  early  as  May  26  that  “  People  are  talking  a 
great  deal  of  the  Remontrances  of  the  Cour  des  aides  concerted 
between  M.  Turgot  and  M.  Malesherbes,  the  aim  of  which  is  to  open 
the  way  for  the  plans  of  the  former  regarding  the  financial  system,  its 
betterment,  and  especially  the  reform  of  the  abuses.”  2  On  June  1  he 
reverts  to  the  same  subject,  gives  a  brief  account  of  the  contents  of  the 
report,  says  that  it  exhibits  the  “  intolerable  atrocity  ”  of  the  prevailing 
method  of  taxation,  and  speaks  of  the  retention  of  the  minutes  by  the 
council  on  the  ground  that  the  language  of  the  court  was  too  “  lively 
and  picturesque  ”  to  be  appropriate  for  the  public  ear. 

Nevertheless,  by  July,  th t  Remontrances  had  been  printed.  Mairo¬ 
bert  writes  (July  19),  11  The  Cour  des  aides,  following  its  custom,  has 
suppressed  its  Remontrances,  which  have  been  secretlv  printed  and  are 
being  sold  with  the  greatest  mystery.  No  work  of  its  class  could  be  bet¬ 
ter  written.  It  contains  nothing  of  the  vague  declamation  and  tiresome 
rhetoric  with  which  such  productions  are  often  filled,  but  sets  forth  irre¬ 
fragable  principles  and  clear  deductions,  which  are  expressed  in  a  whole¬ 
some,  austere  and  nervous  style.  It  is  full  of  striking  truths  hard  for  kings 
to  listen  to,  but  which  must  nevertheless  be  told  them.”  The  admission 
of  Malesherbes  at  this  time  to  the  king’s  council,  the  author  adds,  does 


1  Quoted  by  Gomel,  op.  cit.,  I.,  474. 

2  Memoires  secrets  pour  servir  0  I'hisloire  de  la  Rtpublique  des  Lettres  cn  France. 
Londres,  1784  sq.  VIII.,  47. 


INTRODUCTION. 


Vll 


honor  to  the  uprightness  of  the  monarch’s  intentions  and  proves  his 
aversion  to  flattery.* 

The  Remontrances  do  not  seem  to  have  become  generally  known 
until  1778,  when  new  editions  appeared.  .  Mairobert  describes, 
April  28,  1778,  the  same  edition  of  which  we  have  made  use.2  On 
April  30,  a  copy  of  it  wras  exhibited  to  the  Cour  des  aides  by  the  king’s 
representatives,  with  the  request  that  the  work  be  suppressed,  since  it 
contained  matter  which  should  never  have  been  made  public.  The 
court  promptly  acceded  to  the  king’s  wishes  and  decreed  its  sup¬ 
pression. 

To  one  unacquainted  with  the  habits  of  French  magistrates  and 
ministers  in  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  authenticity  1 
of  this  address  to  the  king  might  seem  incredible.  One  would  naturally 
infer  that  it  had  been  composed  by  some  philosophe ,  like  Diderot,  who 
put  his  violent  denunciations  into  the  mouth  of  a  dignified  judge  in 
order  to  give  them  weight.  Nevertheless  the  general  tone  adopted  by 
Malesherbes  in  the  discussion  which  received  the  official  sanction  of 
the  Cour  des  aides  was  perfectly  in  accord  with  the  habits  of  the  time. 
Any  one  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  look  over  the  remontrances  of  the 
Parlement  of  Paris 3  or  of  the  provincial  parlements ,  or  the  earlier  utter¬ 
ances  of  the  Cour  des  aides,  from  1756  on,  or  will  read  Turgot’s  pre¬ 
ambles  to  his  edicts  removing  the  restrictions  on  the  grain  trade  and 
abolishing  the  corvees,  or  Necker’s  Compte  rendu  of  1781,  will  discover 
the  same  tendency  in  government  officials  publicly  and  unreservedly 
to  expose  the  evils  of  which  all  were  conscious.  The  reforms  of  the 
National  Assembly  in  1789-90  will  seem  far  less  abrupt  than  they  are 

1  Mem.  Seer.,  VIII.,  120-121, 

2  “ Elies  [the  Remontrances ]  sont  datees  du  6  Mai,  1773,  et  out  180  pages,  indes 
pendammenl  de  deux  lacunes  qu'on  y  remarque."  Op.  cit.,  XI.,  209.  With  the 
kind  permission  of  Professor  George  L.  Burr,  the  librarian  of  the  President  White 
Library  of  Cornell  University,  we  reproduce  the  exact  and  .complete  text  of  the  only 
copy  of  the  famous  Remontrances  which  is  known  to  exist  in  this  country.  The 
edition  generally  used  by  French  writers  forms  a  part  of  a  collection  published  at 
Bruxelles  in  1779,  Memoir es  pour  servir  a  I'histoire  du  droit  public  fran<ais  ou 
Recueil  de  ce  qui  s’est  passe  a  la  Cour  des  aides  de  i75b~I775-  Portions  of  this  have 
been  reprinted  by  De  Vignaux  in  his  Memoires  sur  Malesherbes.  The  date,  May  6, 
is  probably  a  mistake.  Cf.  Jobez,  La  France  sous  Louis  XVL.,  I.,  236-7  and  243 
and  n. 

*  Cf.  Vol.  II.  of  Flammermont’s  Remontrances  du  Parlement  de  Paris  au  XVJIIe . 
SiicU. 


viii 


INTRODUCTION. 


usually  represented  to  have  been,  if  we  realize  that  the  different  govern¬ 
mental  bodies  had  long  been  vigorously  inculcating  the  desire  for  a 
change,  by  persistently  calling  the  nation’s  attention  to  the  absurdity, 
wastefulness,  and  injustice  of  the  existing  order. 

The  Retnontrances  here  reproduced  are,  as  has  been  pointed  out, 
very  clear  and  intelligible.  Almost  all  the  technical  terms  are  care¬ 
fully  explained  to  the  young  ruler.  Nevertheless,  since  French  judicial 
procedure  differs  in  some  important  respects  from  ours,  for  example, 
in  the  matter  of  appeals,  there  may  be  a  few  places  which  will  not  be 
completely  understood  by  the  reader.  Still  it  has  not  been  deemed 
best  to  attempt  to  elucidate  such  differences  in  detail ;  they  play  but 
a  very  small  part  in  the  exposition,  and  an  explanation  would  in  most 
cases  prove  both  difficult  and  irrelevant  to  the  main  object  of  the  pub¬ 
lication. 


TRES-HUMBLES 


ET  TRES-RESPECTUEUSES 

REMONTRANCES 

Que  presen  tent  au  Roi  notre  tres  honor e  Sonve- 
raiti  6°  Seigneur ,  les  Gens  tenans  sa  Cour  des 
Aides  a  Paris } 


Sire, 

[1]  Votre  Cour  des  Aides  vient  de  r£clamer  pour  elle-meme  &  pour 
toute  la  Magistrature  contre  quelques  articles  de  l’acte  de  son  r£tab- 
lissement ;  mais  il  lui  reste  un  devoir  encore  plus  important  a  remplir ; 
c’est  la  cause  du  peuple  que  nous  devons  a  present  plaider  au  Tribunal 
de  VOTRE  MAJEST&.  Nous  devons  vous  presenter  un  tableau  fidele 
des  droits  &  des  impositions  qui  se  levent  dans  votre  Royaume,  &  qui 
sont  l’objet  de  la  jurisdiction  qui  nous  est  confide ;  nous  devons  faire 
connoitre  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  au  commencement  de  son  regne,  la 
vraie  situation  de  ce  peuple,  dont  le  spectacle  d’une  Cour  biillante  ne 
lui  rappelle  point  le  souvenir.  Qui  s^ait  meme  si  les  tdmoignages  de 
joie  &  de  tendresse  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  a  re^us,  dans  le  moment 
de  son  avdnement,  de  tous  ceux  qui  ont  pu  approcher  de  sa  Personne 
de  ce  peuple  un  peu  moins  malheureux  que  celui  des  Provinces,  ou 
deja  heureux  par  ses  espdrances,  ne  l’entretiennent  pas  dans  une  erreur 
funeste  sur  le  sort  du  reste  de  la  Nation?  Cette  Nation,  SIRE,  a 
toujours  signald  son  zele  &  son  attachment  pour  ses  Maitres,  en  faisant 
les  plus  grands  efforts  pour  maintenir  la  splendeur  de  leur  trone  :  mais 
au  moins  faut-il  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  sgache  ce  que  ces  secours  im- 
menses  coutent  au  malheureux  peuple. 

[2]  Cependant  l’examen  approfondi  de  tous  les  impots  seroit  un 

'The  original  spelling,  which  differs  in  a  few  respects  only  from  that  of  to-day,  has 
been  retained,  as  well  as  the  capitalization;  the  paragraphs  however,  have  frequently 
been  combined,  as  they  often  included  but  a  sentence  or  two,  and  have  been 
numbered  to  correspond  with  the  paragraphs  of  the  English  translation  which  follows, 

(X) 


2 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


travail  infini  auquel  VOTRE  MAJESTE^  ne  peut  pas  se  livrer  elle- 
meme.  Nous  pr^senterons  des  m£moires  particuliers  sur  chaque  objet ; 
&  VOTRE  MAJEST&  pourra  en  renvoyer  la  discussion  a  ceux  qu’elle 
honorera  de  sa  confiance.  Mais  dans  ce  jour,  SIRE,  dans  ce  jour 
precieux  ou  nous  parlons  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  pour  etre  entendus 
d’elle-meme,  nous  nous  bornerons  a  lui  rendre  sensibles  les  causes 
g£n£rales  &  fondamentales  de  tous  les  abus,  &  a  £tablir  des  v£rit£s 
assez  simples  pour  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  puisse  s’en  convaincre, 
qu’elle  puisse,  pour  ainsi  dire,  s’en  p£n£trer :  &  quand  vos  intentions 
seront  connues,  quand  vos  instructions  auront  £t£  donn^es,  ce  sera  a  vos 
Ministres  a  s’y  conformer  dans  l’examen  detail^  qui  sera  fait  avec  eux 
des  diff£rentes  parties. 

.[3]  Aucune  consideration  ne  doit  nous  arreter,  SIRE,  quand  nous 
avons  des  objets  si  importants  a  presenter  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE.  C’est 
cependant  avec  regret  que  nous  nous  verrons  obliges  de  porter  nos  re¬ 
gards  sur  ce  temps  malheureux  ou  l’absence  des  Ministres  de  la  Justice 
&  le  silence  des  Loix  a  laisse  une  libre  carriere  a  l’avidite  des  Finan¬ 
ciers  &  au  despotisme  des  Administrateurs.  VOTRE  MAJESTY  a  fait 
cesser  les  malheurs  publics,  &  nous  voudrions  que  le  souvenir  en 
ffit  entierement  efface  par  cet  acte  edatant  de  votre  justice.  Si  nous 
n’avions  a  nous  plaindre  que  de  la  persecution  soufferte  par  les  Mag- 
istrats,  &  rneme  si  nous  n’avions  a  denoncer  que  les  infractions  faites 
pendant  ces  temps  de  trouble  a  l’order  judiciaire,  nous  penserions  que 
tout  etant  repare,  tout  doit  etre  enseveli  dans  l’oubli.  Mais  il  est  une 
importante  verite,  SIRE,  que  nous  ne  pouvons  eviter  de  mettre  sous 
vos  yeux  sans  trahir  notre  devoir:  c’est  que  la  pretendue  necessite 
d’affermir  l’autorite  souveraine  a  servi  de  pretexte  a  des  exactions 
exercees  avec  impunite  sur  vos  Sujets ;  qu’il  a  ete  fait  une  ligue  entre 
les  ennemis  des  Tribunaux,  &  ceux  qui  faisoient  gemir  le  peuple  sous 
le  poids  des  impots  arbitraires ;  que  ceux-la  ont  prete  leur  appui  pour 
aneantir  la  Magistrature,  &  leur  ministere  pour  la  remplacer,  &  que  le 
prix  de  ce  funeste  service  a  £t£  de  livrer  le  peuple  a  leur  cupidity. 

C4J  II  nous  est  douloureux,  SIRE,  d’avoir  a  vous  denoncer  ce 
systeme  d’oppression  dans  des  jours  de  eminence.  Mais  des  Loix 
ontheuses  au  peuple  ont  £t£  promulgu^es  dans  la  forme  qu’on  regardoit 
alors  comme  ldgale,  &  elles  subsistent  -encore  aujourd’hui,  puisque 
"VO  I  KE  MAJESTt  a  valid£  tout  ce  qui  s’dtoit  fait  pendant  l’inaction 
de  la  Justice.  Nous  voyons  aussi  plusieurs  places  importantes  encore 
occupies  par  ceux  qui  ont  abus^  de  leur  pouvoir ;  &  si  de  nouveaux  abus 


INTRODUCTORY. 


3 


excitent  l’animadversion  de  la  Justice,  on  ne  manquera  pas  de  faire 
valoir,  en  faveur  des  coupables,  le  pr^tendu  merite  de  s’etre  sacrifids  pour 
le  maintien  de  l’autorit£  Royale  ;  &  sous  pr£texte  de  les  mettre  a  l’abri 
de  la  vengeance  de  leurs  ennemis,  on  voudra  mettre  leur  administration 
a  I'abri  des  recherches  de  la  Justice.  II  est  done  bien  important,  SIRE, 
d’affranchir  VOTRE  MAJESTE  du  fardeau  d’une  reconnoissance  si 
pr£judiciable  a  son  peuple,  &  de  lui  faire  connoitre  que  ceux  qui  pre- 
tendoient  travailler  pour  l’autorit6  Royale,  ont  r^ellement  &  efficace- 
ment  travailld  pour  s’arroger  sur  tous  les  Ordres  de  l’Etat  un  pouvoir 
exorbitant,  &  inutile  au  service  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE. 

[5]  Nous  desirerions,  SIRE,  que  d’autres  que  nous  pussent  vous  faire 
parvenir  ces  facheuses  v£rit£s.  Que  n’est-il  possible  que  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  abandonne  aujourd’hui  ces  funestes  maximes  de  Gouverne- 
ment,  ou  plutot  cette  politique  introduite  depuis  un  siecle  par  la  jalousie 
des  Ministres,  qui  a  r^duit  au  silence  les  Ordres  de  l’Etat,  except^  la 
seule  Magistrature  !  Que  n’est-il  possible  a  la  Nation  elle-meme  de 
s’expliquer  sur  ses  int^rets  les  plus  chers  !  Alors,  SIRE,  avec  quelle  joie 
nous  remettrions  en  d’autres  mains  le  soin  de  vous  faire  connoitre  tous 
les  exces  aux  quels  s’est  port£  ce  meme  Ministere  qui  vouloit  nous 
an£antir  !  Mais  puisque  nous  seuls  jouissons  encore  de  ce  droit  antique 
des  Francois,  de  ce  droit  de  parler  a  nos  Rois,  &  de  r^clamer  avec  liberty 
contre  I’infraction  des  Loix  &  des  droits  nationaux,  nous  ne  devons 
point  user  envers  nos  ennemis  d’une  g£nerosit£  qui  nous  rendroit 
coupables  envers  la  Nation  entiere. 

[6]  Le  premier  tableau  que  nous  ayons  a  presenter  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTY,  est  celui  des  droits  connus  sous  le  nom  de  Droits  des 
Fermes.  Nous  ne  vous  annoncons  pas,  SIRE,  une  v6rit£  nouvelle,  en 
vous  disant  que  ces  droits  sont  moins  on^reux  par  les  sommes  memes 
que  le  tresor  royal  recoit  du  peuple,  que  par  les  frais  de  la  r^gie,  &  les 
gains  des  Fermiers,qui  certainement  sont  trop  forts,  puisque  les  Minis¬ 
tres  du  dernier  regne  ont  s<;u  en  reprendre  une  partie,  non  pas  pour 
le  profit  de  VOTRE  MAJESTfi,  mais  pour  en  gratifier  leurs  favoris. 
Cette  v6rit£  qui  est  dans  la  bouche  du  public  entier,  ne  peut  pas  etre 
ignore  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE. 

[7]  Elle  sqait  aussi  qu’ind^pendamment  des  sommes  d’argent  tiroes 
de  ses  Sujets,  l’Etat  est  priv6,  par  les  droits  des  Fermes,  d’une  multitude 
de  citoyens,  employes  les  uns  a  faire  la  fraude,  les  autres  a  1  empecher. 
Eh  !  quels  citoyens?  Ceux  pr£cis6ment  qui  pourroient  etre  les  plus 

tiles,  les  uns  par  la  force  du  corps  &  le  courage,  les  autres  par  l’industrie 


4 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


&  l’activit^ :  car  il  est  notoire  que  le  metier  de  Commis,  &  peut-etre 
meme  le  metier  de  fraudeur,  malgr£  ses  risques,  valent  mieux  que  le 
metier  de  soldat,  &  que  les  places  de  finances  procurent  a  ceux  qui  les 
obtiennent,  des  avantages  plus  certains  &  plus  considerables  que 
l’agriculture,  le  commerce  ou  les  manufactures;  qu’il  ne  reste  done 
dans  ces  professions  utiles  que  ceux  qui  n’ont  pas  eu  assez  de  bonheur 
ou  de  talent  pour  parvenir  a  la  finance. 

[8]  VOTRE  MAJEST&  n’ignore  pas  non  plus  qu’outre  les  droits 
payes  sur  chaque  denr^e,  il  en  est  dont  la  production  est  defendue  ou 
gen£e  dans  le  Royaume  pour  l’interet  de  la  Ferme  ;  que  tel  est  le  tabac, 
dont  la  culture  est  interdite  a  vos  Sujets,  pendant  qu’il  s’en  achete  tous 
les  ans  de  l’^tranger  pour  plusieurs  millions ;  que  tel  est  aussi  aujourd’hui 
le  sel,  denr£e  d’un  bien  plus  grand  prix,  &  un  des  dons  les  plus  pr£- 

’cieux  que  la  nature  ait  faits  a  la  France,  si  la  main  du  Financier  ne 
repoussoit  sans  cesse  ce  present  que  la  mer  ne  cesse  d’apporter  sur  nos 
cotes ;  qu’il  est  des  parages  ou  la  fabrication  du  sel  n’est  permise  qu’a 
quelques  privil£gi£s,  &  que  les  Commis  de  la  Ferme  assemblent  les 
paysans,  dans  certains  temps  de  l’annee,  pour  submerger  celui  que  la 
mer  a  d£pos£  sur  le  rivage ;  que  sur  d’autres  cotes  la  fabrication  du 
sel,  permise  en  apparence,  est  cependant  assujettie  a  de  telles  con- 
traintes,  que  le  Fermier  peut  ruiner,  &  ruine  r^ellement  celui  qui  l’en- 
treprend  contre  son  gr£ ;  que  presque  par-tout  l’exces  du  prix  du  sel 
prive  le  peuple  de  l’avantage  qu’il  pourroit  tirer  de  cette  pr^cieuse 
denree  pour  les  salaisons,  pour  la  nourirture  &  la  conservation  des  bes- 
tiaux,  &  pour  une  infinite  d’arts  utiles,  meme  pour  l’engrais  des  terres. 

[9]  VOTRE  MAJESTE  sgait  aussi  que  les  autres  droits  sur- les  den- 
rees  nuisent  tous  a  la  production  &  au  commerce;  que  la  France  pr6- 
duiroit  plus  de  vins  sans  les  droits  d’Aides ;  qu’il  s’y  fabriqueroit  plus 
de  marchandises  sans  les  droits  de  Traites.  Le  detail  de  ces  privations 
seroit  infini ;  &  nous  reconnoissons,  SIRE,  que  nous  ne  pourrions  vous 
en  donner  un  tableau  complet,  car  chaque  jour  nous  en  apprend  de 
nouvelles :  mais  cette  esquisse  suffit  pour  faire  connoitre  le  tort  que  les 
droits  des  Fermes  font  a  votre  Royaume,  independamment  des  sommes 
que  le  peuple  paie  &  pour  le  gain  des  Fermiers,  &  pour  les  frais  de  r£gie. 

[10]  Il  n’est  pas  possible  non  plus  que  VOTRE  MAJEST&  ne  soit 
pas  instruite  de  la  rigueur  des  Loix  p^nales  prononcees  contre  la  con- 
trebande.  Elle  s?ait  que  ceux  qui  se  rendent  coupables  de  ce  delit,  ne 
sont  quelquefois  point  habitues  a  le  regarder  comme  un  crime ;  qu’il  y 
a  des  Provinces  entieres  oil  les  enfans  y  sont  Aleves  par  leurs  peres, 


ABUSES  DUE  TO  THE  FARMING  OF  THE  TAXES. 


5 


n’ont  jamais  acquis  d’autre  industrie,  &  ne  connoissent  d’autres  moyens 
pour  subsister ;  &  que  quand  ces  malheureux  sont  pris,  ils  subissent  le 
genre  de  captivity  destine  aux  grands  crimes,  &  quelquefois  la  mort. 
Nous  ne  doutons  pas  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  ne  soit  attendrie  au  recit 
de  ces  cruaut£s,  &  qu’elle  n’ait  demande  comment,  dans  l’origine,  on 
a  pu  prononcer  la  peine  de  mort  contre  des  citoyens  pour  un  interet 
de  finance. 

[n]  Mais  il  est  encore  une  autre  tyrannie  dont  il  est  possible  que 
VOTRE  MAJEST&  n’ait  jamais  entendu  parler,  parce  qu’elle  n’offre 
point  un  spectacle  si  cruel,  &  qui  cependant  n’est  pas  moins  insuppor¬ 
table  au  peuple,  parce  qu’elle  est  sentie  par  tous  les  citoyens  du  dernier 
etat,  par  ceux  qui  vivent  tranquillement  de  leur  travail  &  de  leur  com¬ 
merce  :  elle  consiste  en  ce  que  chaque  homme  du  peuple  est  oblige  de 
souffrir  journellement  les  caprices,  les  hauteurs,  les  insultes  meme  des 
Suppots  de  la  Ferme.  On  n’a  jamais  fait  assez  d’attention  a  ce  genre 
de  vexations,  parce  qu’elles  ne  sont  eprouv^es  que  par  des  gens  obscurs 
&  inconnus.  En  effet,  si  quelques  Commis  manquent  d’^gards  pour 
des  personnes  consid£r£es,  les  Chefs  de  la  finance  s’empressent  de 
desavouer  leurs  subalternes,  &  de  donner  satisfaction  :  &  c’est  pr£cise- 
ment  par  ces  £gards  pour  les  Grands,  que  la  Finance  a  eu  l’art  d’as- 
sujettir  a  un  despotisme  sans  bornes  &  sans  frein  tous  les  hommes  sans 
protection.  Or  la  classe  des  hommes  sans  protection  est  certainement 
la  plus  nombreuse  dans  votre  Royaume ;  &  ceux  qui  ne  paraissent 
proteges  par  personne,  sont  ceux  qui  ont  plus  de  droit  a  la  protection 
immediate  de  VOTRE  MAJEST&. 

[12]  Il  est  done  de  notre  devoir  de  d£velopper  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE 
les  vraies  causes  de  cette  servitude  a  laquelle  le  peuple  est  sounds  dans 
toutes  les  Provinces.  Cette  cause  est,  SIRE,  dans  la  nature  du  pouvoir 
que  les  Prepos^s  de  lar  Ferme  ont  en  main;  pouvoir  arbitraire  a 
beaucoup  d’egards,  &  avec  lequel  par  consequent  il  leur  est  trop  aise 
de  se  rendre  redoutables. 

[13]  Premi^rement,  le  code  de  la  Ferme  generate  est  immense,  & 
n’est  recueilli  nulle  part.  C’est  une  science  occulte  que  personne,  ex¬ 
cept^  les  Financiers,  n’a  etudi£  ni  pu  etudier :  en  sorte  que  le  parti¬ 
cular  a  qui  on  fait  un  proces,  ne  peut  ni  connoitre  par  lui-meme  la  loi 
a  laquelle  il  est  assujetti,  ni  consulter  qui  que  ce  soit;  il  faut  qu’il  s’en 
rapporte  a  ce  Commis  meme,  son  adversaire  &  son  persdeuteur.  Com¬ 
ment  vaut-on  qu’uh  laboureur,  un  artisan,  ne  tremble  pas,  ne  s’humilie 
pas  sans  cesse  devant  un  ennemi  qui  a  contre  lui  de  si  terribles  armes? 


6 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[14]  D’autre  part,  les  loix  de  la  Ferine  n£  sont  pas  seulement  in* 
connues,  elles  sont  aussi  quelquefois  incertaines.  II  y  a  beaucoup  de 
droits  douteux  que  le  Fermier  essaie  d’exercer  suivant  les  circonstances. 
On  conceit  que  les  Employes  de  la  Fernie  font  ces  essais  par  preference 
sur  ceux  qui  ont  le  malheur  de  leur  deplaire.  On  con^oit  aussi  qu’on 
ne  les  fait  jamais  que  sur  ceux  qui  n’ont  pas  assez  de  credit  pour  se 
dc-fendre. 

[15]  Enfin  il  est  d’autres  loix  malheureusement  trop  certaines,  mais 
dont  l’ex^cution  litt<5 rale  est  impossible  par  l’exces  de  leur  rigueur.  Le 
Fermier  lesaobtenues  scachant  tres-bien  qu’il  ne  les  fera  pas  ex^cuter; 
&  il  s’est  reserve  d’en  dispenser  quand  il  le  voudra,  mais  a  condition 
que  cette  dispense,  sans  laquelle  le  particulier  redevable  des  droits  seroit 
ruine,  sera  une  faveur  accordee  arbitrairement  ou  par  lui  ou  par  ses 
Preposes.  Tel  est  un  des  systemes  favoris  de  la  Finance,  qu’il  faut  ab- 
solument  devoiler  a  VOTRE  MAJEST&.  Oui,  SIRE,  on  a  entendu  le 
Financier  dire  au  citoyen  :  11  faut  que  la  Fernie  ait  des  graces  a  vous 
accorder  6°  a  vous  refuser:  il  faut  que  vous  soyiez  obliges  de  les  lui 
venir  dewander.  Ce  qui  est  dire  en  termes  ^quivalens :  Ce  ti' est  pas 
assez  d'apporter  votre  argent  pour  satisfaire  notre  avidite ;  il  faut 
sa/isfaire  par  des  bassesses  V insolence  de  nos  Comtnis.  Or,  quand  il 
seroit  vrai  que  l’avidite  du  Fermier  tourne  au  profit  du  Roi,  il  est  cer¬ 
tain  au  moins  que  l’insolence  de  cette  multitude  de  Commis  qui  inon- 
dent  les  provinces,  lui  est  absolument  inutile. 

[  1 6]  Nous  nous  sommes  plus  £tendus,  SIRE,  sur  les  abus  de  ce  genre 
que  sur  les  autres,  soit  parce  qu’ils  ne  sont  pas  assez  connus,  soit  parce 
que  nous  croyons  qu’il  est  impossible  d’y  rem^dier  sans  porter  obstacle 
aux  recouvremens.  Enfin,  SIRE,  nous  croyons  qu’on  n’a  jamais  mis 
sous  vos  yeux  les  moyens  employes  par  la  Ferme  generate  pour  reussir 
dans  ses  contestations  contre  les  particuliers. 

[17]  Le  premier  de  ces  moyens,  SIRE,  il  ne  faut  pas  se  le  dis- 
simuler,  est  de  n’avoir  point  de  Juge,  ou,  ce  qui  est  a  peu  pres  meme 
chose,  de  n’avoir  pour  Juge  que  le  tribunal  d’un  seul  homme.  Les 
Cours  des  Aides,  &  les  Tribunaux  qui  y  ressortissent,  sont,  par  leurs  ins¬ 
titutions,  Juges  de  tous  les  impots :  mais  la  plus  grande  partie  de  ces 
affaires  ont  et<§  evoquees,  &  sont  renvoyees  devant  un  seul  Commissaire 
du  Conseil,  qui  est  l’lntendant  de  chaque  province,  &  par  appel,  au 
Conseil  de  Finance,  e’est-a-dire,  a  un  Conseil  qui  r^ellement  ne  se  tient 
ni  en  presence  de  VOTRE *MAJESTfc,  ni  sous  les  yeux  du  Chef  de  la( 
Justice,  auquel  n’assistent  ni  les  Conseillers  d’Etat,  ni  les  Maitres  des 


ABUSES  IN  THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  JUSTICE. 


7 


Requetes,  &  qui  n’  est  compost  que  d’un  Controleur-GEnEral  &  d’un 
seul  Intendant  des  Finances ;  oil  par  consequent  l’Intendant  des  Fi¬ 
nances  est  presque  toujours  le  seul  Juge  ;  car  il  est  rare  qu’un  Controleur- 
GEnEral  ait  le  temps  de  s’occuper  des  affaires  contentieuses. 

[18]  Nous  rendons  justice,  SIRE,  avec  tout  le  public,  aux  Magistrats 
qui  occupent  a  present  ces  places;  mais  les  vertus  personnelles  d’un 
homme  mortel  ne  doivent  point  nous  rassurer  sur  les  effets  d’une  ad¬ 
ministration  permanente.  Ce  que  nous  dEfErons  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE 
est  un  systeme  de  justice  arbitraire  sous  lequel  le  peuple  gemit  depuis 
un  siecle,  &  gEmiroit  sans  cesse,  si  on  ne  reclamoit  que  dans  le  temps 
oil  le  pouvoir  est  dans  la  main  de  ceux  qui  veulent  en  abuser.  II  faut 
done  profiter  du  moment  heureux  oil  la  justice  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE 
a  preside  a  tous  ses  choix,  pour  etablir  en  presence  de  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  &  de  ses  Ministres,  la  maxime  incontestable  que  ce  n’est 
point  donner  des  Juges  au  Peuple,  que  de  ne  lui  donner  que  le  tribunal 
d’un  seul  homme.  Or  pour  tous  les  genres  d’affaires  qui  ont  EtE  en- 
levEes  par  des  Evocations  a  la  Justice  reglee,  ce  tribunal  d’un  seul  homme 
est  le  seul  qui  ait  EtE  donnE  au  Peuple.  Dans  les  provinces  e’est  l’ln- 
tendant  qui  prononce  sur  le  sort  des  citoyens,  seul  dans  son  cabinet,  & 
souvent  dans  son  travail  avec  le  Directeur  des  Fermes ;  &  a  Paris,  ou 
se  jugent  les  appels,  e’est  encore  l’lntendant  des  Finances'  qui  statue 
irrEvocablement,  seul  dans  son  cabinet,  &  souvent  dans  son  travail  avec  le 
Fermier-GEnEral :  &  sur  cela,  SIRE,  nous  croyons  pouvoir  interpeller  la 
bonne  foi  de  ceux  mernes  a  qui  ce  pouvoir  exorbitant  est  confiE ;  e’est 
a  eux  que  nous  demandons  s’il  n’est  pas  vrai  que  cette  justice  arbitraire 
soit  la  seule  qu’on  rende  a  vos  sujets  dans  toutes  les  matieres  EvoquEes. 

[19]  Ajoutons  que  dans  celles  qui  ne  sont  pas  encore  EvoquEes,  & 
oil  le  recours  a  la  Justice  rEglEe  semble  encore  permis,  le  Fermier- 
GEnEral  a  trouvE  le  moyen  de  rendre  ce  recours  illusoire,  &  que  ce 
n’est  pour  le  malheureux  peuple. qu’une  occasion  de  faire  des  frais  inu¬ 
tiles,  par  1’usage  introduit  de  porter  les  requetes  en  cassation  contre 
les  Arrets  des  Cours  des  Aides,  au  Conseil  des  Finances,  e’est-a-dire, 
toujours  a  ce  tribunal  composE  du  seul  Controleur-GEnEral  &  du  seul 
Intendant  des  Finances.  Car,  d’une  part,  les  Fermiers  soutiennent  que 
dans  le  Conseil  le  mal-jugE  doit  etre  un  moyen  de  cassation,  lorsqu’il 
s’agit  des  droits  du  Roi,  &  que  tous  les  droits  qui  leur  sont  affermEs 
doivent  jouir  de  ce  privilEge.  D’autre  part,  on  a  etabli  au  Conseil  des 


The  functions  of  the  six  Intendants  of  finance  are  described  below,  paragraph  112. 


8 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


Finances  une  jurisprudence  sur  les  cassations  absolument  contraire  aux 
Loix  certaines,  &  constamment  observees  dans  le  vrai  Conseil  de 
VOTRE  MAJESTfi ;  c’est  qu’en  cassant  un  Arret  de  Cour  souveraine, 
on  juge  le  fond  sans  le  renvoyer  a  un  autre  tribunal.  Des-lors  il  n’existe 
plus  de  difference  entre  la  requete  en  cassation  presentee  a  votre  Con¬ 
seil,  &  l’appel  interjettE  a  un  Juge  supErieur;  &  le  recours  au  Conseil 
n’est  qu’un  degrE  de  jurisdiction  de  plus.  Tel  est  done  l’ordre  des 
Jurisdictions  pour  tous  les  droits  des  Fermes. 

[20]  Sur  les  objets  EvoquEs,  conime  le  controle  &  les  francs-fiefs, 
on  se  pourvoit  d’abord  devant  la  seule  personne  de  1’Intendant  de  la 
province,  ensuite  devant  la  seule  personne  de  l’lntendant  des  Finances ; 
&  sur  les  objets  non  EvoquEs,  comme  les  Aides,  on  se  pourvoit  d’abord 
en  l’Election,  ensuite  a  la  Cour  des  Aides,  mais  toujours,  a  la  fin,  devant 
la  seule  personne  de  l’lntendant  des  Finances. 

[21]  Nous  s^avons  qu’on  donne  des  motifs  plausibles  de  ces  Evoca¬ 
tions  &  de  ces  attributions.  On  dira  a  VOTRE  MAJEST&  qu’on  a 
voulu  epargner  aux  Fermiers  &  a  leurs  adversaires  les  frais  &  la  longueur 
de  la  Justice  rEglEe,  &  qu’on  a  voulu  aussi  Eviter  une  partialitE  que  les 
Financiers  prEtendent  toujours  avoir  EprouvEe  de  la  part  des  Juges 
ordinaires.  On  vous  expliquera  meme  la  cause  de  cette  prEtendue 
partialitE,  en  avouant-que  les  droits  sont  si  rigoureux,  &  les  rEglemens 
pour  la  rEgie  si  contraires  a  l’ordre  judiciaire  comraun,  que  ces  rEglemens 
ne  peuvent  etre  bien  observEs  que  par  des  Juges  qui,  Etant  initiEs  dans 
l’admimstration,  ont  senti  la  nEcessite  de  les  faire  exEcuter. 

[22]  Mais  si  le  premier  de  ces  motifs  Etoit  sincere,  on  auroit  proposE 
aux  Cours  des  Aides  d’enregistrer  des  loix  qui  Etablissent  une  procEdure 
abrEgEe  &  sans  frais  ;  loix  que  ces  Cours  adopteroient  avec  empresse- 
ment,  mais  qu’on  ne  leur  a  jamais  proposEes,  parce  qu’on  n’a  pas  voulu 
perdre  des  prEtextes  d’Evocation.  Et  quant  au  reproche  de  partialitE, 
s’il  Etoit  vrai  qu’on  n’eut  eu  d’autres  intentions  que  de  donner  au 
Fermier  des  Juges  initiEs  dans  l’administration,  les  appels  des  Inten- 
dans  &  les  requetes  en  cassation  se  porteroient  au  vrai  Conseil  de 
VOTRE  MAJEST&,  qui  est  composE  de  Magistrats  qui  ont  administrE 
les  provinces,  &  non  pas  au  seul  Controleur-GEnEral  &  au  seul  Inten- 
dant  des  Finances.  II  faut  done  avouer  que  le  vrai  motif  des  Evoca¬ 
tions,  la  vraie  intention  du  Gouvernement,  est  de  ne  donner  d’autres 
Juges  au  Fermier  pour  tous  ses  proces,  que  le  Ministre  &  les  Admi- 
nistrateurs  des  Finances;  e’est-a-dire  qu’on  a  voulu  que  le  Fermier  ffit 
son  Juge  a  lui-meme,  &  celui  de  tout  le  public,  toutes  les  fois  qu’il 
auroit  un  crEdit  prEpondErant  dans  les  bureaux. 


EVOCATIONS  TO  THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS. 


9 


[23]  Nous  n’entrerons  point,  SIRE,  dans  le  detail  de  toutes  ces 
Evocations,  parce  que  1’EnumEration  en  seroit  infinie,  &  que  nous  nous 
faisons  quelque  peine  d’insister  trop  long  temps  sur  cet  objet  qui  nous 
est  personnel,  puisqu’il  intEresse  notre  jurisdiction.  D’ailleurs  il  nous 
seroit  impossible  de  donner  des  preuves  de  la  plupart  des  abus  qu’entrame 
cette  administration,  parce  que  ces  affaires  n’Etant  portEes  a  aucuti  tri¬ 
bunal  rEgle,  Tabus  le  plus  constatE  par  la  notoriEtE  publique  ne  Test  par 
aucune  piece  juridique  :  mais  VOTRE  MAJEST&  supplEera  aisEment 
a  cet  Egard  aux  Remontrances  des  Cours,  en  Ecoutant  le  tEmoignage 
universel  du  public. 

[24]  C’est  par-la  qu’Elle  apprendra  jusqu’a  quel  point  les  Financiers 
ont  abusE  de  leur  pouvoir  arbitraire  dans  la  rEgie  de  tous  les  droits 
compris  dans  le  bail  des  Fermes,  sous  le  nom  de  domaine,  qui  sont 
tous  enlevEs  a  la  connoissance  de  la  Justice  rEglEe.  Elle  s<;aura  que 
ceux  qu’on  nomme  droits  de  controle,  d’insinuation,  de  centieme 
denier,  droits  qui  portent  sur  tous  les  actes  passEs  entre  les  citoyens, 
s’arbitrent  suivant  la  fantaisie  du  Fermier  ou  de  ses  PrEposEs;  que  les 
prEtendues  loix  en  cette  matiere  sont  si  obscures  &  si  incompletes, 
que  celui  qui  paie  ne  peut  jamais  s?avoir  ce  qu’il  doit ;  que  souvent  le 
PrEposE  ne  le  sait  pas  mieux,  &  qu’on  se  permet  des  interprEtations 
plus  ou  moins  rigoureuses,  selon  que  le  PrEposE  est  plus  ou  moins  avide  ; 
&  qu'il  est  notoire  que  tous  ces  droits  ont  eu  sous  un  Fermier  une  ex¬ 
tension  qu’ils  n’avoient  pas  eu  sous  les  autres :  d’ou  il  rEsulte  Evidem- 
ment  que  ce  Fermier  est  le  lEgislateur  souverain  dans  les  matieres  qui 
sont  l’objet  de  son  intEret  personnel;  abus  intolErable,  &  qui  ne  se 
seroit  jamais  introduit,  si  ces  droits  Etoient  sounds  a  un  tribunal,  quel 
qu’il  fut ;  car  quand  on  s?ait  qu’on  aura  des  Juges,  il  faut  bien  avoir  des 
loix  fixes  &  certaines. 

[25]  VOTRE  MAJESTE  sgaura  que  dans  les  derniers  temps  ces  ex¬ 
tensions  ont  EtE  portEes  a  des  exces  inconnus  jusqu’alors ;  que  le 
Fermier  ne  se  contente  plus  d’etre  instruit  des  secrets  des  families 
consignEs  dans  les  actes  qui  se  passent  journellement,  mais  qu’il  re¬ 
cherche  tout  ce  qui  s’est  passE  depuis  vingt  ans,  sous  prEtexte  que  les 
droits  n’ont  pas  EtE  exigEs  avec  assez  de  rigueur,  pendant  que  le  parti- 
culier  sur  lequel  il  auroit  EtE  ExercE  une  concussion,  n’auroit  pas  deux 
ans  pour  rEclamer. 

[26]  Vous  sqaurez,  SIRE,  que  les  vexations  de  ce  genre  ont  EtE 
portEes  a  un  tel  exces,  que  pour  s’y  soustraire  les  particuliers  sont 
rEduits  a  faire  des  actes  sous  signature  privEe  plutot  que  pardevant 


IO 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


Notaires;  &  que  dans  les  cas  ou  il  est  indispensable  de  contracter  en 
forme  authentique,  on  exige  souvent  des  rddacteurs  d’alterer  les  actes 
par  des  clauses  obscures  ou  equivoques,  qui  donnent  ensuite  lieu  a  des 
discussions  interminables  :  en  sorte  qu’un  impot  £tabli  sous  le  sp£cieux 
pr^texte  d’augmenter  l’authenticite  des  actes,  &  de  pr£venir  les  proces, 
force  au  contraire  vos  subjets  a  renoncer  souvent  aux  actes  publics,  &. 
les  entralne  dans  des  proces  qui  sont  la  ruine  de  toutes  les  families. 

[27]  Quant  au  droit  de  franc-fief,  qui  est  aussi  nomm£  droit 
domanial,  c’est  une  finance  qui  s’exige  des  roturiers  ou  non-nobles  pour 
les  fiefs  qu’ils  poss^dent;  &  ce  droit  a  £t£  sounds  aussi  a  la  justice 
arbitraire.  Ce  droit  est  une  annee  de  revenu  qu’on  fait  payer  tous  les 
vingt  ans  pour  jouir  tranquillement  dans  les  dix-neuf  autres  ann^es. 
Mais  quand  il  y  a  mutation  pendant  les  vingt  ans,  on  fait  payer  le  droit 
entier  au  nouvel  acquereur,  sans  accorder  a  l’ancien  indemnity  pour 
les  ann£es  pendant  lesquelles  il  devait  jouir;  usage  qui  est  peut-etre 
aujourd’hui  consacr£  par  quelque  Reglement,  mais  qui  certainement 
a  £t£  dans  l’origine  une  concussion.  VOTRE  MAJESTE  s^aura  aussi 
qu’on  a  ajoute  huit  sous  pour  livre  a  un  droit  qui  est  de  la  totality  du 
revenu;  qu’on  fait  devaluation  des  biens  sans  deduction  des  frais,  & 
bien  d’autres  injustices  de  detail.  Mais  ce  qui  £tonnera  le  plus  VOTRE 
MAJESTE,  sera  d’apprendre  que,  sous  pretexte  du  paiement  de  ce 
droit,  le  Fermier-Gen£ral  fait  juger  aujourd’hui  par  la  Justice  arbitraire 
la  question  d’etat  la  plus  int^ressante,  celle  de  la  noblesse. 

[28]  On  a  attribue  aux  Intendans  la  connoissance  des  contestations 
sur  les  franc-fiefs,  comme  sur  le  cor.trole  &  autres  droits  semblables; 
c’est-a-dire,  qu’on  a  voulu  les  constituer  Juges  de  l’execution  de  la  Loi 
bursale,  de  la  quotit£  du  droit  pour  le  franc-fief;  &  a  present  quand 
le  particulier  soutient  qu’il  n’en  doit  aucun,  parce  qu’il  est  noble,  & 
qu’il  plait  au  Fermier  de  contester  sa  noblesse,  on  veut  que  cette 
contestation  soit  portee  au  merne  tribunal:  en  sorte  que  le  Gentil- 
homme  depend  du  jugement  d’un  seul  homme  pour  jouir  de  l’^tat  qui 
lui  a  £t£  transmis  par  ses  ancetres.  Il  est  aise  de  concevoir  jusqu’ou 
ont  du  etre  port^s  les  abus  d’une  telle  Justice,  &  VOTRE  MAJESTE 
en  sera  plus  convaincue  par  des  faits  que  la  notori£t£  publique  pourra 
lui  apprendre. 

[29]  Elle  s<;aura,  par  example,  qu’en  1723  le  feu  Roi  avoit  exig£  de 
tous  ceux  qui  avoient  et£  anoblis  sous  le  regne  pr£c£dent,  un  droit  de 
confirmation  a  cause  de  son  av^nement  a  la  Couronne ;  mais  que  la 
Loi  n’avoit  point  prononc£  la  peine  de  d£ch£ance  contre  ceux  par  qui 


Severity  of  penalties. 


i  i 

ce  droit  n’auroit  pas  EtE  payE  ;  que  cette  dEchEance  a  depuis  EtE  pro- 
noncEe  par  des  Arrets  du  Conseil  non  revetus  de  Lettres-patentes ; 
comme  si  on  pouvoit  etre  condamnE  a  perdre  son  Etat  d’apres  des  Arrets 
qui  n’ont  point  le  caractere  de  Loix  enregistrEes ;  qu’enfin  ces  Arrets, 
dont  le  dernier  est  de  1’annEe  1730,  avoient  toujours  EtE  rEputEs  pure- 
ment  comminatoires,  &  que  les  Fermiers-GEnEraux  eux-memes  avoient 
avouE  publiquement  qu’ils  n’avoient  jamais  EtE  exEcutEs.  En  effet, 
1’exEcution  en  paroissoit  impossible,  parce  qu’il  rEpugne  a  tous  les  prin- 
cipes  de  punir  la  faute  de  n’avoir  pas  payE  une  taxe  par  la  dEchEance 
de  la  noblesse,  peine  infamante  a  laquelle  on  ne  condamne  jamais  que 
ceux  qui  sont  convaincus  de  crimes  capitaux  ;  &  qu’il  est  encore  moins 
possible  de  faire  tomber  cette  peine  sur  les  enfans  de  celui  qui  n’a  pas 
payE,  de  declarer  dEchus  de  la  noblesse  des  citoyens  qui  l’ont  re^ue 
avec  la  naissance,  &  ont  toujours  vEcu  conformEment  a  cet  Etat,  parce 
que  leur  pere  a  nEgligE  autrefois  de  satisfaire  une  Loi  bursale  dont  il 
n’a  peut-etre  pas  eu  connoissance. 

[30]  Ce  sont  la  de  ces  rigueurs  auxquelles  tout  le  monde  se  refuse  : 
la  justice  ainsi  que  1’humanitE  ne  permettent  jamais  1’ execution  litterale 
de  semblables  Loix  ;  &  voila  pourquoi  cet  Arret  du  Conseil  de  1730,  & 
tant  d’autres  Loix  du  meme  genre,  sont  restEs  sans  effet.  Mais  telle 
est,  SIRE,  la  nature  du  pouvoir  arbitrage,  que  la  justice  &  l’humanit6 
elle-meme  perdent  tous  leurs  droils  quand  un  seul  homme  est  sourd  a 
leur  voix.  II  s’est  trouv£  un  Fermier  qui  a  voulu  faire  revivre  cet. Arret 
de  1730,  oubli£  depuis  qu’il  existe,  &  un  Ministre  qui  lui  a  abandonn£ 
toutes  les  families  qui  n’avoient  pas  pay£  le  droit  de  confirmation. 
Ainsi  celui  dont  le  pere  ou  l’aieul  ont  obtenu  l’anoblissement  le  plus 
glorieux  pour  prix  de  leur  sang  &  de  leurs  services,  &  qui  ayant,  a  leur 
exemple,  pass£  sa  vie  dans  la  dispendieuse  profession  des  armes,  ne 
s’est  pas  trouv£  en  £tat  de  payer  la  taxe,  pourra  aujourd’hui  etre  d£chu 
des  droits  de  la  noblesse,  parce  qu’il  en  a  rempli  les  devoirs;  &  sa 
famille  sera  rel£gu£e  par  1’impitoyable  Financier,  dans  la  classe  des 
roturiers;  tandis  que  peut-etre  ce  Financier  lui-meme,  anobli  par  une 
charge  v£nale,  jouira  des  riiemes  privileges  que  la  plus  haute  noblesse. 

[31]  VOTRE  MAJEST&  voit,  par  cet  exemple,  jusqu’a  quel  point 
un  Ministere  dur  a  pu  abuser  des  Evocations  autrefois  trop  lEgErement 
accordEes,  &  Elle  croira  aisEment  qu’on  ne  s’en  est  pas  tenu  a  abuser 
des  anciennes,  &  que,  sur-tout  pendant  l’absence  de  la  Magistrature,  on 
a  profitE  des  malheurs  publics  pour  soumettre  de  nouveaux  genres 
d’affaires  au  pouvoir  arbitraire,  sans  craindre  aucunes  rEclamations. 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


I  2 


[32]  Nous  donnerons  pour  exeniple  les  visites  domiciliaires  qui  se 
font  pour  la  recherche  du  tabac  de  contrebande.  Le  prix  excessif 
qu’on  a  mis  au  tabac,  a  donnE,  depuis  quelques  annEes,  un  tel  attrait  a 
la  fraude,  que  pour  l’empecher  on  a  employE  des  moyens  qui  tous  les 
jours  deviennent  plus  violens,  &  cependant  sont  toujours  inutiles.  Les 
Fermiers-GEnEiaux  ont  obtenu  de  ces  Loix  qui  exciteroient  une  guerre 
intestine  dans  le  Royaume,  si  on  vouloit  les  faire  exEcuter  littEralement. 
Leurs  Commis  sont  autorisEs  a  faire  les  visites  les  plus  sEveres  dans 
toutes  les  maisons  indistinctement  &  sans  aucune  exception,  sans  respect 
pour  le  rang,  pour  la  naissance,  pour  les  dignitEs.  De  semblables 
Loix  avoient  dEja  EtE  obtenues  par  les  Fermiers  en  diffErens  temps,  & 
pour  diffErens  objets ;  mais  il  existoit  toujours  un  fiein  contre  l’exces 
de  l’abus ;  c’est  celui  de  la  Justice  rEglEe,  qui  peut  sEvir  contre  le 
Commis  qui  abuse  du  droit  que  lui  a  donnE  la  Loi.  Aujourd’hui  ce 
frein  n’existe  plus;  le  dernier  Ministere  a  saisi  le  moment  de  l’absence 
de  la  Cour  des  Aides  pour  enlever  ce  genre  d’affaires  a  la  Justice  rE¬ 
glEe,  &  l’attribuer  a  des  Commissaires  du  Conseil. 

[33]  II  est,  SIRE,  bien  d’autres  Evocations  semblables:  on  pourroit 
citer  celle  des  droits  sur  les  cartes,  celle  des  droits  de  la  caisse  de 
Poissy,  &  tant  d’autres.  Nous  n’avons  voulu  en  donner  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  que  quelques  exemples  ;  le  reste  est  rEservE  pour  les  mE- 
moires  particuliers.  Quand  la  totalitE  aura  EtE  mise  sous  les  yeux  de 
VOTRE  MAJESTE  &  de  ses  Ministres,  nous  espErons,  SIRE,  qu’eux- 
memes  reconnoitaont  la  nEcessitE  de  ne  les  pas  laisser  subsister. 

[34]  II  semble  cependant  que  le  Fermier-GEnEral  auroit  pu  se  dis¬ 
penser  d’employer  tant  de  moyens  illEgaux  pour  se  soustraire  a  la 
Justice  rEglEe,  quand  on  considere  les  moyens  lEgaux  qui  lui  ont  EtE 
aussi  donnEs  pour  rEussir  contre  ses  adversaires,  dans  quelque  Justice 
que  ce  soit.  Ces  moyens  sont  tels  qu’il  n’est  plus  permis  aux  Juges  de 
chercher  ou  est  la  vEritE  ni  ou  est  la  justice,  &  qu’ils  sont  presque 
toujours  forcEs  de  juger  d’apres  des  pieces  qui,  aux  yeux  de  la  raison 
seroient  lEgitimement  suspectes. 

[35]  C’est  ce  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  va  voir  clairement,  quand 
nous  lui  aurons  exposE  par  quelle  voie  le  Fermier  dEcouvre  &  constate 
les  fraudes  ;  car  c’est  a  la  dEcouverte  de  la  fraude  que  tendent  presque 
tous  ses  proces.  Nous  allons  etre  obligEs,  SIRE,  de  vous  entretenir 
du  dEtail  fastidieux  d’une  guerre  continuelle  qui  se  fait  entre  les  deux 
especes  d’hommes  les  plus  mEprisables,  d’une  part,  des  contrebandiers, 
&  de  l’autre,  des  espions :  mais  comrne  s’est  le  peuple  innocent  qui 


SMUGGLING. 


*3 


eni  souffre,  &  que  ce  tableau  peut  faire  impression  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY, 
nous  ne  croyons  pas  devoir  le  lui  epargner. 

[36]  Les  moyens  de  decouvrir  la  fraude  se  reduisent  aux  proces- 
verbaux  des  Commis,  &  a  la  delation.  Quant  aux  proces-verbaux  des 
Commis,  voici  ce  que  la  Loi  a  etabli.  Le  Fermier-Gen^ral  a  droit 
d’exercer,  par  le  ministere  de  ses  Commis,  &  avec  quelques  formalites 
de  Justice,  les  plus  rigoureuses  recherches  dans  les  chemins,  &  souvent 
jusques  dans  les  maisons  des  particuliers.  Si  dans  ces  visites  les 
Commis  croient  avoir  trouv£  une  fraude,  ils  en  dressent  proces-verbal ; 
&  sur  ce  proces-verbal,  sign£  de  deux  Commis,  les  faits  sont  regaid^s 
comme  constants,  &  la  fraude  comme  prouv£e. 

[37]  Si  le  particular  accuse  de  fraude  par  le  proces-verbal,  pretend 
que  les  Commis  sont  calomniateurs,  il  ne  peut  le  soutenir  en  Justice 
qu’en  s’inscrivant  en  faux;  &  il  est  n£cessaire  d’expliquer  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTY  ce  que  c’est  qu’une  inscription  de  faux.  II  ne  suffit  pas  a 
l’accus^  de  pr£tendre  que  les  faits  all£gu£s  contre  lui  sont  denies  de 
preuves ;  il  faut  qu’il  prouve  directement  le  contraire.  Or  cette  preuves 
par  sa  nature,  est  le  plus  souvent  impossible.  Comment  prouver  un 
fait  n£gatif?  Comment  prouver  aux  Commis  la  faussete  des  faits  par 
eux  altegu£s,  quand  tout  s’est  passe  dans  l’interieur  d’une  maison,  sans 
autres  temoins  que  Taccuse  &  les  Commis  eux-memes? 

[38]  De  plus,  les  formalins  prescrites  pour  1’inscription  de  faux  sont 
d’un  detail  infini,  &  Tomission  d’une  seule  prive  l’accuse  de  sa  juste 
defense.  De  plus,  il  faut,  pour  etre  admis  a  s’inscrire  en  faux,  con¬ 
signer  une  amende  que  la  plupart  des  gens  du  peuple  sont  hors  d’etat 
de  payer.  De  plus,  on  ne  leur  donne  qu’un  temps  tres-court  pour  se 
determiner,  c’est-a-dire,  pour  consuller  des  gens  de  Loi,  pour  chercher 
des  preuves  juridiques,  pour  empiunter  l’argent  n£cessaire  pour  la 
consignation.  Il  est  done  vrai,  il  est  evident,  il  est  reconnu  qu’un 
horn  me  du  peuple  n’a  aucun  moyen  possible  pour  se  pouivoir  contre 
ces  proces-verbaux  signes  de  deux  Commis. 

[39]  Or  on  a  souvent  vu  qu’un  de  ces  Commis  ne  s^avoit  ni  lire  ni 
ecrire ;  on  lui  avoit  seulement  appris  a  former  les  caracteres  de  son 
nom.  Les  Fermiers-Generaux  ont  soin  d’en  avoir  un  par  brigade  qui 
spache  ecrire:  c’est  celui-la  qui  redige  le  proces-veibal ;  un  de  ses 
camarades  le  signe,  &  il  ne  leur  paroissoit  pas  necessaire  que  celui-la 
sput  ce  qu’on  lui  donnoit  a  signer.  Votre  Cour  des  Aides,  informee 
de  cet  abus,  quelques  temps  avant  la  dispersion  de  la  Magistrature, 
rendit  un  Arret  de  Reglement  qui  defendit  aux  Commis  qui  ne 


14 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


Sfavoient  pas  lire,  de  signer  des  proces-verbaux.  Les  Fermiers- 
G^neraux  oserent  s’en  plaindre,  comme  d’un  Reglement  qui  rendoit 
leur  regie  impossible ;  &  nous  croyons,  SIRE,  que  pendant  l’absence 
de  la  Cour  des  Aides  cet  Arret  a  ete  mal  execute. 

[40]  Mais  il  est  un  autre  abus  auquel  la  Cour  des  Aides  ne  peut  pas 
rem£dier  par  son  autorite,  parce  qu’il  consiste  dans  une  convention 
secrete  entre  le  Fermier  &  ses  Commis;  convention  express£ment  d£- 
f endue  par  les  Ordonnances,  mais  dont  on  ne  peut  jamais  avoir  de 
preuves  juridiques.  II  est  notoire  que,  malgre  la  defense  de  la  Loi,  le 
Fermier  promet  a  ses  Commis  une  part  dans  les  amendes  auxquelles  ils 
font  condamner  les  particuliers  par  leurs  proces-verbaux,  &  que  c’est  la 
une  partie  de  leur  solde.  Ainsi  la  fraude  est  reput£e  prouv^e  contre 
un  citoyen  par  la  seule  affirmation  de  deux  hommes  qui,  non-seulement 
sont  aux  gages  du  Fermier-G£n£ral  son  adversaire,  mais  attendent  un 
salaire  proportionne  a  la  somme  a.laquelle  ce  citoyen  sera  condamne. 

[41]  Telle  est  la  voie  juridique  pour  constater  la  fraude  par  les 
proces-verbaux.  Mais  il  falloit  aussi  aux  Fermiers  des  moyens  pour 
decouvrir  oil  elle  peut  etre,  &  pour  diriger  les  demarches  de  leurs 
Commis.  C’est  pour  y  parvenir  qu’on  a  voulu  qu’il  put  se  trouver  dans 
chaque  societe  de  marchands,  dans  chaque  maison,  dans  chaque  famille 
un  deiateur  qui  avertit  le  Financier  qu’en  tel  lieu  &  en  telle  occasion 
il  y  aura  une  prise  a  faire.  Ce  deiateur  ne  se  montre  point;  mais  les 
Commis,  avertis  par  lui,  vont  surprendre  celui  qui  a  ete  denonce,  & 
acquierent  la  preuve,  ou  plutot  se  la  fabriquent  eux-memes  par  leur 
proces-verbal.  Quand  un  avis  a  r£ussi,  il  est  donne  une  recompense 
au  denonciateur,  c’est-a-dire  a  un  complice,  a  un  associe,  a  un  com¬ 
mensal,  a  la  femme  qui  a  denonce  son  mari,  au  fils  qui  a  denonce  son 
pere. 

[42]  Daignez,  SIRE,  reflechir  un  instant  sur  ce  tableau  de  la  regie 
des  Fermes.  Par  la  foi  accordee  aux  proces-verbaux,  le  prix  est  con- 
tinuellement  mis  au  parjure ;  par  les  delations,  c’est  a  la  trahison 
doinestique  qu’on  promet  recompense.  Tels  sont  les  moyens  par  lesquels 
plus  de  cent  cinquante  millions  arrivent  tous  les  ans  dans  les  coffres  de 
VOTRE  MAJESTY. 

[43]  Ce  n’est  point  a  nous,  SIRE,  de  vous  indiquer  d'autres  impots 
qui  puissent  remplacer  ce  produit  immense  ;  ce  n’est  pas  meme  a  nous 
a  examiner  si  les  seules  ressources  de  l’economie  pourroient  y  suppieer. 
Il  est  cependant  necessaire  de  venir  au  secours  d’un  peuple  opprime 
par  cette  monstrueuse  regie ;  &  s’il  est  vrai  que  l’economie  seule  ne 


TYRANNY  OF  THE  OFFICIALS  OF  THE  FARM.  1 5 

suffise  pas  pour  que  VOTRE  MAJESTfi  puisse  renoncer  au  produit 
entier  de  ses  Fermes,  il  est  au  moins  bien  des.  adoucissemens  qu’on 
pourroit  apporter  aux  rualheurs  publics,  si  la  diminution  des  ddpenses 
permettoit  le  sacrifice  d’une  portion  des  revenus.  Voila  pourquoi 
nous  avons  dfi  mettre  sous  vos  yeux  le  terrible,  spectacle  du  plus  beau 
Royaume  de  l’univers,  g^missant  sous  une  tyrannie  qui  fait  tous  les 
jours  de  nouveaux  progres. 

[44]  On  loue,  SIRE,  &  on  implore  en  meme  temps  votre  bien- 
faissance  ;  mais  nous,  d£fenseurs  du  peuple,  c’est  votre  justice  que  nous 
devons  invoquer ;  &  nous  s<;avons  que  presque  tous  les  sentimens  dont 
l’ame  d’un  Roi  est  susceptible,  l’amour  de  la  gloire,  celui  des  plaisirs, 
l’amiti£  meme,  le  desir  si  naturel  a  un  grand  Prince,  de  rendre  heureux 
ceux  qui  approchent  de  lui,  sont  des  obstacles  perp£tuels  a  la  justice 
rigoureuse  qu’il  doit  a  ses  peuples,  parce  que  ce  n’est  qu’aux  depens 
du  peuple  qu’un  Roi  est  vainqueur  de  ses  ennemis,  magnifique  dans  sa 
Cour,  &  bienfaisant  envers  ceux  qui  1’environnent. 

[45]  Et  si  la  France,  &  peut-etre  l’Europe  entiere  est  accabl^e  sous 
le  poids  des  impots;  si  la  rivalit£  des  Puissances  les  a  entrain£es  a 
l’envi  dans  des  d£penses  6normes,  qui  ont  rendu  ces  impots  n£cessaires ; 
&  si  ces  d^penses  sont  encore  doubles  par  une  dette  nationale  im¬ 
mense,  contracts  sous  d’autres  regnes ;  il  faut  que  VOTRE  MAJESTY 
se  souvienne  que  vos  ancetres  ont  £t£  couverts  de  gloire,  mais  que  cette 
gloire  est  encore  pay£e  par  les  generations  presentes ;  qu’ils  captiverent 
les  coeurs  par  leur  liberalite,  qu'ils  etonnerent  l’Europe  par  leur 
magnificence,  mais  que’cette  magnificence  &  cette  liberalite  ont  fait 
creer  les  impots  &  les  dettes  qui  existent  encore  aujourd’hui. 

[46]  Il  faut  aussi  que  VOTRE  MAJEST&  se  rappelle  sans  cesse  que 
le  vertueux  Louis  XII,  malgre  sa  passion  pour  la  guerre,  ne  se  crut 
jamais  permis  d’employer  les  moyens  qui  auroient  ete  onereux  a  ses 
sujets ;  &  que  malgre  la  bonte  qui  etoit  sa  vertu  caracteristique,  il  eut 
le  courage  de  s’exposer  aux  reproches  d’avarice  de  la  part  de  ses  cour- 
tisans,  parce  qu’il  s^avoit  que  si  l’economie  d’un  Roi  peut  etre  censuree 
par  quelques  hommes  frivoles  ou  avides,  sa  prodigality  fait  couler  les 
larmes  d’une  nation  entiere. 

[47]  Cette  grande  verite,  SIRE,  est  aujourd’hui  reconnue  de  toutes 
les  nations,  a  qui  l’experience  de  bien  des  siecles  a  appris  a  ne  de- 
mander  a  leurs  Rois  que  les  vertus  qui  feront  le  bonheur  des  hommes ; 
&  si,  a  votre  av£nement,  toute  la  France  a  fait  £clater,  par  ses  acclama¬ 
tions,  son  amour  pour  le  sang  de  ses  Maitres,  la  s6v£rit£  de  notre  mi- 


i6 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


nistere,  SIRE,  nous  oblige  de  vous  avouer  qu’une  partie  de  ces  trans¬ 
ports  £toit  aussi  due  a  l’opinion  qu’on  a  conque  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE 
des  ses  plus  tendres  ann£es,  &  a  1’esp^rance  qu'une  sage  Economic 
feroit  bientot  diminuer  les  charges  publiques. 

[48]  Cependant,  SIRE,  tandis  que  cette  Economic  vous  est  de¬ 
mands  par  les  vceux  universels  de  toute  la  nation,  ceux  qui  ne  font 
consister  la  grandeur  souveraine  que  dans  le  faste,  sont  toujours  ceux 
qui  approchent  le  plus  pres  du  trone ;  &  pendant  que  le  miserable  a 
qui  la  duret£  des  impots  arrache  la  subsistance,  est  £loigne  de  vos  re¬ 
gards,  les  objets  de  votre  bienfaisance  &  de  votre  magnificence  sont 
continuellement  sous  vos  yeux.  II  a  done  fallu  leur  opposer  le  tableau 
effrayant,  mais  non  exagere,  de  la  situation  des  peuples.  Puisse-t-il 
vous  etre  toujours  present,  SIRE  !  S’il  l’eut  £t£  aux  Rois  vos  pr£d£- 
cesseurs,  VOTRE  MAJESTE  pourroit  suivre  aujourd’hui  les  sentimens 
de  son  coeur;  &  quand  on  lui  fait  connoitre  que  l’humanit£  r^pugne  a 
la  rigueur  des  Loix  bursales  £tablies  dans  son  Royaume,  Elle  ne  balan- 
ceroit  pas  a  les  revoquer,  &  ne  seroit  pas  arret^e  par  cette  n£cessite 
de  payer  les  dettes  de  1  Etat,  qui  fait  sans  cesse  obstacle  a  la  reforma¬ 
tion  des  abus  les  plus  odieux. 

[49]  Au  reste,  SIRE,  sans  entreprendre  de  proposer  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  cette  reformation  generale  des  droits  des  Fermes,  il  pourra 
vous  etre  presente  sur  plusieurs  parties  des  memoires  particulars,  qui 
seront  discutes  avec  vos  Ministres  :  car  il  n’est  pas  possible  que  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  entre  elle-meme  dans  le  detail  de  tout  ce  qui  a  ete  invente 
par  les  Fermiers-Generaux  pour  faire  payer  les  droits,  &  par  les  fraudeurs 
pour  s’y  soustraire.  Mais  ce  que  nous  pouvons  demander  a  present  a 
VOTRE  MAJESTE  elle-meme,  e’est  de  faire  examiner  les  extensions 
de  tous  les  droits  faites  sous  le  dernier  Ministere,  &  les  evocations  ac- 
cordees  avec  une  profusion  dont  il  n’y  avoit  pas  d'exemple. 

[50]  Vous  nous  avez  ordonne,  SIRE,  de  nous  soumettre  sans  exa- 
men  a  tout  ce  qui  a  re?u  le  caractere  de  Loi  pendant  que  nous  etions 
eioignes  de  nos  fonctions,  &  une  force  majeure  nous  a  empeches  de 
veiller  aux  droits  &  aux  interets  du  peuple  :  il  est  done  necessaire  que 
VOTRE  MAJESTE  elle-meme  daigne  en  prendre  le  soin  ;  &  dans 
l’examen  qu’Elle  fera  faire,  nous  la  supplions  de  faire  distinguer  avec 
grande  attention  ce  qui  est  r^ellement  utile  a  la  perception,  de  ce  qui 
n’a  £t£  introduit  que  par  la  complaisance  aveugle  du  Ministere  pour 
les  Financiers,  &  pour  satisfaire  leur  despotisme.  Il  est  juste  sur-tout 
que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  fasse  retrancher  de  ces  nouvelles  loix  tout  ce 


REFORMATION  OF  THE  TAXATION  REQUESTED.  1 7 

qui  £tablit  une  justice  arbitraire.  Nous  convenons  que  puisqu’il  faut 
percevoir  des  droits  excessifs,  il  faut  etre  soumis  a  des  loix  rigoureuses ; 
mais  au  moins  faut-il  que  ce  soient  des  loix  precises  :  car  aucun  motif, 
aucune  consideration,  aucun  int^ret  ne  peut  autoriser  VOTRE  MAJEST& 
a  faire  ddpendre  le  sort  du  peuple  de  l’avidite  du  Fermier,  ou  du  caprice 
de  l’Administrateur. 

[51]  Enfin,  SIRE,  quoique  notre  fonction  ne  soit  point  de  vous 
dormer  des  projets,  &  que  nous  devions  £viter  sur-tout  de  nous  livrer  a 
des  systemes  incertains,  il  est  cependant  une  verity  si  importante,  si 
evidente,  &  tellement  faite  pour  etre  sentie  par  VOTRE  MAJESTfc 
elle-meme,  que  nous  nous  croyons  obliges  de  la  mettre  sous  vos  yeux ; 
c’est  qu’il  y  auroit  un  avantage  certain  pour  VOTRE  MAJESTY,  & 
immense  pour  le  peuple,  a  simplifier  les  droits  qui  existent,  &  les  loix 
qui  en  assurent  la  perception. 

[52]  Nous  avons  d£ja  observe  que  la  procedure  £tablie  pour  les 
Fermes  est  un  code  effrayanl  par  son  immensity  :  or  il  n’est  aucun 
homme  verse,  soit  dans  la  Jurisprudence,  soit  dans  l’administration, 
qui  n’atteste  qu’il  n’y  a  de  bonnes  loix  que  dans  les  loix  simples.  Si  on 
considere  les  droits  dont  la  perception  a  donn£  lieu  a  ce  code,  on  verra 
que  ces  droits  mis  sur  chaque  denr^e,  sont  difiterens,  suivant  le  genre 
de  commerce  qui  s’en  fait,  suivant  les  lieux  oil  ils  se  pergoivent,  suivant 
la  quality  des  personnes.  La  fraude,  toujours  active  &  toujours  in- 
dustrieuse,  en  profite,  &  se  fait  jour,  pour  ainsi  dire,  a  travers  les 
sinuosit^s  de  la  loi.  La  Finance  invente  tous  les  jours  de  nouveaux 
moyens  pour  la  poursuivre  ;  &  ces  moyens  employes  contre  les  fraudeurs 
genent  tous  les  citoyens  dans  la  propti^te  de  leurs  biens,  &  dans  la 
liberty  de  leurs  personnes. 

[53]  C’est  ce  qui  a  fait  multiplier  a  l’infini  ces  Commis,  qui  portent 
une  curiosity  si  importune  sur  toutes  les  actions  de  la  vie ;  c’est  ce 
qui  a  fait  accorder  aux  Financiers  le  droit  de  visiter  les  marchandises, 
d’entrer  jusques  dans  les  maisons,  de  violer  le  secret  des  families ;  c’est 
aussi  cette  in£galit£  des  droits  pergus  dans  les  differens  pays,  qui  a  obli¬ 
ge  les  <Rois  vos  pred£cesseurs  a  couper  leur  Royaume  dans  tous  les 
sens,  par  des  lignes  qu’il  faut  faire  garder  comme  autant  de  frontieres, 
par  une  arm£e  innombrable  de  Commis. 

[54]  Voila,  SIRE,  a  quoi  on  rem^dieroit  en  simplifiant  les  droits: 
les  Fermiers  de  VOTRE  MAJEST&  y  gagneroient  une  grande  partie 
des  frais  de  r£gie,  &  la  contrebande  deviendroit  aussi  plus  difficile  ;  car 
rien  ne  la  favorise  autant  que  la  complications  des  droits  &  l’obscurit£ 


i8 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


des  r£glemens ;  &  le  peuple  en  retireroit  l’avantage  d’etre  moins  tour- 
mente  par  les  recherches  des  Employes  de  la  Ferme;  recherches  qui 
ne  sont  nulle  part  plus  incommodes  que  dans  les  pays  que  Ton  regarde 
comme  sujets  a  la  fraude,  &  nomm^ment  dans  les  limites  de  ce  qu’on 
appelle  le  pays  des  cinq  grosses  Fermes,  le  pays  d’Aides,  le  pays  de 
grandes  Gabelles,  &c. 

[55]  Cependant,  SIRE,  nous  ne  pretendons  pas  dire  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  que  cette  simplification  soit  un  ouvrage  facile.  On  voit 
avec  evidence,  dans  la  speculation,  qu’elle  est  possible,  &  qu’elle  sera 
tr£s-utile  a  l’Etat ;  mais  pour  y  proceder,  il  faut  connoitre  dans  le  plus 
grand  detail,  non-seulement  le  produit  de  chaque  droit  dans  chaque 
territoire,  mais  la  vraie  source  de  ce  produit,  &  pr^voir  avec  justesse 
quelle  augmentation  ou  quelle  diminution  chaque  changement  ap- 
portera  dans  le  recouvrement.  Ce  n’est  pas  seulement  le  produit 
actuel  qu’il  faut  connoitre,  mais  le  produit  possible.  II  faut  calculer 
non-seulement  les  int^rets  de  la  Ferme,  mais  ceux  du  cultivateur,  du 
fabricateur,  du  commerqant  &  du  consommateur  de  chaque  denr£e. 
Nous  osons  cependant  assurer  VOTRE  MAJESTE  que  ce  travail  peut 
se  faire,  malgre  toutes  ces  difficultes.  II  existe  certainement  des 
materiaux  immenses  &  dans  les  registres  de  la  Ferme-g^nerale,  &  dans 
les  bureaux  des  Ministres  &  des  Intendans  des  Finances,  &  meme  chez 
beaucoup  de  Commerqans ;  il  n’est  question  que  de  determiner  par  qui 
&  comment  ils  seront  employes. 

[56]  Sera-ce  les  Fermiers-Generaux  eux-memes  qu’on  chargera  de 
ce  travail?  C’est  ce  qu’on  a  voulu  faire  plus  d’une  fois,  SIRE.  C’est 
a  eux  qu’on  a  demande  des  projets ;  mais  nous  devons  avertir  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  qu’en  meme  temps  que  la  simplification  des  droits  est 
avantageuse  a  la  Ferme,  les  plus  habiles  Fermiers  ont  en  cela  un  interet 
personnel  contraire  a  celui  de  la  Ferme,  parce  que  la  science  qu’on 
iendra  inutile,  est  celle  qu’ils  ont  acquise  avec  de  grands  travaux,  & 
que  par  cette  science  profonde,  &  la  complication  de  la  machine  qu’ils 
font  mouvoir,  ils  se  sont  rendus  n^cessaires  au  Gouvernement,  &  font 
tous  les  jours  la  Ioi  aux  Ministres.  D’ailleurs  peut-on  douter  que  les 
Financiers,  edges  en  legislateurs,  n’ajoutent  a  la  rigueur  des  droits  tout 
ce  qui  servira  a  cimenter  ce  despotisme  intolerable,  &  inutile  au  service 
de  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  auquel  ils  ont  deja  asservi  la  nation? 

[57]  Il  faut  certainement  consulter  les  Fermiers-Generaux;  & 
malgre  l’observation  que  nous  venons  de  faire  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE, 
on  en  a  deja  vu  qui  ont  montre  assez  d’amour  pour  le  bien  public,  pour 


REFORMATION  OF  THE  TAXATION  REQUESTED. 


!9 


y  sacrifier  tous  les  interets  &  tous  les  pr£jug£s  de  leur  £tat :  &  cepen- 
dant,  en  les  consultant,  il  ne  faut  jamais  oublier  en  quoi  leur  inteiet  est 
contraire  a  celui  du  peuple  &  a  celui  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE. 

[58]  Vous  avez  beaucoup,  SIRE,  a  attendre,  dans  ce  tiavail,  du  zele 
&  des  lumieres  des  Magistiats  charges  de  l’administration  de  vos 
Finances ;  nous  croyons  merae  qu’il  est  important  qu’il  soit  fait  sous 
leur  direction.  Mais  sera-ce  par  eux-memes?  Un  travail  si  etendu 
peut-il  etre  fait  par  un  seul  homme?  Et  cet  homrne  peut-il  etre  celui 
dont  le  temps  est  d£ja  consomm^  par  le  courant  des  affaires  jouma- 
lieres  de  son  administration?  Ils  emploieront  sans  doute  des  coop^ra- 
teurs  :  mais  si  c’est  un  bureau  attach^  a  la  seule  personne  du  Magistrat, 
on  tombera  toujours  dans  les  inconv^niens  d£ja  si  souvent  £prouv£s, 
d’etre  dans  la  d^pendance  d’un  seul  homme,  d’avoir  ce  seul  homme 
pour  d£fenseur  du  peuple  contre  tous  les  efforts  r^unis  de  toute  la 
Finance  ;  a  quoi  il  faut  ajouter  que  sa  mort  entrainera  un  jour  la  perte 
de  toutes  les  connoissances  acquises  &  de  tous  les  travaux  faits  dans  la 
partie  de  l’administration  qu’il  seroit  peut-etre  le  plus  n£cessaire 
d’^clairer. 

[59]  Il  seroit  juste,  SIRE,  que  tous  les  details  de  la  regie  des  Fermes 
fussent  connus  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  pour  qui  les  droits  sont  per^us, 
&  du  peuple  qui  les  paie ;  &  que  quand  ce  peuple  vous  adresse  ses 
plaintes,  quand  il  demande  du  soulagement  aux  malheurs  qu’il  £prouve. 
le  remede  put  vous  en  etre  indiqu£,  &  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  pfit  en 
juger  par  elle-meme.  Puisque  cela  est  impossible  dans  l’£tat  actuel  de 
la  complication  des  Loix,  il  faut  certainement  travailler  a  les  simplifier  : 
mais  jusqu’a  ce  que  ce  travail  soit  achev£,  jusqu’a  ce  que  ce  nouveau 
corps  de  Loix  soit  donn£  a  la  France,  n’est-il  aucun  frein  qu’on  puisse 
mettre  a  ce  despotisme  des  Fermiers,  fond£  sur  l’ignorance  ou  est  tout 
le  public  des  Loix  &  de  leur  r£gie?  Il  en  est  un,  SIRE;  &  vous 
pouvez  ordonner  des  a  present  aux  Fermiers-G^n^raux  de  faire  publier 
des  tarifs  exacts  &  circonstancies  des  droits  qu’ils  ont  a  percevoir,  & 
une  collection  courte,  claire  &  m£thodique  des  r^glemens  qu’il  faut  ob¬ 
server,  &  qu’il  importe  au  public  de  connoitre. 

[60]  Peut-etre  dira-t-on  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  que  ce  travail  sera 
long  &  difficile  ;  cependant  si  on  veut  etre  de  bonne  foi,  on  conviendra 
qu’il  n’est  aucune  partie  des  droits  afferm^s  dont  plusieurs  Fermiers  & 
plusieurs  Directeurs  ne  soient  sp^cialement  occupes ;  que  chacun 
d’eux  a  sur  sa  partie  un  traits  complet,  qui  lui  sert  a  fournir  d’un 
moment  a  1’autre  les  m^moires  dont  la  Ferme-gen^rale  a  besoin ;  qu’ils 


20 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


ont  aussi  des  instructions  abr^gees  qui  servent  a  diriger  leurs  Commis; 
&  il  seroit  juste  que  le  public  en  eut  communication,  puisque  le  public 
a  sans  cesse  a  se  d^fendre  des  entreprises  de  ces  Commis.  Le  travail 
est  done  fait,  il  n’y  a  plus  qu’a  le  publier. 

[61]  Mais  nous  devons  pr£venir  VOTRE  MAJESTE  que  les  Fer- 
miers  ne  se  preteront  qu’avec  repugnance  a  cette  publication,  &  cette 
repugnance  meme  en  prouvera  la  necesstie.  On  ne  veut  pas  que  le 
peuple  lui-meme  connoisse  ses  droits;  on  veut  le  tenir  dans' une  sou- 
mission  aveugle  pour  la  Ferme-generale  :  on  craint  qu’il  ne  se  forme 
dans  chaque  province  des  practiciens  qui,  apres  avoir  etudie  les  loix 
financieres,  pourront  guider  les  particuliers  dans  leurs  contestations 
contre  le  Fermier.  Or  il  est  de  votre  devoir,  SIRE,  de  procurer  cette 
facilite  a  vos  malheureux  sujets.  Vous  leur  devez  l’appui  des  loix ;  & 
cet  appui  devient  illusoire,  quand  les  loix  ne  sont  pas  connues  de  ceux 
qui  ont  le  droit  de  les  invoquer. 

[62]  En  vous  presentant,  SIRE,  le  tableau  general  des  droits  des 

Fermes,  nous  n’avons  voulu  entrer  dans  le  detail  d’aucune  affaire  par- 
ticuliere.  Nous  nous  croyons  cependant  ob  ig£s  de  supplier  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  de  prendre  en  consideration  les  Remontrances  qui  furent 
faitesau  feu  Roi  au  mois  d’Aout  1770,  &  qui  jusqu’a  present  sont  restees 
sans  reponse.1 . 


[63]  Pourquoi  n’oserions-nous  pas  esperer,  SIRE,  que  cette  impor- 
tante  verification  pourra  vous  determiner  a  l’acte  de  justice  qui  illustrera 
le  plus  le  commencement  de  votre  regne  ;  a  choisir  les  homines  les  plus 
dignes  de  la  confiance  de  la  Nation,  &  les  charger  de  l’exatnen  de  tous 
les  ordres  qui  retiennent  encore  aujourd’hui  des  citoyens  dans  l’exil  ou 
dans  la  captivite  ? 

[64]  Nous  portons  encore  plus  loin  nos  espOances;  &  si  VOTRE 
MAJESTY  se  determine  a  faire  faire  cet  examen,  nous  ne  doutons  pas 
qu’  a  cette  occasion  on  n’^tablisse  des  principes  dans  une  matiere  oil 
Ton  n’en  connut  jamais.  Il  en  r£:;ultera  au  moins  cette  v£rit£,  que 
des  ordres  attentatoires  a  la  liberty  des  citoyens  ne  doivent  jamais  etre 
accord^s  a  des  particuliers,  ni  pour  leurs  intdrets  personnels,  ni  pour 
venger  leurs  injures,  parce  que  dans  un  pays  ou  il  y  a  des  loix,  les  par¬ 
ticuliers  n'ont  pas  besoin  d’ordres  extrajudiciaires,  &  que  d’ailleurs  cte 

1  Note  de  l’Rditeur. — Il  s’est  trouv6  ici  une  lacune  clans  le  manuscrit  sur  lequel 
on  a  imprim6,  &  qui  avoit  pour  objet  les  lettres  de  cachet.  .  .  .  See  note,  If  64  o(  the 
Translation. 


Lettres  de  Cachet. 


21 


tels  ordres  sont  donnes  aux  puissans  contre  Ies  foibles,  sans  reciprocity, 
ce  qui  est  la  plus  criante  de  toutes  les  injustices. 

[65]  Peut-etre  pensera-t-on  qu’il  y  a  des  cas  privileges  ou  c’est  pour 
l’ordre  public  qu’il  faut  des  actes  d’autorite  qui  ne  soient  point  revetus 
des  formalites  de  la  Justice.  On  dira  qu’il  est  quelquefois  utile  de  sup¬ 
pler  a  la  lenteur  de  la  Justice  reglee,  qui  laisseroit  evader  des  coupa- 
bles ;  que  pour  la  police  &  la  surety  des  grandes  villes,  il  faut  pouvoir 
s’assurer  des  gens  legitimement  suspects;  que  souvent  l’interet  public 
se  reunit  a  celui  des  families  pour  sequestrer  de  la  society  un  sujet  qui 
ne  pourroit  que  la  troubler,  &  contre  lequel  on  n’a  d’autres  preuves  que 
celles  qui  sont  administrees  par  cette  famille  meme,  qui  cherche,  a  se 
soustraire  a  l’infamie  d’une  procedure  legale. 

[66] (  Mais  quand  on  aura  discute  toutes  ces  considerations  en  votre 
presence,  &  qu’on  aura  mis  sous  vos  yeux  les  abus  qui  en  ont  ete  faits, 
vous  reconnoitrez,  SIRE,  que  ce  sont  de  vains  pretextes,  qui  n’auroient 
jamais  du  faire  livrer  a  la  puissance  arbitraire  la  liberty  des  citoyens: 
ou  du  moins  qu’il  faut  reserver  aux  opprimes  la  faculty  de  redamer 
contre  la  violence. 

[67]  Vous  reconnoitrez  que  s’il  est  des  cas  ou  ce  soit  la  Justice  elle- 
meme  qui  vous  demande  des  ordres  prompts  &  secrets,  parce  qu’on 
craint  que  la  lenteur  de  la  procedure  ne  favorise  la  fuite  des  criminels, 
un  Roi  legislateur  pourroit  donner  a  la  Justice  plus  d’activite,  sans  em¬ 
ployer  des  moyens  iliegaux,  &  qu’alors  la  celerity  requise  ne  priveroit 
pas  celui  qui  auroit  ete  injustement  arrete,  de  son  recours  contre  le 
calomniateur. 

[63]  Que  si  l’ordre  public  veut  qu’on  s’assure  d’un  homme  legiti¬ 
mement  suspect,  la  iegitimite  des  soup^ons  doit  etre  constatee,  en  sorte 
que  celui  qui  a  ete  la  victime  innocente  de  ces  precautions  politiques, 
puisse  demander  &  obtenir  une  indemnity,  &  qu’il  scache  au  moins 
pourquoi  &  par  qui  cette  violence  est  exercee. 

[69]  Enfin,  que  quand  on  use  de  menagement  pour  une  famille  qui 
est  venue  implorer  elle-meme  les  secours  du  Gouvemement  contre  un 
sujet  qui  la  deshonore,  il  n’est  pas  encore  necessaire  que  ce  genre  de 
justice  soit  sans  aucun  recours.  En  effet,  ce  n’est  que  1’edat  des  pro¬ 
cedures  qu’on  veut  eviter.  Or,  sans  faire  de  procedures  publiques,  il 
est  possible  de  consigner  les  motifs  de  l’ordre  du  Roi  dans  un  acte  signe 
de  celui  qui  a  expedie  1’ordre,  &  de  ceu*  qui  l’ont  obtenu;  de  con- 
server  .cet  acte  au  moins  pendant  tout  le  temps  de  la  detention  du 
prisonnier,  &  de  lui  en  donner  communication. 


22 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[70]  Ce  prisonnier,  quel  que  soit  son  crime,  devroit  etre  admis  a 
presenter  sa  justification,  &  meme  a  demander  que  les  causes  de  1’ordre 
rigoureux  fussent  examinees  de  nouveau  par  d’autres  que  ceux  qui  l’ont 
fait  decerner,  &  qu’il  en  fut  rendu  un  nouveau  compte  au  Roi,  qui 
chosiroit  pour  cet  examen  les  hommes  de  la  reputation  la  plus  intacte 
&  la  plus  imposante.  Et  comme  il  est  tres-difificile,  &  souvent  meme 
impossible  a  un  prisonnier  de  faire  parvenir  sa  reclamation  jusqu’au 
Roi,  il  seroit  necessaire  de  faire  faire  de  temps  en  temps,  &  toujours 
par  des  personnes  etrangeres  a  l’administration,  &  de  l’integrite  la  plus 
reconnue,  une  visite  de  toutes  les  prisons  Royales,  &  une  revue  exacte 
de  toutes  les  lettres  de  cachet. 

[71]  Quand  on  sgaura  que  ces  precautions  sont  prises  par  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  contre  les  surprises  qui  pourroient  Iui  etre  faites,  &  sur-tout 
quand  on  se  rappellera  que  votre  regne  aura  commence  par  un  examen 
severe  de  tout  ce  qui  a  ete  reproche  a  la  precedente  administration, 
croyez,  SIRE,  que  les  abus  de  ces  ordres  donnes  en  votre  nom,  seront 
tres-rares.  Nous  ne  pouvons  que  vous  faire  entrevoir  les  avantages  qui 
resulteront  de  cette  recherche  ;  mais  si  elle  s’execute,  vous  jugerez,  par 
la  reconnoissance  de  la  Nation,  de  l’importance  du  bienfait.  Nous 
nous  sommes  livres,  SIRE,  a  une  digression  que  nousne  nous  reprochons 
point,  puisqu’elle  a  ete  pour  nous  1’occasion  de  vous  presenter  des  re¬ 
flexions  peut-etre  utiles  sur  le  genre  d’abus  qui  a  le  plus  excite  de 
plaintes  de  la  part  d’une  partie  de  la  nation,  &:  sur  lequel  il  est  le  plus 
facile  de  lui  donner  satisfaction. 

[72]  Il  est  temps  de  reveniraux  impots.  '  Les  vexations  occasionnees 
pour  la  perception  des  droits  des  Fermes  ont  une  excuse ;  c’est  la 
necessite  de  procurer  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  le  revenu  considerable  qui 
est  le  produit  de  ces  droits  :  mais  il  semble  qu’il  ne  devroit  pas  en  etre 
de  meme  des  impositions  qui  se  levent  directement  sur  le  peuple.  Si 
la  sorame  qu’on  veut  lever  etoit  fixee,  comme  elle  le  devroit  toujours 
etre,  on  n’auroit  plus  qu’a  choisir  la  forme  de  repartition,  la  plus  juste, 
la  plus  simple,  la  moins  dispendieuse.  L’administration  est  <donc  in¬ 
excusable  quand  elle  introduit  dans  la  levee  de  ces  impots  un  despo- 
tisme  aussi  inutile  qu’odieux,  quand  elle  ajoute  a  1’impot  meme  des  frais 
de  regie,  qui  sont  toujours  supportes  par  le  peuple.  Voila  cependant, 
SIRE,  ce  qu’on  eprouve  dans  la  levee  de  tous  les  impots  directs,- >de  la 
taille,*  de  la  capitation,  du  vingtieme  ;  &  une  partie  de  ces  inconveniens 
se  fait  meme  sentir  dans  toutes  les  prestations  de  service  corporel  qui 
s’exigent  du  peuple,  comme  la  milice  &  la  corvee. 


FRANCE  RESEMBLES  AN  ORIENTAL  DESPOTISM.  2J 

[73]  Mais  la  discussion  de  ces  abusnous  conduira  n^cessairement  a 
de  bien  plus  grandes  questions.  La  perception  des  droits  sur  les 
denies  ne  tient  pas  a  la  forme  du  gouvernement  de  l’Etat ;  mais  la  re¬ 
partition  des  impots  directs  tient  essentiellement  a  la  constitution  de 
la  Monarchic.  Les  vices  de  cette  repartition  font  partie  d’un  systeme 
general  d’administration  qui  depuis  longtemps  s’introduit  dans  votre 
Royaume,  &  le  remede  ne  peut  se  trouver  que  dans  la  reformation  qu’il 
plaira  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  d’apporter  dans  l’administration  generate. 

[74]  Ainsi  nous  examineions  la  regie  de  chaque  impot  direct,  & 
VOTRE  MAJESTE  y  verra  le  developpement  de  ce  systeme  funeste : 
mais  il  faut  auparavant  remonter  a  l’origine  ;  il  faut  faiie  connoitre  a 
VOTRE  MAJESTIC  le  principe  general  &  ses  consequences;  &  peut- 
etre  serez-vous  etonne,  SIRE,  quand  vos  verrez  jusqu’a  quel  point  on  a 
abuse  du  pretexte  de  votre  autorite  contre  cette  autorite  elle-meme. 

[75]  Vous  nous  permettez,  SIRE,  de  nous  servir  du  terme  de  des- 
potisme,  tout  odieux  qu’il  est ;  dispensez-nous  de  recourir  a  des  circon- 
locutions  embarrassantes,  quand  nous  avons  des  verites  importantes  a 
vous  rendre  sensibles.  Le  despotisme  contre  lequel  nous  iedamons 
aujourd’hui,  est  celui  qui  s’exerce,  a  votre  ins^u,  par  des  emissaires  de 
1’ Administration,  gens  absolument  inconnus  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY. 
Non,  SIRE,  nous  ne  venons  point  off ri r  a  VOTRE  MAJEST&  des  dis¬ 
sertations  inutiles,  &  peut-etre  dangereuses,  sur  les  limites  de  sa  puis¬ 
sance  souveraine ;  c’est  au  contraire  le  droit  de  recourir  a  cette  puis¬ 
sance,  que  nous  allons  revendiquer  pour  tous  les  citoyens,  &  nous  ne 
nommerons  despotisme  que  le  genre  de  Tadministration  qui  tend  a 
priver  vos  sujets  de  ce  droit  qui  leur  est  si  pr£cieux,  &  a  soustraire 
a  votre  justice  ceux  qui  oppriment  le  peuple. 

[76]  L‘id£e  qu’on  s’est  faite  du  despotisme,  ou  de  la  puissance  abso- 
lue,  dans  les  differens  temps  &  chez  les  difftkens  peuples,  n’est  pas  la 
meme.  On  parle  souvent  d’un  genre  de  gouvernement  qu’on  nonime 
le  despotisme  Oriental :  c’est  celui  dans  lequel  non-seulement  le  Souverain 
jouit  d’une  autorite  absolue  &  illimit^e,  mais  chacun  des  ex£cuteurs  de 
ses  ordres  use  aussi  d’un  pouvoir  sans  bornes.  II  en  r^sulte  n^cessaire- 
ment  une  tyrannie  intolerable  :  car  il  est  une  difference  infinie  entre  la 
puissance  exercee  par  un  maitre  dont  le  veritable  interet  est  celui  de 
son  peuple,  &  celle  d’un  sujet  qui,  enorgueilli  de  ce  pouvoir  auquel  il 
n’etoit  pas  destine,  se  plait  a  en  aggraver  le  poids  sur  ses  egaux  ;  genre 
de  despotisme  qui,  etant  transmis  graduellement  a  des  Ministres  de 
differens  ordres,  se  fait  sentir  jusqu’au  dernier  citoyen  ;  en  sorte  qu’il 
n’est  personne,  dans  un  grand  Empire,  qui  puisse  s’en  garantir. 


24 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS, 


[77]  Le  vice  de  ce  gouvernement  est  tout  a-la-fois  dans  la  constitu¬ 
tion  &  dans  les  moeurs. 3 .Dans, la. constitutioivparce  que* les^peuples1 
qui  y  sont  sujets,  n’ont  ni  tribunaux,  ni  corps  de  loix,  ni  repr^sentans 
du  peuple.  Point  de  tribunaux ;  voila  pourquoi  1’autorite  est  exerc£e 
par  un  seul  homnie.  Point  de  loix  fixes  &  positives ;  voila  pourquoi 
celui  qui  a  l’autorite  en  main,  statue  d’apres  ses  propres  lumieres, 
c’est-a-dire,  ordinairement  d’apres  ses  affections.  Point  de  repr£sen- 
tans  du  peuple;  voila  pourquoi  le  despote  d’une  Province  peut  l’op- 
primer  contre  la  volonte  &  a  l’insgu  du  Souverain,  &  avec  l’assurance 
de  l’impunite. 

[78]  Les  moeurs  contribuent  aussi  a  cette  impunite  ;  car  les  peuples 
soumis  a  ce  genre  de  despotisme  sont  toujours  des  peuples  en  proie  a 
l’ignorance.  Personne  ne  lit,  personne  n’entretient  de  relation;  les 
cris  de  l’opprime  ne  se  font  point  entendre  au-dela  du  pays  qu’il  habite. 
L’innocent  n’a  done  point  en  sa  faveur  de  recours  a  l’opinion  publique, 
qui  est  un  frein  si  puissant  contre  la  tyrannie  des  subalternes. 

[79]  Telle  est  done  la  malheureuse  situation  de  ces  peuples,  que  le 
Souverain  meme  le  plus  juste  ne  peut  faire  sentir  les  effets  de  sa  justice 
qu’a  ceux  qui  approchent  de  lui,  ou  dans  le  petit  nombre  d’affaires  dont 
il  peut  prendre  connoissance  par  lui  meme.  Tout  ce  qu’il  peut  faire 
pour  le  reste  de  ses  sujets,  est  de  choisir  le  moins  mal  qu’il  peut  les 
d^positaires  de  son  autorite,  &  de  les  exborter  aussi  a  faire  les  meilleurs 
choix  qu’ils  pourront  pour  les  places  inferieures.  Mais  quelque  chose 
qu’il  fasse,  le  citoyen  du  dernier  ordre  g£mit  toujours  sous  Pautorit6 
d’un  despote  du  dernier  grade,  &  lui  est  aussi  soumis  que  les  Grands  de 
l’Etat  le  sont  au  Souverain  lui-meme. 

[80]  II  semble  qu’une  telle  forme  de  gouvernement  ne  peut  pas 
exister  chez  les  Nations  qui  ont  des  loix,  des  moeurs  &  des  lumieres : 
aussi  dans  les  pays  polices,  lors  meme  que  le  Prince  jouit  d’un  pouvoir 
absolu,  la  condition  des  peuples  doit  etre  tres-diff£rente.  Quelque 
absolue  que  soil  l’autorit£,  la  justice  peut  etre  rendue  par  deliberation, 
&  dans  les  Tribunaux  astreints  a  des  loix  certaines.  Si  les  Juges 
s’ecartent  de  ces  loix,  on  peut  recourir  a  des  Tribunaux  superieurs,  & 
enfin  a  1’autorite  souveraine  elle-meme.  Tous  les  recours  sont  possi¬ 
bles,  parce  que  tous  les  actes  d’autorite  sont  ecrits,  constates,  deposes 
dans  des  registres  publics ;  qu’il  n’est  point  de  citoyen  qui  ne  puisse 
trouver  un  defenseur  edaire,  &  que  le  public  meme  est  le  censeur  des 
Juges.  Et  non-seulement  la  justice  est  rendue  aux  particuliers,  mais 
les  Corps,  les  Communautes,  les  Villes,  les  Provinces  entieres  peuvent 


TYRANNY  OF  THE  ADMINISTRATION. 


25 


aussi  1  obtenir,  &  pour  pouvoir  defendre  leurs  droits,  doivent  avoir  des 
assemblies  &  des  reprisentans. 

[81]  Ainsi  dans  un  pays  police,  quoique  soumis  a  une  puissance  ab- 
solue,  il  ne  doit  y  avoir  aucun  intiret,  ni  giniral,  ni  particulier,  qui  ne 
soit  defendu  ;  &  tous  les  dipositaires  de  la.  puissance  souveraine  doivent 
etre  soumis  a  trois  sortes  de  freins,  celui  des  Ioix,  celui  du  recours  a 
l’autorite  supirieure,  celui  de  l’opinion  publique. 

L82J  Cette  distinction  entre  les  diffirens  genres  de  pouvoir  absolu 
n’est  point  nouvelle.  Ces  definitions  ont  ete  souvent  donnies  par  des 
Jurisconsultes,  par  les  Auteurs,  tant  anciens  que  modernes,  qui  ont 
icrit  sur  la  legislation.  Elies  sont  le  resultant  de  ce  qu’on  lit  dans  les 
histoires  &  les  relations  des  diffirens  pays  :  mais  il  nous  etoit  nicessaire 
de  les  retracer,  parce  que  nous  avons  une  grande  viriti  a  en  diduire. 
Nous  devons  faire  connoitre  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY  que  le  gouverne- 
ment  qu’on  veut  itablir  en  France  est  le  vrai  despotisme  des  pays  non 
polices;  &  que  chez  la  Nation  la  plus  instruite,  dans  le  siecle  ou  les 
mceurs  sont  les  plus  douces,  on  est  menace  de  cette  forme  de  gouverne- 
ment  oil  le  Souverain  ne  peut  pas  etre  eclairi  lors  meme  qu’il  le  veut 
le  plus  sincirement. 

[83]  La  France,  ainsi  que  le  reste  de  l’Europe  Occidental,  etoit 

regie  par  le  droit  feodal  •  mais  chaque  Royaume  a  eprouve  differentes 
revolutions  depuis  que  ce  gouvernement  est  de  trait.  Il  est  des 

Nations  qui  ont  ete  admises  a  discuter  leurs  droits  avec  le  Souverain, 
&  les  prerogatives  y  ont  ete  fixees.  Dans  d’autres,  Pautorite  absolue 
a  si  promptement  prevalu,  qu’aucun  des  droits  nationaux  n’a  ete  exa-. 
mine ;  &  il  en  est  resulte  au  moins  un  avantage  pour  ces  pays,  c’est 
qu’il  n’y  a  aucun  pretexte  pour  y  detruire  les  corps  intermediaires,  & 
enfreindre  la  liberte  naturelle  a  tous  les  hommes,  de  deiiberer  en  com- 
mun  sur  des  interets  communs,  &  de  recourir  a  la  puissance  supreme 
contre  les  abus  des  puissances  subalternes. 

[84]  En  France,  la  Nation  a  toujours  eu  un  sentiment  profond  de 
ses  droits  &  de  sa  liberte.  Nos  maximes  ont  ete  plus  d’une  fois  re- 
connues  par  nos  Rois ;  ils  se  sont  meme  glorifies  d’etre  les  Souverains 
d’un  peuple  libre :  cependant  les  articles  de  cette  liberte  n’ont  jamais 
ete  rediges ;  &  la  puissance  reelle,  la  puissance  des  armes,  qui,  sous  le 
gouvernement  feodal,  etoit  dans  les  mains  des  Grands,  a  ete  totalement 
reunie  a  la  puissance  Royale. 

[85]  Alors,  quand  il  y  a  eu  de  grands  abus  d’autorite,  les  represen- 
tans  de  la  nation  ne  se  sont  pas  contentes  de  se  plaindre  de  la  mauvaise 


26 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


administration;  ils  se  sont  crus  obliges  a  revendiquer  les  droits 
nationaux.  Ils  n’ont  pas  parie  seulement  de  justice,  mais  de  liberty; 
&  l’effet  de  Ieurs  demarches  a  £te  que  les  Ministres,  toujours  attentifs 
a  saisir  les  moyens  de  rnettre  leur  administration  a  l’abri  de  tout  exa- 
men,  ont  eu  l’art  de  rend  re  suspects  &  les  Corps  redamans,  &  la  re¬ 
clamation  elle-meme.  Le  recours  au  Roi  contre  ses  Ministies  a  ete 
regarde  comme  un  attentat  a  son  autorite.  Les  doieances  des  Etats, 
les  remontrances  des  Magistrats  ont  ete  transformees  en  demarches 
dangereuses,  dont  le  Gouvernement  devoit  se  garantir.  On  a  persuade 
aux  plus  puissans  Rois  de  la  terre  qu’ils  avoient  a  craindre  jusqu’aux 
larmes  d’un  peuple  sounds ;  &  c’est  sous  ce  pretexte  qu'on  a  introduit 
en  France  un  gouvernement  bien  plus  funeste  que  le  despotisme,  & 
digne  de  la  barbarie  Orientale;  c’est  l’administration  clandestine  par 
laquelle,  sous  les  yeux  d’un  Souverain  juste,  &  au  milieu  d’une  nation 
edairee,  1’injustice  peut  se  montrer,  disons  plus,  elle  se  commet  notoire- 
rnent.  Des  branches  entieres  d’administration  sont  fondees  sur  des 
systemes  d’injustices,  sans  qu’aucun  recours,  ni  au  public,  ni  a  l’autorite 
superieure,  soit  possible. 

[86]  C’est  ce  despotisme  des  Administrateurs,  &  sur-tout  ce  systeme 
de  clandestinite,  que  nous  devons  denoncer  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  ;  car 
nous  n’aurons  point  la  t£m£rit6  de  discuter  les  autres  droits  sacr£s  du 
trone.  II  nous  suffit  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  ait  desavoue,  dans  l’acte 
de  rdtablissement  de  la  Magistrature,  les  maximes  de  tyrannie  qui  avoient 
ete  execut^es  sous  un  ministereiaujcurd’hui  proscrit;  &  nous  nous  con- 
formerons  aux  intentions  de  VOTRE  MAjESTfi,  en  n’agitant  point  des 
questions  qui  n’auroient  jamais  du  etre  elev^es. 

[87]  Mais  ce  n’est  point  blesser  la  juste  subordination ,  que  de  rnettre 
sous  vos  yeux  une  suite  d’infractions  faites  a  la  liberty  nationale,  a  la 
liberte  naturelle  de  tous  les  hommes,  qui  vous  mettent  aujourd’hui 
dans  1’impossibilite  d’entendre  vos  sujets,  &  d’edairer  la  conduite  de 
vos  Administrateurs. 

i°.  On  a  cherche  a  an£antir  les  vrais  representans  de  la  nation. 

20.  On  est  parvenu  a  rendre  illusoires  les  reclamations  de  ceux  qu’on 
n’a  pas  encore  pu  detruire. 

30.  On  veut  meme  les  rendre  impossibles.  C’est  pour  y  parvenir 
que  la  clandestinite  a  ete  introduite.  II  en  est  de  deux  genres ;  l’une 
qui  cherche  a  derober  aux  yeux  de  la  nation,  a  ceux  de  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  elle-meme,  les  operations  de  1’administration ;  l’autre  qui 
cache  au  public  la  personne  des  Administrateurs.  Voila,  SIRE,  le 


ABSENCE  OF'  LOCAL  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 


27 


precis  du  svsteme  que  nous  d£nongons  a  VOTRE  MAJESTlv,  &  que 
nous  allons  developper. 

[88]  Nous  annon^ons  comme  la  premiere  demarche  de  ce  despot- 
isme,  celle  d’aneantir  tous  les  repr^sentans  de  la  nation,  &:  si  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  veut  bien  r^flechir  sur  la  reunion  de  plusieurs  faits  dont 
aucun  n’est  douteux,  elle  y  trouvera  la  demonstration  de  cette  v£rit£. 

[89]  Les  Assemblies  ginirales  de  la  Nation  n’ont  point  iti  con- 
voquies  depuis  cent  soixante  ans,  &  long-temps  auparavant  elles  etoient 
devenues  tres-rares,  nous  oserons  meme  dire  presqu’  inutiles,  parce  qu’on 
faisoit  sans  elles  ce  qui  rendoit  leur  presence  le  plus  nicessaire, 
l’itablissement  des  impots. 

[90]  Quelques  Provinoes  avoient  des  Assemblies  particulieres  ou 
Etats  provinciaux  :  plusieurs  ont  iti  privies  de  ce  pricieux  privilege; 
&  dans  les  Provinces  ou  ces  Etats  existent  encore,  leur  ministere  est 
resserri  dans  des  bornes  qui  deviennent  tous  les  jours  plus  itroites. 
Ce  n’est  pas  une  assertion  timiraire  de  dire  que  dans  nos  Provinces 
on  entretient  entre  les  dipositaires  du  pouvoir  arbitraire  &  les  repri- 
sentans  des  Peuples,  une  espece  de  guerre  continuelle,  ou  le  despotisme 
fait  tous  les  jours  de  nouvelles  conquetes.- 

[91]  Les  Provinces  qui  n’avoient  pas  d’Etats  piovinciaux  itoient 
nommies  pays  d’Election  ;  &  il  y  existoit  riellement  des  Tribunaux 
nommis  Elections,  composis  de  personnes  ilues  par  la  Province  elle- 
merne,  qui,  au  moins  pour  la  ripartition  des  impots,  remplissoient 
quelques-unes  des  fonctions  des  Etats  provinciaux.  Ces  Tribunaux  exis¬ 
tent  encore  sous  le  nom  d’Elections ;  mais  ce  nom  est  tout  ce  qu’il 
leur  reste  de  leur  institution  primitive.  Ces  Officiers  ne  sont  plus  ri¬ 
ellement  ilus  par  la  Province ;  &  tels  qu’ils  sont,  on  les  a  mis  dans  la 
dipendance  presqu’  entiere  des  Intendans  pour  les  fonctions  qui  leur 
restent.  Nous  aurons  une  autre  occasion  de  parler  des  Elections,  en 
parlant  de  I’impot  de  la  taille  ;  nous  ferons  meme  connoitre  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTY  en  quoi  elles  diffiroient  des  Etats  provinciaux:  il  suffit 
d’observer  a  present  que  les  vrais  Elus  des  Provinces  n’existent  plus. 

[92]  Il  restoit  au  moins  a  chaque  Corps,  a  chaque  Communauti  de 
Citoyens  le  droit  d’administrer  ses  propres  affaires,  droit  que  nous  ne 
dirons  point  qui  fasse  partie  de  la  constitution  primitive  du  Royaume, 
car  il  remonte  bien  plus  haut ;  c’est  le  droit  naturel,  c’est  le  droit  de 
la  raison.  Cependant  il  a  £t£  aussi  enlev£  a  vos  Sujets;  &  nous  ne 
craindrons  pas  de  dire  que  l’administration  est  tombee  a  cet  £gard 
dans  des  exces  qu’on  peut  nommer  pu£riles. 


28 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[93]  Depuis  que  des  Ministres  puissans  se  sont  fait  un  principe 
politique  de  ne  point  laisser  convoquer  d’Assembiee  nationale,  on  en 
est  venu,  de  consequence  en  consequence,  jusqu’a  declarer  nulles  les 
deliberations  des  Habitans  d’un  village,  quand  elles  ne  sont  pas  au- 
torisees  par  l’lntendant;  en  sorte  que  si  cette  Communaute  a  une  de* 
pense  a  faire,  quelque  legere  qu’elle  soit,  il  faut  prendre  l’attache  du 
Subdeiegue  de  l’lntendant,  par  consequent  suivre  le  plan  qu’il  a 
adopte,  employer  les  ouvriers  qu’il  favorise,  les  payer  suivant  son  arbi¬ 
trage  ;  &  si  la  Communaute  a  un  proces  a  soutenir,  il  faut  aussi  qu’elle 
se  fasse  autoriser  par  l’lntendant;  il  faut  que  la  cause  de  la  Com¬ 
munaute  soit  plaidee  a  ce  premier  Tribunal  avant  d’etre  porte  a  la 
Justice;  &  si  l’avis  de  l’lntendant  est  contraire  aux  Habitans,  ou  si 
leur  adversaire  a  du  credit  a  1’Intendance,  la  Communaute  est  dechue 
de  la  faculte  de  defendre  ses  droits. 

[94]  Voila,  SIRE,  par  quels  moyens  on  a  travailie  a  etouffer  en 
France  tout  esprit  municipal,  a  eteindre,  si  on  le  pouvoit,  jusqu’aux 
sentimens  de  citoyen  :  on  a,  pour  ainsi  dire,  interdit  la  Nation  entiere, 
&  on  lui  a  donne  des  tuteurs. 

[95]  L’aneantissement  des  Corps  redamans  etoit  un  premier  pas 
pour  aneantir  le  droit  de  reclamation  lui-meme.  On  n’a  cependant 
pas  e te  jusqu’a  prononcer  en  termes  expres,  que  tous  recours  au  Prince, 
toutes  demarches  pour  les  Provinces  fussent  defendues ;  mais  VOTRE 
MAJESTY  n’ignore  pas  que  toute  requete  dans  laquelle  les  interets 
d’une  Province  ou  ceux  de  la  Nation  entiere  sont  stipules,  est  regardee 
com  me  une  temerite  punissable,  quand  elle  est  signee  d’un  seul  par- 
'  ticulier,  &  comrne  une  association  illicite,  quand  elle  est  signee  de 

plusieurs.  Il  avoit  cependant  fallu  donner  a  la  Nation  une  satisfaction 
apparente,  quand  on  avoit  cesse  de  convoquer  les  Etats :  aussi  les  Rois 
avoient-ils  annonce  que  les  Cours  de  Justice  tiendroient  lieu  des  Etats, 
que  les  Magistrats  seroient  les  representans  du  Peuple. 

[96]  Mais  apres  leur  avoir  donne  ce  titre,  pour  consoler  la  Nation  de 
la  perte  de  ses  anciens  &  veritables  representans,  on  s’est  souvenu  dans 
toutes  les  occasions  que  les  fonctions  des  Juges  etoient  restreintes  a 
leur  seul  territoire  &  a  la  Justice  contentieuse,  &  on  a  mis  les  m ernes 
limites  au  droit  de  representation. 

[97]  Ainsi  tous  les  abus  possibles  peuvent  etre  commis  dans 
l’adir.inistration  sans  que  le  Roi  en  soit  jamais  instruit,  ni  par  les  re¬ 
presentans  du  Peuple,  puisque  dans  la  plupart  des  Provinces  il  n’y  en 
a  point;  ni  par  les  Cours  de  Justice,  puisqu’on  les  ecarte,  comrae  in- 


the  Co  wee. 


29 


comp^tentes,  d£s  qu’elles  veulent  parler  de  l’administration  ;  ni  par  les 
particuliers,  a  qui  des  exemples  de  s£v£rite  ont  appris  que  c’est  un 
crime  d’invoquer  la  justice  de  leur  Souverain. 

[98]  Malgr£  tous  ces  obstacles,  le  cri  public,  genre  de  reclamation 
qu’on  ne  peut  jamais  tout-a-fait  etouffer,  etoit  toujours  a  Craindre  pour 
les  Administrateurs  &  peut  etre  a-t-on  craint  aussi  qu’un  jour  un  Roi 
ne  voulut,  de  son  propre  mouvement,  se  faire  rendre  compte  de  tous 
les  secrets  de  l’administration.  On  a  done  voulu  que  ce  compte  fut 
impossible  a  rendre,  ou  au  moins  qu’il  ne  put  etre  rendu  que  par  les 
seuls  Administrateurs,  sans  etre  expose  a  aucune  contradiction  ;  &  c’est 
pour  cela  qu’on  a  fait  tant  d’efforts  pour  introduce  par-tout  l’adminis- 
tration  clandestine. 

[99]  Pour  prouver  cette  verite  dans  toute  son  etendue;  il  faudroit 
entrer  dans  le  detail  de  toutes  les  parties  du  Gouvernement ;  mat's 
quelques  exemples  suffiront  pour  la  rendre  sensible.  Nous  les  choisirons 
dans  les  impots  qui  font  notre  principal  objet,  &  nous  n’hesiterons  point 
de  citer  les  administrations  qui  ont  le  plus  merite  l’approbation  publi- 
que ;  car  nous  devons  toujours  faire  connoitre  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY 
les  vices  intrinseques  d’une  administration,  quoiqu’ils  soient  repares 
pendant  un  temps  par  les  qualites  personelles  de  l’Administrateur. 

[100]  Par  exemple,  il  est  reconnu  dans  toute  l’Europe  que  rien  n’a 
plus  signale  le  dernier  regne  que  la  construction  des  chemins  qui 
facilitent  le  commerce,  &  doublent  la  valeur  des  biens  du  Royaume. 
Le  gouvernement  a  cru  jusqu’a  present  que  la  corvee  etoit  necessaire 
pour  ce  grand  ouvrage  &  la  corvee  n’est  autorisee  par  aucune  Loi  du 
Royaume.1  Il  semble  qu’il  auroit  fallu  la  faire  reconnoitre  juridique- 
ment ;  &  alors  on  auroit  pu  etablir  des  regies  certaines  &  publiques  sur 
la  repartition  de  ce  travail  souvent  plus  accablant  pour  le  Peuple  que 
la  taille  elle-meme. 

[101]  Ce  n’est  pas  le  parti  qu’on  a  pris :  on  craignoit,  disoit-on,  la 
sensation  qu’exciteroit  dans  le  Royaume  une  Loi  qui,  en  reglant  la 
corvee,  sembleroit  l’autoriser.  En  consequence  toutes  les  operation^ 
se  sont  faites  en  secret,  &  il  n’a  paroit  pas  meme  qn  Arret  du  Conseil 
imprime  concernant  une  imposition  qui,  depuis  si  long-temps,  fait 
gemir  les  Peuples.  Chaque  Province  n’apprend  que  le  projet  d’un 
chemin  est  arrete,  que  quand  on  en  commence  l’execution  ;  &  si  le 
choix  de  cette  route  est  contraire  au  bien  de  la  Province,  il  est  trop 


'  See  note,  If  100  of  the  Translation. 


30 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


tard  pour  s’y  opposer.  Si  le  travail  est  reparti  avec  injustice  ou  avec 
trop  de  durete,  ceux  qui  voudroient  se  plaindre  n’ont  ni  Juges  legaux 
devant  qui  se  pourvoir,  ni  regies  certaines  a  opposer  a  la  rigueur  des 
ordres  qu’ils  ont  regus,  ni  moyens  juridiques  pour  constater  l’injustice 
qui  leur  a  ete  faite. 

[102]  On  dit  aujourd’hui  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  veut  adoucir  la 
rigueur  de  la  corvee ;  ou  y  substitue  une  imposition  d’un  autre  genre. 
La  Nation  attend  ces  changemens  avec  confiance,  &  deja  avec  re- 
connoissance ;  &:  nous  osons  esp^rer  que  ce  qui  sera  substitue  a  la 
corvee,  ne  sera  point  infecte  de  la  meme  clandestine.  Nous  avons 
cependant  du  vous  representer  les  abus  qu’entrainoit  cette  administra¬ 
tion,  comme  un  des  exemples  les  plus  frappans  du  systeme  general. 

[103]  II  en  est  de  meme  du  vingtieme ;  &  a  cet  egard  l’abus  a  en¬ 
core  moins  de  pr^texte;  car  on  pourroit  dire  sur  la  corvee,  que  la 
ceierite  n£cessaire  pour  les  ouvrages  ne  permettoit  pas  d’attendre  la 
discussion  de  toutes  les  injustices  particulieres  :  mais  le  vingtieme  est 
une  imposition  mise  tous  les  ans  sur  les  memes  terres  depuis  pres  de 
quarante  ann£es,  presque  sans  interruption.  Croiroit-on  que  depuis 
ces  quarante  ann£es  les  roles  de  cette  imposition  ne  sont  point  encore 
deposes  dans  aucuns  registres  ou  les  particuliers  puissent  les  consulte'r. 

[104]  Ce  n’est  point  une  formality  omise  par  negligence;  car  cet 
abus  fut  represente  au  Roi  par  sa  Cour  des  Aides  en  1756.  Le  Minis- 
tere  de  ce  temps  ceda  a  Pevidence  :  le  feu  Roi  consentit  que  ce  de¬ 
pot  fut  fait ;  mais  les  Ministres  qui  sont  venus,  apres  avoir  employe 
pendant  plusieurs  annees  tous  les  detours  possibles  pour  s’opposer  in- 
directement  a  l’effet  de  cette  parole  sacree,  on  finit  par  obtenir  qu’elle 
soit  expressement  revoquee. 

[105]  Nous  ne  rapporterons  point  ici  tout  ce  qui  s’est  passe  a  ce 
sujet,  pour  ne  pas  fatiguer  VOTRE  MAJESTE  du  redt  d’une  affaire 
finie  :  si  cependant  VOTRE  MAJESTE  vouloit  en  etre  instruite,  ces 
faits  ne  sont  point  oublies,  &:  il  seroit  aise  de  les  mettre  sous  ses  yeux. 
Mais  aujourd’hui  nous  nous  contenterons  d’observer  que  la  plupart  des 
infideiites  des  Preposes  du  vingtieme  sont  necessairement  inconnues  & 
impunies,  a  la  faveur  de  cette  clandestinite.  Par  exemple,  quand  un 
Prepose  trahit  l’interet  du  fisc,  en  menageant  le  contribuable  qu’il  veut 
favoriser,  &  que,  pour  cacher  aux  Ministres  cette  prevarication,  il  rem- 
plit  le  vuide  en  augmentant  injustement  les  autres  quotes,  ceux  qui  se 
trouvent  leses  ne  peuvent  faire  connottre  cette  iniquite,  parce  qu’ils  ne 
le  pourroient  que  par  l’inspection  du  role  entier,  &  que  ce  role  est  secret. 


IRRESPONSimLITY  OF  ADMINISTRATIVE  OFFICIALS.  3 1 

[106]  VOTRE  MAJESTY  voit  par  cet  exemple,  que  le  genre 
d’abus  qui  favorise  la  clandestinite  des  roles,  est  precis£ment  celui  qui 
est  le  plus  contraire  a  l’interet  du  Roi,  a  l’intdret  de  finance,  a  l’intdret 
fiscal.  Ce  n’est  done  point  pour  cet  interet  que  les  Administrateurs 
ont  fait  defendre  le  depot  des  roles  ;  e’est  done  uniquement  pour  mettre 
leur  administration  a  1’abri  de  tout  examen,  &  pour  procurer  l’impunite 
a  leurs  Preposes. 

[107]  Et  quand  toutes  les  precautions  prises  pour  cet  objet  se  trou- 
vent  insuffisantes,  quand  les  vexations  sont  si  evidentes  qu’on  ne 
sqauroit  les  pallier,  il  arrive  encore  le  plus  souvent  que  ceux  qui  en  sont 
coupables  obtiennent  l’impunite  par  l’effet  de  l’autre  genre  de  clan¬ 
destinite,  de  celle  que  nous  avons  nomm.ee  clandestine  de  personnes, 
&  qui  consiste  en  ce  que  le  plus  souvent  on  ne  s^ait  pas,  on  ne  peut 
pas  meme  decouvrir  a  qui  chaque  abus  d’autorite  doit  etre  impute. 

[108]  L’administration  de  votre  Royaume  se  fait,  SIRE,  aupres  de 
la  personne  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  par  les  Ministres  aides  de  leurs 
Commis,  &  dans  certaines  parties,  par  les  Intendans  des  Finances,  aides 
pareillement  de  leurs  Commis :  dans  les  Provinces  elle  se  fait  par  les 
Intendans  &  leurs  Subdeiegims.  Nous  allons  considerer  ces  differentes 
personnes  en  commengant  par  le  dernier  ordre,  &  par  ceux  qui  ap- 
prochent  le  plus  pres  du  peuple. 

[109]  Le  Subdeiegue  d’un  Intendant  est  un  homme  sans  qualite, 
sans  pouvoir  legal,  qui  n’a  le  droit  de  signer  aucune  Ordonnance  : 
aussi  toutes  celles  qu’il  fait  rendre  sont  signees  par  l’lntendant.  On 
sgait  cependant  dans  les  Provinces  que  e’est  le  Subdeiegue  qui  a  pro¬ 
nonce  stir  beaucoup  de  details  dans  lesquels  l’lntendant  lui-meme  ne 
peut  pas  entrer.  Si  ce  Subdeiegue  abuse  de  son  pouvoir,  ce  n’est  qu’a 
I’lntendant  qu’on  peut  se  pouvoir:  mats  comment  les  gens  du  peuple 
oseroien t-ils  exercer  ce  recours,  quand  ils  voient  que  e’est  sous  le  nom 
de  l’lntendant  lui-meme  que  1’Ordonnance  a  ete  rendue,  &  que  sans 
doute  ce  Magistrat  superieurse  croira  eompromis,  &  oblige  de  soutenir 
son  Ordonnance? 

[no]  Ce  qui  se  passe  a  cet  egard  du  Subdeiegue  a  1’Intendant,  est 
aussi  ce  qui  se  passe  de  l’lntendant  au  Ministre,  &  du  Ministre  a  \  O  TRE 
MAJESTY  elle-meme. 

[in]  L’lntendant  evite  autant  qu’il  peut  de  prononcer  en  son 
nom.  Dans  toutes  les  affaires  qui  pourroient  le  compromettre,  il  prend 
le  partie  de  faire  rendre  un  Arret  du  Conseil,  ou  de  se  faire  autoriser 
par  une  lettre  du  Ministre ;  &  le  particulier  de  la  Province  qui  voudroA 


3  2 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


se  pourvoir  contre  le  jugement  de  l’lntendant,  &  porter  ses  plaintes  au 
Conseil  ou  au  Ministre,  reste  sans  replique,  quand  il  se  voit  condamn6 
d’avance  par  une  decision  du  Ministre,  ou  un  Arret  du  Conseil. 

[112]  Pour  les  Intendans  des  Finances,  qui  sont  places  entre  les  In- 
tendans  des  Provinces  &  les  Ministres,  ce  sont  des  puissances  tout-a-fait 
inconnues  de  tous  ceux  qui  sont  £loign£s  de  la  capitale  &  du  s£jour 
de  la  Cour.  On  sgait  en  g£n£ral  que  ces  Magistrats  existent,  &  qu’ils 
ont  une  grande  autorit£  dans  le  Royaume  ;  cependant  on  ne  voit  point 
quels  sont  les  genres  d’affaires  pour  lesquels  il  faut  recourir  a  eux, 
parce  que  r^ellement  il  n’en  est  aucun  qui  d^pende  directement  d’eux, 
&  personne  sp^cialement  ne  leur  est  subordonn^  &  n’est  tenu  de  re¬ 
connoitre  leurs  ordres.  C’est  dans  leur  travail  avec  le  Controleur- 
G£n6ral  qu’ils  font  toute  leur  administration,  en  lui  faisant  signer  des 
lettres,  ou  de  ces  Arrets  du  Conseil  qu’on  nomme  Arrets  de  Finance; 
&  le  particulier  qui  croit  avoir  a  se  plaindre  de  ces  decisions,  ne  peut 
s’en  prendre  ni  a  l’lntendant  des  Finances,  qui  ne  signe  rien,  &  ne 
peut  etre  tenu  de  rien,  puisque  le  Ministre  n’est  pas  oblige  a  suivre  son 
avis,  &  s’en  £carte  quelquefois ;  ni  au  Controleur-G£n£ral,  qui  diroit 
avec  raison  qu’il  ne  peut  pas  r^pondre  de  tout  ce  que  lui  font  signer 
les  six  Intendans  des  Finances. 

[  1 1 3]  Enfin  le  Ministre  lui-meme  n’a  aucun  £tat  dans  le  Royaume, 
aucune  autorit£  directe.  C’est  cependant  en  lui  que  reside  toute  la 
puissance,  parce  que  c’est  lui  qui  certifie  la  signature  de  VOTRE 
MAJESTE.  Il  peut  tout,  &  ne  r£pond  de  rien  ;  car  le  nom  respec¬ 
table  dont  il  lui  est  permis  de  se  servir,  ferme  la  bouche  a  quiconque 
oseroit  se  plaindre. 

[114]  Ainsi,  pendant  que  l’Habitant  d’un  village  n’ose  se  pourvoir 
contre  la  vexation  d’un  Subdel£gue  qui  s’est  fait  autoriser  par  l’Or- 
donnance  d’un  Intendant,  nous,  Habitans  de  la  capitale,  nous  person- 
nellement,  Magistrats  charges  par  £tat  de  faire  parvenir  la  v£rit£  aux 
oreilles  de  VOTRE  MAJEST&,  combien  de  fois  nous  nous  sommes  vus 
tax£s  d’audace  pour  avoir  rdclam£  contre  les  ordres  surpris  au  Roi  par 
ses  Ministres  ! 

[ 1 1 5 3  Osons  dire  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY  la  v£rit£  toute  entiere.  II 
en  a  6t6  mis  sous  nos  yeux  dont  la  fausset^  £toit  physiquement  d£- 
montr£e,  &  d’autres  dans  lesquels  il  £toit  Evident  que  ce  nom  sacr6 
avoit  £t6  prostitu£  pour  des  sujets  indignes  de  1’attention  du  Roi ;  & 
quand  nous  avons  fait  voir  clairement  les  petites  passions  subalternes 
qui  avoient  fait  obtenir  ces  ordres,  les  petites  vengeances,  les  petites 


ABUSE  OF  THE  KING’S  SIGNATURE. 


33 


protections,  ne  nous  a-t-on  pas  dit  que  c’^toit  manquer  a  la  Majesty 
Royale,  que  de  r^voquer  en  doute  qu’un  ordre  sign£  du  Roi  fut  r£- 
ellement  donn£  par  lui-meme?  Et  si  VOTRE  MAJESTE  vouloit  que 
ces  faits,  que  nous  ne  faisons  qu’all^guer,  fussent  articules  &  prouv£s, 
nous  serions  en  £tat  de  la  satisfaire. 

[116]  De  plus,  ces  memes  Ministres  ont  attir£  a  eux,  depuis  un 
siecle,  le  detail  de  tant  d’affaires  de  tous  les  genres,  qu’il  letir  est 
impossible  de  les  exp^dier  eux-memes.  II  s’est  done  £tabli  un  nouveau 
genre  de  puissance  interm£diaire  entre  vos  Ministres  &  vos  autres 
Sujets,  qui  n’est  ni  celle  des  Commandans  ni  celle  des  Intendans  des 
Provinces ;  e’est  celle  des  Commis,  personnages  absolument  inconnus 
dans  l’Etat,  &  qui  cependant  parlant  &  £crivant  au  nom  des  Ministres, 
ont  comme  eux  un  pouvoir  absolu,  un  pouvoir  irresistible,  &  sont  meme 
encore  plus  qu’eux,  a  l’abri  de  toutes  recherches,  parce  qu’ils  sont 
beaucoup  moins  connus. 

[ 1 1 7 ]  Ainsi  un  particulier  sans  appui,  sans  aucune  relation  avec  la 
Cour,  par  exemple,  un  homme  qui  vit  dans  sa  Province,  peut  recevoir 
l’ordre  le  plus  rigoureux,  sans  s^avoir  ni  par  qui  cet  ordre  a  £t£  d£cern£, 
pour  en  obtenir  la  revocation,  ni  quelles  en  sont  les  causes,  pour  faire 
entendre  sa  justification.  L’ordre  est  signe  du  Roi ;  mais  ce  particulier 
obscur  s^ait  bien  que  le  Roi  n’a  jamais  entendu  prononcer  son  nom. 
La  signature  du  Roi  est  certifi£e  par  un  Ministre ;  il  s?ait  aussi  qu’il 
n’est  pas  connu  des  Ministres.  II  ignore  si  e’est  par  l’lntendant  de 
sa  Province  que  l’ordre  a  6t£  obtenu,  ou  si  un  de  ses  ennemis  a  trouv£ 
acces  aupres  des  Commis  de  Versailles,  du  premier,  du  second  ou  du 
troisieme  rang,  ou  si  e’est  un  de  ces  ordres  en  blanc  qui  sont  quelque- 
fois  donnas  aux  differentes  puissances  de  chaque  Province:  il  1’ignore, 
&  il  reste  dans  l’exil,  peut-etre  dans  les  fers. 

[ x  1 8]  Nous  avons  crq  n^cessaire,  SIRE,  de  presenter  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  ces  notions  des  difterens  genres  de  despotisme,  &  surtout 
de  clandestinite  ;  nous  pouvons  a  present  en  faire  l’application  aux 
trois  impositions  directes,  la  taille,  la  capitation,  le  vingtieme. 

[  1 1 9]  La  taille,  le  plus  ancien  des  impots  directs,  est  celui  qui  se 
leve  sur  les  roturiers  non  privil^gies,  dans  les  Provinces  qu’on  appelle 
pays  d’Election,  e’est-a-dire  dans  celles  qui  n’ont  point  d  Etats 
provinciaux ;  «&  comme  la  taille  est  personnelle,  on  la  fait  payer  aussi 
aux  fermiers  des  Ecctesiastiques,  des  Nobles  &  des  privileges.  Ainsi 
e’est  une  imposition  qui  est  aujourd’hui  support^  par  presque  tous  les 
propri£taires  des  terres. 

3 


34 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[120]  On  a  joint  ala  taille  plusieurs  impositions  qu’on  nomme 
accessoires,  &  tous  les  ans  on  en  ajoute  de  nouvelles.  Ces  accessoires 
egalent  a  present,  ou  meme  surpassent  le  prjncipal  de  la  taille.  On 
dit  que  depuis  long-temps  le  principal  de  la  taille  n’est  jamais  aug- 
mente  ;  cependant  le  peuple  qui  en  supporte  le  poids,  se  plaint  souvent 
de  l’augmentation.  Ce  n’est  qu’une  dispute  de  mots :  on  n’augmente 
pas  le  principal,  mais  on  augmente  les  accessoires. 

[  1 2 1  ]  II  faut  exposer  a  VOTRE  MAJEST&  comment  se  font, 
chaque  annee,  l’imposition  &  la  repartition  de  la  taille  &  de  ses 
accessoires.  II  y  a  quatre  operations. 

i°.  Le  brevet  de  la  taille  contient  l’imposition  sur  toutes  les  Genera¬ 
tes:  ainsi,  soit  qu’on  veuille  lever  une  somme  accessoire  a  la  taille 
sur  tout  le  Royaume  ou  sur  quelque  Generality  en  particulier,  c’est  par 
ce  brevet  qu’elle  s’impose,  &  c’est  aussi  par  ce  brevet  qu’on  repartit 
entre  les  Generalites  la  somme  totale  imposee  sur  le  Royaume.  C’est 
au  Conseil  que  s’arrete  le  brevet  de  la  taille. 

2°.  Les  commissions  contiennent  l’imposition  sur  toutes  les  Elections. 
Par  consequent  si  on  veut  lever  une  somme  sur  quelque  Election  en 
particulier,  c’est  par  les  commissions  qu’on  l’impose.  C’est  aussi  dans 
les  commissions  qu’est  faite  la  repartition  entre  les  Elections  de  la 
somme  imposee  sur  chaque  Generality.  Les  commissions,  ainsi  que  le 
brevet,  sont  erivoyees  du  Conseil. 

3°.  Ce  qu’on  appelle  le  departement,  est  l’acte  par  lequel  on  impose 
chaque  paroisse  ou  communaute.  On  impose  done  au  departement 
les  sommes  qu’on  veut  lever  sur  une  paroisse  en  particulier,  ce  qui 
arrive  souvent  pour  constructions  de  presbyteres,  rejet  de  frais  de  Justice 
ou  autres  depenses;  &  c’est  aussi  au  departement  que  se  fait  la  repar¬ 
tition  entre  les  paroisses  de  la  somme  imposee  sur  l’Election.  Le 
departement  se  fait  dans  la  Province  meme,  &  e'est  aujourd’hui  par 
l’lntendant  seul,  &  sans  aucuns  recours.  Les  Elus  &  autres  personnes 
qui  ont  droit  d’assister  a  l’assembiee  du  departement,  n’y  ont  plus  de 
voix  deliberative,  &  les  Cours  ne  peuvent  plus  prendre  connoissance  de 
ce  qui  s’y  passe. 

4°.  Le  role  de  la  taille  contient  l’imposition  sur  chaque  contribuable, 
ou,  ce  qui  est  la  meme  chose,  la  repartition  entre  les  contribuables  de 
la  somme  imposee  sur  tout  la  paroisse  ou  communaute.  Le  r61e  de  la 
taille  se  fait  par  les  contribuables  eux-memes,  e’est-a-dire,  par  ceux  qui 
sont  k  leur  tour  Asseeurs  ou  Collecteurs.  Cependant  l’lntendant  a 
droit  d’imposer  d’autorite  &  d’office  un  contribuable  qu’il  croit  favoiisi 


ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  Taille. 


35 


par  les  Collecteurs.  II  a  aussi  le  droit,  d’envoyer  dans  les  paroisses  des 
Commissaires,  qui  font  assembler  les  habitans,  qui  font  faire  en  leur 
presence  le  role  de  la  taille,  qu’on  appelle  alors  role  d’office.  La 
fonction  de  ces  Commissaires  devroit  se  terminer  a  instruire  les  con- 
tribuables  des  r^glemens  faits  pour  la  confection  des  roles,  &  a  les 
obliger  a  s’y  conformer :  cependant  I’autorite  d’un  hornme  envoys  par 
l’Intendant  est  telle  dans  les  Provinces,  que  ces  Commissaires  font  faire 
le  role  comme  ils  veulent ;  &  cela  est  tellement  reconnu,  que  souvent 
les  Intendans  donnent  des  instructions  imprim£es  pour  prescrire  a 
leurs  Commissaires  les  regies  suivant  lesquelles  ils  veulent  que  la 
repartition  soit  faite.  Au  reste,  quoique  les  quotes  d’office  soient  faites 
par  les  Intendans,  &  les  roles  d’office  par  les  Commissaires,  cette  quat- 
rieme  repartition  n’est  pas  autant  soumise  a  l’autorite  arbitraire  que 
les  trois  premieres;  car  les  particulars  leses  ont  droit  de  se  pourvoir 
en  Justice. 

[122]  Nous  allons  considerer  ces  quatre  operations  d’abord  sous 
1’aspect  d’impositions,  ensuite  sous  celui  de  repartitions.  En  les  con- 
siderant  comme  impositions,  on  voit  evidemment  que  pendant  que  les 
Cours  ne  cessent  de  soutenir  que  leur  enregistrement  libre  est  neces- 
saire  pour  1'etablissement  des  impots,  pendant  que  cette  maxime  est 
regardee  par  la  Nation  comme  son  unique  ressource  depuis  qu’elle  n’a 
plus  de  representans,  &  que  les  Rois  eux-memes  sont  convenus  en  mille 
occasions  du  principle,  il  s’impose  cependant  tous  les  ans  de  nouvelles 
sommes  sur  le  peuple  sans  enregistrement,  &  par  des  actes  d’autorite 
arbitraire,  tels  que  le  brevet  de  la  taille,  les  commissions,  &  l’op^ration 
du  departement. 

[123]  S’il  faut  donner  a  VOTRE  MAJESTfi  une  idee  des  abus  qui 
peuvent  r£sulter  de  cette  forme  arbitraire  d’imposition,  il  est  un  fait 
recent  &  notoire  que  nous  pouvons  choisir  pour  exemple.  Depuis 
1771,  on  a  impost,  comme  accessoire  de  la  taille,  les  sommes  qu’on  a 
crues  n£cessaires  tant  pour  le  remboursement  des  offices  de  Magis- 
trature  qu’on  vouloit  supprimer,  que  pour  le  paiement  des  gages  des 
Officiers  par  qui  on  vouloit  faire  tenir  les  nouveaux  Tribunaux  :  aujour- 
d’hui  la  Magistrature  est  retablie,  &  les  nouveaux  Tribunaux  sont 
detruits,  cependant  l’imposition  subsiste. 

[124]  On  pense  peut-etre,  SIRE,  dans  voire  Conseil,  que  la  suite 
des  operations  faites  pendant  ces  quatre  ann^es  entraine  encore  aujour- 
d’hui  une  depense  trop  considerable  pour  etre  prise  sur  les  revenus 
ordinaires.de  VOTRE  MAJESTE;  &a  cet  egard  ces  operations 


36 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


peuvent  etre  compares  a  une  guerre  qui  a  fait  cr£er  des  impots  qu’on 
laisse  encore  subsister  quelque  temps  apres  la  paix,  pour  payer  les 
dettes  contracts.  Bientot  la  cause  cessera,  &  devons-nous  esperer 
qu’alors  l’imposition  sera  aussi  supprimee?  Oui,  SIRE,  nous  l’esp^rons, 
nous  ne  nous  permettons  pas  meme  d’en  douter;  mais  nous  devons 
avouer  que  notre  esp^rance  n’est  fondle  que  sur  la  confiance  person- 
nelle  que  toute  la  Nation  a  dans  votre  justice :  car  depuis  long-temps 
personne  en  France  ne  se  flatte  de  voir  jamais  cesser  un  impot  qui 
peut  etre  renouvelle  tous  les  ans  par  un  acte  secret  d’autorit£  arbi¬ 
trage,  comme  le  brevet  de  la  taille;  &  si  VOTRE  MAJESTE  vouloit 
se  faire  rendre  compte  de  toutes  les  impositions  g£n£rales  ou  particu- 
lieres  qui  se  levent  dans  le  Royaume,  &  qui  ont  £t<§  ainsi  £tablies  par 
l’autorite  arbitraire,  Elle  verroit  peut-etre  que  la  plupart  ont  eu  pour 
motifs  des  besoins  momentan£es  qui  ont  cess£,  &  que  cependant  on 
a  continue  de  lever  l’impot. 

[125]  A  present,  SIRE,  nous  allons  considerer  les  quatre  operations 
l’une  apres  l’autre  sous  le  second  aspect,  c’est-a  dire,  comme  repartition. 
Commen?ons  par  le  brevet  de  la  taille,  qui  contient  la  premiere  repar¬ 
tition  entre  les  Generalites.  Nous  avons  deja  dit  qu’il  s’arrete  au 
Conseil  de  Finance.  Mais  VOTRE  MAJESTE  sail  qu’a  l’exception  du 
Controleur-Gen^ral  &  d’un  Intendant  des  Finances,  aucun  de  ceux 
qui  assistent  a  ce  Conseil  ne  peut  etre  instruit  de  la  situation  des 
Provinces,  ni  des  besoins  de  l’Etat :  c’est  done  le  Ministre  seul  qui  fixe 
tous  les  ans  &  la  somme  de  l’imposition,  &  la  premiere  repartition. 
Nous  ignorons,  SIRE,  &  toute  la  France  ignore  par  quel  principe  ce 
Ministre  se  determine  :  nous  sgavons  seulement  qu’avant  la  fixation  du 
brevet  personne  dans  le  Royaume  n’a  vu  prendre  aucune  information 
de  l’etat  des  Provinces.  Le  brevet  de  la  taille  est  done  reellement  un 
acte  fait  par  l’autorite  arbitraire,  sans  avoir  pris  des  connoissances 
suffisantes  pour  l’objet  qui  exigeroit  le  plus  que  tous  les  ordres  de  l’Etat 
fussent  consults. 

[126]  II  en  est  a  peu  pres  de  meme  des  commissions,  qui  contien- 
nent  la  seconde  repartition,  puisqu’elles  se  font  au  meme  Conseil  de 
Finance,  par  consequent  par  la  seule  volonte  du  Ministre  &  de 
l’lntendant  des  Finances.  II  y  a  cependant  une  difference  en  ce 
qu’avant  d’expedier  les  commissions,  on  demande  l’avis  des  Intendans 
de  chaque  Province.  C’est  done  sur  le  rapport  du  seul  Intendant  qu’on 
statue  sur  le  sort  de  chaque  Province.  Or  cet  Intendant  lui-meme 
est  oblige  de  s’en  rapporter  a  des  subalternes;  car  il  ne  peut  pas  con- 
noitre  lui  seul  &  par  lui-meme  l’etat  de  toute  sa  Gdn£ralit<L 


ARBITRARY  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  Taille. 


37 


[127]  D’ailleurs  il  faut  observer  que  cet  Intendant  a  souvent  tin 
int^ret  contraire  a  celui  de  sa  Province.  En  effet,  on  ne  sauroit 
dissimuler  que  l’lntendant  est  un  homme  qui  court  la  carriere  de  la 
fortune;  qu’il  a  sans  cesse  besoin  des  graces  de  laCour;  qu’il  ne  peut 
les  obtenir  que  par  un  Ministre,  a  qui  souvent  on  est  sur  de  plairs  en 
lui  facilitant  les  moyens  de  tirer  tout  le  parti  possible  des  impots.  II 
est  vrai  aussi  que  l’£tat  pr^caire  &  incertain  de  ces  Magistrats  les 
oblige  a  de  grands  6gards  pour  tous  les  gens  de  leur  Province  qui  ont 
du  credit  a  la  Cour. 

[128]  Nous  sommes  cependant  bien  eioign^s,  SIRE,  d’eiever  des 
doutes  sur  la  sincerity  des  avis  que  les  Intendans  envoient  a  votre 
Conseil;  nous  ne  doutons  pas  qu’ils  n’aient  le  zele  &  le  courage  ndces- 
saires  pour  defendre  les  int^rets  de  la  Province  qui  leur  est  confine ; 
nous  croyons  aussi  que  la  plus  exacte  justice  preside  aux  comptes  qu’ils 
vous  rendent  des  facultds  r^ciproques  de  toutes  les  Elections  de  leur 
G6n£ralite. 

[129]  II  faut  cependant  avouer  qu’il  n’est  pas  juste  que  ce  soit  par 
les  seuls  Intendans  que  la  situation  des  peuples  vous  soit  presentee,  & 
qu’il  est  etonnant  que  ni  les  Corps  ni  les  particuliers  de  chaque  Province 
n’aient  £t£  admis  a  donner  des  mdmoires  en  faveur  du  peuple  avant 
la  fixation  du  brevet  &  des  commissions. 

[130J  Nous  observons  encore  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  que  ce  brevet 
&  ces  commissions  sont  non-seulement  des  actes  d’autorite  arbitraire, 
mais  aussi  des  actes  clandestins  dans  leur  execution  :  car  jamais  ni  le 
brevet  ni  les  commissions  ne  sont  imprimis,  ni  annonc^s  publiquement ; 
on  envoie  seulement  les  commissions  a  l’Election,  qui  doit  s’y  con- 
former  lors  du  d^partement,  pour  faire  la  troisieme  repartition.  La 
Province  n’apprend  done  son  sort  que  dans  le  moment  de  ce  d^parte- 
ment,  e’est-a-dire,  quand  tout  est  irrevocablement  terming  Elle  ne' 
connoit  jamais  le  sort  des  autres  Provinces ;  car  nulle  part  dans  le 
Royaume  on  ne  voit  le  tableau  general. 

[13 1]  Ainsi  non-seulement  les  Provinces  sont  jugees  sans  etre 
entendues,  lorsqu’on  arrete  le  brevet  &  les  commissions,  mais  il  leur 
est  absolument  &  physiquement  impossible  de  se  pourvoir  devant 
VOTRE  MAJESTE  elle-meme  par  opposition.  Si  une  Province,  en 
effet,  est  imposee  a  des  sommes  excessives  pour  des  besoins  imaginaires, 
pour  des  depenses  insensees,  elle  n’en  est  avertie  que  dans  1  instant  oil 
ces  sommes  vont  etre  levies.  Si  cette  meme  Province  a  et£  trait£e 
injustement  dans  la  repartition  generate,  soit  parce  que  sa  situation  n  a 


38 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


pas  ete  assez  bien  connue,  soit  par  l’effet  d’une  predilection  du  Mi- 
nistre  pour  d  autres  Provinces,  non-seulement  il  ne  lui  est  pas  permis  de 
se  pourvoir  contre  l’injustice,  mais  il  ne  lui  est  pas  meme  possible  de 
la  connoitre. 

[132]  Cette  clandestine,  SIRE,  est  un  systeme  tres-reflechi :  car 
il  est  necessaire  de  rappeller  a  VOTRE  MAJEST&  qu’en  l’annee  1768 
la  Cour  des  Aides  avoit  ordonne  a  chaque  Election  de  lui  envoyer  fous 
les  ans,  dans  la  huitaine  apres  le  departement ,  un  etat  con/enant  la 
somme  to  tale  des  impositions  a  repartir  sur  les  paroisses ;  lequel  etat 
devoit  contemn  le  mon/ant  principal  de  la  taille  0°  de  ses  accessoires ,  de 
la  capitation ,  &  des  sommes  qui  s'imposent  au  marc  la  livre  (Pice lies, 
&  devoit  do nncr  une  connoissance  exac/e  des  sommes  reparties  chaque 
annee  sur  les  tallies.  La  Cour  des  Aides,  SIRE,  vouloit  avoir  ce  tableau 
general  uniquement  pour  le  presenter  au  Roi ;  &  il  est  bon  d’observer 
qu’il  n’etoit  pas  possible  qu’elle  en  fit  d’autre  usage;  car  des  loix 
enregistrees  &  observees  depuis  plus  d’un  siecle,  ne  lui  permettent  pas 
de  faire  aucun  acte  d’autorite  sur  ce  qui  se  passe  au  departement. 

[ 1 33 ]  Croirez-vous,  SIRE,  que  l’Administration  a  eu  le  credit  de 
faire  casser  un  tel  Arret?  Il  est  difficile  de  deviner  sous  quel  pretexte  ; 
car  vraisemblablement  on  n’alla  pas  jusqu’a  dire  au  feu  Roi,  en  termes 
expres,  qu’on  vouloit  empecher  que  personne  ne  put  lui  faire  connoitre 
la  situation  de  son  peuple ;  nous  ne  croyons  pas  non  plus  qu’on  ait  ose 
avancer  en  sa  presence  la  maxime  barbare  &  trop  souvent  proferee, 
que  le  peuple  supporte  toujours  aisement  son  malheur,  pourvu  que  le 
Gouvernement  ait  1’art  de  le  lui  cacher. 

C*34]  Permettez-nous,  SIRE,  une  derniere  reflexion  sur  l’arbitraire 
de  ces  deux  repartitions.  On  conqoit  aisement  que  des  Ministres  a 
qui  le  despotisme  etoit  cher,  aientvoulu  s’arroger  a  eux-memes,  sous  le 
nom  du  Conseil  de  VOTRE  MAJESTY,  le  droit  d’imposer  arbitraire- 
ment  la  somme  qu’il  leur  plairoit  sur  le  peuple  ;  mais  on  ne  congoit  pas 
quel  interet  ils  ont  pu  avoir  a  priver  le  peuple  du  droit  de  se  faire 
entendre  sur  la  repartition.  Aussi  croyons-nous  que  ces  Ministres  si 
imperieux  n’auroient  pas  etabli  eux-memes  la  forme  de  repartition  qui 
existe  aujourd’hui,  si  les  reflexions  que  nous  venons  de  faire  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  leur  eussent  e te  presentees  dans  toute  leur  simplicite. 

[135]  Mais  il  est  un  aveu  que  nous  devons  faire  a  VOTRE  MAJEST& 
dans  ce  jour  ou  nous  nous  sommes  prescrit  le  devoir  de  lui  dire  tout 
espece  de  verite  sans  aucune  reticence ;  c’est  que  nos  predecesseurs 
ont  eu  vraisemblablement  a  se  reprocher  de  n’avoir  pas  devoile  autant 


ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  Tail/e. 


39 


qu’ils  l’auroient  du  ce  systeme  de  clandestine  dans  le  temps  qu’il  fut 
introduit.  Alors  il  n’y  avoit  deja  plus  d’Etats  g£n£raux  ni  provinciaux, 
ni  meme  de  repr^sentans  des  Provinces  charges  par  le  peuple  de  faire 
la  repartition  des  impositions.  Cette  repartition  se  faisoit  par  des 
Juges  subroges  a  ces  anciens  representans  de  la  Nation,  &  il  y  avoit 
appel  de  ces  Juges  aux  Cours  des  Aides.  Ces  Magistrats  redamerent; 
mais  leurs  efforts  se  terminerent  a  demander  l’execution  des  loix  qui 
etoient  alors  en  vigueur,  c’est-a-dire,  a  demander  que  la  repartition 
fut  faite  par  eux,  au  lieu  de  l’etre  par  le  Conseil.  Ces  reclamations  ne 
parurent  done  qu’une  dispute  de  jurisdiction,  une  affaire  personnelle  a 
ces  Cours,  &  peu  interessante  pour  l’Etat. 

[136]  Mais  si  ces  memes  Cours  avoient  revendique  pour  le  peuple 
entier  le  droit  naturel  qu'ont  tous  les  hommes  d’etre  entendus  avant 
d’etre  juges,  si  elles  avoient  insiste  sur  la  necessite  de  connoitre  l’etat 
des  Provinces  avant  d’asseoir  les  impositions,  si  elles  avoient  sur-tout 
fait  connoitre  aux  Rois  la  difference  du  despotisme  a  la  clandestinite, 
il  ne  nous  paroit  pas  possible  que  le  systeme  actuel  eut  ete  adopte  ni 
par  les  Rois,  ni  par  les  principaux  Ministres;  car  ils  n’y  ont  aucun 
interet ;  &  les  Administrateurs  subalternes  sont  les  seuls  qui  en  profitent, 
puisque  ce  sont  eux  qui,  a  la  faveur  des  tenebres,  peuvent  se  rendre 
independans  de  l’autorite  superieure. 

[137]  Nous  allons  passer  a  la  troisieme  repartition,  celle  qui  se  fait 
au  departement,  entre  les  Paroisses  ou  Communautes  de  chaque  Elec¬ 
tion.  Autrefois  cette  repartition  n’etoit  pas  arbitraire,  elle  se  faisoit  par 
les  Elus,  qui  etoient  alors  des  personnes  reellement  elues  par  la  Province. 
On  ne  pouvoit  cependant  pas  assimiler  l’assembiee  de  ces  Elus  a  une 
assembiee  d’Etats  provinciaux,  &  la  difference  est  bien  sensible.  Des 
Etats  provinciaux  accordent  ou  refusent  des  dons  gratuits;  des  Etats 
provinciaux  reglent  toutes  les  parties  de  l’administration ;  des  Etats 
provinciaux  sont  les  defenseurs  de  tous  les  droits  de  la  Province,  &  ces 
droits  sont  ordinairement  ceux  dont  la  conservation  etoit  promise  a 
chaque  Province  lors  de  sa  reunion  a  la  couronne.  La  fonction  des 
Elus  ne  s’etendoit  pas  a  tous  ces  objets :  ils  faisoient  au  departement 
comme  Asseeurs  generaux  de  la  Province,  la  repartition  de  l’imposition 
entre  toutes  les  Paroisses  &  Communautes,  comme  dans  chaque 
Paroisse  ou  Communaute  il  y  a  des  Asseeurs  particuliers  qui  repartissent 
entre  tous  les  contribuables  la  somme  imposee  sur  la  Communaute. 

[138]  Il  faut  observer,  pour  prevenir  toute  equivoque,  que  ces 
anciens  Elus  avoient  aussi  la  fonction  queceux  qui  portent  aujourd  hui 


40 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


le  nom  d’Elus  ont  conserv^e,  celle  de  Juges  dans  le  tribunal  de  1’Elec- 
tion  :  mais  ce  n’est  pas  sous  cet  aspect  que  nous  les  considerons  ici, 
c’est  comme  Ass^eurs  g^n^raux  de  la  Province. 

[139]  Or  cette  fonction  d’Ass£eurs  g^n^raux  a  excite  la  jalousie  de 
PAdministration,  &  voici  les  differens  coups  qui  ont  et£  portes  suc- 
cessivement  a  la  liberty  nationale  dans  cette  partie. 

Premterement,  on  a  supprime  les  vrais  Elus,  ceux  qui  etoient  r^elle- 
ment  choisis  par  le  peuple,  &  on  leur  a  substitue  des  Officiers  nommds 
par  le  Gouvernement,  &  proprietaires  d’offices  v^naux. 

Secondement,  on  a  fait  entrer  l’lntendant  de  la  Province  au  departe- 
ment,  on  lui  a  donne  la  pr^sidence,  &  on  a  fini  par  oter  la  voie 
deliberative  aux  Elus  &  a  tous  ceux  qui  ont  droit  d’assister  au  departe- 
ment.  On  a  aussi  defendu  aux  Cours  superieures  de  prendre  con- 
noissance  de  ce  qui  s’y  passe ;  en  sorte  qu’aujourd’hui  la  repartition 
qui  se  fait  au  departement  est  l’ouvrage  de  seul  Intendant,  sans  recours 
&  sans  appel. 

[140]  VOTRE  MAJESTY  remarquera  aisement  que  la  seconde 
operation  rendoit  la  premiere  inutile.  En  effet,  on  con^oit  que  le 
despotisme  ait  voulu  faire  supprimer  les  vrais  Elus,  tant  qu’ils  ont  eu 
un  pouvoir ;  mais  depuis  que  le  Commissaire  du  Conseil1  est  devenu  le 
maitre  absolu  au  departement,  &  que  personne  n’y  a  plus  que  voix 
consultative,  il  n’y  a  aucune  raison  &  merae  aucun  pretexte  pour  ne  pas 
rendre  aux  Provinces  le  droit  d’y  envoyer  des  representans  qui  puissent 
defendre  leurs  interets. 

[141]  Troisiemement  enfin,  il  fut  fait  en  1767  une  derniere  enter¬ 
prise,  dont  il  faut  rendre  compte  a  VOTRE  MAJESTfe.  Dans  cette 
annee  l’esprit  de  clandestinite  prevalut  a  un  tel  point,  qu’on  voulut 
que  la  repartition  qui  se  fait  au  departement  fut  cachee  a  tous  ceux 
qui  ont  droit  d’y  assister.  Dans  cette  vue  on  imagina  de  faire  deux 
brevets  de  taille,  l’un  qui  fut  porte  au  departement,  l’autre  qui  restat 
secret,  &  dont  PIntendant  seul  fit  la  repartition  dans  son  cabinet. 
On  ne  mit  dans  le  premier  brevet  que  la  taille  principale,  qui,  dit-on, 
ne  varie  jamais,  &  sur  laquelle  par  consequent  il  est  inutile  de  con- 
suiter  la  Province,  &  on  reserva  pour  le  brevet  secret  les  accessoires, 
toutes  les  impositions  nouvelles,  tout  ce  qui  est  sujet  a  variation  d’une 
annee  a  l’autre;  on  y  fit  entrer  meme  toutes  les  diminutions  sur  les 
accessoires  de  la  taille,  accordees  a  des  malheureux  que  des  desastres 


1 1.  <?.,  the  Intendant. 


system  of  two  Brevets. 


41 


ont  mis  dans  l’impossibilite  de  pouvoir  payer;  diminutions  qui  leur 
sont  dues,  mais  qui  ne  doivent  etre  accordees  qu’a  ceux  a  qui  on  les 
doit  reellement,  si  on  rapporte  en  augmentation  sur  les  uns  ce  qui  a  et£ 
diminue  sur  les  autres.  Voila,  SIRE,  sur  quoi  on  a  voulu  que  l’lnten- 
dant  put  statuer  seul,  sans  la  presence  importune  de  ceux  qui  assistent 
au  departement. 

[142]  Votre  Cour  des  Aides  fit  au  feu  Roi,  dans  Pann6e  1768,  des 
Remontrances  dans  lesquelles  le  systeme  de  ces  deux  brevets  fut 
d£velopp£  ;  mais  comme,  depuis  plus  d’un  siecle,  la  Cour  des  Aides 
ne  prend  aucune  connoissance  juridique  de  ce  qui  se  fait  au  departe- 
ment,  elle  ne  put  que  faire  des  Remontrances,  &  ne  rendit  aucun  Arret. 
Ces  Remontrances  furent  vraisemblablement  renvoy£es  par  le  feu  Roi 
aux  Administrateurs,  c’est-a-dire  a  ceux  memes  qui  avoient  voulu 
introduire  cette  nouvelle  clandestine  dans  la  repartition. 

[143]  Mais  a  present  que  nous  esperons  que  VOTRE  MAJESTY 
voudra  bien  nous  entendre,  nous  attestons  que  de  toutes  les  operations 
faites  par  le  despotisme,  il  n’en  est  aucune  oil  ce  funeste  esprit  de 
clandestinite  se  soit  plus  manifeste  que  dans  ce  systeme  des  deux 
brevets.  En  effet,  puisque  les  Elus  n’ont  plus  de  voix  deliberative  au 
departement,  qu’ils  n’y  ont  plus  aucun  pouvoir,  nous  ne  concevons  pas 
quelles  intentions  honnetes  on  a  pu  avoir  en  ecartant  de  pareils  temoins. 

[144]  II  nous  reste,  SIRE,  a  vous  parler  de  la  quatrieme  &  derniere 
repartition,  de  celle  qui  se  fait  entre  les  contribuables  par  le  role  de 
chaque  Paroisse.  Quand  les  reglemens  sur  la  taille  ont  ete  faits,  le 
despotisme  n’avoit  pas  encore  fait  tous  les  progres  qu’on  a  vus  depuis, 
&  dont  nous  parlerons  a  l’occasion  de  la  capitation  &  du  vingtieme : 
ainsi  on  ne  croyoit  pas  encore  que  l’autorite  arbitraire  put  statuer  sur  le 
sort  de  chaque  particulier  individuellement.  Cette  autorite  ne  s’est 
done  pas  encore  entierement  empale  de  cette  quatrieme  repartition; 
cependant  elle  y  a  deja  porte  plusieurs  atteintes.  Nous  en  avons  deja 
indique  deux  principals;  l’une  consiste  dans  l’usage  ou  sont  plusieurs 
Intendans  de  faire  faire  tous  ou  presque  tous  les  roles  en  presence  de 
Commissaires,  l’autre  consiste  dans  les  diminutions  accordees  par 
l’autorite  du  seul  Intendant. 

[145]  Quant  aux  roles  par  Commissaires,  ou  roles  d ’office,  il  est 
certain  que  la  presence  du  Commissaire  dans  une  assemble  de  gens 
de  la  campagne,  est  trop  imposante  pour  laisser  ni  aux  Collecteurs  la 
liberte  de  faire  leur  role  suivant  leur  ame  6°  conscience,  ni  aux  par¬ 
ticulars  qui  se  croient  leses,  celle  de  se  pourvoir.  Cet  inconvenient 


42 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


avoit  pr6vu  par  la  Cour  des  Aides,  lorsque  ces  roles  par  Commis- 
saires  furent  permis.  Elle  pensa  qu’il  ne  faudroit  en  faire  que  rare- 
ment,  &  pour  quelque  cas  extraordinaire,  par  exemple,  quand  on  vient 
de  faire  un  nouveau  reglement  sur  la  confection  des  roles,  &  qu’on  veut 
l’expliquer  aux  Habitans  des  Communaut£s.  Cette  Cour  crut  y  pour- 
voir  'en  defendant  aux  Commissaires  de  rien  recevoir  des  contribuables, 
&  pensa  que  ces  commissions  ne  seroient  pas  fr^quentes  quand  elles 
ne  seroient  pas  utiles,  &  que  les  Intendans  ne  seroient  pas  engages  a 
les  multiplier  par  le  desir  de  donner  des  places  a  leurs  prot£g£s : 
cependant  dans  plusieurs  Gen£ralit£s  tout  se  fait  par  Commissaires,  & 
surement  on  les  paie  fort  cher.  On  a  done  rendu  inutile  la  precaution 
prise  par  la  Cour  des  Aides.  II  n’y  a  cependant  pas  d’apparence  que 
les  Intendans  fassent  supporter  ces  frais  par  le  Roi ;  mais  il  est  vrai- 
semblable  qu’on  impose  sur  les  Paroisses  une  somme  destin£e  a  cette 
depense.  C’est  une  concussion,  puisque  la  Loi  l’a  defendu :  e’est 
cependant  ce  que  l’Intendant  peut  toujours  faire  impun^ment,  puisque 
l’imposition  absolue  des  Paroisses  se  fait  au  d^paitement,  ou  il  est  le 
maitre. 

[146]  Quant  aux  diminutions  accord^es  aux  particuliers  qui  ont  fait 
des  pertes,  nous  avons  deja  observe  qu’on  les  regarde  comme  des 
graces  provenues  de  la  libdralitd  du  Roi,  &  que  c’est  sous  ce  pr^texte 
qu’on  les  fait  annoncer  par  l’lntendant  au  d^partement.  Car  si  ce  ne 
sont  pas  des  graces,  &  que  la  somme  dont  un  particular  est  diminu£ 
se  reporte  sur  le  g£n£ral  des  Habitans,  ce  doit  etre  a  ceux  qui  font  les 
roles  a  statuer  sur  les  diminutions;  autrement  une  diminution  seroit 
une  gratification  que  l’Intendant  accorderoit  a  ses  favoris,  en  la  faisant 
payer  par  le  peuple.  C’est  encore  ce  que  la  Cour  des  Aides  a  pr£vu^ 
&  a  quoi  elle  a  voulu  pourvoir,  en  ordonnant  express^ment  que  les 
moderations  ou  decharges  accordees  par  l’lntendant,  ne  pouriont  en 
aucun  cas  etre  reimposees  sur  les  redevables :  mais  les  Intendans  ont 
encore  elude  cette  disposition,  en  faisant  cetle  reimposition  au  departe- 
ment,  ou  ils  sont  les  maitres ;  &  nous  avons  deja  observe  qu’ils  ont  eu 
grand  soin  de  faire  mettre  les  diminutions  dans  le  brevet  secret,  de 
peur  que  leur  conduite  a  cet  egard  ne  fut  critiquee. 

[147]  Au  fond,  la  diminution  accordee  a  un  particulier  sur  son 
imposition  n’est  point  une  grace;  c’est  une  justice,  &  souvent  meme 
une  necessite ;  car  il  est  necessaire  de  faire  une  remise  a  celui  que  la 
grele  ou  un  incendie  a  mis  dans  l’impossibilite  physique  de  payer.  Ce 
ne  seroit  done  point  de  la  puissance  arbitraire  des  Intendans  que  dev- 


FAVORITISM  IN  THE  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  Taille. 


43 


roient  dipendre  les  diminutions,  &  ils  devroient  encore  moins  faire  une 
telle  operation  dans  un  acte  secret  &  clandestin  ou  toutes  les  injustices 
sont  a  couvert.  La  Cour  des  Aides  a  divoili  &  dimontri  clairement 
tous  ces  artifices,  &  les  abus  qui  en  doivent  resulter,  dans  ses  Remon¬ 
trances  de  1763,  sur  lesquelles  nous  avons  dija  observe  qu’il  n’a  pas 
iti  rendu  justice  au  peuple,  parce  que  l’examen  en  fut  renvoyi  aux 
auteurs  des  abus  qu’on  dinon<;oit,  &  les  Intendans  sont  restis  maitres 
d’accorder  des  graces  a  leurs  protigis  aux  dipens  du  peuple,  sous  le 
nom  de  diminution  d’imposition. 

[148]  II  est  encore  d’autres  injustices  &  d’autres  infractions  aux 
riglemens  commises  dans  la  confection  des  roles  de  tailles;  il  est  peut- 
etre  aussi  des  changemens  nicessaires  a  apporter  aux  loix  existantes. 
On  dit  que  la  plupart  de  vos  Administrateurs  le  pensent,  &  peut-etre 
votre  Cour  des  Aides  pensera-t-elle  de  meme.  Ces  changemens  exi- 
geront  une  longue  discussion,  qui  doit  etre  faite  avec  vos  Ministres ; 
mais  des  a  present  nous  devons  demander  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  elle- 
meme  d’obvier  au  moins  a  la  clandestine  des  trois  premieres  reparti¬ 
tions.  Nous  supplions  VOTRE  MAJESTE  de  commencer'par  se  faire 
representer  les  Remontrances  faites  par  sa  Cour  des  Aides  en  1768. 
Elle  y  verra  la  discussion  des  deux  brevets  de  taille ;  Elle  y  verra  aussi 
specialement  ce  qui  concerne  les  diminutions ;  &  nous  esperons 
qu’apres  que  ces  edaircissemens  auront  ete  mis  sous  les  yeux  de 
VOTRE  MAJESTfi,  tout  ce  systeme  de  clandestinite  &  d’iniquite  ne 
subsistera  plus. 

[149]  Mais  ce  n’est  point  a  cela,  SIRE,  que  se  termineront  nos 
demandes  &  nos  esperances  sous  le  regne  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE; 
nous  la  supplions  aussi  de  rendre  a  ces  Assemblies  provinciales  qu’on 
nomme  dipartemens,  la  consistance  &  l’authenticiti  qu’elles  n’ont  plus 
depuis  un  siecle.  Nous  la  supplions  d’y  faire  porter  toutes  les  imposi¬ 
tions  qui  se  levent  chaque  annie  sur  la  Province,  sans  aucune  exception, 
c’est-a  dire,  non-seulement  la  taille  &  ses  accessoires,  mais  la  capitation, 
le  vingtieme,  ce  qui  s’impose  pour  la  construction  des  presbyteres  & 
autres  dipenses  locales,  &  meme  la  milice  &  la  corvie.  Nous  la 
supplions  d’ordonner  que  toutes  ces  impositions  soient  annoncies 
publiquement,  que  les  repartitions  soient  faites,  que  les  roles  en  soient 
publies  dans  un  temps  qui  permette  a  ceux  qui  se  croient  lisis,  de 
recourir  a  votre  justice. 

[150]  Enfin,  SIRE,  il  nous  semble  qu’il  est  temps  de  rendre  a  vos 
Peuple s  le  droit  qu’ils  avoient  anciennement  de  nommer  des  repri- 


44 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


sentans  pour  assister  a  cette  Assemble  oil  il  est  status  sur  le  sort  de 
la  Province.  Nous  avons  d£ja  fait  connoitre  que  la  presence  de  ces 
Elus  ne  pourra  point  faire  comparer  P Assemble  du  d^partement  a  des 
Etats  provinciaux,  ainsi  le  despotisme  lui-meme  n’en  pourra  prendre 
aucun  ombrage.  Elle  ne  portera  non  plus  aucun  prejudice  aux  Elus 
en  titre  d’office,  qui  ne  perdront  rien  des  fonctions  actuellement 
attaches  a  leurs  charges.1  Enfin  cet  ^tablissement  n’apportera  aucun 
changement  a  cette  Assemble  provinciate  qu’on  nomme  le  d^parte- 
ment :  il  peut  done  etre  fait  des  a  present,  sans  aucune  depense,  sans 
aucune  operation  pr^alable.  Ce  n’est  point,  SIRE,  une  innovation 
que  nous  proposons  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY,  puisque  e’est  l’ancienne 
constitution  du  Royaume  que  nous  la  supplions  de  faire  revivre,  en 
accordant  a  chaque  Province  ce  qui  est  accords  par-tout  a  chaque 
partieulier,  le  droit  d’etre  entendue  avant  d’etre  jug£e. 

[15 1]  On  a  supprim£  les  anciens  Elus  parce  qu’ils  avoient  une 
puissance  en  quality  d’Ass^eurs  des  impositions,  &  qu’il  y  avoit  alors 
des  Ministres  qui  vouloient  ddtruire  toute  puissance  qui  n’£toit  pas 
£mande  d’eux;  mais  aujourd’hui  que  e’est  l’Intendant  qui  fait  cette 

1  Nota.  Pour  Sclaircir  la  question  &  ne  laisser  aucun  nuage,  nous  pensons  qu’il  ne 
faudroit  rendre  aux  repr*sentans  qu’dlira  la  Province,  que  la  stance  au  d*partement, 
&  non  la  fonction  de  Juges  au  tribunal  de  l’Election;  en  voici  les  raisons: 

i°.  Si  on  vouloit  leur  donner  les  lonctions  de  Juges,  le  Roi  seroit  oblige  a  rembourser 
les  Elus  en  titre  d’office;  au  lieu  qu’il  ne  leur  sera  rien  dfi  quand  on  ne  donnera  aux 
vrais  Elus  que  Passistance  au  d*partement,  &  qu’eux-mSmes  Elus  en  titre  d’offiee  n’en 
seront  point  prives,  &  continueront  d’y  assister. 

2°.  Les  Elus  sont  actuellement  des  Juges  Royaux,  mais  Juges  inferieurs,  Juges  A  la 
charge  de  l’appel.  Ils  ont  des  affaires  contentieuses  A  juger,  ce  qui  les  oblige  A  fitre 
imti*s  dans  la  Jurisprudence  &  A  la  pratique,  &  les  fonctions  joumalieres  exigent  d’eux 
de  r*sider  dans  la  ville  ou  est  le  siege  de  leur  Tribunal.  Il  s’ensuit  que  si  ceux  qui 
seront  choisis  par  la  Province,  devoient  tenir  le  tribunal  de  l’Election,  le  choix  ne 
pourroit  etre  fait  qu’entre  ceux  qui  habitent  la  ville,  &  A  qui  il  convient  de  se  livrer 
aux  fonctions  de  Juges,  &  de  singer  dans  un  Tribunal  qui  n’est  pas  souverain. 

Or  quand  une  Province  aura  A  choisir  des  repr*sentans  pour  d*fendre  ses  int*r*ts, 
soit  au  d*partement,  soit  par  des  m*moires  addresses  au  Roi,  il  faut  que  ce  choix  im¬ 
portant  puisse  tomber  sur  tous  les  habitans  de  la  Province  sans  exception,  il  faut  qu’on 
puisse  toujours  choisir  le  plus  digne.  Cependant  il  y  a  tel  homme  qui  se  croira  honor* 
d  etre  le  defenseur  des  droits  de  sa  Province,  qui  s’assujettira  volontiers  A  aller  tous 
les  ans,  dans  le  temps  du  d*partement,  dans  la  ville  oA  il  se  tient;  mais  il  ne  voudra 
m  r*sider  dans  cette  petite  ville,  ni  consacrer  sa  vie  entiere  au  jugement  des  proc*s 
particulars.  Il  faut  done  que  les  repr*sentans  de  la  Province  assistans  au  d*partement, 
soient  des  personnes  diff*rentes  des  Juges  tenant  le  Tribunal  de  l’Election. 

[The  editor  adds  an  unimportant  note  of  his  own,  which  we  omit.] 


DEMAND  FOR  PROVINCIAL  ASSEMBLIES. 


45 


assiette  de  sa  seule  autorite,  Ies  pr^textes  cessent;  &  si  jusqu’a  present 
les  Rois  n’ont  pas  rendu  cette  justice  a  la  Nation,  c’est  sans  doute 
parce  qu’elle  ne  leur  a  jamais  ete  demandde.  Nous  avons  deja  avou£ 
que  dans  tous  les  temps  les  Magistrats  ont  trop  peu  insist^  sur  le 
retablissement  de  ce  qui  est  Stranger  a  leur  jurisdiction  ;  voila  pourquoi, 
dans  le  temps  qu’on  donna  aux  Intendans  voix  preponderate  aux 
departemens,  les  Cours  ne  firent  pas  observer  que  puisque  cet  acte  de 
despotisme  etoit  fait,  il  falloit  au  moins  rendre  aux  Provinces  le  droit 
de  choisir  elles-memes  leurs  Elus.  Peut-etre  demandera-t-on  de  quelle 
utility  sera  a  la  Nation  la  simple  assistance  de  ces  repr£sentans  qui 
n’auront  aucun  pouvoir  reel :  mais  ignore-t-on  a  combien  d’abus  la 
seule  presence  d’un  homme  consider  peut  mettre  obstacle?  Les 
Administrateurs  du  dernier  regne  ne  Pignoroient  certainement  pas, 
puisque  par  leur  systeme  des  deux  brevets  ils  ont  voulu  derober  leurs 
operations  a  la  connoissance  nieme  des  Elus  en  titre  d’offtce,  qui 
certainement  ne  leur  en  imposoient  pas  autant  que  des  gens  choisis 
par  la  Province. 

[152]  D’ailleurs  il  n’est  pas  vraisemblable  qu’on  refuse  a  de  veri- 
tables  Elus  le  droit  de  recourir  a  VOTRE  MAJEST&  quand  leurs 
representations  n’auront  pas  ete  ecoutees  du  departement,  puisqu’ils  y 
seront  sans  pouvoir.  Ils  ne  pourront  jamais  retarder  l’execution  ;  mais 
ils  jouiront  du  droit  naturel  qu’ont  tous  vos  Sujets,  &  il  leur  sera  permis 
d’en  faire  usage  pour  le  bien  de  la  Province.  Nous  devons  aussi 
prevenir  VOTRE  MAJESTfe  que  si  ces  Elus  choisis  par  la  Province 
font  rarement  des  representations  contre  la  conduite  des  Intendans, 
ou  meme  si  celles  qu’ils  feront  se  trouvent  quelquefois  mal  fondees,  il 
ne  faudra  pas  en  conclure  que  leur  existence  soit  inutile;  car  le  vrai 
bien  qu’ils  auront  fait  sera  le  mal  que  leur  presence  aura  empeche. 

[153]  Nous  pensons  done,  SIRE,  que  si  VOTRE  MAJESTE  veut 
bien  rendre  aux  Provinces  ces  antiques  representans,  &  qu’il  ne  soit 
fait  par  leur  ministere  aucune  plainte  bien  fondee  de  l’administration, 
ce  sera  une  premiere  preuve  de  l’utilite  de  cet  etablissement ;  &  que 
si,  malgre  la  rarete  ou  le  peu  de  succes  de  leurs  plaintes,  Padministra- 
tion  fait  encore  des  efforts  &  cherche  des  pretextes  pour  se  debarrasser 
de  cette  censure  incommode,  ce  sera  le  complement  de  cette  preuve. 

[154]  Enfin  quand  nous  avons  represent^  les  inconveniens  des  deux 
premieres  repartitions  qui  se  font  arbitrairement  dans  votre  Conseil, 
nous  ne  vous  avons  indique  aucun  moyen  d’y  remedier,  parce  que 
jusqu’a  present  il  n’y  a  personne  dans  les  Provinces  qui  en  connoisse 


46 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


assez  bien  la  situation  pour  la  faire  connoitre  a  votre  Conseil.  Mais 
quand  il  y  aura  dans  le  ressort  de  chaque  Election,  des  citoyens  qui 
auront  assist^  avec  mission  dans  un  ddpartement,  ou  la  repartition  de 
tout  ce  qui  se  leve  sur  la  Province  aura  £t£  faite  en  leur  presence,  ils 
seront  en  £tat  de  donner  des  m£moires  instructifs,  &  nous  ne  doutons 
pas  que  VOTRE  MAJESTfe  ne  leur  permette  &  ne  leur  ordonne  meme 
de  faire  passer  de  tels  m£moires  aux  Ministres  de  la  Finance,  &  a  tous 
ceux  qui  composent  le  Conseil :  alors  les  Intendans  auront  des  con- 
tradicteurs,  &  le  peuple  des  d^fenseurs. 

[155]  Et  nous  croyons,  SIRE,  que  les  Intendans  qui  r^gissent  k 
present  vos  Provinces,  ne  craindront  point  d’etre  exposes  a  cette 
contradiction.  Nous  croyons  qu’eux  &  les  Ministres  qui  composent 
actuellement  votre  Conseil,  desireront  ardemment  d’etre  £clair£s  & 
guides  dans  une  operation  aussi  importante  que  la  repartition  des 
impots,  qui  cependant  jusqu’a  present  ne  se  pouvoit  faire  qu’au  hasard. 

[156]  Les  deux  autres  impositions  dont  nous  allons  entretenir 
VOTRE  MAJESTE,  sont  etablies  sur  des  principes  diff^rens  de  ceux 
de  la  taille.  Nous  avons  d£ja  observe  que  la  taille  est  le  plus  ancien 
des  impots  directs,  &  que  pendant  long-temps  ce  fut  le  seul.  Elle  fut 
creee  par  Charles  VII,  pour  subvenir  a  la  solde  des  troupes  regiees 
qui,  vers  ce  siecle,  furent  etablies  dans  presque  toute  l’Europe.  Ce¬ 
pendant  la  Noblesse  etoit  toujours  assujettie  au  service  militaire  de 
fief;  il  etoit  done  juste  qu’elle  fut  exempte  de  la  taille. 

[157]  Mais  dans  les  siecles  suivans  le  service  militaire  fut  tout-a- 
fait  oublie,  &  la  Noblesse  ne  servit  plus  l’Etat  que  dans  des  troupes 
enregimentees  &  soudoyees.  Dans  le  meme  temps  on  commenga  a 
moins  respecter  les  privileges  de  la  Noblesse,  parce  qu’^tant  accord^s 
a  des  charges  v£nales,  ils  devinrent  le  partage  de  la  richesse.  Alors 
les  Administrateurs  des  finances  congurent  le  projet  de  les  enfreindre; 
mais  ce  fut  d’abord  indirectement,  &  la  plus  forte  de  ces  infractions 
fut  d’imposer  les  roturiers  pour  les  biens  qu’ils  tenoient  a  ferme  dts 
Nobles  ou  autres  exempts.  Enfin  Louis  XIV,  dans  ses  dernieres 
guerres,  cr£a  deux  impots  auxquels  les  Nobles  &  les  privil^gies  furent 
assujettis  directement  en  leur  nom ;  ce  fut  d’abord  la  capitation,  & 
ensuite  le  dixieme. 

[158]  Nous  nous  ^tendrons  peu  sur  la  capitation  ;  nous  croyons  que 
ce  que  nous  aurions  a  en  dire  seroit  superflu.  En  effet,  cette  imposi¬ 
tion  est  ttop  vicieuse,  sous  quelque  aspect  qu’on  la  considere,  pour  que 
jes  Ministres  de  VOTRE  MAJESTY  n’en  soient  pas  convaincus.  Elle 


the  Capiiation. 


47 


a  ete  etabjie  dans  des  temps  malheureux  ou  l’on  saisissoit  sans  examen 
toutes  les  ressources  qui  se  pr£sentoient.  En  1713,  lors  de  la  paix 
faite  apres  une  guerre  malheureuse,  Louis  XIV  ne  crut  pas  pouvoir 
remplir  l’engagement  qu’il  avoit  pris  avec  ses  peuples  de  la  supprimer, 
&  cette  imposition  a  eu  depuis  le  meme  sort  que  beaucoup  d’autres; 
on  a  mieux  aim£  conserver  un  impot  vicieux  &  enregistre,  que  d'en 
substituer  un  plus  raisonnable,  mais  qu’il  auroit  fallu  soumettre  a  la 
critique  de  l’enregistrement. 

[159]  D’ailleurs,  un  interet  encore  plus  puissant  a  rendu  cette  im¬ 
position  plus  pr£cieuse  que  toutes  les  autres  aux  yeux  de  quelques 
Administrateurs  ;  c’est  l’arbitraire  qui  y  regne.  II  est  tel,  que  les 
exc£dens  de  capitation,  dont  la  somme  est  incertaine  &  variable,  son 
enticement  a  la  disposition  des  Administrateurs;  &  c’est  cette  somme 
qui  est  r£serv£e  depuis  long-  temps  pour  les  d£penses  favorites  & 
secretes. 

[160]  VOTRE  MAJESTY  concevra  a  present  pourquoi  on  a  ferme 
les  yeux  sur  les  inconveniens  Cidens  de  la  capitation.  Peut-etre 
dira-t-on  aujourd’hui  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  que  ces  excedens  de 
capitation  sont  n^cessaires,  parce  que  ce  sont  les  seuls  fonds  avec 
lesquels  on  puisse  faire  des  depenses  utiles  pour  les  Provinces.  Si 
cela  est,  il  faudroit  que  VOTRE  MAJEST&  s’informat  des  moyens 
qu’on  employoit  avant  que  la  capitation  fut  connue  en  France. 

[16 1]  Au  fond,  SIRE,  non-seulement  la  capitation  de  vos  Sujets  est 
fix6e  a  la  volonte  d’un  seul  homme,  non  seulement  les  roles  en  sont 
secrets,  mais  ceux  qui  sont  charges  de  cette  repartition,  &  qui  voud- 
roient  ne  la  pas  faire  arbitrairement,  n’ont  aucune  regie  qui  puisse  les 
guider. 

[162]  Autrefois  un  Gentilhomme  de  chaque  Generalite  devoit  etre 
associe  a  l’lntendant  pour  faire  les  roles  de  la  Noblesse  :  cette  formality 
est  tombee  en  desuetude,  &  il  faut  y  avoir  peu  de  regret;  car  ce 
Gentilhomme  n’Coit  point  choisi  par  la  Province ;  il  Coit  noninie 
par  le  Gouvernement,  &  toujours  sur  la  presentation  de  l’lntendant : 
ainsi  ce  n’^toit  qu’un  temoin  oisif  de  ses  operations. 

[163]  Il  est  cependant  quelques  ordres  de  citoyens  dont  la  capita¬ 
tion  n’est  point  arbitraire.  Par  exemple,  la  capitation  des  taillables 
est  devenue  un  accessoire  de  la  taille.  On  permet  aussi,  dans  quelques 
grandes  villes,  aux  Communautes  d’artisans  de  r^partir  cette  imposition 
sur  elles  memes,  &  on  a  rem^die  par  ce  moyen  a  l’arbitraire  pour  la 
repartition  entre  ces  contribuables.  Mais  d’apres  quelle  loi,  d’apres 


48 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


quelle  regie  la  somme  g£n£rale  doit-elle  etre  impos^e  sur  chaque  corps' 
(Partisans?  C’est  ce  que  nous  ignorons,  &  ce  qui  vraisemblablement 
depend  tout-a-fait  de  la  volonte  des  Administrateurs. 

[164]  II  est  aussi  d’autres  Sujets  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE  dont  la 
capitation  est  fixee;  ce  sont  ceux  qui  la  paient  par  retenue  sur  les 
gages  de  leurs  offices.  Mais  si  celle-la  n’est  pas  arbitraire,  elle  est 
injuste.  Elle  ne  le  seroit  pas,  si  la  capitation  £toit  un  impot  r£el  qui 
affectat  chacun  des  biens  des  contribuables.  Elle  est  injuste,  puisque 
c’est  un  impot  personnel  qu’on  devroit  proportionner  a  toutes  les 
facultes  de  ceux  qui  sont  imposes.  Or  il  y  a  souvent  une  tres-grande 
difference  de  fortune  entre  ceux  qui  possedent  une  charge  semblable ; 
cependant  ils  paient  la  meme  capitation. 

[165]  Pour  celle  qui  ne  se  leve  ni  par  retenue  des  gages,  ni  par 
contribution  des  Corps  &  Communaut^s,  ni  comme  accessoire  de  la 
taille,  c  est  un  impot  absolument  arbitraire,  c’est  un  asservissement 
honteux  de  tous  les  citoyens  aux  Administrateurs.  Si  nous  voulions 
faire  connoitre  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  tous  les  abus  qui  en  ont  result^, 
nous  craindrions  d  etre  soup^onn^s  d’exag£ration.  Par  exemple,  seroit- 
on  cru  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  si  on  lui  alleguoit  qu’on  a  vu  des 
Intendans  se  glorifier  d’avoir  menace  des  habitans  de  leur  G£nOalit6 
de  les  doubler  a  la  capitation,  s’ils  ne  se  pretoient  a  des  arrangemens 
que  sans  doute  ces  Administrateurs  croyoient  utiles  a  la  Province,  rnais 
auxquels  ils  n  avoient  pas  le  droit  de  forcer  directement  des  citoyens? 

[166]  II  nous  est  impossible,  SIRE,  de  vous  donner  la  preuve  de 
tous  les  faits  de  ce  genre,  puisqu’un  des  vices  principaux  de  cette  im¬ 
position  est  la  clandestinite.  II  est  cependant  un  abus  qui  se  commet 
tous  les  ans,  &  qui  est  d’un  genre  si  grave,  que  nous  nous  croyons 
obliges  d  en  avertir  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  quoique  nous  ne  puissions  pas 
le  prouver;  mais  il  sera  ais£  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  de  le  verifier. 

[167]  Daignez,  SIRE,  faire  constater  s’il  est  vrai  que  dans  beaucoup 
de  \  illes  on  impose  chaque  ann^e  tous  les  Officiers  de  Justice  a  une 
capitation  plus  forte  que  celle  qu’on  peut  leur  faire  payer,  ce  qui  les 
force  a  venir  demander  une  grace  a  l’lntendant,  &  les  met  aussi  dans 
la  d^pendance  absolue  de  ce  Magistral  Et  sur  qui  s’exerce  cette 
tyrannie?  Sur  les  Juges  qui  ont  a  statuer  sur  le  sort  des  homines,  par 
consequent  sur  l’ordre  de  citoyens  auquel  il  seroit  le  plus  necessaire  de 
conserver  sa  liberty  &  son  inddpendance.  Voila,  SIRE,  a  quoi  servent 
les  impositions  arbitraires  &  clandestines,  &  jusqu’ou  peuvent  se  porter 
des  despotes  qui  sont  surs  de  n’etre  ni  surveillds  ni  critiques.  En  efifet. 


the  Capitation. 


49 


sans  diminuer  le  pouvoir  des  Intendans,  si  on  les  obligeoit  settlement  a 
publier  les  roles  de  la  capitation,  il  ne  seioit  pas  possible  qu’ilsy  laissas- 
sent  voir  une  quote  sur  chaque  juge  qui  seroit  diminuee  tous  les  ans, 
except^  dans  l’ann£e  ou  ce  Juge  leur  auroit  deplu. 

[ 1 68]  Nous  ne  vous  disons  rien  de  plus,  SIRE,  sur  la  capitation ; 
nous  sommes  seulement  obliges  de  revendiquer  notre  jurisdiction  sur 
cet  objet.  La  capitation  est  un  impot ;  par  consequent  votre  Cour 
des  Aides  devroit  en  connoitre,  &  elle  ne  peut  se  dispenser  de  reclamer 
son  droit  dans’toutes  les  occasions,  parce  qu’elle  ne  doit  jamais  renoncer 
volontairement  a  aucune  portion  de  la  jurisdiction  qui  lui  a  ete  donn£e 
pour  le  bien  du  peuple,  &  pour  le  maintien  de  la  justice. 

[169]  Mais  ce  que  nous  demandons  bien  plus  vivement  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTY,  c’est  de  r^voquer  tout-a-fait  la  capitation,  qui  est  une  source 
intarissable  d’injustices,  ou  au  moins  d’en  changer  entierement  la 
nature;  &  nous  rendons,  SIRE,  aux  Magistrats  Municipaux  de  Paris  & 
aux  Intendans  de  Provinces  la  justice  de  croire  qu’ils  desirent  ardem- 
ment  d’etre  decharges  de  cette  repartition  fantastique,  &  aussi  desa- 
gr£able  pour  des  Magistrats  qui  aiment  la  regie,  qu’elle  est  chere  a  ceux 
qui  veulent  en  abuser. 

[170]  II  est  temps,  SIRE,  de  parler  a  VOTRE  MAJEST&  du 
vingtieme,  cet  impot  qui  est  aujourd’hui  l’objet  des  plus  fortes  reclama¬ 
tions  du  peuple,  parce  qu’il  avoit  e te  regarde  comme  une  ressource 
extraordinaire  reservee  pour  les  temps  malheureux,  jusqu’au  moment 
ou  Ton  a  profite  de  l’absence  de  la  Magistrature  pour  en  faire  un  impot 
perpetuel.  Nous  serions  exposes,  SIRE,  aux  reproches  les  plus  justes 
de  toute  la  Nation,  si  nous  ne  faisions  les  plus  grands  efforts  pour 
obtenir  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE  d’en  fixer  la  duree.  S'il  est  vrai  que  la 
prolongation  de  cette  imposition  pendant  la  paix  fut  necessaire  pour 
payer  les  dettes  de  la  guerre,  falloit-il  oter  au  peuple  l’esperance  d’en 
voir  le  terme?  Et  quelle  necessite  d’accabler  la  Nation  par  cette 
perspective  de  perpetuite? 

£171]]  Depuis  quarante  ans  cette  imposition  a  ete  renouveliee 
presque  sans  discontinuation ;  &  VOTRE  MAJESTE  s^ait  combien 
peu  de  resistance  a  eprouve  chacun  de  ces  renouvellemens.  C  etoit 
seulement  une  occasion  de  mettre  sous  les  yeux  du  Roi  la  malheureuse 
situation  de  son  peuple;  auroit-on  du  priver  de  cette  consolation  un 
peuple  si  r£elleme.nt  malheureux?  Mais  nous  ne  craignons  pas,  SIRE, 
que  sous  votre  regne,  des  representations  faites  pour  le  peuple  ne  soient 
qu’une  simple  consolation. 

4 


5° 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[172]  Nous  supplions  VOTRE  MAJESTfe  de  se  rappeller  ce  qui 
vient  de  lui  etre  dit  de  la  capitation.  Si  apres  la  guerre  de  1701  le 
terme  de  cette  imposition  eut  ete  fixe,  &  qu’on  se  fut  content^  de  la 
prolonger  par  des  renouvellemens  successifs,  peut-etre  se  seroit-il  trouvd 
un  moment  favorable  ou  les  Cours  en  auroient  fait  reconnoitre  les 
abus,  &  au  moins  les  Administrateurs  ne  se  seroient  pas  port£s  a  tarn 
d’exces,  s’ils  avoient  eu  a  craindre  qu’a  chaque  renouvellement  leur 
conduite  fut  critiqu^e. 

[173]  C’est  ce  qui  etoit  arrive,  SIRE,  a  l’occasion  du  vingtfeme, 
avant  qu’il  fut  rendu  perp^tuel.  On  avoit  reconnu  en  1763  que  cet 
impot,  deja  si  on^reux  par  lui-meme,  l’£toit  devenu  encore  davantage 
par  l’inquisition  qu’on  exerqoit  pour  le  lever;  &  dans  le  temps  d’un 
renouvellement  le  Parlement  de  Paris  y  avoit  rem^die  par  une  clause 
qui  ne  fut  point  d£sapprouv£e  par  le  Roi,  &  qui  fut  imit^e  par  toutes 
les  autres  Cours.  L’objet  du  Parlement  £toit  de  mettre  un  terme  aux 
inquisitions,  &  pour  cela  on  d6fendit  d’augmenter  les  quotes  de  l’ann£e 
1763.  Mais  cette  clause,  qui  remedioit  aux  abus,  d£plut  a  ceux  qui 
vouloient  les  conserver ;  aussi  quand  l’impot  a  ete  retabli  en  notre 
absence,  la  clause  n’a  £t£  mise  ni  dans  la  loi  meme,  ni  dans  l’enregistre- 
ment  fait  par  ceux  qui  occupoient  nos  places. 

[174]  Le  peuple  n’a  pas  tard£  a  ressentir  les  cruels  effets  de  cet 
impot  rdtabli  sans  la  clause  de  1763  ;  car  dans  l’instant  meme  presque 
tous  les  sujets  de  VOTRE  MAJEST&  ont  vu  augmenter  consid^rable- 
ment  leurs  quotes,  sans  qu’il  leur  fut  donn£  aucune  raison  de  cette 
augmentation  subite,  &on  a  annonce  dans  tout  le  Royaume  de  nouvelles 
recherches,  &  une  rigueur  dont  il  n’y  avoit  pas  encore  eu  d’exemples ; 
comme  si  les  Administrateurs  avoient  voulu  se  venger  de  la  contrainte 
oil  ils  avoient  £t£  depuis  1763  jusqu’en  1771  ;  oserons-nous  dire,  SIRE? 
comme  s’ils  avoient  voulu  faire  sentir  au  peuple  tout  ce  qu’il  avoit 
perdu  en  perdant  ses  anciens  Magistrats. 

[175]  Les  choses  en  sont  venues  au  point  qu’aujourd’hui  la  perpe- 
tuite  meme  de  l’impot  est  peut-etre  moins  accablante  pour  le  peuple, 
que  le  despotisme  qu’il  entraine.  Voila,  SIRE,  l’objet  duquel  il  est 
n^cessaire  que  VOTRE  MAJEST&  daigne  s’occuper,  &  nous  crovons 
qu’il  n’en  est  aucun  qui  soit  plus  digne  de  son  attention  :  car  c’est  la 
nature  meme  des  impositions  qu’il  faut  examiner;  ce  sont  les  principes 
fondamentaux  de  cette  partie  de  1’administration  que  nous  allons  tacher 
d’eclaircir. 

[176]  En  effet,  si  nous  ne  demandions  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  que 


THE  TWENTIETHS. 


5  r 


de  fixer  la  dur£e  du  vingtieme,  ce  seroit  uniquement  votre  amour  pour 
vos  peuples  que  nous  aurions  a  invoquer ;  mais  pour  faire  connoitre  la 
n£cessit£  de  rdtablir  la  clause  de  1763,  ou  d’y  substituer  quelque  autre 
disposition  equivalente,  il  faut  donner  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  une 
notion  simple  &  juste  de  cet  impot,  qui  a  £te  connu  en  France  au 
commencement  de  ce  siecle,  sous  le  nom  de  dixieme,  &  depuis  sous 
celui  de  vingtieme,  de  sou  pour  livre  du  dixieme,  &c.  &  pour  rendre 
cette  definition  claire  &  sensible,  il  faut  remonter  au  principe,  il  faut 
determiner  la  vraie  nature  des  impots  reels. 

[177]  On  nomine,  SIRE,  impot  r£el  celui  qui  se  leve,  non  sur  la 
personne  des  contribuables,  mais  sur  leurs  biens;  en  sorte  que  c’est 
chaque  bien,  chaque  fonds  de  terre  qui  est  impose  proportionnellement 
a  son  produit.  Toutes  les  fois  qu’on  veut  etablir  un  tel  impot,  il  semble 
qu’on  doit  commencer  par  determiner  la  somme  totale  que  le  Roi  veut 
percevoir  sur  son  peuple,  &  chercher  ensuite  la  forme  de  repartition 
&  de  perception  la  moins  dispendieuse  pour  le  Roi,  &  qui  livre  le  moins 
le  peuple  au  pouvoir  arbitraire,  &  aux  vexations  qui  en  sont  la  suite 
necessaire. 

[178]  Ce  n’est  point  la  ce  qu’on  a  fait  dans  l’imposition  du  dixieme 
&  des  vingtiemes  ;  on  a  voulu  que  chaque  particular  portat  au  tresor 
Royal  une  certaine  portion  de  son  revenu;  &  pour  faire  executer  cette 
loi,  on  a  etabli,  sur-tout  dans  les  derniers  temps,  une  r£gie  qui  a  le 
double  d^faut  de  couter  au  Roi  des  frais  considerables,  &  de  soumettre 
le  peuple  au  pouvoir  arbitraire.  Sur  cela  nous  representons  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTF1,  premi^rement,  qu’une  imposition  reelle  dont  la  somme 
totale  n’est  pas  fix£e,  est  une  injustice  commise  envers  la  nation; 
secondement,  que  ce  genre  d’imposition  est  vicieux  en  lui-meme,  parce 
qu’il  entraine  n^cessairement  &  les  frais  &  Parbitraire. 

[r79]  Nous  osons  dire  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  qu’un  tel  impot  est 
une  injustice  commise  envers  la  Nation,  d’apres  le  grand  principe  qu’un 
Roi  ne  doit  jamais  imposer  sur  ses  sujets  ni  plus  ni  moins  que  ce 
qu’exigent  les  besoins  de  l’Etat.  En  effet,  si  un  impot  tel  que  le 
dixieme  ou  les  vingtiemes,  produit  moins  qu’il  ne  faut  pour  le  besoin 
de  l’Etat,  il  faut  chercher  d’autres  ressources,  &  on  en  trouve  qui  sont 
moins  on^reuses  au  peuple  qu’un  impot  direct.  Si  au  contraire  le 
dixieme  ou  vingtieme  produit  plus  qu’il  n’est  necessaire,  vous  ne  pouvez 
pas  douter,  SIRE,  que  ce  surplus  ne  soit  employ^  a  des  d^penses  pour 
lesquelles  il  n’auroit  pas  £t£  juste  de  mettre  un  nouvel  impot  sur  vos 
peuples. 


52 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[180]  Nous  avons  dit  aussi  que  ce  genre  d’imposition  entraine 
n^cessairement  les  frais  &  l’arbitraire.  Pour  rendre  cette  verite  sensi¬ 
ble,  il  faut  faire  connoitre  a  VOIRE  MAJESTY  les  differentes  formes 
de  repartitions  employees  dans  les  differentes  Provinces  pour  les  im¬ 
positions  dont  la  somrne  est  fixee.  Nous  en  examinerons  le  plus 
sommairement  qu’il  sera  possible  les  avantages  &  les  inconveniens 
reciproques,  &  il  sera  aise  de  se  convaincre  que  rimposition  du 
vingtieme  reunit  tous  les  inconveniens;  qu’elle  occasionne  plus  de  frais, 
plus  de  despotisme  &  plus  d'injustices  de  tous  les  genres  qu’aucune 
espece  de  repartition,  &  que  la  clause  de  1763  e toit  un  remede  neces- 
saire  a  apporter  a  des  abus  qui  ne  pouvoient  plus  etre  supportes. 

[x8i]  Il  est  des  pays  ou,  quand  la  somme  de  l’imposition  est 
determinee,  on  en  laisse  faire  chaque  annee  la  repartition  par  les 
contribuables  eux-memes.  Il  en  est  d’autres  ou  l’on  fait  un  cadastre, 
c  est-^-dire,  une  evaluation  fixe  de  tous  les  biens  des  contribuables, 
d’apres  laquelle  les  sommes  imposees  chaque  annee  se  trouvent  reparties 
par  une  simple  operation  d’arithmetique,  &  sans  que  personne  s’en 
mele.  Il  y  a  des  raisons  de  preference  pour  &  contre  ces  deux  sys- 
temes  de  repartition. 

[182]  On  peut  dire  en  faveur  de  la  repartition  annuelle  par  les 
contribuables,  qu  elle  n  entraine  aucuns  frais,  &  ne  soumet  point  le 
peuple  au  despotisme  des  Preposes  envoyes  par  le  Gouvernement. 
On  peut  dire  aussi  que  les  contribuables  sont  les  seuls  qui  puissent  faire 
la  repartition  avec  justice,  parce  qu’il  n’est  point  de  cultivateur  qui  ne 
connoisse  tr^s-bien  la  valeur  de  la  terre  de  son  voisin,  &  qu’il  est  im¬ 
possible  qu’un  etranger  acquiere  jamais  cet,te  connoissance.  Aussi 
soutient-on  que  tous  les  cadastres  sont  injustes,  qu’on  en  convient  dans 
les  Provinces  cadastres,  &  que  cette  injustice  provient,  ou  de  ce  que 
le  cadastre  a  ete  fait  originairement  par  des  gens  incapables  de  le  bien 
faire,  parce  qu  ils  etoient  Strangers  a  la  paroisse,  ou  de  ce  que  depuis 
que  le  cadastre  est  fait,  il  est  survenu  des  variations  dans  la  valeur  des 

biens,  ce  qui  peut-arriver  &  arrive  tres-souvent  par  mille  causes 
differentes. 

[183]  Les  partisans  du  cadastre  disent  que  dans  les  Provinces 
cadastres  il  n’y  a  non  plus  ni  frais  de  repartition,  ni  arbitrage.  Il  est 
vrai  que  dans  le  temps  de  la  confection  du  cadastre  il  y  a  des  frais 
enormes,  &  une  autorite  despotique  dans  la  personne  des  Commissaires 
au  cadastre  qui  ont  a  statuer  sur  le  sort  de  tous  les  particulars ;  mais 
ce  temps  malheureux  une  fois  passe,  la  tranquillite  du  peuple  est  assume 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  A  CADASTER. 


53 

pour  toujours.  En  effet,  dans  les  pays  de  cadastres,  non-seulement  il 
n’y  a  ni  frais  ni  arbitraire,  mais  il  n’y  a  point  non  plus  de  proces ;  au- 
lieu  que  la  repartition  annuelle  entre  les  contribuables  est  une  source 
intarissable  de  divisions,  de  haines  &  de  contestations. 

[184]  Quant  a  l’objection  que  les  contribuables  ont  plus  de  con- 
noissances  de  leurs  faculty  reciproques  que  ne  peut  en  avoir  un  Com- 
rnissaire  Stranger,  on  repond  qu’ils  ont  aussi  des  interets  personnels  & 
des  passions  qui  les  empechent  d’op£rer  avec  justice.  Or  on  pretend 
avoir  remedie  a  tout  a-la-fois,  en  faisant  faire  le  cadastre  par  un  Com- 
missaire.  Cet  homme  btranger  a  la  paroisse  ne  doit  avoir  d’autre 
interet  que  celui  de  la  justice ;  &  si  les  connoissances  du  local  lui 
manquent,  il  y  suppRe  en  ecoutant  contradictoirement  les  contribua¬ 
bles,  dont  l’universalite  a  toujours  interet  a  contredire  chaque  declara¬ 
tion  particuliere. 

[185]  On  dit  aussi  en  faveur  du  cadastre,  &  contre  la  repartition 

annuelle  par  les  contribuables,  que  cette  connoissance  de  leurs  facultes 
reciproques  qu’ont  les  contribuables,  ne  peut  servir  que  pour  la  reparti¬ 
tion  entre  les  habitans  d’une  meme  Communaute  ;  mais  il  y  a  aussi  des 
repartitions  a  faire  entre  les  Communautes  de  chaque  Province,  &  entre 
toutes  les  Provinces  du  Royaume,  &  on  soutient  que  celles-la  ne  peuvent 
etre  faites  avec  justice  que  par  un  cadastre,  &  par  des  Commissaires 
envoyes  par  le  Gouvernement.  * 

[186]  Il  est  bon  de  faire  observer  a  VOTRE  MAJESTfe  que  cette 
derniere  objection  contre  la  repartition  par  les  contribuables,  n’a  lieu 
que  parce  qu’on  ne  veut  pas  que  les  Communautes  &  les  Provinces 
aient  des  represen  tans;  car  si  elles  en  avoient,  rien  n’empecheroit  que 
toutes  les  Communautes  ne  s’assemblassent  par  ces  representans,  &  ne 
repartissent  elles-memes  sur  elles-memes  la  somme  imposee  sur  la 
Province,  comme  les  habitans  d’une  Communaute  peuvent  repartir 
eux-memes  &  sur  eux-memes  la  somme  imposee  sur  la  Communaute. 
Peut-etre  reuniroit-on  tous  les  avantages  en  faisant  faire  un  cadastre 
par  les  contribuables  eux-memes,  &  non  par  des  Commissaires :  des 
qu’il  seroit  fait,  il  n’y  auroit  plus  jamais  ni  frais,  ni  arbitraire,  ni  proces ; 
&  comme  il  auroit  e te  fait  par  ceux  qui  connoissent  par  eux-memes  la 
valeur  des  biens,  &  entre  qui  J’interet  commun  est  que  chacun  soit 
impose  avec  justice,  il  y  a  lieu  de  croire  que  cette  repartition  seroit 
plus  juste  que  toute  autre. 

[187]  Ce  genre  de  cadastre  auroit  encore  un  avantage,  c’est  que 
quand  il  surviendroit  une  variation  dans  la  valeur  des  biens,  qui  rendioit 


54 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


necessaire  une  reformation  de  cadastre,  la  Communaute  elle-meme 
verroit  cette  necessity,  &  pourroit  proc^der  a  cette  reformation,  sans 
attendre  qu’elle  fut  ordonnt§e  par  le  Gouvernement. 

[188]  Enfin  en  faisant  faire  ainsi  le  cadastre,  on  y  gagne  tous  les 
frais  de  la  confection,  qui  sont  enormes,  &  qui  le  plus  souvent  empechent 
d’employer  cette  forme  de  repartition.  En  effet,  ces  frais  sont  pre- 
mierement  ceux  du  sejour  d’un  Commissaire  etranger  successivement 
dans  tous  les  villages  d’une  Province,  &  ceux-la  n’auroient  pas  lieu. 
Secondement  ceux  de  l’arpentage  ;  &  nous  croyons  aussi  qu’on  pourroit 
s’en  passer ;  car  nous  concevons  que  l’arpentage  est  necessaire  a  un 
Commissaire  etranger,  qui,  ne  connoissant  pas  par  lui-meme  la  valeur 
des  terres,  ne  peut  que  s’informer  en  general  de  celles  qui  sont  bonnes, 
mauvaises  ou  mediocres,  &  imposer  chaque  fonds  a  raison  du  nornbre 
d’arpens  qu’il  contient,  &  qu’il  croit  etre  de  bonne,  mauvaise  ou 
mediocre  qualite  :  mais  les  gens  du  pays,  qui  ont  la  science  directe  de 
la  valeur  de  chaque  piece  de  terre,  n’ont  pas  besoin  de  ce  travail,  & 
peuvent  faire  leur  cadastre  sans  arpentage  prealable. 

[189]  Disons  plus:  le  cadastre  se  fera  de  lui-meme,  sans  que  le 
Gouvernement  l’ordonne,  pourvu  que  I’impot  reparti  sur  les  contri- 
buables  soit  un  impot  reel,  un  impot  dont  chaque  quote  s’applique  a 
chaque  piece  de  terre,  &  que  chacune  de  ces  pieces  de  terre  soit/ 
exactement  designee.  En  effet,  quand  il  y  aura  eu  une  fois  un  roH 
bien  fait  dans  une  Paroisse,  tous  les  fonds  s’y  trouveront  £valu£s.  On 
sgaura  que  le  role  de  cette  ann£e  etoit  bien  fait,  parce  qu’une  Com- 
munaute  d’Habitans  est  un  public,  &  qu’aucun  ne  se  refuse  a  une  verite 
£vidente.  Ce  role  reconnu  pour  bon  sera  done  le  cadastre. 

[190]  Si  jusqu’a  present  l’impot  de  la  taille  qui  se  r£partit  par  les 
contribuables,  n’a  point  produit  de  cadastre  entre  les  taillables,  malgr£ 
les  roles  qui  se  font  tous  les  ans,  e’est  que  la  taille  n’est  point  un  impot 
reel,  que  les  quotes  ne  s’appliquent  point  a  chaque  bien,  qu’on  impose 
chaque  contribuable  pour  la  totality  des  biens  qu’il  possede,  ce  qui 
change  d  une  ann£e  a  l’autre ;  qu’on  fait  aussi  entrer  dans  le  motif  de 
la  quote  le  commerce  &  l’industrie ;  qu’il  y  a  des  privileges  personnels ; 
en  sorte  que  le  bien  pour  lequel  on  a  impost  une  annee  le  roturier 
taillable,  est  poss£d£  une  autre  ann£e  par  un  exempt:'  ainsi  les 
roles  d  une  ann£e  sont  inutiles  pour  les  ann^es  suivantes. 

[191]  Voila,  SIRE,  a  peu  pres  ce  qu’il  y  a  a  dire  sur  les  deux 
formes  usit^es  pour  la  repartition  d’une  imposition  dont  la  somme  est 
fixee.  II  peut  y  avoir  sur  cela  diff^rentes  opinions,  entre  lesquelles 


DISADVANTAGES  OF  THE  TWENTIETHS. 


55 


nous  ne  prendrons  aucun  parti,  car  nous  ne  voulons  presenter  a 
VOTRE  MAJESTE  sur  cet  objet  que  des  v£rit£s  incontestables.  Or 
la  verity  incontestable  est  que  l’impot  du  dixieme  ou  des  vingtieraes, 
l’impot  ou  1’on  n’a  point  une  somme  a  r^partir,  mais  ou  I’on  exige  de 
tous  les  particuliers  une  certaine  portion  du  produit  de  leurs  biens,  a 
par  sa  nature  plus  d’inconveniens,  entraine  plus  de  frais,  occasionne 
plus  d’injustices  qu’aucune  des  difiterentes  repartitions  dont  nous 
venons  de  donner  le  tableau.  Voila  ce  qu’il  faut  demontrer  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTE,  &  nous  lui  ferons  connoitre  ensuite  qu’a  ces  vices  derivans 
de  la  nature  de  l’imposition,  on  a  ajout£  en  France  une  clandestine 
inutile. 

[192]  Nous  avons  observe  que  dans  les  repartitions  entre  les  con- 
tribuables  il  n’y  a  point  de  frais  &  point  d’arbitraire,  mais  qu’il  y  a  des 
proces  continuels  ;  &  que  dans  le  cadastre  il  n’y  a  ni  frais,  ni  arbitraire, 
ni  proces,  lorsque  le  cadastre  est  fait ;  mais  que  la  confection  exige  de 
grands  frais,  &  que  l’autorite  arbitraire  y  preside,  a  moins  qu’on  ne 
fasse  faire  le  cadastre  par  les  contribuables  eux-memes. 

[193]  Dans  l’impot  du  vingtieme,  si  on  veut  le  percevoir  avec  exacti¬ 
tude,  on  a  tous  les  ans  &  continuellement  les  memes  frais  de  r£gie  qui 
sont  n£cessaires  une  fois  pour  la  confection  d’un  cadastre :  il  faut 
aussi  que  le  Peuple  soit  soumis  a  perp£tuit£  a  ce  pouvoir  arbitraire 
auquel  il  est  soumis  pour  un  temps  pendant  la  confection  du  cadastre. 
Enfin  il  y  a  continuellement  des  proems,  comme  dans  les  pays  ou  la 
repartition  se  fait  tous  les  ans  par  les  contribuables,  &  n’a  pas  encore 
produit  une  evaluation  certaine. 

[194]  Tous  ces  inconveniens  de  l’imposition  du  vingtieme  ont  une 
cause  commune ;  e’est  que  dans  le  systeme  de  cet  impot  le  Roi  a  en 
son  nom  un  proces  continuel  avec  chaque  particulier  de  son  Royaume, 
&  que  ce  proces  depend  de  revaluation  de  chaque  piece  de  terre. 

[195]  Il  faudroit  done,  pour  que  l’impot  fut  bien  per<;u,  qu’il  y  eftt 
dans  chaque  lieu  un  homme  du  Roi  charge  de  stipuler  ses  interets.  Il 
faudroit  done  couvrir  la  France  entiere  d’une  armee  de  Commis ;  &  si 
jusqu’a  present  le  nombre  de  ces  Commis  n’est  pas  si  considerable, 
e’est  que  l’impot  n’est  pas  encore  per^u  avec  toute  la  rigueur  dont  il 
est  susceptible,  &  a  laquelle  il  est  certain  qu’on  le  portera  un  jour,  si 
VOTRE  MAJEST&  n’y  met  un  frein  en  corrigeant  la  loi.  Aussi  il  est 
certain  que  cette  rigueur,  &  les  frais  qu’elle  entraine,  ont  continuelle¬ 
ment  augment^  depuis  que  cet  impot  existe,  except^  pendant  le  temps 
qu’a  dur£  la  clause  de  1763.  Outre  ces  frais  perpetuels,  nous  disons 


56 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS, 


qu’il  y  a  aussi  un  arbitraire  perpetuel;  car  il  n’est  pas  possible  que  la 
pouvoir  de  ces  Preposes  ne  soit  pas  arbitraire.  Us  ont,  dit-on, 
rintendant  pour  Juge;  mais  est-il  possible  que  l’Intendant  prononce 
en  connoissance  de  cause  sur  autant  de  proces  qu’il  y  a  de  fonds  de 
biens  dans  sa  Generalite?  Et  comment  tous  ces  proces  pourrdient-ils 
etre  instruits?  II  faut  done  absolument  qu’il  s’en  rapporte  au  Prepose. 
Ce  Prepose  est  done  le  vrai  Juge  des  Peuples. 

[196]  Or  peut-on  douter,  SIRE,  que  le  Gouvernement  ne  donne  a 
chacun  de  ces  Preposes  une  gratification  lorsqu’il  a  fait  augmenter  la 
totality  des  quotes  du  vingtieme  dans  son  d^partement?  En  eftet, 
sans  cet  encouragement,  quel  seroit  l’homme  qui  iroit  s’exposer  gratuite- 
ment  a  la  haine  de  tout  un  pays?  Cependant  il  s’ensuit  que  non- 
seulement  un  pouvoir  arbitraire  preside  a  cette  imposition,  mais  que 
celui  a  qui  ce  pouvoir  est  confix,  a  interet  de  vexer  IdPeuple.:  &  n^an- 
moins  il  faut  avouer  que  cet  encouragement  a  la  vexation  n’est  pas 
encore  suffisant  pour  l’interet  de  la  Finance;  car  il  y  a  toujours  des 
contribuables  qui  s^avent  donner  au  Prepose  des  motifs  encore  plus 
puissans  pour  les  manager.  Et  daignez,  SIRE,  consumer  a  cette 
occasion,  que  tel  est  le  double  inconvenient  des  impositions  arbitraires; 
on  y  vexe  le  foible  sous  pr^texte  de  l’interet  du  Roi,  &  on  y  favorise  le 
puissant  ou  l’intrigant  contre  1’inte ret  du  Roi. 

[*97]  Enfin  nous  disons  aussi  que  le  vingtieme  doit  etre,  comme  la 
taille,  une  source  intarissable  de  proces.  11  est  evident  que  cela  doit 
arriver  jusqu  a  ce  que  le  proces  general  du  Roi  avec  tous  les  particuliers 
de  son  Royaume  soit  irrevocablement  termine,  e’est-a-dire,  qu’on  ait 
fait  un  cadastre  par  le  moyen  des  roles  du  vingtieme.  Or  nous  croyons, 
SIRE,  qu  il  ne  se  (era  jamais  par  cette  voie,  ou  que  ce  ne  sera  que  tr£s- 
lentement  &  tres-imparfaitement :  en  voici  la  raison,  que  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  trouvera  sensible. 

[198]  Il  est  reconnu  qu’il  n’y  a  que  les  Habitans  d’un  pays  qui 
connoissent  reciproquement  la  valeur  de  leurs  biens:  le  cadastre  ne 
peut  done  etre  bien  fait  que  quand  il  Rest  par  eux,  ou  au  moins  avec 
eux.  Aussi  avons-nous  indiqug  comme  la  meilleure  methode  pour  faire 
faire  un  cadastre,  celle  'd’en  charger  les  Communautes  elles-memes. 
Cependant  nous  avons  aussi  observe  que  quand  on  envoie  un  Com- 
missaire  au  cadastre,  ce  Commissaire  peut  s’aider  des  lumieres  des 
Habitans,  parce  que  l’interet  general  du  pays  est  que  reparation  soit 
bien  faite,  &  que  la  declaration  de  chaque  particulier  ait  pour  contra- 
dicteur  la  Communaute  entiere.  Mais  un  Prepose  au  vingtieme  ne 


ABUSES  IN  THE  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  TWENTIETHS. 


57 


peut  s’aider  des  lumieres  de  personne,  parce  que  personne  n’a  interet 
a  l’edairer,  &  qu’au  contraire  l’interet  general  est  de  tromper  cet 
homme,  qui  est  l’ennemi  coramun  de  tout  le  pays. 

[199]  Nous  avons  aussi  annonce  a  VOTRE  MAJEST&  qu’a  ces 
inconveniens  qui  derivent  de  la  nature  de  l’imposition  d’un  dixieme 
ou  d’un  vingtieme,  on  a  joint  sans  n£cessit£  ceux  de  la  candestinite : 
on  y  trouve  meme  les  deux  genres  de  clandestinite  que  nous  avons 
definis,  celle  des  operations,  &  celle  des  personnes. 

Clandestinite  d'  Operations. 

[200]  Nous  avons  deja  expose  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY  avec  quelle 
tenacite  le  Ministere  a  empeche  que  les  roles  du  vingtieme  ne  fussent 
deposes ;  ce  qui  etoit  avouer  qu’on  vouloit  qu’il  y  efit  impunite  toutes 
les  fois  qu’il  auroit  ete  accorde  des  faveurs  ou  exerce  des  depredations. 

Clandestinite  de  Personnes. 

[201]  II  faut  qu’a  cet  egard  VOTRE  MAJESTY  sgache  ce  qui 
s’etoit  introduit  pendant  le  dernier  Ministere.  Autrefois  celui  qui  se 
croyoit  trop  impose  s’adressoit  a  l’lntendant  de  la  Province.  On 
sgavoit  bien  que  l’lntendant  s’en  rapporteroit  au  Prepose  ;  mais  au 
moins  l’lntendant,  le  Prepose,  le  contribuable  habitoient  dans  la  meme 
Province  ou  le  bien  etoit  situe  ;  ainsi  on  pouvoit  s’entendre  contradic- 
toirement,  &  il  n’etoit  pas  impossible  de  verifier  des  faits  aliegues  de  part 
&  d’autre.  Sous  le  dernier  Ministere,  il  a  sembie  que  les  Ministres 
eux-memes  fussent  jaloux  de  cette  autorite  des  Intendans  des  Provinces ; 
&  il  y  a  eu  un  instant  oil  ceux  qui  s’adressoient  a  l’lntendance,  rece- 
voient  pour  reponse  qu’actuellement  c’etoit  au  Conseil  du  Roi  qu’il  falloit 
s’adresser  directement ;  comme  s’il  etoit  possible  que  le  Conseil,  resi- 
dant  aupres  de  la  personne  du  Roi,  statuat  sur  la  valeur  d’un  arpent  de 
vigne  ou  de  pre  situe  a  l’extremite  du  Royaume.  Quel  seroit  done  le 
recours  du  particulier  qui  seroit  vexe  par  la  cupidite  ou  Panimosite 
d’un  Prepose?  On  verroit  evidemment  que  Pinjustice  qu’on  eprouve 
ne  peut  etre  que  le  fait  du  Directeur  du  vingtieme ;  &  cependant  ce 
Directeur  repondroit  froidement  que  cela  ne  le  regarde  pas;  que  les 
roles  ont  ete  faits  au  Bureau  general,  &  que  ceux  qui  se  croient  trop 
imposes,  n’ont  qu’a  faire  le  voyage  de  Paris  pour  se  plaindre. 

[202]  Cet  abus,  SIRE,  n’est  pas  ancien ;  e’est  sous  le  dernier 
Ministere  qu’il  a  ete  introduit :  nous  croyons  qu’il  ne  subsiste  plus  sous 
Je  Ministere  actuel,  &  nous  esperons  qu’on  ne  le  verra  plus  reparoitre 


58 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


sous  votre  regne.  Cependant  il  <§toit  n^cessaire  de  faire  sgavoir  a 
VOTRE  MAJESTY  qu’il  a  exists,  &  que  1’esprit  du  despotisme  &  de 
clandestinite  a  pu  se  porter  jusqu’a  cet  exces. 

[203]  II  nous  reste  actuellement  a  expliquer  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY, 
i°.  Comment  il  est  possible  que  ceux  qui  ont  voulu,  dans  l’origine, 
^tablir  en  France  un  impot  r£el,  aient  choisi  la  forme  du  dixieme  ou 
du  vingtieme,  malgr£  les  inconv£niens  que  nous  venons  d’exposer ; 

20.  Pourquoi  on  n’a  pas  change  la  nature  de  cet  impot,  quand 
l’exp^rience  en  a  fait  reconnoitre  les  abus; 

3°.  Quel  a  du  etre  l’effet  de  la  clause  de  1763  pendant  qu’elle  a  eu 
lieu. 

[204]  Nous  ne  devons  pas,  SIRE,  calomnier  la  m^moire  des  Minis- 
tres  qui,  en  l’ann^e  1710,  imaginerent  &  firent  £tablir  le  dixieme.  On. 
^toit  alors  dans  une  situation  forc£e ;  &  la  r6gie  fut  si  douce  dans  ces 
commencemens,  que  les  inconv^niens  ne  se  firent  pas  sentir.  Le 
dixieme  fut  impost  dans  un  temps  ou  les  calamity  d’une  guerre 
malheureuse  Etoient  r^unies  a  celle  de  la  famine.  Il  n’dtoit  pas 
question  de  fixer  alors  la  somme  qu’on  vouloit  lever  sur  le  Peuple :  on 
levoit  ce  qu  on  pouvoit ;  &  s’il  efit  6t6  possible  de  lever  des  sommes 
bien  plus  considerables  que  ce  que  produisoit  le  dixieme,  on  les  auroit 
employees  utilement  aux  besoins  de  l’Etat,  qui  etoient  reels  &  excessifs. 

[205]  Mais  le  grand  objet  qu’on  se  proposoit  pour-lors,  etoit  de 
faire  payer  le  dixieme  par  ceux  qui  n’etoient  pas  deja  epuises  par  la 
taille,  c’est-a-dire  par  la  Noblesse  &  les  privileges.  Or  la  plupart 
avoient  afferme  leurs  biens,  &  les  baux  etoient  sinceres,  parce  que 
jusqu  alors  on  n’avoit  eu  aucun  int£ret  a  en  faire  de  simuies.  Il  ne  fut 
done  fait  aucune  inquisition  des  facultes  de  chaque  particulier :  on  ne 
monta  point  de  regie  dispendieuse ;  chacun  donna  sa  declaration ; 

1  Intendant  en  fut  Juge,  &  il  pouvoit  y  suffire,  parce  que  toutes  les 
declarations  appuyees  sur  des  baux  n’etoient  pas  suspectes,  &  que  pour 
les  autres  on  ne  fit  aucunes,  ou  presque  aucunes  recherches. 

[206]  Quand  la  meme  imposition  fut  etablie  en  1733,  au  com¬ 
mencement  d  une  guerre  offensive,  &  apres  vingt  ans  de  paix ;  quand, 
apres  une  interruption  de  peu  d’annees,  elle  fut  renouveliee  en  1741, 
au  commencement  d’une  autre  guerre,  &  sur-tout  quand  le  dixieme  ou 
le  vingtieme  fut  continue  pendant  la  paix  pour  payer  les  dettes  de  la 
guerre,  il  auroit  fallu  commencer  par  fixer  la  somme  que  le  Roi  vouloit 
percevoir,  celle  qui  £toit  n^cessaire  pour  les  besoins  de  l’Etat. 

[207]  Ce  n  est  point  ce  qui  fut  fait.  Les  Ministres  voulurent  tirer 


ABUSES  IN  THE  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  TWENTIETHS. 


59 


de  l’imposition  tout  le  parti  possible,  &  d’autre  part  les  particuliers  qui 
se  voyoient  imposes  d’apres  leurs  baux,  employerent  aussi  toutes  les 
ruses  possibles  pour  se  soustraire  a  I’imposition  par  des  baux  simulC, 
des  pots-de-vin,  &c.  &  ce  fut  alors  que  le  Gouvernement  etablit  une 
inquisition  aussi  impracticable  qu’odieuse,  aussi  onCeuse  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  pour  les  frais,  que  pr£judiciable  au  peuple  par  les  vexations. 

[208]  C’est  alors  qu’il  auroit  fallu  reprendre  les  vrais  principes  des 
impots  r£els,  changer  enticement  la  nature  de  l’imposition  du  ving- 
tieme,  &  y  substituer  un  autre  impot  rd  qui  n’entrainat  ni  les  frais 
perpetuels  de  r£gie,  ni  un  perpCuel  despotisme :  mais  alors  il  existoit 
un  autre  intCet  que  celui  de  la  Finance,  celui  des  Administrateurs. 

[209]  En  effet,  apres  le  tableau  que  nous  venons  de  tracer,  il  est 
Evident  que  les  Administrateurs  ont  dans  cette  partie  un  pouvoir  qu’on 
ne  voit  nulle  part :  car  nous  pensons,  SIRE,  que  dans  les  pays  meme 
oil  le  peuple  est  sounds  au  despotisme  le  plus  decide,  &  oil  la  volonte 
du  Ministre  peut  faire  le  sort  de  toute  une  Province,  on  n’a  pas  reserve 
a  ce  Ministre  le  pouvoir  de  statuer  lui-meme,  de  statuer  sur  le  sort  de 
chaque  particulier  de  l’Etat.  C’est  cependant  ce  que  nous  voyons  en 
France.  Il  n’est  aucun  propriCaire  de  biens  dans  le  Royaume  qui 
n’ait  a  solliciter  les  faveurs  de  l'Administrateur  du  vingtieme,  ou  a 
craindre  les  effets  de  son  ressentiment.  Or  il  n’est  pas  dans  l’humanit6 
que  celui  qui  est  revetu  d’un  pouvoir  si  exorbitant  s’en  demette  volon- 
tairement;  &  si  cela  arrive  quelque  jour,  il  faudra  que  celui  qui  fera  ce 
sacrifice,  soit  doue  d’une  vertu  peu  commune.  Voila,  SIRE,  pourquoi 
I’impot  du  vingtieme  subsiste  tel  qu’il  est;  voila  pourquoi  il  a  toujours 
C6  prot£g£  ;  voila  pourquoi  on  a  voulu  en  faire  la  base  de  toutes  les 
autres  impositions,  malgr£  les  abus  Cidens  que  1’expCience  auroit  du 
faire  connoitre. 

[210]  C’etoit  done  la  reclamation  g£n£rale  qui  devoit  obliger  a 
reformer  une  imposition  si  vicieuse,  &  c’est  ce  qui  est  arrive  en  1763. 
Cependant,  SIRE,  il  faut  avouer  que  le  cri  public  ne  fut  pas  encore 
aussi  prompt  ni  aussi  Cergique  qu’il  auroit  dfi  l’etre,  parce  que  la 
politique  du  despotisme  est  toujours  d’avoir  de  grands  mCagemens 
pour  ceux  qui  peuvent  se  faire  entendre.  La  reclamation  fut  done 
lente,  parce  que  ce  n’Coient  pas  les  gens  puissans  qui  avoient  le  plus  a- 
se  plaindre  de  la  r£gie  du  vingtieme ;  &  ceci  mCite,  SIRE,  que 
VOTRE  MAJESTE  y  fasse  de  profondes  reflexions. 

[211]  Ce  ne  fut  done  qu’en  1763  que  le  Parlement  enregistra  une 
prorogation  du  vingtieme,  d  la  charge  que  le  pre?nier  <5^  le  second 


6o 


TRANSITIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


vingtiemes,  tant  qu'ils  auront  lieu ,  seront  per(us  sur  les  roles  aeluelsy 
dont  les  quotes  ne  pourront  e/re  augmentees ,  a  peine  contre  les  eontre- 
venans  d'etre  poursuivis  extraordinairement.  Nous  ne  devons  point 
dissimuler  a  VOTRE  MAJESTfi  que  cette  fameuse  clause  de  1763 
changeoit  enticement  la  nature  de  l’imposition,  &  la  convertissoit  en 
un  cadastre ;  &  c’est  par  la  qu’elle  remEdioit  a  tous  les  abus,  &  qu’elle 
remplissoit  toutes  les  conditions  que  nous  avons  annoncEes  comme 
nEcessaires  pour  l’Etablissement  d’un  impot  reel. 

i°.  La  somme  imposEe  sur  le  peuple  par  le  Roi  Etoit  fixEe. 

20.  II  n’y  avoit  plus  de  despotisme  des  PrEposEs  a  craindre. 

30.  Ces  Proposes  Cant  devenus  inutiles,  le  Couvernement  devoit 
s’Epargner  tous  les  frais  de  rEgie. 

[212]  Cette  clause  ne  pouvoit  done  etre  critiquEe  qu’en  disanl  que 
les  roles  de  1763  n’Coient  pas  assez  bien  faits  pour  en  faire  un 
cadastre  :  mais  c’Coit  avouer  que  le  travail  fait  depuis  bien  des  annEes 
avec  tant  de  dEpenses,  avoit  te  inutile  pour  l’objet  qu’on  s’Etoit 
propose  ;  car  les  Administrateurs  n’avoient  cessE  d’annoncer  que  par 
leurs  recherches  sur  le  vingtieme,  ils  auroient  bientot  une  Evaluation  de 
tous  les  biens  du  Rovaume,  qui  rendroit  a  l’avenir  les  repartitions 
simples  &  justes,  &  prEviendroit  tous  les  proces.  On  auroit  done 
conclu  que  la  mEthode  employEe  Etoit  mauvaise,  &  qu’il  falloit  recourir 
a  une  autre  forme  d’imposition. 

[213]  C’est  a  quoi  les  Administrateurs  ne  vouloient  pas  consentir. 
En  consEquence  ils  se  contenterent  de  murmurer  en  secret  contre  la 
clause  de  1763.  Ils  prEtendoient  qa’elle  Etoit  injuste,  parce  qu’elle 
laissoit  subsister  des  impositions  injustes;  qu’on  ne  pourroit  plus 
dEcharger  ceux  qui  Etoient  trop  imposEs,  puisqu’on  ne  pouvoit  pas 
augmenter  ceux  qui  ne  1’Etoient  pas  assez.  Mais  tant  que  l’ancienne 
Magistrature  a  existE,  on  s’est  bien  gardE  de  proposer  au  feu  Roi  de 
remEdier  a  ces  inconvEniens  par  une  loi  contraire  a  la  clause,  parce 
qu’il  Etoit  aisE  de  prEvoir  que  l’examen  de  cette  loi  produiroit  une 
explication  qui  pourroit  faire  dEcouvrir  les  vices  d’une  imposition  qu’on 
vouloit  conserver.  On  prit  done  le  parti  d’attendre  des  momens 
favorables ;  &  cependant  on  conserva  depuis  1763  jusqu’en  1771,  aux 
frais  du  Roi,  tous  les  bureaux  &  tout  les  Commis  que  la  clause  sembloit 
avoir  rendus  inutiles.  On  ne  fit  point  non  plus  le  dEpot  des  roles, 
qui  cependant  par  cette  clause  devenoit  plus  nEcessaire  que  jamais ; 
car  puisque  ces  roles  devenoient  le  cadastre  de  tout  le  Royaume,  il 
falloit  les  rendre  publics. 


FARTHER  OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  TWENTIETHS. 


61 


[214]  Le  moment  desiC  arriva,  ce  fut  celui  de  l’an^antissement  de 
la  Magistrature..  Un  vingtieme  fut  rendu  perpytuel  sans  la  clause  de 
1763,  ni  aucune  autre  clause  £quivalente ;  ce  qui  a  fait  revivre  tous  les 
abus  a-la-fois,  &  ce  qui  a  donny  lieu  a  la  nouvelle  inquisition  sous 
laquelle  le  peuple  g^mit  depuis  quatre  ans. 

[2x5]  Nous  nous  plaignons,  SIRE,  preincrement  de  la  perpetuity  de 
l’impot,  secondement  de  l’abolition  de  la  clause  de  1763,  &  nous  sup- 
plions  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  ou  de  la  Ctablir,  ou  d’y  suppleer  par  une 
loi  qui  ait  les  memes  eft'ets,  qui  fixe  la  somrne  totale  de  ce  qui  sera  pay£ 
par  les  peuples,  qui  dispense  VOTRE  MAJEST&  des  frais  de  Cgie,  & 
qui  ne  laisse  pas  le  Royaume  entier  soumis  au  despotisme  des  Adminis- 
trateurs  &  des  PCposys  du  vingtieme. 

[216]  Les  trois  impositions  que  nous  venons  d’examiner  sont  les 
seuls  impots  directs  qui  se  levent  dans  votre  Royaume,  &  s’il  s’en  leve 
d’autres  dans  quelques  Provinces  sous  diflCrens  noms,  ce  sont  des  faits 
dont  nous  n’avons  point  de  connoissance,  &  que  nous  n’avons  pas  eu 
occasion  de  verifier.  Nous  avons  aussi  indiqu£  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE 
les  prestations  de  service  corporel,  comrne  la  milice  &  la  conCe,  & 
nous  n’en  dirons  pas  davantage.  S’d  y  a  des  abus,  nous  ne  doutons 
pas  que  les  Ministres  qui  president  a  ces  administrations,  &  en  qui  le 
public  a  la  plus  grande  confiance,  ne  travaillent  a  les  reformer. 

[217]  Le  logement  des  gens  de  guerre  est  encore  une  autre  espece 
de  service  exig£  du  peuple,  &  dont  la  Cour  des  Aides  n’a  point  de 
connoissance  juridique.  Nous  protestons  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  que 
nous  sommes  bien  yioignes  de  chercber  a  ytendre  notre  jurisdiction 
dans  ce  moment  oil  nous  ne  devons  etre  occup^s  que  des  inCrets  des 
peuples;  mais  ce  n’est  empCter  sur  les  droits  d’aucune  puissance  que 
d’avertir  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  en  qui  resident  tous  les  genres  de  puis¬ 
sance,  de  ce  qui  s’est  pass£  a  cet  ygard.  Et  dans  ce  jour,  SIRE,  ou 
nous  prysentons  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  le  tableau  des  impositions,  nous 
ne-pouvons  vous  laisser  ignorer  que  sous  vos  yeux  &  dans  votre  capitale 
il  se  leve  une  taxe  sur  beaucoup  de  maisons,  sous  le  nom  de  logement 
de  gens  de  guerre,  qui  est  un  vyritable  impot  Cel  y tabli  sur  vos  sujets 
sans  aucune  loi,  &  sans  qu’on  connoisse  les  regies  d’apres  lesquelles 
s’en  fait  l’assiette.  Nous  sgavons  que  le  produit  de  cette  imposition 
est  destine  au  logement  des  troupes,  qui  est  un  service  militaire;  mais 
ce  n’est  pas  une  raison  suffisante  pour  que  l’autority  militaire  preside 
k  la  rypartition.  Quand  la  taille  fut  cryye  sous  Charles  VII,  elle  fut 

’estinye  a  la  solde  des  troupes;  on  n’imagina  cependant  pas  de 


62 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS* 


l’^tablir  sans  aucune  loi  expresse,  ni  de  la  faire  r£partir,  juger  &  lever 
par  les  gens  de  guerre. 

[218]  Nous  ignorons  si,  sous  le  meme  pnftexte,  on  a  <§tabli  de 
semblables  taxes  dans  les  Provinces,  &  nous  n’avons  pas  cherch£  a 
nous  en  informer ;  nous  esptfrons  que  ce  sera  VOTRE  MAJESTE  elle- 
meme  qui  se  fera  rendre  compte  de  tout  ce  qui  concerne  cette  singuliere 
imposition ;  &  quant  a  la  ville  de  Paris,  nous  la  supplions  de  faire 
verifier,  1  .  par  quelle  loi  l’impot  qu’on  y  leve  a  £t£  dtabli  originaire- 
ment;,  20.  suivant  quelle  loi  il  s’augmente  tous  les  jours;  30.  par  qui  & 
suivant  quelle  regie  se  fait  la  taxe  de  chaque  maison ;  40.  a  qui  peut 
s’adresser  le  propri^taire  qui  se  plaint  de  sa  taxe.  Quand  VOTRE 
MAJESTY  sera  d<ftermin<fe  sur  cette  objet,  nous  ne  doutons  pas  qu’elle 
ne  fasse  connoitre  ses  intentions  par  une  loi  publique ;  car  le  public  a 
droit  de  demander  a  connoitre  les  loix  auxquelles  on  veut  le  soumettre.1 

[219]  Nous  protestons  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  qu’en  rapportant  des 
faits  particuliers,  notre  intention  n’est  point  d’armer  sa  s6verit£  contre 
les  coupables  :  mais  il  faut  bien  faire  connoitre  quelle  a  £t£  la  con¬ 
duce  des  depositaires  du  pouvoir  arbitraire  pendant  qu’ils  se  sont  crus 
affranchis  de  la  censure  de  la  Justice  r£gl£e,  &  nous  regardons,  SIRE, 
ce  moment  ou  le  despotisme,  se  croyant  assure  de  l’impunit£,  s’est 
montr£  a  d^couvert,  comme  un  moment  pr^cieux  a  saisir  pour  d£mon- 
trer  au  Roi  ami  de  la  justice,  les  exc£s  dont  nous  sommes  menaces. 

[220]  En  effet,  SIRE,  quand  nous  remontons  a  la  source  des  abus, 
&  que  nous  proposons  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY  des  remedes  inutiles 
depuis  long-temps,  comme  celui  de  faire  porter  les  impositions  de  tous 
les  genres  au  departement  qui  se  fait  dans  chaque  Province,  ou  d’ad- 
mettre  a  ce  meme  departement  des  repr£sentans  du  peuple  oubli^s 
depuis  plusieurs  siecles,  nous  pr^voyons  bien  qu’on  dira  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTY  que  ce  sont  des  nouveaut^s  que  nous  voulons  introduire 
dans  l’administration.  Il  faut  done  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  voie 
clairement  que  si  nous  lui  proposons  ce  qu’on  appelle  des  nouveaut^s, 
&  ce  qui  cependant  n’est  que  le  r^tablissement  des  anciennes  regies, 
c  est  parce  que  le  progres  &  les  v^ritables  innovations  que  fait  tous  les 
jours  le  despotisme,  rendent  le  r£tablissement  des  vrais  principes 
absolument  n£cessaire. 

l[Note  de  l ' Editeur.~\  Il  y  a  encore  id  une  lacune  dans  le  manuscrit  sur  lequel  on 
aimprimd :  il  paroit  qu  ’il  etoit  question  des  vexations  de  plusieurs  Ministres&  Prepos6s 
des  finances. 


NECESSITY  OF  A  GENERAL  REFORM. 


63 


[221 J  11  ne  faut  point  vous  le  dissimuler,  SIRE,  puisque  vous  voulez 
faire  le  bonheur  perpetuel  de  cette  Nation  qui,  dans  l’instant  de  votre 
av^nemept,  s’est  jet£e  dans  vos  bras  avec  une  confiance  si  touchante. 
Ce  n’est  point  a  la  reformation  des  abus  particuliers  que  vous  devez 
borner  vos  soins,  c’est  le  systeme  de  l’administration  qu’il  faut  attaquer. 

[222]  On  s<pait  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  aime  la  justice,  on  sgait 
que  vos  Ministres  actuels  veulent  la  faire  fleurir;  mais  tant  que  le  bien 
que  vous  ferez  au  peuple  ne  sera  fonde  que  sur  votre  justice  personnelle, 
ou  sur  celle  de  vos  Ministres,  ce  ne  sera  qu’un  bien  passager,  &  la 
generation  future  verra  le  despotisme  se  venger  sur  le  peuple  de  la 
contrainte  qu’il  aura  eprouvee  sous  votre  regne.  II  faut  done  que  le 
temps  de  ce  regne  soit  employe  a  donner  au  peuple  des  preservatifs 
contre  le  despotisme,  &  sur-tout  contre  la  clandestine. 

[223]  Ce  n’est  done  point  des  faits  particuliers  que  nous  avons  du 
nous  plaindre,  ou  au  moins  nous  n’avons  du  les  employer  que  comme 
preuves  du  systeme  general,  &  nous  devons  invoquer  cet  amour  de  la 
justice  dont  VOTRE  MAJESTY  est  penetree,  pour  obtenir  des  loix 
qui  fassent  le  bonheur  perpetuel  de  votre  Royaume,  des  loix  telles  que 
cette  justice  qui  est  dans  votre  coeur,  survive  a  VOTRE  MAJEST& 
elle-meme,  &  se  fasse  sentir  a  nos  derniers  neveux. 

[224]  Voila,  SIRE,  les  vues  generales  qu’ont  du  vous  presenter 
d’anciens  Magistrats  qui,  comme  les  autres  citoyens,  ont  ete  temoins 
du  malheur  du  peuple,  &  qui,  ayant  consacre  leurs  vies  aux  jugemens 
des  proces  occasionnes  par  les  impots,  ont  vu  de  plus  pres  quelquesunes 
des  causes  de  ce  malheur.  Nous  vous  presentons  ces  reflexions  avec 
confiance,  parce  que  nous  s<;avons  que  le  sentiment  qui  nous  les  a 
dictees  les  fera  agreer  de  VOTRE  MAJESTEl.  Mais  nous  reconnois- 
sons  qu’en  agitant  un  si  grand  nombre  de  questions,  nous  avons  pu 
tomber  dans  quelques  erreurs.  Et  comment  aurions-nous  pu  les  eviter, 
puisque  depuis  si  long-temps  les  Administrateurs  ne  cherchent  qu’a  se 
couvrir  d’un  voile  impenetrable,  &  que  le  vice  principal  de  leurs 
operations  est  cette  clandestinite,  qui  ne  permet  de  rien  edaircir  & 
de  rien  constater?  Mais  nous  aurions  mal  rempli  notre  ministere,  si 
la  crainte  de  nous  tromper  sur  quelques  details  nous  avoit  empeches  de 
mettre  sous  vos  yeux  une  masse  de  verites  utiles  &  incontestables ;  & 
vous-meme,  SIRE,  nous  oserons  le  dire  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  vous 
tomberiez  dans  les  pieges  que  vos  tendent  les  ennemis  de  votre  peuple, 
si  la  decouverte  de  ces  legeres  erreurs  vous  rendoit  suspectes  les  verites 
qu’il  e toit  si  important  de  vous  faire  connoitre. 


64 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[225]  Nous  n’aurions  pas  non  plus  la  t6m£rite  de  croire  que  d’autres 
que  nous  ne  puissent  pas  vous  fournir  d’autres  lumieres,  &  nous 
n’imiterons  point,  SIRE,  la  pr^somption  coupable  de  ces  Administra- 
teurs  qui,  depuis  plus  d  un  siecle,  ont  cherche  a  ^carter  du  trone  tous 
ceux  qui  pouvoient  edairer  le  Roi,  comme  si  la  v£rite  ne  devoit 
parvenir  au  Souverain  que  par  leur  organe.  Nous  pensons,  SIRE, 
comme  toute  la  Nations  sur  les  Ministres  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE  a 
appelWs  aupres  d’Elle;  mais  il  est  encore  bien  des  v£rit£s  qui  ne  vous 
parviendront  ni  par  les  Ministres,  ni  par  les  Magistrats. 

[226]  C’est  sur  le  Peuple  entier  que  pesent  les  impots,  &  leur  com¬ 
plication  est  telle,  que  chaque  Province,  chaque  Corps,  chaque  pro¬ 
fession  est  soumise  a  quelque  loi  bursale  qui  lui  est  particuliere,  &  a  des 
griefs  personnels  a  exposer  a  VOTRE  MAJESTfi.  II  n’est  pas  juste 
qu’un  Ministre  statue  seul  &  sans  contradicteur  sur  cette  multitude 
d  objets,  &  il  11  est  pas  possible  non  plus  qu’un  Corps  de  Magistrature 
soit  seul  aupres  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE  l’interprete  de  cette  quantity 
£norme  de  difiterens  int£rets. 

[227]  La  preuve  la  plus  r£elle  que  nous  puissions  donner  a  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  de  la  sincerity  de  notre  zele,  est  de  lui  faire  connoitre  dans 
quel  cas  &  jusqu’a  quel  point  elle  doit  etre  en  garde  contre  les  Minis¬ 
tres  &  les  autres  Administrateurs,  &  comment  elle  peut  etre  garantie 
de  la  seduction  par  d’autres  que  par  les  Magistrats,  qui  depuis  long- 
temps  jouissent  seuls  dans  le  Royaume  du  droit  de  representation,  & 
sont  quelquefois  insuffisans  pour  remplir  dans  toute  son  etendue  cet 
important  ministere. 

[228]  La  confiance  que  nous  inspire  l’administration  actuelle,  ne 
doit  point  nous  fermer  la  bouche.  Nous  croyons  au  contraire  devoir 
saisir  le  moment  ou  VOTRE  MAJESTY  est  entour^e  des  homrnes  les 
plus  instruits  &  les  plus  irr^prochables,  &  nous  espdons  qu’ils  se 
rduniront  a  nous,  &  qu’ils  desireront  autant  que  nous-memes,  que 
VOIRE  MAJESTE  se  fasse  edairer  sur  1’usage  du  pouvoir  qui  leur  est 
confie,  &  dont  ils*ne  veulent  point  abuser. 

[229]  Il  est  certain  qu’a  beaucoup  d’<§gards,  &  peut-etre  sur  le  plus 
grand  nombre  des  objets,  les  Ministres  d’un  Roi  moment  sa  confiance 
plus  que  personne ;  car  on  peut  dire  en  general  que  tout  ce  qui 
intdesse  la  gloire  de  son  regne,  intdresse  aussi  celle  de  leur  ministere. 
Ainsi  le  Souverain  ne  peut  pas  douter  que  ses  Ministres  ne  prennent  le 
plus  sincere  intdret  au  succes  de  sesarmes,  au  maintien  de  son  autorite 

dans  1  interieur  de  son  Royaume,  a  sa  consideration  chez  les  Puissances 
etrangeres. 


IRRESPONSIBILITY  OF  THE  MINISTERS. 


65 

[230]  Mais  sur  d’autres  objets  l’interet  du  Ministre  n’est  pas  toujours 
celui  de  Roi.  Par  exemple,.quand  il  est  question  d’asservir  les  peuples 
a  tous  les  suppots  de  l’administration,  sous  pr^texte  de  maintenir 
l’autority  Royale,  ou  d’ytendre  cette  administration  jusques  sur  les  plus 
petits  objets,  il  y  a  une  grande  difference  entre  ces  deux  int^rets  :  car 
il  n’est  pas  ytonnant  qu’un  sujet  devenu  Ministre  soit  flatty  des  plus 
petits  details  de  la  puissance,  qu’il  ait  par-tout  des  amis  a  proteger  & 
des  ennemis  a  pers^cuter,  que  son  orgueil  se  repaisse  de  la  multiplicity 
des  hommages  qu’entraine  la  multiplicity  des  pouvoirs :  mais  un  Roi 
est  trop  grand,  trop  puissant,  trop  supyrieur  a  ses  sujets  pour  etre  mu 
par  ces  petites  passions,  &  il  ne  peut  voir  son  autority  intyressye  que 
dans  des  objets  dignes  de  lui. 

[231]  Il  est  un  troisieme  genre  d’affaires  dans  lequel  les  Ministres 
non-seulement  n’ont  pas  le  meme  intyret  que  le  Roi,  mais  en  ont  un 
absolument  contraire.  De  ce  nombre  sont  toutes  celles  ou  il  est 
question  d’introduire  1’administration  clandestine;  car  l’intyret  du  Roi 
est  toujours  d’ydairer  la  conduite  de  ses  Ministres,  &  celui  des  Minis¬ 
tres  est  quelquefois  de  n’etre  pas  eclairs. 

[232]  Il  est  enfin  un  grand  nombre  d’objets  sur  lesquels  l’intyret  du 
Roi  ytant  contraire  a  celui  des  Ministres,  le  peuple  a  le  meme  intyret 
que  le  Roi;  mais  tcus  les  Grands  de  l’Etat,  tous  les  gens  considyrys, 
tous  ceux  qui  approchent  du  Roi,  ou  qui  sont  a  portye  de  se  faire  en¬ 
tendre  de  lui,  ont  les  memes  interets  que  les  Ministres;  &  voila,  SIRE, 
ce  qui  myrite  le  plus  votre  attention,  ce  qui  doit  meme  etre  l’objet  de 
vos  profondes  ryflexions  :  car  il  n’est  que  trop  vrai  que  cet  intyret  des 
Ministres  ryuni  a  celui  de  tous  les  gens  puissans,  l’emporte  presque 
toujours  sur  celui  du  Roi  ryuni  a  celui  du  peuple. 

[233]  C’est  ce  que  nous  avons  dyja  fait  voir  au  sujet  du  vingtieme 
&  de  la  capitation.  Ces  deux  impositions,  ou  les  Ministres  &  leurs  sub- 
ordonnys  se  sont  ryservy  le  droit  de  taxer  vos  sujets  ou  de  modyrer 
leurs  taxes  arbitrairement  &  a  volonty,  donnent  lieu  a  un  despotisme 
odieux  a  la  France,  &  honteux  pour  une  nation  libre ;  despotisme  con¬ 
traire  aux  vrais  intyrets  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  meme  a  1’intyret  fiscal, 
que  les  despotes  sacrifient  toujours  aux  considerations  qui  leur  sont 
personnelles ;  mais  despotisme  tres-utile  a  tous  les  gens  considy rabies, 
parce  que  ce  sont  toujours  eux  qui  sont  traitys  favorablement  par  les 
Ministres,  par  les  Intendans,  par  les  autres  despotes  de  cette  partie. 

[234]  Tel  est  aussi  l’exces  des  dypenses.  On  se  propose  sans  cesse 
d’y  mettre  un  frein,  &  tout  le  monde  applaudit  dans  la  spyculation  a 

5 


66 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


ces  projets  de  reformation;  mais  dans  1’exicution,  tous  les  Ministres, 
tous  les  Ordonnateurs  des  dipenses  s’y  refusent,  &  ils  sont  appuyis  par 
toutes  les  puissances  de  la  Cour,  &  merae  de  la  capitale,  parce  que  ce 
sont  toujours  des  gens  puissans  qui  ont  part  aux  faveurs  des  Ministres. 

[235]  Tel  est  encore  l’abus  des  lettres  de  cachet  accordies  sur  la 
demande  des  particuliers,  &  que  chaque  personne  puissante  dans  le 
Royaume  se  croit  en  droit  d’obtenir.  Et  nous-memes  Magistrats,  qui 
nous  regardons  comrne  les  reprisentans  du  peuple,  mais  qui  sommes 
aussi  du  nombre  de  ces  gens  considers  qui  ont  acces  chez  les  Minis¬ 
tres,  n’avons-nous  pas  a  nous  reprocher  de  n’avoir  jamais  reclame  avec 
assez  d’energie  contre  les  abus  de  ce  genre? 

[236]  Sur  tous  ces  objets,  SIRE,  il  existe  necessairement  deux 
partis  dans  un  Royaume ;  d’un  cote,  tous  ceux  qui  approchent  du 
Souverain ;  de  l’autre,  tout  le  reste  de  la  nation.  II  faut  done  qu’un 
Roi  qui  veut  etre  juste,  puise  ses  sentimens  dans  son  propre  coeur,  & 
ses  lumieres  dans  celles  de  la  nation  entiere. 

[237]  Mais  comment  etablir  une  relation  entre  le  Roi  &  la  Nation, 
qui  ne  soit  pas  interceptee  par  tous  ceux  dont  un  Roi  est  entoure  ? 
Nous  ne  devons  point  vous  le  dissimuler,  SIRE ;  le  moyen  le  plus  sim¬ 
ple,  le  plus  naturel,  le  plus  conforme  a  la  constitution  de  cette  Monar¬ 
chic,  seroit  d’entendre  la  Nation  elle-meme  assemble,  ou  au  moins  de 
permettre  des  assembles  de  chaque  Province  :  &  personne  ne  doit 
avoir  la  lacheti  de  vous  tenir  un  autre  langage ;  personne  ne  doit  vous 
laisser  ignorer  que  le  voeu  unanime  de  la  Nation  est  d’obtenir  ou  des 
Etats  giniraux,  ou  au  moins  des  Etats  provinciaux. 

[238]  Mais  nous  s^avons  aussi  que  depuis  plus  d’un  siecle  la  jalousie 
des  Ministres,  &  peut-etre  celle  des  courtisans,  s’est  toujours  opposie 
a  ces  assemblies  nationales ;  &  si  la  France  est  assez  heureuse  pour  que 
VOTRE  MAJESTY  s’y  determine  un  jour,  nous  privoyons  qu’on  fera 
naitre  encore  des  difficultis  de  formes.  Ces  difficultis  seront  aisiment 
surmonties  quand  VOTRE  MAJESTY  le  voudra;  elles  ne  sont  pas  de 
nature  a  faire  un  obstacle  riel  a  ce  qui  vous  est  demandi  par  les  voeux 
ardens  de  ce  peuple  que  vous  aimez.  II  est  cependant  possible  qu’elles 
retardent  encore  pendant  quelques  temps  le  ritablissement  de  ces  Etats 
tant  desiris ;  &  en  attendant  n’existera-t-il  aucune  autre  voie  par  laquelle 
les  voeux  du  peuple  puissent  parvenir  a  un  Roi  qui  veut  les  entendre? 

[239]  Dans  ce  moment,  SIRE,  nous  ne  vous  parlons  point  une  langue 
qui  vous  soit  itrangere.  Toute  l’Europe  a  sgu  que  le  premier  senti¬ 
ment  de  VOTRE  MAJESTY,  lors  de  son  avinement  a  la  couronne,  a 


PETITIONS  FAIL  TO  REACH  THE  KING. 


67 


6t6  de  faciliter  a  tous  ses  sujets  les  approches  de  son  trone,  &  qu’elle 
s’estfaitune  regie  de  recevoir  tous  les  memoires  qui  lui  sont  pr£sent£s. 
Mais  la  clandestinite  de l’administration  s’oppose  sans  cesse  a  ce  desir 
mutuel  que  le  Roi  &  la  Nation  auroient  a  s’entendre,  &  rend  inutile 
ce  premier  sentiment  d’un  jeune  Roi,  si  pr^cieux  pour  le  peuple  qu’il 
doit  gouverner. 

[240]  Vous  recevez,  SIRE,  les  requetes  de  tous  vos  Sujets;  mais 
les  grands  abus  ne  peuvent  jamais  vous  etre  pr£sent£s,  parce  que  le 
tableau  des  operations  du  Gouvernement  n’existe  nulle  part.  II  faut 
done,  pour  que  VOTRE  MAJESTY  puisse  etre  instruite  par  les  requetes 
qu’Elle  regoit,  que  l’administration  ne  se  tienne  plus  cach^e ;  il  faut 
que  tous  les  actes  d’autorite  faits  en  votre  nom  soient  connus  &  du 
public  &  des  particuliers  qui  ont  droit  de  s’en  plaindre ;  il  faut  que 
les  motifs  soient  ^galement  publics,  &  qu’a  chacun  de  ces  actes  d’autorit£ 
soit  annexd  le  nom  de  celui  de  qui  il  est  emane,  &  qui  doit  repondre 
de  Tabus  qu’il  a  fait  de  son  pouvoir.  Sans  cela,  les  requetes  presentees 
au  Roi  n’ont  qu’un  objet  vague,  &  les  abus  d’autorite  resteront  toujours 
ignores  &  impunis. 

[241]  Vous  recevez  les  requetes  de  tous  vos  Sujets;  mais  il  ne  leur 
est  permis  de  recourir  a  votre  justice  que  pour  leurs  affaires  person- 
nelles ;  &  cependant  les  Corps,  les  Provinces,  l’Etat  lui-meme,  restent 
sans  defenseurs.  Il  faut  done,  SIPE,  en  attendant  que  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  ait  retabli  les  Etats,  qu’il  existe  au  moins  des  d£put£s  de 
chaque  Province,  choisis  par  la  Province  elle-meme,  qui  remplissent 
aupres  de  VOTRE  MAJESTY  &  de  son  Conseil  intime,  une  des  fonc- 
tions  que  les  Procureurs-g£n6raux  remplissent  dans  les  Cours,  celle  de 
stipuler  les  int^rets  du  public,  &  sur-tout  de  la  Province  qui  leur  aura 
donn6  mission.  Cet  ^tablissement  n’exige  point  indispensablement 
celui  d’une  Assemble  d’Etats  dans  chaque  Province.  Nous.avons 
d£ja  observe  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  qu’on  distinguoit  anciennement 
les  pays  d’Etats  des  pays  d’ Elections.  Ces  derniers,  sans  avoir  d’Etats, 
£lisoient  des  repr<§sentans,  &  rien  n’empecheroit  de  r^tablir  cet  antique 
usage.1  En  effet,  la  n6cessit6  £vidente  a  fait  appeller  aupres  du  Con¬ 
seil  des  deputes  du  commerce  de  chaque  Province :  les  int£rets  du 
commerce  sont-ils  done  les  seuls  que  chaque  Province  ait  a  stipuler? 

lNo(a.  Il  ne  faut  pas  que  cet  6tablissement  soit  dispendieux  pour  la  Province,  &  il 
est  possible  de  1  ’eviter;  car  il  n’est  pas  absolument  necessaire  que  ces  deputes  viennent 
se  montrer  &  sollicker  personnellement  dans  la  capitale.  Cette  fonction  pourroit  etre 
remplie  par  les  Elus  que  nous  avors  propose  de  r6tablir,  &  ce  seroit  par  des  memoires 


68 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[242]  Vous  recevez  les  requetes  de  tous  vos  Sujets ;  mais  ignorez- 
vous,  SIRE,  que  le  plus  grand  nombre  de  vos  Sujets,  &  nomm<hnent 
ceux  qui  auroient  le  plus  besoin  de  votre  protection,  sont  absolument 
hors  d’etat  de  l’implorer,  parce  qu’ils  n’ont  ni  la  capacite  n^cessaire 
pour  faire  eux-memes  un  m^moire,  ni  les  faculty  n^cessaires  pour  le 
faire  faire  par  un  autre,  ni  les  relations  n£cessaires  pour  le  faire  par- 
venir  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE?  Et  quelle  est  la  ressource  de  ceux  qui 
languissent  dans  les  prisons,  &  qu’on  se  gardera  bien  d’en  laisser  sortir, 
quand  on  pr^voira  que  le  premier  usage  qu’ils  feront  de  leur  liberty, 
sera  d’implorer  votre  justice?  II  faudroit  done  que  les  repr^sentans  de 
chaque  Province  fussent  sp^cialement  autoris^s  a  se  constituer  les 
d^fenseurs  des  pauvres,  des  foibles,  des  opprim£s,  sur-tout  des  captifs, 
comme  en  Justice  r£gl£e  les  Procureurs  &  Avocats-g6n£raux  sont  les 
d£fenseurs-n£s  des  absens,  des  interdits,  des  mineurs,  de  tous  ceux, 
en  un  mot,  qui  ne  peuvent  pas  de  d^fendre  eux-memes. 

[243]  Vous  recevez  les  requetes  de  tous  vos  Sujets ;  mais  il  est  une 
importante  v6rit£,  SIRE,  que  nous  oserons  vous  dire  aujourd’hui,  parce 
qu’il  n’est  pas  possible  que  l’exp^rience  d’une  ann£e  ne  vous  en  ait  d£ja 
convaincu ;  e’est  que  ce  recours  de  tous  les  particuliers  a  la  seule  per. 
sonne  du  Roi  est  absolument  illusoire,  parce  qu’il  n’est  pas  possible  que 
VOTRE  MAJESTY  seule  statue  en  connoissance  de  cause  sur  les 
plaintes  &  les  demandes,  souvent  indiscretes,  de  plusieurs  millions 
d’hommes. 


[244]  II  faut  done  que  ces  requetes  soient  renvoy6es,  &  elles  le  sont 
dans  les  diiferens  d^partemens.  Or  vous  sgavez,  SIRE,  que  e’est  ren- 
voyer  chaque  requete  pr<§cis£ment  a  celui  contre  qui  elle  est  dirig^e ; 
car  on  ne  recourt  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY  elle-meme  que  quand  on  a 
£puis£  toutes  les  autres  voies,  &  que  e’est  du  Ministre  qu’on  veut  se 
plaindre.  Or  nous  venons  de  faire  connoitre  que  sur  des  objets  t'res- 


adresses  k  la  Cour  qu’ils  stipuleroient  les  impels  de  leurs  Provinces.  On  pourroiti 
aussi  avoir  a-la-fois  deux  sortes  de  representans  qui  ne  couteroient  rien  a  la  Provinces 

&  qui  Slant  ensemble  dans  une  relation  continuelle,  exerceroient  conjointement  leur 
mimstere. 

Les  uns  rSsideroient  dans  la  Province,  &  en  connoitroient  mieux  les  vrais  inlets  que 
ceux  qui  rSsident  prSs  la  Cour,  &  ceux-la  n’auroient  aucune  depense  St  faire  pour  tenir 
mission,  puisqu’ils  ne  se  dSplaceroient  point.  Les  autres,  entrainSs  par  leurs  affaires 
personnels  dans  la  capitale,  se  chargeroient  gratuitement  de  suivre  les  affaires  de  la 
Province,  &  tiendroient  it  honneur  d’en  etre  charges.  Nous  croyons  que  pour  que  ces 
representans  soient  b.en  choisis,  &  que  la  faveur  n’ait  aucune  part  ft  ce  choix,  U  faut 
que  ces  commissions  ne  soient  point  utiles. 


AT5PEAL  TO  THE  KING  ILLUSORY. 


69 

importans  le  Ministere  entier,  &  meme  tous  ceux  qui  approchent  de 
votre  personne,  ont  un  int^ret  contraire  a  celui  de  VOTRE  MAJESTY 
&  a  celui  de  la  Nation. 

[245]  Puisque  ce  sont  les  lumieres  de  toute  la  Nation  qu’il  faudroit 
communique r  a  VOTRE  MAJEST&,  seroit-il  possible  que  ce  fut  la 
Nation  elle-meme  qui  fit  le  premier  examen  de  toutes  ces  requetes,  & 
que  ce  fut  son  suffrage  qui  indiquat  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE  celles  qui 
m^ritent  son  attention  personnelle? 

[246]  Ici  nous  devons  nous  arreter,  SIRE.  Nous  avons  os6 
avancer  que  le  recours  de  tous  les  Sujets  a  la  seule  personne  du  Roi 
est  inutile  &  illusoire,  parce  que  c’est  une  v£rit£  £vidente  dont  VOTRE 
MAJEST&  elle-meme  est  certainement  convaincu  ;  mais  si  nous  allions 
jusqu’a  proposer  d’admettre  une  reclamation  publique  contre  les  abus 
de  l’administration,  ne  serions-nOus  pas  taxes  de  temerite?  Tous  les 
ennemis  de  la  liberte  publique,  &:  sur-tout  ceux  qui  ont  le  privilege  de 
parler  en  votre  nom,  ne  diroient-ils  pas  que  ce  sont  les  actions  de 
VOTRE  MAJESTY  elle-meme  qu’on  veut  soumettre  a  la  censure  pub¬ 
lique?  Une  telle  objection  est  faite  pour  nous  imposer  le  silence  le 
plus  respectueux.  Nous  vous  demandons  cependant,  SIRE,  qu’il  nous 
soit  seulement  permis  de  vous  rendre  compte  de  ce  qui  se  passe  sous 
nos  yeux  dans  l’administration  de  la  Justice  contentieuse. 

[247]  Celui  qui  se  pourvoit  en  Cour  souveraine  a  le  droit  de  faire 
imprimer  ses  mOnoires  &  de  les  faire  publier ;  &  quand  il  est  appellant 
de  la  Sentence  d’un  Tribunal  inf£rieur,  le  mOnoire  imprint  est  n£ces- 
sairement  la  critique  du  Jugement  de  ce  Tribunal.  Nous  n’ignorons 
pas  non  plus  que  les  particuliers  qui  se  pourvoient  a  VOTRE  MAJEST& 
elle-meme  contre  un  Arret  de  Cour  souveraine  par  demande  en  cassa¬ 
tion,  en  revision  ou  autrement,  usent  du  meme  droit,  &  qu’il  s’imprime 
&  se  publie  des  m^moires  sign£s  d’Avocats  au  Conseil,  ou  les  parti¬ 
culiers  critiquent  les  Arrets  de  Cour  souveraine  par  lesquels  ils  se 
croient  l£s£s. 

[248]  Nous  sgavons,  SIRE,  que  cette  publicity  des  m^moires  n’est 
pas  unanimement  approuv^e  ;  on  dit  qu’il  est  meme  des  Magistrats 
qui  la  regardent  comme  un  abus,  &  qui  soutiennent  que  les  mdmoires 
ne  devroient  etre  faits  que  pour  1’instruction  des  Juges  qui  doivent 
prononcer  sur  chaque  proces,  mais  que  le  public  ne  doit  pas  se  con- 
stituer  le  juge  des  tribunaux. 

[249]  Pour  nous,  SIRE,  nous  avons  toujours  cru  &  nous  croyons 
toujours  devoir  r^pondre  a  VOTRE  MAJESTY  &  a  la  Nation,  de  la 


70 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


justice  que  nous  rendons  aux  particuliers ;  &  s’il  est  vrai  que  quelques 
Magistrats  ne  pensent  pas  de  meme,  nous,  qui  venons  d’avertir  VOTRE 
MAJESTE  qu’Elle  doit  r£cuser  le  temoignage  des  Ministres,  quand  ils 
soutiennent  1’administration  clandestine,  nous  devons  avouer  qu’il  faut 
aussi  recuser  celui  des  Juges,  quand  ils  s’opposent  a  la  publicity  des 
memoires. 

[250]  Au  fond,  l’ordre  commun  de  la  Justice  en  France  est  qu’elle 
soit  rendue  publiquement.  C’est  a  1’ Audience  publique'que  se  portent 
naturellement  toutes  les  causes ;  &  quand  on  prend  le  public  a  temoin 
par  des  mdmoires  imprimis,  ce  n’est  qu’augmenter  la  publicity  de 
1’ Audience.  Si  on  objectoit  que  la  profusion  avec  laquelle  se  publient 
les  memoires,  est  une  nouveaute  introduite  depuis  peu  d’ann£es,  ce  re- 
proche  d’innovation  ne  seroit  pas  une  objection  suffisante ;  car  il  y  a 
de's  nouveautes  utiles ;  &  si  l’on  avoit  rejete  les  innovations,  nous  viv- 
rions  encore  sous  l’empire  de  l’ignorance  &  de  la  barbarie.  Mais 
d’ailleurs,  bien  loin  que  cet  usage  puisse  etre  regards  comme  une  inno¬ 
vation  dangereuse,  nous  pensons,  SIRE,  que  c’est  le  r^tablissement  de 
l’ancien  ordre  judiciaire  de  ce  Royaume,  qu’il  tient  peut-etre  a  la  con¬ 
stitution  primitive  de  la  Monarchic;  &  cette  observation  ne  sera  pas 
indigne  de  votre  attention. 

[25 1 J  Une  tres-ancienne  Monarchic  a  toujours  subi  des  revolutions 
de  bien  des  genres,  sur-tout  quand  elle  a  ete  fondle  dans  des  siecles 
d  ignorance,  &  qu’elle  a  subsist^  jusqu’au  siecle  le  plus  edaire.  'Si  on 
considere  sous  cet  aspect  l’histoire  de  cette  Nation,  on  verra  que  le 

progres  des  lumieres  a  mis  une  difference  infinie  entre  les  moeurs  &  les 
lois  des  differens  ages. 


[252]  Du  temps  de  nos  premiers  ancetres,  toutes  les  conventions 
des  hommes  etoient  verbales,  &  il  falloit  que  la  foi  due  aux  temoins 
suppiedt  a  des  actes  que  personne  n’auroit  s?u  dresser.  On  n’avoit 
aussi  que  des  loix  mal  redigees,  &  consistant  souvent  dans  une  tradi¬ 
tion  incertaine,  &  qui  laissoit  tout  a  l’arbitrage  du  Juge. 

[253]  Les  abus  de  cette  Justice  arbitraire  etoient  enormes.  Ce  fut 
vraisemblablement  l’exces  du  mal  qui  fit  recourir  au  remede  le  plus 
simple  &  le  plus  efficace,  la  publicite.  Les  Rois  rendirent  eux-memes 
la  justice  a  la  Nation  assemblee  dans  le  champ  de  Mars,  avec  un  eclat 
&  une  authenticite  dont  il  n’y  a  pas  eu  d’exemple  dans  les  temps 

o  ernes,  &  a  leur  exemple,  les  Grands  de  l’Etat  la  rendirent  aussi, 
chacun  dans  leur  territoire,  en  presence  du  Peuple. 

[254]  Il  faut  observer  que  dans  ce  premier  age  1’administration 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PUBLICITY  IN  THE  JUDICIAL  PROCEDURE.  1 1 

n’etoit  pas  encore  s£par£e  de  la  Justice  contentieuse ;  1’une  &  l’autre 
etoient  exerc£es  par  le  Roi  lui-meme,  aide  des  suffrages  publics.  Ces 
Monarques  si  redoutes  permettoient  done  qu’on  vint  se  plaindre  pub- 
liquement  a  eux  des  fautes  de  leurs  Ministres  :  ils  ne  craignoient  point 
les  humbles  requetes  de  ceux  qui  venoient  implorer  leur  appui ;  mais 
ils  vouloient  se  garantir  des  seductions  de  ceux  qui.  interposent  leur 
puissance  pr^caire  entre  le  Roi  &  le  Peuple. 

[255]  Dans  l’age  suivant,  on  commenga  a  ecrire  les  actes  qui 
fixent  l’etat  des  hommes  &  leurs  obligations,  &  il  se  forma  aussi  un 
corps  de  Jurisprudence  ecrite,  a  laquelle  il  fallut  se  conformer  dans  les 
jugemens.  Cet  age,  qu’on  peut  nommer  celui  de  l’e’criture,  eut  de 
grands  avantages  sur  celui  qui  avoit  precede,  puisqu’alors  les  droits 
des  citoyens  furent  fondes  sur  des  titres  constans,  &  qu’on  esp^ra 
de  n’etre  plus  juge  par  les  fantaisies  des  hommes,  mais  par  la  loi  elle- 
meme. 

[256]  Cependant  le  nouvel  ordre  judiciaire  eut  d’autres  inconveniens 
inconnus  aux  siecles  anterieurs.  On  eut  des  loix  precises  ;  mais  l’etude 
en  devint  si  compliqu£e,  que  personne,  except^  ceux  qui  s’y  livrerent 
entierement,  ne  put  ni  faire  la  fonction  de  Juge,  ni  meme  avoir  con- 
noissance  de  ses  propres  affaires.  Il  s’eieva  dans  la  Nation  un  nouvel 
ordre  de  citoyens,  qui  furent  les  gens  de  loi :  lesj  uns  furent  subrog^s 
aux  Grands  de  l’Etat  dans  la  fonction  de  rendre  la  justice,  les  autres 
se  chargerent  de  stipuler  les  droits  des  particuliers,  &  la  Nation,  dont 
la  plus  grande  partie  etoit  encore  livr£e  a  l’ignorance,  fut  obligee  de 
leur  accorder  une  confiance  aveugle. 

[257]  Ce  fut  aussi  alors  que  la  Justice  cessa  d’etre  aussi  publique 
que  dans  les  premiers  temps.  Elle  se  rendit  cependant  encore  pub- 
liquement  dans  des  Audiences  tenues  dans  l’enceinte  de  chaque  tribu¬ 
nal.  Mais  quand  les  details  d’un  proces  exigerent  un  examen  de 
pieces,  les  Juges  proc^derent  a  cet  examen  dans  des  deliberations 
secretes,  &  on  perdit  l’avantage  d’avoir  le  public  pour  temoin  de  la 
conduite  des  Juges. 

[258]  Nous  observons  encore  que  ce  fut  dans  cet  age  que  1’adminis- 
tration  fut  separee  de  la  Justice  contentieuse.  Les  proces,  &  sur-tout 
les  appels  s’etant  multiplies,  &  la  Jurisprudence  etant  devenue  une 
science  profonde,  il  ne  fut  plus  possible  que  la  justice  fut  rendue  par 
le  Roi  ni  par  les  Grands.  Les  Rois  se  reposerent  de  cette  fonction 
sur  les  Magistrats,  Jurisconsultes  &  Gradues,  mais  ils  se  reserverent 
l'administration ;  &  comme  elle  s’exer^a  par  des  lettres  du  Prince,  an 


72 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


lieu  de  proclamations  publiques  autrefois  usities,  tout  se  fit  dans  le 
secret  du  cabinet.’ 

[259]  Enfin  est  venu  un  troisieme  age,  que  nous  nommerons  celui 
de  l’impression  :  c’est  celui  ou  l’art  de  l’Imprimerie  a  multiple  les 
avantages  que  l’icriture  avoit  procures  aux  hommes,  &  en  a  fait  dis- 
paroitre  les  inconviniens.  Les  connoissances  s’itant  itendues  par 
l’impression,  les  loix  icrites  sont  aujourd’hui  connues  de  tout  le  monde ; 
chacun  peut  entendre  ses  propres  affaires.  Les  Legistes  ont  perdu  cet 
empire  que  leur  donnoit  l’ignorance  des  autres  hommes.  Les  Juges 
eux-memes  peuvent  etre  juges  par  un  public  instruit ;  &  cette  censure 
est  bien  plus  severe  &  plus  Equitable  quand  elle  peut  etre  exercie  dans 
une  lecture  froide  &  riflichie,  que  quand  les  suffrages  sont  entrainis 
dans  une  assemble  tumultueuse. 

[260]  L’art  de  l’lmprimerie  a  done  donni  a  l’icriture  la  merae  pub¬ 
licity  qu’avoit  la  parole  dans  le  premier  age  au  milieu  des  assemblies 
de  la  Nation.  Mais  il  a  fallu  plusieurs  siecles  pour  que  la  dicouverte 
de  cet  art  fit  tout  son  effet  sur  les  hommes.  II  a  fallu  que  la  Nation 
entiere  ait  pris  le  gout  &  l’habitude  de  s’instruire  par  la  lecture,  & 
qu’il  se  soit  formi  assez  de  gens  habiles  dans  l’art  d’icrire  pour  preter 
leur  ministere  a  tout  le  public,  &  tenir  lieu  de  ceux  qui,  douis  d’une 
iloquence  naturelle,  se  faisoient  entendre  de  nos  peres  dans  le  champ 
de  Mars  ou  dans  les  plaids  publics. 

[261]  Ce  moment  est  arrivi  ;  SIRE,  vos  Sujets  en  iprouvent  les 
effets  dans  la  Justice  riglie,  depuis  que  l’usage  est  itabli  d’instruire  & 
d’intiresser  le  public  par  des  mimoires  imprimis  ;  &  VOTRE  MAJESTE 
pourroit  faire  jouir  du  meme  privilege,  du  meme  avantage  ceux  de  ses 
Sujets  qui  se  plaignent  de  l’administration. 

[262]  II  semble  que  le  recours  a  votre  Conseil  ou  a  vos  Ministres 

1 II  n’est  pas  inutile  d’observer  que  c’est  dans  le  second  age  qu’on  crut  pouvoir  se 
passer  des  Etats;  car  jusqu’alors  il  falloit  absolument  que  les  Rois  assemblassent  la 
Nation  pour  lui  faire  entendre  leurs  volontes.  Bientot  les  Ministres  trouverent  le 
moyen  de  rendre  ces  assemblies  de  plus  en  plus  rares,  parce  qu’il  leur  convenoit 
d  ecarter  de  leur  gestion  des  contradicteurs;  ensuite  ils  trouverent  si  commode  de 
travailler  dans  l’obscurite,  qu  ils  chercherent  a  epaissir  les  voiles  dont  ils  s’itoient 
couverts;  c  est  ce  qui  a  donni  naissance  a  cette  administration  clandestine  qui  a  fait 
tant  de  progre«  depuis  la  cessation  des  Etats  generaux  jusqu’  aux  derniers  temps:  c’est 
done  dans  1  kge  de  1  ecriture  qu’a  commenci  en  France  la  clandestinite  de  l’adminis¬ 
tration,  &  si  c  est  dans  celui  de  l’impression  qu’elle  a  fait  de  grands  progris,  c’est 
que  jusqu  A  present  le  recours  conlre  l’administration  par  des  memoires  publics  &  im¬ 
primis,  n’a  pas  ete  permis. 


PLEA  FOR  PUBLICITY  IN  THE  ADMINISTRATION. 


73 


contre  un  Intendant,  contre  un  Commandant  de  Province,  pourroit 
etre  aussi  public  que  le  recours  aux  Cours  souveraines  contre  un  Tri¬ 
bunal  inf£rieur  ;  &  puisqu’on  se  pourvoit  a  la  personne  meme  de 
VOTRE  MAJESTE  par  des  m^moires  imprimis  &  en  presence  du 
public,  contre  des  Arrets  rendus  en  votre  nom  dans  les  Cours  sup£- 
rieures,  dans  ces  Cours  si  anciennement  rev£r£es,  dans  ces  Cours  com- 
posees  d’un  grand  nombre  de  Magistrats,  dans  ces  Cours  ou  les  Arrets 
ne  passent  qu’a  la  plurality  des  suffrages,  &  apres  une  longue  discus¬ 
sion  ;  pourquoi  ne  pourroit-on  pas  se  pourvoir  avec  la  meme  publicity 
contre  d’autres  actes  d’autorite  qui  sont  aussi  faits  en  votre  nom,  mais 
qui  ne  sont  que  l’ouvrage  d’un  seul  homme,  qui  ont  ete  enfant^s  dans 
le  secret,  &  sans  aucune  discussion  prealable? 

[263]  La  difference  est,  dit-on,  qu’on  s?ait  que  VOTRE  MAJESTE 
ne  tient  jamais  en  personne  ses  Cours  de  justice,  mais  qu’on  ignore 
toujours  si  les  actes  d’autorite  sortis  du  cabinet,  ne  sont  pas  son  pro- 
pre  ouvrage  :  &  telle  est  depuis  long-temps  la  politique  des  Ministres, 
que  leur  personne  est  toujours  a  couvert,  &  que  le  nom  de  VOTRE 
MAJESTE,  dont  il  est  permis  de  se  revetir,  ou  une  signature  qui  res- 
semble  a  la  votre,  &  sur  laquelle  le  respect  ne  permet  pas  d’^lever 
aucun  doute,  ont  mis  dans  la  meme  classe  les  actes  de  votre  volonte 
personnelle,  &  ceux  qui  se  prodiguent  a  votre  ins?u ;  en  sorte  que  les 
citoyens  opprim^s  craignent  toujours  de  s’^carter  du  respect  en  se 
plaignant  de  Pinjustice,  &  ne  sgavent  jamais  si  ce  n’est  pas  manquer  a 
la  puissance  supreme  que  de  l’invoquer.  Voila  done,  SIRE,  ou  l’on 
en  est  reduit  par  la  clandestine  des  personnes,  cette  branche  du  sys- 
teme  general  que  nous  avons  d^veloppee  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE. 

[264]  La  France  a  le  bonheur  d’avoir  un  Maitre  dont  le  premier 
d£sir  a  £t£  d’etre  £claire,  &  qui  a  voulu  permettre  a  tous  ses  Sujets  de 
recourir  a  sa  justice  personnelle  contre  tous  les  abus  d’autorite  ;  & 
quand  on  demontre  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  quand  Elle-meme  a  reconnu 
par  son  experience  que  ce  recours  est  impossible,  par  le  nombre  infini 
de  requetes  auxquelles  il  donne  lieu,  &  que  le  seul  moyen  de  faire  par- 
venir  la  voix  du  peuple  jusqu’au  Roi,  est  de  permettre  a  chaque  citoyen 
d’invoquer  le  temoignage  du  public,  comrae  dans  les  Tribunaux  ou 
s’exerce  la  justice  r^glee,  on  croit  pouvoir  opposer  a  notre  zele  un  ob¬ 
stacle  invincible,  on  croit  devoir  nous  imposer  silence  en  pronon^ant  le 
nom  sacr£  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE,  &  on  veut  que  des  milliers  d’in- 
justices  soient  impunies  a  perp^tuit^,  qu’elles  soient  a  l’abri  de  toutes 
reclamations,  qu’il  soit  impossible  de  vous  les  manifester,  par  la  crainte 


74 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


imaginaire  qu’il  n’y  ait  une  occasion  oil  Ton  parle  avec  trop  peu  de 
respect  d’un  ordre  qui  se  trouvera  £man£  de  VOTRE  MAJESTE  elle- 
meme ;  comme  si  Ton  pouvoit  douter  de  l’extreme  circonspection 
dont  useront  toujours  ceux  qui  vous  adresseront  leurs  requetes,  &  ceux 
qui,  par  £tat,  seront  charges,  de  les  r£diger  &  de  les  signer. 

[265]  Cependant,  SIRE,  puisqu’on  allegue  cette  crainte,  toute 
chim£rique  qu’elle  est.  puisqu’on  veut  se  prevaloirdu  respect  personnel 
d d  a  VOTRE  MAJEST&,  il  ne  nous  est  pas  possible  d’insister  davan- 
tage ;  mais  c’est  la  le  cas  ou  VOTRE  MAJEST&  doit  se  determiner 
elle-meme.  Nous  vous  avons  rappelte  1’exemple  de  ces  anciens  Rois 
qui  ne  croyoient  point  leur  autorit^  bless£e  par  la  liberty  donn£e  a 
leurs  Sujets  de  venir  implorer  leur  justice  en  presence  de  la  Nation  as¬ 
semble.  C’est  a  vous  a  juger,  SIRE,  si  ce  sera  affoiblir  votre  puis¬ 
sance  que  d’imiter  en  cela  Charlemagne,  ce  Monarque  si  fier,  &  qui 
porta  si  loin  les  prerogatives  de  sa  couronne.  C*est  a  son  exemple  que 
vous  pouvez  encore  r£gner  a  la  tete  d’une  Nation  qui  sera  toute  entiere 
votre  conseil;  &  vous  en  tirerez  bien  plus  de  ressources,  parce  que 
vous  vivez  dans  un  siecle  bien  plus  6clair6. 

[266]  Daignez  songer  enfin,  SIRE,  que  le  jour  que  vous  aurez  ac¬ 
cords  cette  pr£cieuse  liberty  a  vos  Sujets,  on  pourra  dire  qu’il.  a  £t6 
conclu  un  traite  entre  le  Roi  &  la  Nation  contre  les  Ministres  &  les 
Magistrats :  contre  les  Ministres,  s’il  en  est  jamais*  d’assez  pervers  pour 
vouloir  vous  cacher  la  v£rit£ ;  contre  les  Magistrats,  s’il  en  est  jamais 
d’assez  ambitieux  pour  pr£tendre  avoir  le  privilege  exclusif  de  vous  la 
dire. 

Ce  sont  la,  SIRE,  les  tres-humbles  &  tr£s-respectueuses  Remontrances 
que  pr£sentent  a  VOTRE  MAJESTE 

Vos  tres-humbles,  tr£s-ob£issans, 
tres-fideles  &  tres-affectionn^s 
Serviteurs  &  Sujets,  les  Gens 
tenans  votre  Cour  des  Aides. 

A  Pans ,  en  la  Cour  des  Aides, 
le  6  Mai  1775. 


ENGLISH  TRANSLATION. 


MOST  HUMBLE 

AND  MOST  RESPECTFUL 


PROTEST 


Presented  to  the  King,  our  most  honored 
Sovereign  and  Lord ,  by  those  who  hold  his 
Cour  des  aides  at  Paris. 

Sire  : 

[1]  Your  Cour  des  aides  has  just  protested  on  its  own  part,  and  on 
the  part  of  the  whole  Magistracy,  against  certain  articles  of  the  act  by 
which  it  has  been  re-established ;  but  another  and  more  important 
duty  still  remains  to  be  fulfilled.  It  is  the  cause  of  the  people  which 
we  must  now  plead  before  the-  tribunal  of  Your  Majesty.  We  must 
present  a  faithful  picture  to  you  of  the  taxes  and  dues  which  are  levied 
in  your  kingdom,  and  which  constitute  the  subject-matter  of  the  juris¬ 
diction  confided  to  us ;  we  must  make  known  to  Your  Majesty  at  the 
beginning  of  your  reign  the  real  condition  of  the  people,  whom  the 
spectacle  of  a  brilliant  court  can  never  call  to  your  mind.  Who  knows, 
indeed,  whether  the  very  proofs  of  joy  and  affection  which  Your 
Majesty  received,  at  the  time  of  your  accession,  from  all  those  who 
were  able  to  approach  your  person,  may  not  foster  in  Your  Majesty’s 
mind  a  fatal  error  as  to  the  condition  of  the  rest  of  the  Nation,  since 
those  whom  you  saw  were  either  a  little  less  miserable  than  the  people 
of  the  provinces  or  were  at  least  happy  in  their  hopes.  Our  Nation, 
Sire,  has  always  proved  its  devotion  to  its  masters  by  its  strenuous 
efforts  to  maintain  the  splendor  of  their  throne ;  but  Your  Majesty 
should  at  least  know  what  these  enormous  contributions  are  costing  the 
unhappy  people. 

[2]  A  careful  examination  of  all  the  taxes  would,  however,  involve 
an  infinite  amount  of  labor,  which  Your  Majesty  cannot  yourself  under¬ 
take.  We  will  therefore  submit  special  communications  on  each  sub- 

(  77  ) 


78 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


ject,  and  Your  Majesty  may  hand  them  over  for  consideration  to  those 
whom  you  may  choose  to  honor  with  your  confidence.  But  to-day. 
Sire,  to-day,  when  it  is  our  precious  privilege  to  speak  directly  to 
Your  Majesty  himself,  we  shall  content  ourselves  with  making  plain  to 
you  the  general  and  fundamental  causes  Of  all  the  abuses,  and  with 
establishing  certain  facts  so  simple  that  Your  Majesty  may  easily  be 
convinced  of  their  truth,  and  which  may  sink  deeply  into  your  mind. 
And  then,  when  your  intentions  are  made  known  and  you  have  given 
your  instructions,  it  will  rest  with  your  Ministers  to  conform  to  them  in 
their  minute  investigation  of  the  various  details. 

[3]  We  ought  not  to  allow  ourselves  to  be  hampered  by  any  con¬ 
siderations  when  we  have  to  present  matters  of  such  moment  to  Your 
Majesty ;  yet  we  cannot  but  regret  that  we  find  ourselves  obliged  to 
refer  to  that  unhappy  period  when  the  absence  of  Ministers  of  Justice 
and  the  silence  of  the  law  left  a  free  field  to  the  avidity  of  the  Financiers1 
and  the  despotism  of  the  Government  Officials.  Your  Majesty  has  put 
a  stop  to  these  public  misfortunes,  and  we  would  that  even  the  memory 
of  them  might  be  completely  effaced  by  that  glorious  instance  of 
your  justice.  Had  we  to  complain  simply  of  the  persecution  suffered 
by  the  Magistrates,  or  even  if  we  had  only  the  disregard  of  the  judicial 
system  during  these  troublous  times  to  denounce,  we  should  believe 
that,  since  everything  is  redressed,  everything  should  be  buried  in  obliv¬ 
ion.  But  there  is  one  important  fact,  Sire,  which  we  cannot,  without 
betraying  our  trust,  avoid  bringing  to  your  notice,  the  fact,  namely,  that 
the  asserted  necessity  of  strengthening  the  sovereign  authority  has 
served  as  a  pretext  for  extortions,  which  have  been  levied  with  impunity 
upon  your  subjects.  A  league  was  formed  between  the  enemies  of  the 
Courts  and  those  who  cause  the  people  to  groan  under  the  weight  of 
arbitrary  taxes ;  the  latter  lent  their  influence  in  annihilating  the  Mag¬ 
istracy  3  and  their  services  in  replacing  it,  and  the  reward  of  their 
hateful  co-operation  was  the  delivering  over  of  the  people  to  their 
cupidity. 

[4]  It  pains  us,  Sire,  to  be  obliged  in  a  period  of  clemency  to  call 
your  attention  to  this  system  of  oppression ;  but  laws  burdensome  for 
the  people  were  promulgated  in  a  form  regarded  as  legal  at  the  time  of 

1  The  financiers  were,  first  and  foremost,  those  capitalists  who  undertook  to  collect 
the  indirect  taxes  for  the  government  under  the  Ancien  Regime. 

The  Parlements  and  the  Cour  des  aides  had  been  abolished  by  Chancellor 
Maupeou  in  1771.  See  the  Introduction. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


79 


their  enactment,  and  they  still  exist  to-day,  since  Your  Majesty  has 
made  valid  all  that  was  done  while  the  administration  of  justice  was 
suspended.  Various  important  positions  are,  moreover,  still  occupied 
by  those  who  have  abused  their  office ;  and  should  new  abuses  call 
forth  the  animadversion  of  the  Courts,  it  will  doubtless  be  claimed  for 
the  offenders  that  they  have  sacrificed  themselves  to  maintain  the  royal 
authority,  and,  under  pretext  of  protecting  them  from  the  vengeance 
of  their  enemies,  the  attempt  will  be  made  to  secure  their  acts  from 
the  investigations  of  justice.  It  is  therefore  important,  Sire,  to  rid  Your 
Majesty  of  a  burden  of  gratitude  so  prejudicial  to  the  welfare  of  your 
people,  and  to  show  you  that  those  who  have  been  pretending  to  labor 
for  the  authority  of  the  throne  have  in  reality  been  successfully  endeav¬ 
oring  to  usurp  for  themselves  excessive  powers  over  all  the  Orders  of 
the  Realm,  which  are  in  no  way  demanded  by  the  interests  of  Your 
Majesty’s  service. 

[5]  We  would  that  we  might  leave  it  to  others,  Sire,  to  acquaint 
you  with  these  disagreeable  truths  !  Why  is  it  not  possible  for  Your 
Majesty  to  abandon  those  malevolent  maxims  of  government,  or  rather 
that  political  system  which  was  introduced  a  century  ago  by  the 
jealousy  of  the  Ministers,  and  which  has  reduced  all  the  Orders  of  the 
Realm  to  silence,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  Magistracy?  Why 
is  it  not  possible  for  the  Nation  itself  to  expound  its  own  dearest  inter¬ 
ests?  In  that  case,  Sire,  with  what  joy  should  we  intrust  to  others  the 
task  of  acquainting  you  with  the  excesses  committed  by  the  very 
ministry  which  would  have  destroyed  us  !  But  since  we  alone  still 
enjoy  the  ancient  privilege  of  Frenchmen,  the  privilege  of  addressing 
our  Sovereigns  and  of  protesting  with  impunity  against  infractions  of 
the  law  and  of  national  rights,  we  may  not  exhibit  toward  our  enemies 
a  generosity  which  would  render  us  offenders  against  the  entire  Nation* 

[6]  The  first  matter  which  we  have  to  lay  before  Your  Majesty  is 
that  class  of  imposts  known  as  the  “  farmed  taxes.”  We  are  not  im¬ 
parting  anything  new  to  you,  Sire,  when  we  assert  that  these  taxes  are 
not  so  onerous  by  reason  of  the  actual  sums  paid  by  the  people  into  the 
royal  treasury,  as  on  account  of  the  cost  of  administration  and  the  profits 
of  the  Farmers  of  the  revenue,  which  are  assuredly  too  great,  since  the 
Ministers  of  the  previous  reign  were  able  to  appropriate  a  part  of  this 
profit,  not-  indeed  for  the  benefit  of  Your  Majesty,  but  in  order  to 
bestow  it  upon  their  favorites.  This  fact,  which  is  in  everybody  s 
mouth,  cannot  be  unknown  to  Your  Majesty. 


So 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[7]  You  are  aware  also  that  aside  from  the  money  taken  from  your 
subjects  the  State  is  deprived,  through  the  farming  of  the  taxes,  of  the 
services  of  a  large  number  of  citizens,  part  of  whom  are  occupied  in 
perpetrating  frauds,  and  the  rest  in  trying  to  prevent  them.  And 
what  citizens?  Precisely  those  who  might  be  most  useful,  either 
through  physical  strength  and  courage,  or  by  reason  of  their  activity 
and  industry :  for  it  is  a  noteworthy  fact  that  the  profession  of  Clerk,1 
and  perhaps  even  that  of  smuggler,  in  spite  of  its  risks,  pays  better 
than  a  soldier’s  career,  and  that  financial  offices  procure  for  those  who 
obtain  them  more  substantial  and  assured  advantages  than  agriculture, 
commerce,  or  manufacture ;  and  that  consequently  only  such  remain  in 
those  professions  as  have  not  the  good  fortune,  or  the  talent,  to  enter  a 
financial  career. 

[8]  Neither  can  Your  Majesty  be  unaware  that  in  addition  to  the 
taxation  on  individual  commodities  the  production  of  certain  of  them 
is  either  forbidden  or  embarrassed  throughout  the  country  in  the 
interest  of  the  Farm.  Your  subjects  are,  for  instance,  forbidden  to 
cultivate  tobacco,  while  millions  are  paid  for  it  each  year  to  foreign¬ 
ers  ;  salt,  too,  would  prove  one  of  the  most  precious  gifts  which  nature 
has  bestowed  upon  Fraace  if  only  the  hand  of  the  Financier  did  not 
constantly  reject  what  the  sea  as  constantly  brings  to  our  shores. 
Your  Majesty  cannot  be  ignorant  that  there  are  regions  where  the 
manufacture  of  salt  is  confined  to  certain  privileged  persons,  and 
where,  at  certain  seasons  of  the  year,  the  agents  of  the  Farm  call 
together  the  peasants  to  throw  back  into  the  sea  the  salt  which  has 
been  deposited  on  the  shore;  that  on  other  coasts  salt  manufacture, 
although  ostensibly  permitted,  is  nevertheless  subject  to  such  restraints 
that  the  Farmer  can  ruin,  and  ruin  effectively,  whoever  undertakes  it 
against  his  wishes ;  that  almost  everywhere  the  exorbitant  price  of  salt 
deprives  the  people  of  the  benefits  that  they  might  derive  from  this  pre¬ 
cious  commodity,  by  using  it  as  seasoning  and  as  a  preservative,  or 
for  their  cattle,  or  in  innumerable  useful  ways,  even  for  the  enrichment 
of  the  soil. 

[9]  Your  Majesty  knows  also  that  all  the  other  taxes  on  commodi¬ 
ties  are  prejudicial  to  production  and  to  commerce;  that  France 
would  produce  more  wine  were  it  not  for  the  excises ;  that  it  would 

1  The  clerks  (commit)  here  referred  to  were  the  subordinate  officials  of  the  Farm. 
There  were  some  30,000  of  them.  For  an  admirable  account  of  the  system  of  farm¬ 
ing  the  revenue,  see  Gomel,  Histoire  financilre  dc la  Revolution  franfuise,  I.,  215  sqq. 


ABUSES  DUE  TO  THE  FARMING  OF  THE  TAXES.  8 1 

manufacture  more  merchandise  were  it  not  for  the  interior  customs 
duties.  The  list  of  these  disadvantages  is  interminable ;  we  are  well 
aware,  Sire,  that  we  cannot  give  you  a  complete  account  of  them, 
because  every  day  we  hear  of  new  ones ;  but  this  sketch  will  suffice  to 
show  you  the  injury  done  to  your  kingdom  by  the  farming  of  the 
taxes,  independently  of  the  sums  paid  by  the  people  for  the  cost  of 
administration  and  as  profit  to  the  Farmers  of  the  revenue. 

[io]  It  is  likewise  impossible  that  Your  Majesty  should  be  unaware 
of  the  severity  of  the  penal  laws  against  smuggling.  You  must  know 
that  those  who  commit  this  offence  are  sometimes  not  accustomed  to 
regard  it  as  a  crime.  There  are  whole  provinces  where  the  children 
are  brought  up  to  it  by  their  parents,  have  never  learned  any  other 
trade,  and  have  no  other  means  of  support ;  and  when  these  unfortu¬ 
nates  are  caught  they  are  condemned  to  the  sort  of  imprisonment 
designed  for  the  worst  of  crimes — sometimes  even  to  death.  We 
doubt  not  that  Your  Majesty  will  be  affected  by  the  recital  of  these 
cruelties,  and  will  ask  how  it  was  possible  in  the  beginning  to  pro¬ 
nounce  sentence  of  death  against  a  citizen  for  an  offence  affecting  only 
the  revenue. 

[n]  But  there  is  still  another  sort  of  tyranny,  of  which  it  is  possible 
that  Your  Majesty  has  never  heard.  Although  it  does  not  afford  so 
cruel  a  spectacle  as  that  of  which  we  have  been  speaking,  it  is  none 
the  less  insupportable  to  the  people,  since  it  affects  all  the  citizens  of 
the  lowest  class,  those  who  live  quietly  by  labor  or  trade.  It  is  due  to 
the  circumstance  that  every  man  belonging  to  the  people  is  forced  to 
submit  daily  to  the  caprices,  the  insolence,  even  the  insults  of  the 
minions  of  the  Tax-farmer.  This  particular  kind  of  annoyance  has 
never  received  much  attention,  because  it  is  only  experienced  by  the 
obscure  and  unknown.  In  fact,. if  a  Clerk  shows  a  want  of  regard  for 
persons  of  consideration  the  heads  of  the  financial  administration 
hasten  to  disavow  their  subordinate  and  to  satisfy  the  complainant; 
and  it  is  precisely  by  means  of  this  consideration  for  the  Great  that  the 
Farm  has  been  able  to  subject  the  defenceless  people  to  an  unrestrained 
and  unlimited  despotism.1  Yet  this  unprotected  class  is  the  largest  in 
your  realm,  and  the  defenceless  certainly  have  the  first  claim  to  the 
direct  protection  of  Your  Majesty. 

[12]  It  devolves  upon  us,  therefore,  to  explain  to  Your  Majesty  the 


xThe  court  is  probably  guilty  of  exaggeration  here.  Cf.  Gomel,  op.cit.,  I.,  325. 

6 


82 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


real  cause  of  the  servitude  to  which  the  people  are  reduced  through¬ 
out  the  provinces.  That  cause,  Sire,  is  to  be  sought  in  the  nature  of 
the  power  exercised  by  the  officers  of  the  Farm — a  power  arbitrary  in 
many  respects,  which  makes  it  only  too  easy  for  them  to  render 
-themselves  formidable. 

[13]  In  the  first  place,  the  General  Farm1  has  an  enormous  body  of 
rules  and  regulations,  which  have  never  been  collected  and  codified.  It 
is  an  occult  science  which  no  one  except  the  Financiers  themselves  has 
studied,  or  can  study,  so  that  the  individual  against  whom  action  is 
brought  can  neither  know  the  law  himself  nor  consult  any  one  else ;  he 
is  obliged  to  rely  on  the  very  same  Clerk  who  is  his  enemy  and  perse¬ 
cutor.  How  can  a  laborer  or  an  artisan  help  trembling  and  humbling 
himself  continually  before  an  adversary  who  has  such  terrible  weapons 
to  turn  against  him? 

[14]  In  the  second  place,  the  laws  of  the  Farm  are  not  only  un¬ 
known  but  are  sometimes  uncertain.  There  are  many  doubtful  pre¬ 
rogatives  which  the  Farmer  will  exercise  according  to  circumstances. 
It  will  readily  be  surmised  that  the  employees  of  the  Farm  make  their 
experiments  by  preference  upon  those  who  have  had  the  misfortune  to 
displease  them.  It  is  natural,  too,  that  they  are  never  made  except 
upon  those  who  have  not  means  enough  to  defend  themselves. 

[15]  Finally,  there  are  other  laws  which  are  unfortunately  only  too 
definite,  but  which  it  is  impossible  to  execute  literally,  by  reason  of 
their  extreme  severity.  The  Farmer  procures  their  adoption  well 
knowing  that  he  will  not  carry  them  into  execution,  and  he  reserves 
the  right  to  exempt  from  them  when  he  wishes,  but  on  condition  that 
such  exemption,  without  which  the  individual  subject  to  the  taxes 
would  be  ruined,  shall  be  a  favor  granted  arbitrarily  either  by  him  or 
his  employees.  This  is  a  favorite  expedient  of  the  financial  adminis¬ 
tration  which  should  be  fully  exposed  to  Your  Majesty.  Yes,  Sire,  the 
Farmer  has  been  known  to  say  to  the  citizen  :  “  The  Farm  must  have 
certain  favors  to  grant  and  to  refuse  you ;  it  is  essential  that  you  should 
be  obliged  to  come  and  ask  for  them.”  This  is  equivalent  to  saying, 

'A  single  great  company,  “  the  General  Farm,”  had,  since  the  end  of  the  17th 
century,  been  conceded  the  privilege  of  raising  the  greater  part  of  the  indirect  taxes, 
including  the  salt  tax,  the  excises,  the  customs  duties,  &c.  For  this  right  the  Farm 
paid  the  government  a  lump  sum,  agreed  upon  in  the  contracts,  which  were  renewed 
at  regular  intervals.  For  the  somewhat  complicated  details  see  Gomel,  op.  ci/.,  I., 

3J7.  sqq- 


ABUSES  IN  THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  JUSTICE. 


83 


“  It  is  not  enough  that  you  bring  your  money  to  satisfy  our  greed — 
you  must  gratify  the  insolence  of  our  Clerks  by  your  servility.”  Now,, 
even  if  it  be  true  that  the  greed  of  the  Farmer  can  be  turned  to  the 
advantage  of  the  King,  it  is,  certain  that  the  insolence  of  the  army  of 
Clerks  who  overrun  the  provinces  cannot  profit  him  in  the  least. 

[16]  We  have  discussed  this  particular  class  of  abuses,  Sire,  dt 
greater  length  than  the  others,  partly  because  they  are  not  so  well 
known,  partly  because  we  do  not  believe  it  is  possible  to  remedy 
them  without  interfering  with  the  levying  of  the  taxes.  We  believe, 
moreover,  Sire,  that  you  have  never  been  made  acquainted  with  the 
methods  employed  by  the  General  Farm  in  order  to  win  its  suits 
with  individuals. 

[17]  The  first  of  these  methods,  Sire — there  is  no  dissembling  the 
fact— is  to  have  no  judge,  or  what  is  almost  the  same  thing,  to  have 
no  other  judge  than  a  tribunal  composed  of  a  single  man.  The  Cours 
des  aides  and  the  tribunals  dependent  upon  them  have,  by  their  con¬ 
stitution,  jurisdiction  over  all  cases  connected  with  the  taxes ;  but  the 
majority  of  such  cases  are  removed  and  referred  to  a  single  commis¬ 
sioner  of  the  King’s  Council,  i.  e.,  the  Intendant  of  a  province,  and, 
by  appeal,  to  the  Council  of  Finance,  that  is  to  say,  to  a  council  which 
in  reality  is  held  neither  in  the  presence  of  Your  Majesty  nor  in  that  of 
the  head  of  the  Judiciary,  where  neither  Counsellors  of  State  nor 
Maitres  des  Requetes  are  present,  and  which  is  composed  only  of  the 
Controller-General  and  a  single  Intendant  of  Finance,  and  where, 
consequently,  the  Intendant  of  Finance  is  usually  the  only  judge,  for 
the  Controller-General  rarely  has  time  to  occupy  himself  with  matters 
of  litigation. 

[  1 8 J  We  render  full  justice,  Sire,  as  does  the  general  public,  to 
those  who  hold  these  offices  at  present;  but  the  personal  virtues  of  a 
mortal  man  cannot  reassure  us  as  to  the  results  of  a  permanent  system. 
What  we  denounce  to  Your  Majesty  is  the  arbitrary  system  of  justice 
under  which  the  people  have  groaned  for  a  century  past,  and  must 
continue  to  groan  if  protests  are  made  only  when  the  power  is  in  the 
hands  of  those  who  have  the  will  to  abuse  it.  We  must  then  avail 
ourselves  of  this  auspicious  moment,  when  justice  has  presided  over  all 
Your  Majesty’s  appointments,  to  convince  Your  Majesty  and  Your 
Majesty’s  Ministers  of  the  incontestable  principle  that  the  people 
cannot  be  said  really  to  have  any  judges  when  only  a  tribunal  consisting 
of  a  single  man  is  granted  them.  Yet  for  all  those  cases  which  have 


84 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


been  removed  from  the  ordinary  course  of  justice,  there  is  only  this 
tribunal  of  a  single  man.  In  the  provinces,  the  Intendant  decides  the 
fate  of  the  citizens,  alone  in  his  office,  and  often  in  co-operation  with 
the  Director  of  the  Farm ;  similarly,  in  Paris,  where  appeals  are  de¬ 
cided,  it  is  the  Intendant  of  Finance  who  officiates,  and  often  in  co¬ 
operation  with  a  Farmer-General.  In  substantiation  of  this  we  believe 
that  we  may  refer,  in  good  faith,  to  the  very  persons  upon  whom  this 
excessive  power  has  been  conferred  ;  we  ask  them  if  it  is  not  true  that 
this  arbitrary  justice  is  the  only  sort  that  your  subjects  can  obtain  in 
all  removed  cases. 

[19]  We  may  add  that  in  such  classes  of  cases  as  have  not  yet  been 
removed,  and  where  appeal  in  the  regular  course  of  justice  seems  still  to 
be  permitted,  the  Farmer-General  has  found  means  to  render  this  re¬ 
course  illusory  and  make  it  only  an  excuse  for  useless  expense  on  the 
part  of  the  unfortunate  people,  by  introducing  the  custom  of  petition¬ 
ing  the  Council  of  Finance  to  reverse  the  decisions  of  the  Cour  des 
aides,  and  in  that  way  bring  the  matter  before  that  very  same  tribunal, 
composed  of  the  Controller-General  and  the  single  Intendant  of 
Finance.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  the  Farmers  maintain  that  an  im¬ 
proper  decision  should  where  the  King’s  taxes  are  involved  be  re¬ 
garded  by  the  council  as  a  ground  for  a  petition  for  removal,  and  that  all 
the  taxes,  the  collection  of  which  is  turned  over  to  them,  should  enjoy 
this  privilege.  On  the  other  hand,  the  decisions  of  the  Council  of 
Finance  relative  to  petitions  for  reversal  are  absolutely  in  conflict  with 
well-established  laws,  which  are  constantly  observed  in  Your  Majesty’s 
true  Council,  for  in  reversing  a  decision  of  a  sovereign  court  the  merits 
of  the  case  are  reconsidered  without  sending  the  case  to  another  tribu¬ 
nal  for  a  new  trial.  The  consequence  is  that  there  is  practically  no 
difference  between  a  petition  for  reversal  presented  to  your  Council 
and  an  appeal  on  the  merits  to  a  higher  court ;  and  the  appeal  to  the 
Council  is  only  another  instance  of  appeal.  Such,  then,  are  the  in¬ 
stances  of  appeal  for  all  cases  where  the  farmed  taxes  are  involved. 

[20]  The  classes  of  cases  which  have  been  removed,  such  as  those 
involving  the  registration  fees  and  the  franc-fief }  are  taken  first  before 
a  single  person,  the  Intendant  of  the  province,  and  subsequently  before 
a  single  person,  the  Intendant  of  Finance,  and  those  classes  of  cases 
which  have  not  been  removed,  such  as  those  relating  to  the  excise 
dues,  are  first  brought  before  the  Election  2  and  then  before  the  Cour 

1  The  nature  of  this  due  is  explained  later.  See  below,  IT  27.  2  An  inferior  court. 


REMOVAL  OF  CASES  TO  THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS.  85 

des  aides ,  but  always,  eventually,  before  a  single  person,  the  Intendant 
of  Finance. 

[21]  We  know  that  plausible  reasons  are  assigned  for  these  removals 
and  this  delegation  of  power.  Your  Majesty  will  be  told  that  it  was 
desired  that  both  the  Farmers  and  their  opponents  should  be  spared  the 
expense  and  the  tedium  of  the  regular  judicial  procedure,  and  that 
the  partiality  might  be  avoided  which  the  Financiers  assert  that  they 
have  always  experienced  on  the  part  of  the  regular  judges.  They 
will  even  explain  to  you  the  reason  of  this  asserted  partiality  by  admit- 
ing  that  the  taxes  are  so  onerous  and  the  regulations  affecting  their 
administration  so  contrary  to  the  ordinary  judicial  procedure  that  these 
regulations  cannot  be  satisfactorily  observed  except  by  judges  who, 
being  initiated  into  the  administration,  realize  the  necessity  of  having 
them  carried  out. 

[22]  But  if  the  first  of  these  motives  were  sincere  the  Cour  des  aides 
would  have  been  asked  to  register  decrees  establishing  a  shorter  and  a 
less  expensive  procedure — decrees  which  these  Courts  would  gladly 
adopt,  but  which  have  never  been  submitted  to  them  for  fear  of  losing 
the  excuse  for  removal.  As  to  the  charge  of  partiality,  if  it  were  true 
that  the  sole  aim  was  to  grant  the  Farmer  judges  who  were  familiar 
with  the  administration,  the  appeals  of  the  Intendants  and  the  petitions 
for  reversal  would  be  carried  to  Your  Majesty’s  own  Council,  which  is 
composed  of  magistrates  who  have  administered  the  provinces,  and  not 
to  the  Controller-General  and  a  single  Intendant  of  Finance.  It  must, 
therefore,  be  admitted  that  the  real  motive  for  these  removals,  the 
real  intention  of  the  government,  is  to  give  the  Farmer  no  other  judge 
in  his  suits  than  a  Minister  and  those  officials  who  are  connected 
with  the  administration  of  the  finance — in  other  words,  to  make  the 
Farmer  himself  the  judge  for  himself  and  for  the  public  at  large , when¬ 
ever  he  may  have  a  preponderating  influence  in  the  government  offices. 

[23]  We  do  not  propose,  Sire,  to  enter  into  these  removals  in 
detail,  because  it  would  be  an  endless  task  to  enumerate  them,  and 
we  are  reluctant  to  dwell  upon  this  subject  at  great  length  because, 
since  it  affects  our  jurisdiction,  it  is  a  personal  matter.  It  would, 
moreover,  be  impossible  to  produce  proofs  of  the  abuses  resulting 
from  this  system  because,  as  these  affairs  are  not  brought  before  any 
regular  tribunal,  it  is  impossible  to  prove  by  any  legal  document  the 
very  abuse  that  is  most  loudly  attested  by  public  notoriety :  but  Your 
Majesty  can  easily  supplement  the  Protests  of  the  Courts  by  giving  ear 
to  the  unanimous  testimony  of  the  public. 


86 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[24]  You  will  learn  from  that  source  to  what  extent  the  Financiers 
have  abused  their  arbitrary  power  in  the  administration  of  all  the 
taxes  which  are  farmed  under  the  head  of  dotnaine ,l  and  which  are 
withdrawn  from  the  cognizance  of  the  regular  Courts.  You  will  find 
that  all  such  as  come  under  the  head  of  registration  fees  and  the  tax 
of  the  centieme  denier ,’  taxes  which  are  levied  upon  every  contract 
entered  into  between  citizens,  are  determined  according  to  the- fancy 
of  the  Farmer  and  his  agents  ;  that  the  supposed  laws  on  these  matters 
are  so  obscure  and  fragmentary  that  he  who  pays  can  never  know  what 
he  really  owes,  that  often  the  agent  himself  knows  no  more  about  it 
than  the  taxpayer,  and  interprets  the  law  more  or  less  rigorously 
according  as  he  is  more  or  less  greedy ;  and  that  it  is  notorious  that  all 
these  taxes  may  receive  an  extension  under  one  Farmer  and  not  under 
the  others,  from  which  it  is  evident  that  the  Farmer  is  the  sovereign 
legislator  in  matters  where  his  own  personal  interests  are  concerned. 
This  is  an  intolerable  abuse  which  would  never  have  arisen  if  these 
taxes  had  been  subject  to  a  tribunal  of  any  kind,  for  where  judges  are 
known  to  exist,  fixed  and  definite  laws  must  be  observed. 

[25J  Your  Majesty  will  be  aware  that  these  extensions  have  of  late 
been  carried  to  an  excess  hitherto  unknown ;  that  the  Farmer  is  no 
longer  satisfied  with  learning  the  family  secrets  recorded  in  the  legal 
documents  which  are  drawn  up  from  day  to  day,  but  pries  into  the 
records  of  the  last  twenty  years  on  the  pretext  that  the  dues  have  not 
been  exacted  with  the  requisite  strictness.  A  private  individual,  on  the 
other  hand,  who  is  the  victim  of  extortion,  may  claim  redress  only 
within  a  period  of  two  years. 

[26]  You  will  find,  Sire,  that  this  sort  of  annoyance  has  been  carried 
to  such  an  extent  that  people  are  reduced  to  signing  documents 
privately  instead  of  before  a  notary ;  and  in  those  cases  where 
it  is  indispensable  that  the  document  should  be  drawn  up  in  regular 
form,  those  drafting  it  are  often  required  to  distort  it  by  obscure  and 
equivocal  clauses,  which  give  rise  subsequently  to  interminable  discus-  j 
sions,  so  that  a  tax  established  under  the  specious  pretext  of  increasing  , 
the  authenticity  of  documents  and  preventing  suits  at  law  forces  your 
subjects,  on  the  contrary,  to  renounce  public  contracts,  and  drags  them 
into  legal  proceedings,  which  are  ruining  all  our  families. 

1  These  comprised  registration  fees,  the  franc-fief.  &c.,  as  well  as  the  revenue  from 
the  royal  domain.  Cf  Necker,  Administration  des  Finances,  Chap.  I. 

*  A  tax  on  sales  of  real  estate. 


THE  OPPRESSIVE  NATURE  OF  CERTAIN  TAXES. 


8? 


[27]  The  right  of  franc-jiff—  which  is  also  called  a  domain  due — is 
a  due  exacted  from  commoners  or  non-nobles  for  the  fiefs  they  hold ;  it, 
too,  has  been  included  in  the  arbitrary  system  of  justice.  It  consists  in 
a  year’s  revenue,  which  one  pays  every  twentieth  year  in  order  to  be 
left  in  peace  for  the  other  nineteen.  But  when  there  is  a  transfer 
during  the  twenty  years  the  new  possessor  is  obliged  to  pay  the  tax, 
although  the  former  owner  is  given  no  indemnity  for  the  years  of  ex¬ 
emption  which  he  paid  for  and  has  not  enjoyed — a  usage  which  may  now 
be  sanctioned  by  some  regulation,  but  which  was  certainly  in  the  begin¬ 
ning  an  extortion.  Your  Majesty  will  learn  besides  that  eight  sous  in 
the  livre  have  been  added  to  a  tax  that  already  equaled  the  whole 
revenue,  that  in  valuing  property  no  deduction  is  made  for  costs,  and 
that  there  are  many  other  minor  abuses.  ’But  what  will  most  astonish 
Your  Majesty  is  to  learn  that  on  the  pretext  of  the  payment  of  this  tax, 
the  Farmer-General  undertakes  to  decide,  through  the  medium  of  this 
arbitrary  justice,  a  most  interesting  question  of  state — the  question  of 
nobility. 

[28]  The  Intendants  have  been  invested  with  authority  to  examine 
into  disputes  concerning  franc-fiefs ,  registration  dues  and  other  similar 
taxes, — that  is,  the  aim  has  been  to  make  them  judges  of  the  adminis¬ 
tration  of  the  revenue  laws,  of  the  amount  to  be  paid  for  franc  fief ; 
and,  at  present,  if  an  individual  claims  that  he  is  not  subject  to 
the  tax  because  he  is  a  noble,  and  the  Farmer  chooses  to  contest  his 
nobility,  the  case  must  be  carried  before  the  same  tribunal,1  so  that  a 
noble  depends  on  the  will  of  a  single  man  for  the  enjoyment  of  the 
rank  which  has  been  transmitted  to  him  by  his  ancestors.  It  is  easy 
to  imagine  to  what  lengths  abuses  of  this  sort  of  justice  are  likely 
to  be  carried,  and  Your  Majesty  will  be  still  farther  convinced  by  the 
facts  which  you  may  learn  from  public  report. 

[29]  You  will  find,  for  example,  that  in  1723  the  late  King  called 
for  a  confirmation  due  from  all  those  who  had  been  ennobled  during 
the  preceding  reign,  but  that  the  law  did  not  pronounce  the  penalty  of 
forfeiture  upon  those  who  did  not  pay  the  tax ;  that  such  forfeiture 
hirs  since  been  established  by  decrees  in  Council  which  did  not  take 
the  form  of  letters-patent  (as  though  one  could  be  condemned  to  forfeit 
his  rank  by  decrees  which  have  not  the  characteristics  of  regularly 
registered  laws)  ;  and  lastly,  that  these  decrees,  of  which  the  latest  is 


1 1.  e.  the  Intendant. 


88 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


dated  1730,  have  always  been  considered  purely  comminatory,  and 
that  the  Farmers-General  themselves  have  publicly  declared  that  they 
have  never  been  put  into  execution.  Indeed,  their  execution  seemed 
impossible,  for  it  would  violate  every  principle  of  justice  to  punish  the 
failure  to  pay  a  tax  by  the  forfeiture  of  nobility,  an  ignominious  pun-, 
•ishment  which  is  invariably  reserved  for  those  who  are  convicted  of 
capital  crimes.  Still  less  possible  would  it  seem  to  pronounce  this 
penalty  upon  the  children  of  the  person  who  had  failed  to  pay  the  tax — 
to  declare  forfeit  of  his  nobility  a  citizen  who  received  it  at  birth  and 
has  lived  in  conformity  with  that  estate,  because  his  father  had 
neglected,  in  times  gone  by,  to  conform  to  a  special  tax  law  of  whose 
existence  he  may  have  been  ignorant. 

[30]  Severities  such  as  these  are  discountenanced  by  everyone; 
neither  justice  nor  humanity  could  ever  permit  the  literal  execution  of 
such  laws,  and  the  consequence  is  that  that  decree  in  Council  of  1730, 
and  many  other  laws  of  like  character,  have  remained  inoperative. 
But,  Sire,  it  is  in  the  very  nature  of  arbitrary  power  that  justice  and 
humanity  are  bereft  of  their  rights  when  but  one  man  is  deaf  to 
their  demands.  A  Farmer  appeared  who  wished  to  revive  the  decree 
of  1730,  forgotten  since  its  inception,  and  a  Minister  who  was  willing 
to  abandon  to  him  all  the  families  who  had  not  paid  the  confirmation 
tax.  Thus  a  man  whose  father  or  grandfather  was  ennobled  as  the 
highest  reward  for  .  shedding  his  blood  in  his  country’s  service,  a  man 
who,  having  passed  his  life  following  the  example  of  his  fathers,  in  the 
expensive  profession  of  arms,  has  not  found  himself  able  to  pay  the 
tax,  may  to-day  be  deprived  of  the  rights  of  his  nobility  because  he 
has  fulfilled  its  duties,  and  his  family  may  be  relegated  by  the  pitiless 
Financier  to  the  class  of  commoners,  while  the  Financier  himself,  en-. 
nobled  perhaps  by  the  purchase  of  an  office,  enjoys  the  privileges  of 
the  highest  nobility. 

[31]  This  example  will  show  Your  Majesty  to  what  extent  a  harsh 
ministry  has  been  able  to  take  advantage  of  removals  too  hastily 
accorded  in  the  past,  and  you  will  readily  believe  that  the  abuses  have 
not  been  restricted  to  the  concessions  made  in  earlier  times,  but  that, 
especially  during  the  absence  of  the  Magistracy,  when  there  was  no 
danger  of  protest,  the  public  calamities  afforded  an  opportunity  to  sub¬ 
ject  new  classes  of  affairs  to  an  arbitrary  power. 

[32]  We  may  cite  as  an  instance  the  domiciliary  visits  made  in 
search  of  contraband  tobacco.  The  exorbitant  price  put  upon  tobacco 


SMUGGLING. 


89 


has  for  several  years  furnished  such  an  incentive  to  fraud  that  to  pre¬ 
vent  it  means  have  been  employed  which,  while  they  become  every 
day  more  outrageous,  are  nevertheless  universally  ineffective.  The 
Farmers-General  have  obtained  such  laws  as  would  excite  civil  war 
should  they  be  literally  executed.  Their  Clerks  are  authorized  to  search 
with  the  greatest  strictness  all  houses,  indiscriminately,  without  excep¬ 
tion,  and  with  no  respect  for  rank,  birth  or  dignities.  Similar  laws 
have  been  obtained  by  the  Farmers  at  various  times  in  the  past,  and 
for  various  objects,  but  excessive  abuse  has  hitherto  been  restrained  by 
established  justice,  which  could  rigorously  punish  the  Clerk  who  abused 
the  right  which  the  law  gave  him ;  to-day  that  restraint  no  longer 
exists;  the  last  ministry  seized  the  moment  of  the  absence  of  the 
Cour  des  aides  to  remove  this  class  of  affairs  from  the  regular  course 
of  justice  and  turn  them  over  to  the  Commissioners  of  the  Council. 

[33]  There  are  many  more  such  removals  that  might  be  mentioned, 
such  as  cases  having  to  do  with  the  tax  on  playing  cards,  the  dues 
collected  at  Poissy,1  and  many  others.  We  wished  to  give  Your 
Majesty  a  few  examples  only,  the  rest  are  reserved  for  special  pre¬ 
sentation.  W’hen  the  whole  matter  has  been  submitted  to  Your  Majesty 
and  your  Ministers,  we  trust,  Sire,  that  you  will  yourself  recognize  the 
necessity  of  putting  a  stop  to  these  abuses. 

[34]  It  would  seem  as  if  the  Farmer-General  might  have  dispensed 
with  employing  so  many  illegal  expedients  for  avoiding  the  regular 
course  of  justice,  when  one  considers  how  many  weapons  have  been 
given  him  with  which  he  can  legally  triumph  over  his  adversaries  in  the 
face  of  any  system  of  justice.  These  methods  no  longer  permit  the 
judges  to  attempt  to  discern  where  truth  and  justice  lie,  for  they  are 
usually  obliged  to  base  their  decisions  upon  documents  which  to  the 
eye  of  reason  are  obviously  suspicious. 

[35]  This  will  be  clear  to  Your  Majesty  when  we  have  exposed  the 
method  by  which  the  Farmer  discovers  and  proves  cases  of  smuggling, 
for  the  detection  of  fraud  is  the  object  of  most  of  his  suits.  We  shall 
be  obliged  to  weary  you,  Sire,  with  tedious  details  of  the  continual  war 
which  is  waged  between  two  of  the  most  contemptible  varieties  of 
men — smugglers  on  the  one  hand,  and  spies  on  the  other ;  but  since  it 
is  the  innocent  who  suffer,  and  as  the  recital  may  make  an  impression 
upon  Your  Majesty,  we  do  not  feel  justified  in  omitting  it. 


1  Upon  cattle  destined  for  the  Paris  markets. 


po 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[36]  The  means  of  detecting  smuggling  reduce  themselves  to  two  — 
the  reports  of  Clerks  and  the  information  of  spies.  As  to  the  Clerks’ 
reports,  the  Farmer-General  has  the  right  to  exercise,  through  his 
Clerks,  and  with  some  legal  formalities,  the  most  rigorous  inspection  of 
the  highways,  and  often  of  private  houses.  If  in  their  visits  the 
Clerks  believe  they  have  discovered  a  case  of  smuggling,  they  report 
upon  it,  and  by  this  report,  signed  by  two  Clerks,  the  facts  are  con¬ 
sidered  established  and  the  fraud  proved. 

[37]  If  the  individual  accused  in  the  report  claims  that  the  Clerks 
are  slanderers,  he  cannot  legally  sustain  his  assertion  except  by  an 
Inscription  en  faux.  It  is  necessary  to  explain  to  Your  Majesty  what 
this  means.  It  is  not  sufficient  for  the  accused  to  assert  that  there 
are  no  proofs  of  facts  alleged  against  him,  he  must  prove  the  direct 
contrary ;  but  such  proof  is  by  nature  often  impossible.  How  is  one 
to  prove  a  negative?  How  prove  to  the  Clerks  the  falsity  of  the 
facts  alleged  by  them,  when  the  whole  affair  has  taken  place  inside 
a  house,  without  other  witnesses  than  the  accused  and  the  Clerks 
themselves? 

[38]  Moreover,  the  formalities  prescribed  for  the  Inscription  en  faux 
are  extremely  complicated,  and  the  omission  of  a  single  one  deprives 
the  accused  of  his  rightful  defense.  In  order  to  be  permitted  to  enter  1 
the  protest  it  is  also  necessary  to  pay  a  fee,  which  the  majority  of  the  ] 
p'eople  are  not  in  a  condition  to  pay  ;  one  is,  besides,  given  a  very  short  \ 
time  for  making  his  arrangements,  that  is  to  say,  for  consulting  a  legal  j 
adviser,  looking  for  legal  proofs,  and  borrowing  the  money  necessary  j 
for  the  fee.  It  must  therefore  be  acknowledged  that  a  man  of  the 
people  has  no  possible  means  of  protecting  himself  against  these  1 
reports  signed  by  two  Clerks. 

[39]  It  is  not  at  all  uncommon  for  one  of  these  Clerks  not  to  be 
able  either  to  read  or  write,  although  he  may  have  been  taught  to 
form  the  characters  of  his  name.  The  Farmers-General  take  care  to 
have  one  in  each  brigade  who  can  write ;  it  is  he  who  makes  out  the 
report,  and  one  of  his  comrades  signs  it,  and  it  does  not  seem  necessary 
to  them  that  he  who  signs  should  also  be  able  to  read.  Your  Cour 
des  aides,  learning  of  this  abuse  some  time  before  the  dispersion  of  the 
Magistracy,  issued  an  administrative  decree  which  forbade  Clerks  who 
could  not  read  to  sign  these  reports.  The  Farmers-General  ventured 
to  complain  of  this  as  a  decree  which  rendered  their  administration 
impossible;  and  we  think,  Sire,  that  during  the  absence  of  the  Cour 
des  aides  the  decree  has  been  but  ill  executed. 


TYRANNY  OF  THE  OFFICIALS  OF  THE  FARM. 


9» 


[40]  But  there  is  another  abuse  which  the  Cour  des  aides  is  unable 
to  remedy  by  its  own  authority,  since  it  consists  of  a  secret  compact 
between  the  Farmer  and  his  Clerks,  a  compact  expressly  forbidden  by 
law,  but  of  which  it  is  impossible  to  obtain  legal  proofs.  It  is  well 
known  that  in  spite  of  the  legal  prohibition  the  Farmer  promises  to  his 
Clerks  part  of  the  fines  to  which  individuals  are  condemned  through 
their  reports,  and  this  constitutes  a  part  of  their  wages.  So  smuggling 
is  considered  proved  against  a  citizen  by  the  simple  affirmation  of  two 
men,  who  are  not  only  in  the  pay  of  his  adversary,  the  Farmer-General, 
but  who  expect  a  remuneration  proportionate  to  the  sum  which  he  is 
condemned  to  pay. 

[41]  Such  is  the  judicial  method  employed  in  proving  smuggling  by 
means  of  reports.  But  the  Farmer  must  also  have  some  means  of 
discovering  where  to  look  for  fraud  and  how  to  direct  the  investigations 
of  his  Clerks.  It  is  to  this  end  that  it  is  considered  desirable  that  there 
should  be  in  every  association  of  merchants,  in  every  house,  and  in 
every  family,  a  spy  who  shall  inform  the  Financier  that  in  such  a  place 
and  on  such  an  occasion  an  arrest  may  be  made.  The  spy  does  not 
need  to  show  himself,  but  the  Clerks,  warned  by  him,  surprise  the 
person  who  has  been  denounced,  and  either  acquire  proofs,  or  manu¬ 
facture  them  themselves  in  their  reports.  When  a  warning  has  been 
successful  a  reward  is  given  to  the  informer,  i.  <?.,  to  the  accomplice, 
the  associate,  the  house-fellow,  to  the  wife  who  has  denounced  her 
husband,  to  the  son  who  has  denounced  his  father. 

[42]  Deign,  Sire,  to  reflect  a  moment  upon  this  picture  of  the 
administration  of  the  Farm.  Through  the  confidence  placed  in  these 
reports  a  premium  is  put  upon  perjury,  while  by  this  system  of  spies 
domestic  treason  is  rewarded.  These  are  the  means  by  which  more 
than  one  hundred  and  fifty  millions  are  every  year  brought  into  Your 
Majesty’s  treasury. 

[43]  It  is  not  for  us,  Sire,  to  suggest  to  you  other  taxes  which 
might  replace  this  immense  contribution ;  it  is  not  even  for  us  to  deter¬ 
mine  whether  the  resources  of  economy  might  not  replace  it.  It  is 
nevertheless  imperative  that  relief  should  be  afforded  to  a  people 
burdened  by  this  monstrous  system  of  administration ;  and  if  it  is  true 
that  economy  alone  will  not  suffice  to  enable  Your  Majesty  to  renounce 
the  entire  revenue  derived  from  the  Farm,  at  least  a  certain  mitigation 
of  the  public  misfortunes  might  be  afforded  if,  by  reducing  expenses, 
a  certain  portion  of  the  revenue  could  be  sacrificed.  This  is  why  we 


92 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


have  felt  it  our  duty  to  show  you  the  terrible  spectacle  of  the  mosl 
glorious  kingdom  in  the  world  groaning  under  a  tyranny  which 
increases  day  by  day. 

[44]  It  is  customary,  Sire,  to  praise  and  implore  Your  Majesty’; 
benevolence  at  the  same  moment,  but  it  is  your  justice  that  we,  the 
defenders  of  the  people,  would  invoke.  We  know  that  almost  all  the 
sentiments  to  which  the  soul  of  a  king  is  susceptible,  the  love  of  glorj 
and  of  pleasure,  even  friendship,  and  the  desire,  so  natural  to  a  grea' 
prince,  of  rendering  happy  those  about  him,  form  perpetual  obstacle: 
to  that  rigorous  justice  which  he  owes  to  his  people,  for  it  is  only  a' 
the  expense  of  the  people  that  a  king  can  be  victorious  over  his  enemies 
magnificent  in  his  court,  and  generous  toward  those  who  surround  him 

[45]  France,  we  might  say  the  whole  of  Europe,  is  crushed  unde; 
the  weight  of  taxes,  and  the  rivalry  of  the  Powers  has  led  them  to  vie 
with  each  other  in  the  enormous  expenses  which  have  rendered  these 
taxes  necessary ;  expenses  are  moreover  doubled  by  a  huge  nationa 
debt  contracted  under  previous  reigns,  Your  Majesty  must  therefore 
remember  that  although  your  ancestors  covered  themselves  with  glory 
that  glory  is  being  paid  for  by  the  present  generation ;  that  while  the] 
captivated  all  hearts  by  their  liberality,  and  astonished  Europe  b] 
their  magnificence,  that  magnificence  and  that  liberality  were  the 
origin  of  taxes  and  debts  which  still  exist  to-day. 

[46]  Your  Majesty  should  never  forget  that  the  virtuous  Louis  XII. 
in  spite  of  his  passion  for  war,  never  believed  himself  justified  in  em 
ploying  means  which  would  have  been  onerous  to  his  subjects ;  and  ir 
spite  of  the  generosity  which  was  his  characteristic  virtue,  he  had  th< 
courage  to  expose  himself  to  the  reproach  of  avarice  from  his  courtiers 
because  he  knew  that  while  a  king’s  economy  might  be  condemnet 
by  a  few  frivolous  or  greedy  men,  his  prodigality  would  make  the  tear 
of  a  whole  nation  flow. 

[47]  That  great  truth,  Sire,  is  recognized  to-day  by  all  the  nation 
who  have  learned  from  the  experience  of  many  centuries  to  require  ii 
their  kings  only  such  virtues  as  make  for  the  general  happiness ;  anr 
if  at  your  accession  all  France  enthusiastically  proclaimed  its  love  fo 
the  race  of  its  masters,  stern  duty,  Sire,  obliges  us  to  confess  that  a  par 
of  those  transports  were  due  to  the  opinion  which  had  been  formed 
Your  Majesty  since  your  tenderest  years,  and  to  the  hope  that  a  wis 
economy  would  diminish  the  public  burdens. 

[48]  But,  Sire,  while  this  economy  is  demanded  of  you  by  the  voic 


REFORMATION  OF  THE  TAXATION  REQUESTED. 


93 

of  the  nation  at  large,  your  throne  is  surrounded  by  those  who  believe 
royal  grandeur  to  consist  only  in  luxury,  while  the  miserable  creature 
whom  the  heavy  taxes  deprive  of  his  daily  bread  is  far  away,  the  ob¬ 
jects  of  your  benevolence  and  magnificence  are  continually  before  your 
eyes.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  oppose  to  them  the  terrifying  but 
not  exaggerated  picture  of  the  condition  of  the  people.  Oh,  that  it 
might  be  ever  present  to  you,  Sire  !  Had  it  been  so  to  your  royal  pre¬ 
decessors,  Your  Majesty  would  to-day  be  able  to  follow  the  dictates  of 
your  heart ;  and  when  you  learned  that  the  dictates  of  humanity  were 
violated  by  the  fiscal  laws  established  in  your  kingdom  you  would  not 
hesitate  to  revoke  them,  and  would  not  be  hindered  by  the  necessity 
of  paying  the  state  debt,  which  is  a  continual  obstacle  to  the  reform 
of  these  odious  abuses. 

>  [49]  For  the  present,  Sire,  without  venturing  to  propose  to  Your 
Majesty  a  general  reformation  of  the  farmed  taxes,  special  memoirs 
may  be  presented  to  you  on  various  subjects,  which  may  be  discussed 
with  your  Ministers,  for  it  is  impossible  that  Your  Majesty  should  your¬ 
self  enter  into  the  details  of  all  the  devices  that  have  been  invented  by 
the  Farmers-General  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  taxes,  and  by  the 
delinquents  to  elude  them.  What  we  do  ask  at  present  of  Your  Majesty 
personally  is  to  institute  an  investigation  into  the  manner  in  which  all 
taxes  were  extended  under  the  last  ministry,  and  into  the  removals 
granted  with  unprecedented  profusion. 

[50]  You  have  commanded  us,  Sire,  to  accept  without  examination 
whatever  has  received  the  stamp  of  law  during  the  period  when  we 
were  excluded  from  our  functions.  A  superior  power  has  prevented  us 
from  watching  over  the  interests  and  rights  of  the  people.  It  becomes 
necessary,  therefore,  for  Your  Majesty  to  undertake  this  duty,  and  in 
the  investigation  which  you  will  institute  we  beseech  you  to  distinguish 
with  the  greatest  care  what  is  really  essential  to  the  collection  of  the 
taxes  from  what  has  been  introduced  only  through  the  blind  com¬ 
plaisance  of  the  ministry  toward  the  Financiers,  in  order  to  gratify 
their  despotism.  Your  Majesty  should  eliminate  from  these  new  laws, 
all  that  goes  to  establish  an  arbitrary  system  of  justice.  We  admit 
that  since  there  are  excessive  taxes  to  be  collected  it  is  necessary  to 
have  rigorous  laws,  but  these  laws  can  at  least  be  definite ;  for  no  motive, 
no  consideration,  no  interest,  can  justify  Your  Majesty  in  permitting 
the  fate  of  the  people  to  depend  upon  the  avidity  of  a  Farmer  or  the 
caprice  of  a  government  official. 


94 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[51]  Finally,  Sire,  although  it  is  not  a  part  of  our  function  to  sug¬ 
gest  plans  to  you,  and  although  we  must,  above  all  things,  avoid  sanc¬ 
tioning  doubtful  systems,  there  is  nevertheless  one  truth  so  important, 
so  evident,  so  calculated  to  appeal  to  Your  Majesty,  that  we  feel 
obliged  to  submit  it  to  you ;  that  is,  that  there  would  be  an  assured  ad¬ 
vantage  for  Your  Majesty  and  an  immense  gain  for  the  people  in  simpli¬ 
fying  the  existing  taxes  and  the  laws  which  provide  for  their  collection. 

[52]  We  have  already  observed  that  the  regulations  established  by 
the  Farm  form  an  appallingly  voluminous  code ;  yet  there  is  no  one 
versed  either  in  jurisprudence  or  in  administration  who  will  not  testify 
that  only  simple  laws  are  good  laws.  Now,  when  one  considers  the 
taxes  the  collection  of  which  has  given  rise  to  this  code,  one  finds  that 
the  dues  on  the  various  commodities  differ  according  to  the  kind  of 
trade  concerned,  the  localities  where  they  are  collected,  and  the  rank 
of  the  individual  taxpayer.  Fraud,  always  active  and  industrious,  profits 
by  this  want  of  uniformity,  and  makes  its  way,  so  to  speak,  between  the 
sinuosities  of  the  law ;  the  financial  administration  is  constantly  invent¬ 
ing  new  methods  of  pursuing  it,  and  the  weapons  employed  against 
smugglers  annoy  and  embarrass  everybody  in  the  enjoyment  of  their 
property  and  the  liberty  of  their  persons. 

[53]  This  accounts  for  the  great  multiplication  of  Clerks,  who  bring 
their  impertinent  curiosity  to  bear  upon  all  the  actions  of  life.  In  this 
way  the  Financiers  have  acquired  the  right  to  inspect  merchandise,  to 
enter  houses,  and  to  violate  family  secrets.  It  is  this  inequality  of  the 
taxes  collected  in  the  different  provinces  which  obliged  your  royal  prede¬ 
cessors  to  divide  the  kingdom  in  every  direction  by  customs  lines,  which 
it  is  necessary  to  guard,  like  frontiers,  with  an  innumerable  army  of  Clerks. 

[54]  All  this  would  be  remedied,  Sire,  by  simplifying  the  taxes. 
Your  Majesty’s  Farmers  would  save  a  13rge  part  of  the  expense  of  ad¬ 
ministration,  and  smuggling  would  become  more  difficult,  for  nothing 
favors  it  so  much  as  the  complication  of  the  taxes  and  the  obscurity  of 
the  regulations  governing  them.  The  people  would  enjoy  the  advan¬ 
tage  of  being  less  tormented  by  the  investigations  of 'the  employees  of 
the  Farm — investigations  which  are  nowhere  so  annoying  as  in  regions 
where  smuggling  is  to  be  expected,  notably  within  the  limits  of  the  so- 
called  territories  of  “  the  five  great  Farms,” 1  «  the  aides,"  “  the  great 
salt  tax,”  &c. 

A  portion  of  central  and  northern  Prance  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  country 
by  a  customs  line. 


SIMPLIFICATION  OF  THE  .TAXES. 


95 


[55]  We  do  not  claim,  Sire,  that  this  simplification  would  be  an 
easy  task.  It  is,  however,  evidently  possible  theoretically,  and  it  would 
be  of  the  greatest  service  to  the  State ;  but  to  carry  it  out,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  know  in  the  greatest  detail  not  only  the  revenue  pro¬ 
duced  by  each  tax  in  each  district,  but  the  real  source  of  that  revenue 
as  well,  and  to  calculate  exactly  what  increase  or  diminution  each  of 
the  proposed  changes  would  produce  in  the  amount.  It  would  be 
necessary  to  know  not  only  the  actual,  but  the  possible  product,  to 
consider  not  only  the  interests  of  the  Farm,  but  those  of  the  cultivator, 
the  manufacturer,  the  merchant,  and  the  consumer,  of  each  commodity. 
VVe  venture,  nevertheless,  to  assure  Your  Majesty  that  this  task  may  be 
accomplished  in  spite  of  its  difficulties.  There  is  certainly  an  enormous 
amount  of  material  in  the  registers  of  the  General  Farm,  in  the  offices 
of  the  Ministers,  of  the  Intendants  of  Finance,  and  even  of  many 
merchants ;  it  only  remains  to  determine  how  and  by  whom  it  shall  be 
utilized. 

[56]  Shall  the  Farmers-General  themselves  be  charged  with  this 
task?  That  has  been  suggested  more  than  once,  Sire.  They  have 
been  asked  to  propose  plans  for  reform  ;  but  we  believe  it  to  be  our 
duty  to  inform  Your  Majesty  that  while  the  simplification  of  the  taxes 
would  be  advantageous  to  the  Farm,  the  most  expert  of  the  Farmers 
have  a  personal  interest  contrary  to  that  of  the  Farm,  because  the 
science  which  they  have  been  at  such  pains  to  acquire  would  be  ren¬ 
dered  useless,  and  it  is  this  profound  science,  and  the  complication  of 
the  machine  which  they  have  to  operate,  which  makes  them  necessary 
to  the  government,  and  permits  them  to  dictate  laws  to  the  Ministers. 
Can  it  be  doubted,  moreover,  that  the  Financiers,  if  transformed  into 
legislators,  would  add  to  the  present  severity  of  the  taxes  whatever 
might  serve  to  cement  the  despotism,  at  once  intolerable  to  the  people 
and  useless  to  Your  Majesty,  to  which  they  have  already  subjected  the 
Nation? 

[57]  Certainly  the  Farmers-General  should  be  consulted.  In  spite 
of  the  observations  which  we  have  made  to  Your  Majesty,  there  have 
been  those  among  them  who  have  had  sufficient  regard  for  the  public 
welfare  to  sacrifice  to  it  the  interests  and  prejudices  of  their  position. 
Nevertheless,  in  consulting  them,  it  should  never  be  forgotten  in  what 
respects  their  interests  are  opposed  to  those  of  the  people  and  to  those 
of  Your  Majesty. 

[58]  You  have  much  to  expect,  Sire,  in  this  undertaking,  from  the 


96 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


zeal  and  knowledge  of  the  officials  at  the  head  of  your  finances.1  We 
even  believe  that  it  is  important  that  the  work  should  be  done  under 
their  direction.  But  shall  they  perform  the  task  themselves?  Can  so 
great  a  work  be  performed  by  a  single  man — and  a  man  whose  time 
is,  perhaps,  already  fully  occupied  by  the  daily  current  of  affairs  in  his 
administration?  Doubtless  he  would  employ  collaborators;  but  if  the 
work  were  put  under  the  control  of  a  single  official  the  same  dis¬ 
advantages  which  have  so  often  been  experienced  in  the  past  would 
inevitably  result  from  being  dependent  upon  one  man,  and  having 
only  a  single  individual  to  defend  the  people  against  the  united  efforts 
of  the  Financiers.  Add  to  this  that  his  death  would  some  day  involve 
the  loss  of  all  the  knowledge  acquired  and  of  all  the  work  done  in 
that  very  branch,  perhaps,  of  the  subject  which  it  might  prove 
especially  necessary  to  clear  up. 

[59]  It  would  be  well,  Sire,  if  all  the  details  of  the  administration 
of  the  Farms  could  be  known  both  to  Your  Majesty,  for  whom  the 
taxes  are  levied,  and  to  the  people,  who  pay  them.  Then,  when  the 
people  addressed  their  complaints  to  you,  and  asked  for  relief  from 
their  burdens,  the  remedy  might  be  suggested  to  you,  and  Your  Majesty 
would  be  able  to  form  your  own  opinion  upon  it.  Since  this  is  impos¬ 
sible  in  the  present  state  of  the  laws,  it  is  certainly  desirable  to  endeavor 
to  simplify  them.  But  until  this  task  can  be  achieved  and  a  new  body 
of  laws  be  given  to  France,  can  no  restraint  be  put  upon  the  tyranny 
of  the  Farmers,  founded  as  it  is  upon  the  general  ignorance  of  the  laws 
and  their  administration?  There  is  such  a  remedy,  Sire,  for  you  can 
at  once  order  the  Farmers-General  to  publish  exact  and  circumstantial 
lists  of  the  taxes  to  be  collected,  and  a  short,  clear,  and  systematic  ac¬ 
count  of  such  of  the  regulations  to  be  observed  as  it  is  important  for 
the  public  to  know. 

[60]  They  may  tell  Your  Majesty  that  this  work  will  be  long  and 
difficult ;  nevertheless,  no  one  can  honestly  refuse  to  admit  that  there 
is  no  branch  of  the  farmed  taxes  with  which  a  number  of  the  Farmers 
or  their  directors  are  not  especially  occupied.  .Each  of  them  has  a 
complete  treatise  upon  his  own  division  of  the  taxes,  which  furnishes 
him  with  the  data  that  the  General  Farm  requires  from  time  to  time ; 
he  has  also  a  set  of  abridged  instructions  for  the  direction  of  his  Clerks, 
and  it  is  but  right  that  these  should  be  communicated  to  the  public, 

'The  Controller-General  is  here  meant.  Turgot  was  just  then  at  the  head  of  the 
finances. 


LETTRES  DE  CACHET. 


97 


since  it  must  always  be  on  the  defensive  against  the  attempts  of  these 
Clerks.  The  work  is  then  already  done,  it  needs  only  to  be  made  public. 

[61]  But  we  must  warn  Your  Majesty  that  the  Farmers  will  not 
lend  themselves  readily  to  this  publication,  the  necessity  of  which  is 
clearly  proved  by  their  very  unwillingness.  They  do  not  wish  the 
people  to  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the  taxes.  They  desire  to  keep  the 
country  in  blind  subjugation  to  the  General  Farm.  They  fear  that 
a  body  of  lawyers  will  arise  in  each  province  who,  having  studied  the 
financial  laws,  will  be  able  to  aid  individual  citizens  in  their  contests 
with  the  Farmer.  But  it  is  your  duty,  Sire,  to  help  your  unhappy 
subjects  by  increasing  their  facilities  for  self-defense.  You  owe  them 
the  support  of  the  laws,  and  that  support  becomes  only  an  illusion 
when  the  laws  are  unknown  to  those  who  have  the  right  to  invoke  them. 

[62]  In  thus  presenting  to  you,  Sire,  a  general  sketch  of  the  farmed 
taxes,  it  has  not  been  our  intention  to  enter  in  detail  into  any  particular 
subject.  Nevertheless,  we  must  beseech  Your  Majesty  to  take  into 
especial  consideration  the  protests  addressed  to  the  late  King  in  the 
month  of  August,  1770,  which  up  to  the  present  time  have  received 
no  response.1 


1  One  might  be  tempted  to  look  upon  the  omission  here  indicated  as  a  device  of  the 
printer  to  stimulate  interest  by  a  show  of  mystery.  The  court  certainly  expresses  its 
opinions  of  the  letires  de  cachet  quite  clearly  in  the  paragraphs  immediately  following 
the  gap  in  the  text.  It  is  possible  that  in  the  portion  of  the  document  which  is  left 
out,  Malesherbes  briefly  reviewed  the  contents  of  the  remarkable  protest  of  August 
14th,  1770,  to  which  he  here  refers,  and  which,  he  declares,  had  been  completely 
ignored  by  the  government.  The  curious  circumstances  that  called  forth  this  earlier 
protest  against  the  abuse  of  the  royal  orders  for  imprisonment,  helps  to  explain  the 
attitude  of  Malesherbes  toward  the  Farmers  of  the  revenue.  The  Farm,  suspecting  a 
merchant,  named  Monnerat,  of  smuggling,  obtained  a  lettre  de  cachet  from  the  king’s 
officials,  and  shut  him  up  in  one  of  the  worst  of  the  Parisian  prisons.  Fie  was  first 
confined  in  a  perfectly  dark,  subterranean  dungeon,  with  a  great  chain  fastened  about 
his  neck.  After  a  month  or  so  he  Was  put  into  a  more  tolerable  cell,  where  he  was 
kept  for  a  year  and  a  half.  He  was  then  released,  and  found  that  he  had  been  im¬ 
prisoned  by  mistake,  having  been  unluckily  taken  for  the  man  for  whom  the  leitre  de 
cachet  was  really  intended.  The  Farmers-General  refused  to  indemnify  him  in  any 
w'ay  for  their  error,  so  he  brought  suit  for  damages  in  the  Cour  des  aides  of  Paris,  of 
which  Malesherbes  was,  it  will  be  remembered,  hirst  President.  Ihe  Farmers,  how¬ 
ever,  had  sufficient  influence  to  procure  the  removal  Revocation')  of  the  case  to  the 
Royal  Council,  and  the  Cour  des  aides  was  peremptorily  forbidden  to  pursue  the 
matter  farther. 

7 


98 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[63]  Why  may  we  not  venture  to  hope,  Sire,  that  this  important 
investigation  may  lead  you  to  perform  an  act  of  justice  which  would 
shed  the  greatest  lustre  upon  the  opening  of  your  reign,  namely,  to 
choose  men  worthy  of  confidence,  and  entrust  to  them  the  examination 
of  all  the  orders  which  to-day  detain  any  citizen  in  exile  or  captivity? 

[64]  Our  hopes  carry  us  still  farther ;  for  if  Your  Majesty  decides 
to  have  this  investigation  made,  we  do  not  doubt  that  you  will  improve 
the  opportunity  to  establish  certain  principles  in  this  matter  where 
none  have  been  recognized  before.  One  thing  at  least  will  become 
apparent,  that  orders  affecting  the  personal  liberty  of  citizens  should 
never  be  granted  to  private  individuals,  either  for  their  personal  interest 
or  to  avenge  their  private  injuries ;  for  in  a  country  where  there  are  laws 
individuals  should  have  no  need  of  extra-judicial  orders;  and,  more¬ 
over,  such  orders  granted  to  the  powerful  against  the  weak,  with  no 
chance  of  redress,  constitute  the  worst  form  of  injustice. 

[65]  It  may  perhaps  be  thought  that  there  are  certain  exceptional 
cases  in  which  the  public  good  requires  acts  of  authority  that  are  not 
clothed  with  the  ordinary  formalities  of  justice.  It  will  be  urged  that  it 
is  sometimes  desirable  to  furnish  a  substitute  for  the  tardy  course  of  jus- 

In  the  vigorous  protest  which  the  tribunal  thereupon  submitted  to  the  king,  it 
claims  that  the  proceedings  which  the  ministry  had  so  hastily  nullified  had  brought  to 
light  “  a  well  devised  system  of  despotism  ”  and  a  new  plan  of  the  financiers  to  sub¬ 
stitute  acts  of  arbitrary  authority  for  the  regular  legal  procedure,  not  only  in  cases  of 
smuggling  but  in  any  instance  where  the  formalities  of  the  law  would  embarrass  them. 

While  the  tribunal  does  not  deny  that  the  lettres  de  cachet  may  be  legitimate  in 
some  cases,  especially  in  order  to  reach  offenders  who  have  taken  refuge  in  some 
nobleman’s  residence  or  other  asylum  where  they  are  ordinarily  exempt  from  arrest,  it 
maintains  that  every  one  who  believes  himself  unjustly  imprisoned  should  be  permitted 
to  bring  suit  for  damages  agaipst  those  who  obtained  the  order,  for  “  this  is  the  only 
protection  against  the  most  dangerous  form  of  persecution.”  The  removal  of  Mon- 
nerat’s  case  to  the  Royal  Council  is,  it  claims,  practically  a  refusal  of  justice,  “  for 
will  an  unfortunate  victim  who  has  long  languished  in  prison  and  dungeon,  in  virtue 
of  an  order  granted  by  your  Ministers  and  procured  by  the  Farmers-General,  dare  to 
plead  in  your  Council  against  these  same  Fanners?  ” 

The  worst  of  it  is,  moreover,  that  this  abuse  has  become  a  recognized  principle 
with  the  government  officials  and  financiers.  .“They  have  established  the  principle 
in  your  Council  that  to  bring  suit  for  damages  against  those  who  have  committed  an 
injustice  in  executing  an  order  surreptitiously  obtained  from  Your  Majesty,  is  to  set  at 
naught  your  own  royal  authority.”  Now  when  the  Farmers  have  no  other  proof  for 
t  eir  suspicions  than  delation,  or  information  which  the  courts  would  regard  as  open 
to  suspicion,  they  proceed  to  punish  the  supposed  crime  “  by  means  of  those  orders 
of  \  our  Majesty  which  are  called  lettres  de  cachet. ”  Those  who  are  merely  suspected- 


LETTRES  DE  CACHET. 


99 


tice,  which  might  allow  criminals  to  escape  ;  that  police  control  and  the 
public  safety  in  great  cities  make  it  necessary  to  keep  some  hold  upon 
suspected  persons,  and  that  often  public  and  family  interest  are  at  one 
in  requiring  the  separation  from  society  of  an  individual  who  might 
cause  annoyance,  and  against  whom  there  are  no  other  proofs  than 
those  which  are  controlled  by  the  family  itself  which  is  seeking  to 
protect  itself  from  the  ignominy  of  a  public  trial. 

[66]  But  when  all  these  considerations  have  been  discussed  in  your 
presence,  and  all  these  abuses  have  been  brought  to  your  attention, 
you  will  see,  Sire,  that  these  are  mere  pretexts,  which  could  never  have 
furnished  a  sufficient  justification  for  permitting  the  liberty  of  the 
citizen  to  be  subjected  to  arbitrary  authority,  or  that,  at  least,  the  right 
of  protesting  against  wrongs  should  be  secured  to  the  oppressed. 

[67]  You  will  perceive  that  in  cases  where  justice  itself  demands 
prompt  and  secret  measures  in  order  that  the  delays  of  the  law  may 
not  permit  the  flight  of  the  criminal,  it  is  still  possible  for  a  Royal  Leg¬ 
islator  to  give  greater  activity  to  justice  without  resorting  to  illegal 
methods,  and  that  the  necessary  celerity  would  thus  be  attained  with- 

of  smuggling  are  in  this  way  cast  into  horrible  prisons  or  even  into  dungeons  destined 
for  those  guilty  of  the  most  hideous  crimes,  as  the  treatment  of  Monnerat  clearly 
shows.  Should  one  of  these  ill-starred  victims  of  the  Farm  seek  justice  on  the  ground 
that  he  is  no  smuggler  or  that  he  has  been  treated  with  undue  harshness,  he  is  pre¬ 
vented  from  gaining  his  suit  by  the  removal  of  his  case  to  the  King’s  Council. 

Letlres  de  cachet  are,  however,  by  no  means  confined  to  the  orders  granted  to  the 
Farmers.  “Consider,  Sire,”  Malesherbes  continues,  “  how  enormously  the  number 
of  these  orders  has  increased,  and  upon  what  a  variety  of  grounds  and  for  what 
strictly  personal  reasons  they  are  now  granted.  Formerly  they  were  reserved  for 
affairs  of  State,  and  then,  indeed,  Sire,  it  was  but  right  that  the  courts  should  respect 
the  secrets  of  your  administration.  Next  they  were  granted  under  certain  peculiar 
circumstances — as  when  the  sympathies  of  the  sovereign  were  aroused  by  the  tears 
of  a  family  that  feared  dishonor.  To-day  they  are  supposed  to  be  necessary  every 
time  a  common  man  has  shown  himself  wanting  in  the  respect  due  to  a  person  of 
quality;  as  if  the  powerful  had  not  advantages  enough  already.  They  are,  too,  the 
usual  form  of  punishment  for  indiscreet  remarks,  which  can  never  be  substantiated 
except  by  delation — always  an  unreliable  form  of  proof,  since  the  delator  is,  of  ne¬ 
cessity,  subject  to  suspicion.”  Further,  the  orders  are  granted  with  great  reckless¬ 
ness  and  are  despatched  by  the  clerks  in  the  government  offices,  and  even  at  the 
instigation  of  the  subdelegates  in  the  provinces.”  “The  result  is,  Sire,  that  no 
citizen  in  your  realms  can  be  certain  that  his  liberty  will  not  be  sacrificed  to  private 
vengeance,  for  no  one  is  so  great  as  to  be  exempt  from  the  hate  of  a  minister  or  so 
insignificant  as  to  be  beneath  the  animosity  of  a  clerk  of  the  Farm. 

The  text  of  this  protest  is  given  by  Vignaux’s  Mem.  sur  Malesherbes ,  pp.  61-96. 


IOO 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


out  depriving  the  person  who  has  been  unjustly  arrested  of  redress 
against  his  calumniator. 

[68]  You  will  perceive  that  if  the  public  safety  demands  that  some 
hold  shall  be  kept  upon  a  person  who  has  given  just  cause  for  suspicion, 
the  legitimacy  of  these  suspicions  should  be  formally  verified,  in  order 
that  an  innocent  victim  of  such  precautions  may  demand  and  obtain 
indemnity,  or  that  he  may  at  least  know  why,  and  by  whom,  these  vio¬ 
lent  measures  have  been  taken. 

[69]  And,  finally,  you  will  perceive  that  in  order  to  shield  a  family 
which  has  itself  invoked  aid  of  the  government  against  one  of  its  mem¬ 
bers  who  has  dishonored  it,  it  is  by  no  means  necessary  that  this  kind 
of  justice  should  be  without  possible  redress.  It  is,  in  reality,  only 
the  publicity  of  legal  procedure  which  it  is  desired  to  avoid.  But 
without  making  the  affair  public,  it  is  possible  to  record  the  reason  for 
the  royal  order  in  a  document  signed  by  the  person  who  issues  the 
order  and  by  those  who  have  obtained  it,  to  preserve  this  document 
at  least  during  the  whole  time  of  the  detention  of  the  prisoner,  and 
to  communicate  its  contents  to  him. 

[70]  The  prisoner,  whatever  his  crime,  should  be  permitted  to  pre¬ 
sent  his  defense,  and  even  to  demand  that  the  reasons  for  this  severe 
order  should  be  examined  afresh  by  others  than  those  who  have  issued 
it,  and  be  reported  upon  anew  to  the  King,  who  would  naturally  choose 
for  this  examination  men  of  the  most  assured  and  unassailable  repu¬ 
tation.  But  since  it  is  very  difficult  and  often  impossible  for  a  prisoner 
to  reach  the  King  himself,  it  would  be  necessary,  from  time  to  time, 
that  all  the  royal  prisons  should  be  visited  and  all  the  existing  lettres 
de  cachet  reviewed  by  persons  unconnected  with  the  administration 
and  of  acknowledged  integrity. 

[71]  If  it  were  known  that  Your  Majesty  had  taken  these  precau¬ 
tions  against  being  misled,  and  especially  could  it  be  remembered  that 
your  reign  was  inaugurated  by  a  strict  investigation  of  all  that  the 
previous  administration  had  been  reproached  with,  we  are  confident, 
Sire,  that  the  abuse  of  these  orders  issued  in  your  name  would  become 
very  rare.  We  can  only  give  you  a  glimpse  of  the  advantages  which 
would  result  from  such  an  investigation,  but  if  it  is  once  made  you  will 
be  able  to  measure  its  importance  by  the  gratitude  of  the  Nation.  We 
have  indulged  in  a  digression,  Sire,  which  we  cannot  regret,  since  it  has 
afforded  an  opportunity  of  presenting  to  you  certain  observations,  which 
may  be  of  some  service,  upon  the  species  of  abuses  which  have  given 


LETTRES  DE  CACHET. 


IOt 


rise  to  the  greatest  complaint  on  the  part  of  one  portion  of  the  Nation,, 
and  which  would  be  among  the  easiest  to  reform. 

[72]  It  is  now  time  to  return  to  the  subject  of  the  taxes.  The 
annoyances  occasioned  by  the  collection  of  the  farmed  taxes  have  one 
excuse,  viz.,  the  necessity  of  obtaining  for  Your  Majesty  the  consider¬ 
able  revenue  which  these  taxes  produce.  But  it  does  not  seem  as  if 
there  need  be  the  same  annoyances  in  the  case  of  the  taxes  which 
are  levied  directly  upon  the  people.  When  the  amount  to  be  raised 
is  fixed,  as  it  should  always  be,  it  should  only  remain  to  choose  the 
fairest,  simplest,  and  least  wasteful  method  of  apportionment.  The 
administration  is  therefore  inexcusable  when  in  levying  these  taxes  it 
introduces  a  despotism  as  useless  it  is  odious,  and  augments  the  tax 
itself  by  an  expensive  system  of  collection,  the  cost  of  which  is  always 
borne  by  the  people.  But  this  is  just  what  happens,  Sire,  in  the  levy¬ 
ing  of  all  the  direct  taxes,  the  taille ,  the  poll  tax  and  the  twentieth; 
and  a  part  of  these  annoyances  are  even  felt  in  connection  with  the 
exaction  of  personal  service  demanded  of  the  people,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  militia  and  the  corvee. 

[73]  But  the  discussion  of  these  abuses  brings  us  to  much  larger 
questions.  The  collection  of  the  taxes  upon  commodities  does  not 
depend  upon  the  form  of  government,  but  the  apportionment  of  the 
direct  taxes  is  intimately  connected  with  the  constitution  of  the  mon¬ 
archy.  The  faults  of  this  apportionment  form  part  of  a  general  plan 
of  administration  which  has  long  existed  in  your  kingdom,  and  they  can 
only  be  remedied  by  a  general  reformation  to  which  it  might  please 
Your  Majesty  to  subject  the  whole  administrative  system. 

[74]  We  shall  therefore  examine  the  regulations  affecting  each  of 
the  direct  taxes  in  order  that  Your  Majesty  may  observe  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  this  unfortunate  system.  But  we  must  first  consider  its  origin  ; 
we  must  make  plain  to  Your  Majesty  its  dominating  principle  and  its 
consequences,  and  you  may  perhaps  be  astonished  to  see  to  what  extent 
the  pretext  of  your  authority  has  been  directed  against  that  authority 
itself. 

[75]  Pardon  us,  Sire,  if  we  make  use  of  the  term  despotism,  hateful 
as  it  is;  permit  us  to  dispense  with  vexatious  circumlocutions  in  view  of 
the  important  facts  which  we  have  to  lay  before  you.  The  despotism 
against  which  we  protest  is  that  which  is  exercised  without  your  knowl¬ 
edge,  by  the  emissaries  of  the  administration,  persons  absolutely 
unknown  to  Your  Majesty.  Not,  Sire,  that  it  is  our  intention  to  offer 


102 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


to  Your  Majesty  a  useless  and  perhaps  dangerous  dissertation  upon  the 
limits  of  your  royal  authority ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  the  right  to  invoke 
that  authority  which  we  propose  to  vindicate  for  every  citizen,  and  by 
the  term  despotism  we  mean  that  sort  of  administration  which  tends 
to  deprive  your  subjects  of  this  right,  which  is  so  precious  to  them, 
and  to  shield  those  from  your  justice  who  oppress  your  people. 

[76]  The  idea  of  despotism,  or  of  absolute  authority,  has  differed  at 
different  times  and  with  different  nations.  There  is,  for  example, 
a  form  of  government  which  is  called  oriental  despotism,  a  govern¬ 
ment,  namely,  in  which  not  only  the  sovereign  enjoys  absolute  and 
unlimited  power,  but  in  which  every  executor  of  his  orders  also  exercises 
unlimited  power.  The  result  is,  of  course,  an  intolerable  tyranny.  For 
there  is  an  infinite  difference  between  the  same  power  wielded  by  a 
ruler,  whose  real  interest  is  that  of  his  people,  and  by  a  subject,  who, 
intoxicated  by  prerogatives  to  which  he  was  not  destined,  delights  in 
aggravating  the  burdens  of  his  equals.  This  sort  of  despotism,  trans¬ 
mitted  from  the  higher  to  the  lower  functionaries,  reaches  in  the  end 
every  subject,  so  that  there  is  not  an  individual  in  the  whole  empire 
who  is  safe  from  it. 

[77]  The  vices  of  such  a  government  are  due  both  to  its  constitution 
and  its  customs  ;  to  its  constitution,  because  the  people  who  are  subject 
to  it  have  neither  tribunals,  nor  codes  of  law,  nor  representatives. 
There  are  no  tribunals,  therefore  authority  is  exercised  by  a  single  man ; 
there  are  no  fixed  and  positive  laws,  therefore  he  to  whom  authority  is 
given  enacts  laws  at  his  own  pleasure,  which  means,  in  general,  accord¬ 
ing  to  his  caprices ;  there  are  no  representatives  of  the  people,  and 
therefore  the  governor  of  a  province  may  oppress  it  with  impunity 
against  the  will  and  without  the  knowledge  of  his  sovereign. 

[78]  The  manners  and  customs  of  the  country  favor  this  impunity, 
for  the  peoples  who  are  subjected  to  this  species  of  despotism  are  always 
a  prey  to  ignorance.  No  one  can  read,  no  general  intercourse  is  main¬ 
tained  ;  the  cries  of  the  oppressed  cannot  be  heard  outside  the  borders 
of  the  province  they  inhabit.  The  innocent  victim  has  not  therefore 
the  support  of  public  opinion,  which  is  so  powerful  a  restraint  upon 
the  tyranny  of  subordinate  officials. 

[79]  Such  is  the  unhappy  situation  of  such  a  people  that  the  most 
benevolent  of  sovereigns  cannot  make  the  effects  of  his  justice  felt 
except  by  those  who  are  near  his  person,  and  in  the  few  matters  of 
which  he  can  himself  take  cognizance.  The  most  that  he  can  do  for 


FRANCE  RESEMBLES  AN  ORIENTAL  DESPOTISM.  IO3 

the  rest  of  his  subjects  is  to  choose  the  higher  representatives  of  his 
authority  as  little  unwisely  as  possible,  and  to  urge  them  to  make  the 
best  possible  choice  for  the  inferior  offices.  But  with  all  that  he  can 
do,  the  citizens  of  the  lowest  class  will  always  be  as  absolutely  subject 
to  the  authority  of  a  despot  of  the  lowest  grade  as  the  nobles  are  to 
the  sovereign  himself. 

[80]  It  would  seem  that  such  a  form  of  government  could  not  exist 
in  nations  which  have  laws,  intelligence  and  habits  of  refinement ;  and 
in  civilized  countries,  even  when  the  ruler  possesses  absolute  power, 
the  condition  of  the  people  ought  to  be  very  different.  However 
absolute  the  power,  justice  may  be  regularly  administered  by  tribunals 
governed  by  fixed  laws,  and  when  judges  depart  from  these  laws  it 
is  possible  to  appeal  to  a  higher  court,  and,  in  the  end,  to  the  sove¬ 
reign  authority  itself.  These  appeals  are  possible  because  all  official 
acts  are  duly  committed  to  writing  and  recorded  in  public  registers, 
because  -  every  citizen  may  find  an  enlightened  defender,  and  because 
the  public  itself  is  the  censor  of  the  judges.  And  not  only  may  indi¬ 
viduals  obtain  justice,  but  societies,  communities,  cities,  and  whole 

t  provinces  as  well,  but  in  order  to  defend  their  rights  they  should  have 
assemblies  and  representatives. 

[81]  Thus  in  a  civilized  country,  even  though  it  be  ruled  by  an 
absolute  power,  there  need  be  no  interest,  either  public  or  private, 
left  unguarded,  for  all  the  representatives  of  royal  authority  should  be 
subjected  to  three  kinds  of  restraint,  that  of  the  law,  that  of  appeal  to 
higher  authority,  and  that  of  public  opinion. 

[82]  This  distinction  between  the  different  kinds  of  absolute  power 
is  not  a  new  one.  It  has  often  been  made  by  jurists  and  authors,  both 
modern  and  ancient,  who  have  written  upon  the  subject  of  law.  It  may 
be  derived  from  a  perusal  of  the  history  and  the  descriptions  of  various 
countries ;  but  it  was  necessary  to  recall  it  on  account  of  the  important 
truth  which  we  desire  to  deduce  from  it.  We  must  make  clear  to 
Your  Majesty  that  the  government  which  it  is  desired  to  establish  in 
France  is  the  real  despotism  of  uncivilized  countries,  and  that  the  most 
highly  cultivated  nation,  in  a  century  of  refined  customs  and  manners, 
is  menaced  with  that  form  of  government  in  which  the  sovereign 
cannot  be  enlightened,  however  sincerely  he  may  desire  to  be. 

[83]  France,  like  the  rest  of  Occidental  Europe,  was  governed  by 
feudal  law,  but  each  of  the  European  kingdoms  has  experienced  its 
own  particular  changes  since  that  form  of  government  was  destroyed. 


104  TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 

Certain  nations  have  been  permitted  to  discuss  their  rights  with  their 
sovereign,  and  the  prerogatives  of  both  ruler  and  people  have  thus 
been  established.  In  others  absolute  sovereign  authority  asserted  itself 
so  speedily  that  the  national  rights  were  disregarded.  This  has  re¬ 
sulted  in  at  least  one  advantage  for  these  countries,  viz.,  the  absence 
of  any  pretext  for  the  destruction  of  intermediary  powers  or  for  the 
restraint  of  that  liberty,  which  is  the  natural  right  of  all  men,  to 
deliberate  in  common  upon  common  interests,  and  to  appeal  to  the 
supreme  power  against  the  tyranny  of  subordinate  authorities. 

[84]  In  France  the  nation  has  always  been  profoundly  conscious  of 
its  rights  and  of  its  freedom.  Our  traditions  have  been  more  than  once 
recognized  by  our  Kings,  who  have  even  gloried  in  being  the  sovereigns 
of  a  free  people.  Nevertheless  the  articles  of  that  freedom  have  never 
been 'duly  drawn  up,  and  the  real  power,  the  power  of  arms,  which 
under  the  feudal  system  was  in  the  hands  of  the  nobles,  has  been 
entirely  concentrated  in  the  sovereign. 

[85]  When,  therefore,  there  have  been  cases  of  grievous  abuse  of 
authority,  the  representatives  of  the  Nation  have  not  been  satisfied  with 
complaining  of  mal-administration,  they  have  felt  obliged  to  vindicate 
the  national  rights.  They  have  talked  not  merely  of  justice,  but  of 
liberty ;  and  the  consequence  of  their  efforts  has  been  that  the  Min¬ 
isters,  who  were  always  ready  to  seize  every  possible  means  of  shielding 
their  administration  from  examination,  have  been  artful  enough  to 
arouse  suspicion  in  regard  both  to  the  governmental  bodies  which  pro¬ 
tested  and  to  the  protests  themselves.  Recourse  to  the  King  against  his 
Ministers  has  been  represented  as  an  attack  upon  his  authority.  The 
grievances  of  the  Estates,  the  remonstrances  of  the  Magistrates,  have 
been  distorted  into  dangerous  measures,  against  which  the  government 
should  protect  itself.  The  most  powerful  of  Kings  have  been  per¬ 
suaded  that  they  must  fear  even  the  tears  of  a  submissive  people. 
Upon  this  pretext  a  government  has  been  introduced  into  France 
which  is  more- fatal  than  despotism  and  is  worthy  of  Oriental  barbarism, 
namely,  the  clandestine  system  of  administration,  which  under  the  eyes 
of  a  just  ruler  and  in  the  midst  of  an  enlightened  nation  permits  injustice 
to  show  herself,  nay  more,  to  flaunt  herself  openly.  Entire  depart¬ 
ments  of  the  administration  are  founded  upon  principles  of  injustice, 
and  no  recourse  either  to  public  opinion  or  to  a  superior  authority 
is  possible. 

[86]  It  is  this  administrative  despotism,  and  especially  this  system 


TYRANNY  OF  THE  ADMINISTRATION. 


I05 

of  secrecy,  which  we  would  denounce  to  Your  Majesty,  for  we  have  no 
intention  of  venturing  to  discuss  the  consecrated  prerogatives  of  the 
throne.  It  is  sufficient  for  us  that  Your  Majesty  has  disavowed,  in  the 
act  which  re-established  the  Magistracy,  the  tyrannical  measures  enacted 
under  a  ministry  which  is  now  dismissed.  And  we  intend  to  conform 
to  the  intentions  of  Your  Majesty  in  ignoring  certain  questions  which 
ought  never  to  have  been  raised. 

[87]  But  it  will  not  be  overstepping  the  bounds  of  a  due  subordina¬ 
tion  to  lay  before  you  a  series  of  encroachments  upon  national  liberty, 
the  liberty  natural  to  all  men,  which  make  it  impossible  for  you  to  hear 
the  grievances  of  your  subjects  or  to  watch  the  conduct  of  your  admin¬ 
istrative  officers. 

First,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  do  away  with  the  real  repre¬ 
sentatives  of  the  nation. 

Secondly,  the  protests  of  those  representatives  whom  it  has  been 
impossible  to  do  away  with  have  been  rendered  illusory. 

Thirdly,  there  is  an  evident  desire  to  make  such  protests  altogether 
impossible,  and  to  this  end  the  system  of  secrecy  has  been  introduced. 
This  secrecy  is  of  a  double  nature ;  it  aims,  on  the  one  hand,  to  shield 
the  operations  of  the  administration  from  the  eyes  of  the  Nation  and 
of  Your  Majesty  himself,  and  on  the  other  to  conceal  from  the  public 
the  identity  of  the  administrative  officers.  This,  Sire,  is  the  outline  of 
the  system  which  we  shall  now  proceed  to  elucidate. 

[88]  We  state  as  the  first  aim  of  this  despotism  the  attempt  to  do 
away  with  all  representatives  of  the  people,  and  if  Your  Majesty  will 
but  consider  the  significance  of  several  facts,  no  one  of  which  is  open 
to  doubt,  you  will  be  convinced  of  the  truth  of  this  statement. 

[89]  General  assemblies  of  the  Nation  have  not  been  corivened  for 
a  hundred  and  sixty  years,  and  for  a  long  time  before  that  they  were 
very  infrequent,  and,  we  venture  to  say,  almost  useless,  since  what 
should  have  rendered  their  presence  especially  necessary,  namely,  the 
fixing  of  the  taxes,  was  accomplished  without  them. 

[90]  Certain  provinces  had  their  own  assemblies  or  Provincial 
Estates ;  but  some  of  the  provinces  have,  been  deprived  of  this  precious 
privilege,  and  in  those  where  the  Estates  still  exist,  their  functions 
have  been  restricted  within  limits  which  become  narrower  every  day. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  a  continual  warfare  is  maintained  in  our 
provinces  between  the  representatives  of  the  people  and  the  guardians  of 
arbitrary  power,  and  in  this  warfare  despotism  gains  fresh  victories  daily. 


106  TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 

[91]  The  provinces  which  had  no  Provincial  Estates  were  called 
Pays  d' Election,  and  certain  tribunals  once  actually  existed  there  called 
Elections ,  composed  of  persons  elected  by  the  province,  who,  at  least 
in  the  matter  of  the  apportionment  of  the  taxes,  performed  some  of 
the  functions  of  Provincial  Estates.  These  tribunals  still  exist  under 
the  same  name,  Elections ,  but  the  name  is  all  that  remains  of  the 
original  institution.  Their  members  are  no  longer  really  elected  by 
the  province,  and,  such  as  they  are,  they  have  been  almost  completely 
subordinated  to  the  Intendants  in  the  exercise  of  the  functions  which 
remain  to  them.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  speak  later  of  the  Elections 
in  considering  the  taille.  We  shall  then  inform  Your  Majesty  how 
they  differ  from  the  Provincial  Estates;  for  the  present,  suffice  it  to 
say  that  the  province  no  longer  elects  any  true  representatives. 

'  [92]  Each  corporation  or  community  still  had  the  right,  at  least,  to 

administer  its  own  affairs,  a  right  which  we  will  not  say  formed  a  part 
of  the  original  constitution  of  the  realm,  for  it  is  more  ancient  even 
than  that — it  is  a  natural  right,  a  right  of  all  intelligent  beings.  Never¬ 
theless  even  this  has  been  taken  away  from  your  subjects ;  and  we  do 
not  fear  to  say  that  the  administration  has  in  this  matter  fallen  into 
excesses  which  must  be  called  puerile. 

[93]  Since  it  has  become  a  political  principle  with  your  powerful 
Ministers,  not  to  permit  the  National  Assemblies  to  be  convoked,  things 
have  gone  from  bad  to  worse,  until  the  deliberations  of  the  inhabitants 
of  a  Village  have  been  declared  null  and  void  unless  authorized  by  the 
Intendant.  Hence  if  a  community  wishes  to  make  an  outlay,  however 
insignificant,  it  must  obtain  the  assent  of  the  Subdelegate  of  the 
Intendant,  and  must  follow  the  plan  w'hich  he  suggests,  employ  the 
workmen  whom  he  favors,  and  pay  them  in  accordance  with  his  dic¬ 
tation.  If  the  community  wishes  to  bring  a  suit  at  law,  the  proceedings 
must  be  authorized  by  the  Intendant ;  the  community  must  first  plead 
its  cause  before  his  tribunal  before  taking  it  to  a  court  of  justice,  and 
if  the  opinion  of  the  Intendant  differs  from  that  of  the  people,  or  if 
their  opponent  enjoys  some  influence  in  the  Intendant’s  office,  the 
community  is  deprived  of  the  opportunity  of  defending  its  rights. 

[94]  Such,  Sire,  are  the  means  which  have  been  employed  to  stifle 
all  municipal  feeling  in  France,  to  extinguish,  if  possible,  even  the 
sentiment  of  citizenship.  The  w-hole  Nation,  so  to  speak,  has  been 
declared  incapable  of  managing  its  own  affairs,  and  has  been  put 
under  the  charge  of  guardians. 


ABSENCE  OF  LOCAL  SELF-GOVERNMENT. 


107 


[95]  destruction  of  protesting  bodies  was  but  the  first  step  toward 
the  abolition  of  the  right  of  protest  itself.  It  has  not  yet  come  to  an 
express  prohibition  of  all  recourse  to  the  prince,  and  of  all  independent 
action  on  the  part  of  the  provinces ;  but  Your  Majesty  knows  that 
every  petition  which  deals  with  the  interests  of  a  province  or  of  the 
Nation  as  a  whole  is  regarded,  when  it  is  signed  by  a  single  individual, 
as  a  punishable  liberty,  and  if  signed  by  a  number  of  persons,  as  evi¬ 
dence  of  a  seditious  association.  It  was,  however,  necessary  to  make 
some  ostensible  reparation  to  the  Nation  for  ceasing  to  convoke  the 
Estates,  so  the  Sovereign  announced  that  the  Courts  of  Justice  should 
take  the  place  of  these  Estates,  and  that  the  Magistrates  should  act  as 
the  representatives  of  the  people. 

[96]  But  after  having  given  the  Magistrates  this  new  title  to  console 
the  Nation  for  the  loss  of  its  real  representatives,  every  opportunity 
was  taken  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  the  functions  of  the  Judges  were 
limited  to  their  own  district  and  to  matters  of  litigation ;  hence  the 
right  of  representation  has  been  restricted  within  the  same  limits. 

[97J  Thus  all  sorts  of  abuses  may  be  committed  by  the  administra¬ 
tion  without  ever  coming  to  the  knowledge  of  the  King,  either  through 
the  representatives  of  the  people,  since  in  most  of  the  provinces  there 
are  no  representatives  ;  or  through  the  Courts  of  Justice,  for  they  are  set 
aside  as  incompetent  so  soon  as  they  venture  to  speak  upon  matters  of 
administration  ;  or  through  individuals,  who  have  been  taught  by  severe 
examples  in  the  past  that  it  is  a  crime  to  invoke  the  justice  of  their 
Sovereign. 

[98]  In  spite  of  these  obstacles  the  Administrative  Officials  have 
always  dreaded  the  voice  of  the  public,  a  species  of  protest  which  can 
never  be  wholly  silenced ;  and  perhaps  they  have  also  been  fearful  lest 
a  day  should  come  when  a  King  would  demand,  of  his  own  accord,  an 
account  of  the  secrets  of  the  administration.  They  were  consequently 
anxious  to  make  such  an  account  impossible,  or  at  least  to  insure  its 
being  rendered  by  themselves  without  any  chance  of  contradiction  ; 
and  it  is  to  this  end  that  they  have  made  such  strenuous  efforts  to 
introduce  a  clandestine  system  of  administration. 

[99]  In  order  to  prove  this  assertion' in  all  its  bearings  we  should  be 
obliged  to  enter  into  the  details  of  all  phases  of  the  government,  but  a 
few  examples  will  suffice  to  render  its  truth  apparent.  We  shall  choose 
our  examples  from  the  taxes,  which  constitute  our  principal  theme, 
and  we  shall  not  hesitate  to  cite  the  administrations  of  those  who  have 


io8 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


done  the  most  to  deserve  public  approval,  for  we  wish  to  acquaint  Your 
Majesty  with  the  intrinsic  vices  of  the  system,  however  much  they  may 
have  been  neutralized  for  a  time  by  the  personal  qualities  of  the  Admin¬ 
istrator  himself. 

[100]  It  is  acknowledged,  for  example,  throughout  Europe  that 
nothing  rendered  the  previous  reign  more  noteworthy  than  the  con¬ 
struction  of  roads,  which  facilitate  commerce  and  double  the  value  of 
property  in  the  realm.  The  government  has  believed  hitherto  that  the 
corvee  was  necessary  to  this  great  work  ;  yet  the  corvee  is  not  authorized 
by  any  law  of  the  land.1  It  would  seem  that  it  ought  to  have  been 
legally  sanctioned,  and  then  it  would  have  been  possible  to  establish 
and  make  public  fixed  rules  for  the  apportionment  of  the  labor  which 
is  often  more  burdensome  to  the  people  than  the  taille  itself. 

[101]  But  this  method  has  not  been  adopted.  It  was  urged  that  there 
was  reason  to  fear  the  sensation  which  would  be  excited  in  the  kingdom 
should  a  law  be  enacted  which,  by  regulating  the  corvee ,  would  seem  to 
authorize  it.  Consequently  all  the  operations  have  been  carried  out  in 
secret,  and  not  even  a  printed  decree  of  the  Council  has  ever  been 
issued  concerning  an  exaction  from  which  the  people  have  so  long 
suffered.  A  province  learns  that  the  construction  of  a  road  has  been 
decreed  only  when  the  work  on  it  has  begun  and  it  is  too  late  to  op¬ 
pose  it,  even  if  the  choice  of  the  route  is  contrary  to  the  interest  of  the 
province.  If  the  work  is  apportioned  with  injustice,  or  with  too  great 
harshness,  those  who  have  complaints  to  make  have  no  legal  judges 
before  whom  to  plead  their  cause,  no  fixed  rules  to  oppose  to  the  rigor 
of  the  orders  they  have  received,  and  no  means  for  legally  proving  the 
injustice  which  has  been  done  them. 

[102]  It  is  said  that  Your  Majesty  is  desirous  of  mitigating  the 
severity  of  the  corvee ,  or  substituting  for  it  some  other  form  of  taxation.2 
The  Nation  awaits  these  changes  with  confidence,  and  already  shows  its 
gratitude ;  and  we  venture  to  hope  that  whatever  substitute  is  found 

1  The  corvee  was  originally  the  unpaid  labor  which  a  lord  might  exact  from  his 
tenant.  There  was  no  regular  royal  corvee  until  1 73S ,  when  the  new  interest  in  high* 
ways  led  the  Controller-General  to  issue  a  simple  instruction  to  the  Inlendants  author¬ 
izing  them  to  employ  forced  labor  in  constructing  the  roads. 

2  Turgot  substituted  for  the  corvee  a  general  road  tax  to  be  paid  by  all  land  owners, 
except  the  clergy.  The  preamble  to  his  edict  (Feb.  1776)  gives  an  almost  sensa¬ 
tional  account  of  existing  abuses.  See  CEuvres  de  Turgot ,  edited  by  Daire,  Vol.  II, 
pp.  287  sqq. 


THE  CORVEE. 


IO9 


for  the  corvee  will  not  be  infected  with  the  same  secrecy.  We  never¬ 
theless  felt  constrained  to  mention  the  abuses  which  occur  in  this 
branch  of  the  administration,  as  they  are  among  the  most  striking 
examples  of  the  general  system. 

[103]  It  is  much  the  same  with  the  tax  of  the  twentieth,  except 
that  in  this  the  abuses  have  a  still  flimsier  pretext.  It  may  be  said  in 
regard  to  the  corvee  that  the  celerity  required  in  the  execution  of  public 
works  will  not  permit  waiting  on  the  discussion  of  instances  of  indi¬ 
vidual  injustice,  but  the  twentieth  has  been  imposed  upon  the  same 
land  almost  without  interruption  every  year  for  the  last  forty  years. 
Can  it  be  credited  that  in  all  these  forty  years  the  rolls  of  this  tax  have 
never  been  recorded  where  private  individuals  might  consult  them? 

[104]  This  formality  has  not  been  omitted  through  negligence,  for 
the  matter  was  presented  to  the  King  by  his  Cour  des  aides  in  1756. 
The  ministry  of  that  period  submitted  the  evidence  presented,  and  the 
late  King  consented  that  such  records  should  be  made ;  but  the  Min¬ 
isters  who  followed,  after  resorting  for  several  years  to  all  sorts  of 
subterfuges  which  might  indirectly  obviate  the  consequences  of  the 
King’s  sacred  word,  finally  succeeded  in  getting  it  definitely  revoked. 

[105]  We  shall  not  here  recall  all  the  details  of  a  matter  that  is  past 
for  fear  of  wearying  Your  Majesty,  but,  if  Your  Majesty  desires  farther 
information,  the  facts  have  not  been  forgotten  and  it  will  be  easy  to 
present  them  to  you.  We  shall  content  ourselves  for  the  present  with 
observing  that  the  majority  of  the  deceptions  practiced  by  the  Collector 
of  the  twentieth  are  necessarily  unknowm  and  unpunished  by  reason  of 
this  secrecy.  For  example,  when  a  Collector  betrays  the  interests  of 
the  royal  treasury  by  favoring  some  individual,  and,  in  order  to  conceal 
his  deception  from  the  Ministers,  makes  up  the  sum  by  unjustly  aug¬ 
menting  the  quotas  of  others,  the  injured  parties  have  no  means  of 
proving  the  injustice  without  being  permitted  to  inspect  the  whole  list, 
and  this  list  is  kept  secret. 

[106]  Your  Majesty  will  see  by  this  example  that  this  sort  of  abuse, 
which  is  permitted  by  the  secrecy  of  the  rolls,  is  precisely  that  which  is 
most  opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  King,  of  the  department  of 
finance,  of  the  treasury.  It  is  not  therefore  in  the  King’s  interest  that 
the  Administrative  Officials  have  prohibited  the  publication  of  the  tax- 
rolls  ;  it  is  purely  to  shield  their  own  conduct  from  all  examination 
and  to  insure  impunity  to  their  Collectors. 

[107]  When  all  these  precautions  are  found  to  be  insufficient,  and 


T  IO 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


the  vexations  become  so  evident  that  there  is  no  way  of  palliating  them, 
it  usually  happens  that  the  culpable  persons  insure  their  impunity  by 
means  of  the  second  sort  of  secrecy,  which,  as  we  have  said,  conceals 
the  identity  of  the  Official,  and  ordinarily  makes  it  impossible  to  dis¬ 
cover  who  is  responsible  for  any  particular  abuse  of  authority, 

[108]  The  administration  of  your  kingdom,  Sire,  is  conducted,  in 
conjunction  with  Your  Majesty,  by  Ministers,  with  the  aid  of  their 
Clerks,  and  in  certain  departments  by  Intendants  of  Finance,  likewise 
with  the  aid  of  Clerks ;  in  the  provinces  it  is  managed  by  the  Intend¬ 
ants  and  their  Subdelegates.  We  shall  proceed  to  consider  these 
different  officials,  beginning  with  the  lowest  order,  with  those,  namely, 
who  approach  most  nearly  to  the  people. 

[109]  The  Subdelegate  of  an  Intendant  is  a  man  without  rank  and 
without  legal  authority,  who  has  no  right  to  sign  any  orders,  hence  all 
those  which  he  executes  are  signed  by  the  Intendant.  It  is  neverthe¬ 
less  well  known  in  the  provinces  that  the  Subdelegate  decides  upon 
many  details  into  which  the  Intendant  himself  cannot  enter.  If  the 
Subdelegate  abuses  his  power  one  can  only  complain  to  the  Intendant ; 
but  how  shall  people  of  the  lower  classes  venture  to  complain  when 
they  see  that  the  order  is  issued  in  the  name  of  the  Intendant  himself, 
and  know  that  this  superior  magistrate  would  doubtless  consider  himself 
compromised  and  feel  obliged  to  uphold  his  own  order  if  it  were 
questioned  ? 

[no]  The  relation  of  the  Subdelegate  to  the  Intendant,  in  such 
cases,  is  much  the  same  as  that  of  the  Intendant  to  the  Minister,  and 
of  the  Minister  to  Your  Majesty  himself. 

[in]  Whenever  it  is  possible  the  Intendant  avoids  making  a  de¬ 
cision  in  his  own  name.  In  any  affair  which  may  compromise  him  he 
takes  the  precaution  of  securing  a  decree  of  the  Council,  or  of  obtain¬ 
ing  authorization  by  a  letter  from  the  Minister.  An  individual  in  one 
of  the  provinces,  who  wishes  to  protest  against  the  decision  of  an 
Intendant  and  carry  his  case  to  the  Council  or  to  the  Minister,  is  help¬ 
less  when  he  finds  himself  condemned  in  advance  by  a  decision  of  the 
Minister  or  a  decree  of  the  Council. 

[112]  As  to  the  Intendants  of  Finance,  whose  official  position  is 
between  the  Intendants  of  the  provinces  and  the  Ministers,  they  are 
authorities  absolutely  unknown  to  those  who  live  at  a  distance  from  the 
capital  and  the  court.  It  is  known  in  a  general  way  that  such  officials 
exist,  and  that  they  have  real  power  in  the  kingdom ;  but  the  public 


IRRESPONSIBILITY  OF  THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  OFFICIALS. 


Ill 


does  not  understand  what  classes  of  affairs  they  are  responsible  for, 
since  there  are,  indeed,  no  matters  directly  under  their  control,  and 
they  have  no  immediate  subordinates  who  are  obliged  to  take  orders 
from  them.  Their  whole  administration  is  carried  on  in  collaboration 
with  the  Controller-General,  whose  signature  they  obtain  for  all  letters 
and  for  those  decisions  of  the  Council  called  Arrets  de  Finance .  The 
individual  w'ho  believes  himself  justified  in  protesting  against  such 
decisions  can  neither  complain  to  the  Intendant  of  Finance — who  signs 
nothing  and  may  not  have  had  anything  to  do  with  the  affair,  since  the 
Minister  is  not  obliged  to  follow  his  opinion  and  sometimes  decides 
contrary  to  it — nor  to  the  Controller-General,  who  might  say  with 
reason  that  he  was  not  responsible  for  all  the  documents  which  he  had 
to  sign  for  the  six  Intendants  of  Finance. 

[i  13]  Finally,  the  Minister  himself  has  no  status,  no  direct  authority 
in  the  State.  It  is  nevertheless  in  him  that  all  power  resides,  since  it 
is  he  who  certifies  the  signature  of  Your  Majesty.  He  can  do  all  and 
yet  can  not  be  held  responsible  for  anything,  since  the  authoritative 
name  which  he  is  permitted  to  use  closes  the  lips  of  whoever  might 
dare  to  complain. 

[114]  So,  just  as  the  inhabitant  of  a  village  dare  not  defend 
himself  against  the  petty  tyranny  of  a  Subdelegate  armed  with  the 
authority  of  an  order  from  the  Intendant,  we,  the  inhabitants  of  the 
capital,  we  personally,  the  Magistrates,  whose  very  office  imposes  upon 
us  the  duty  of  bringing  the  truth  to  the  ears  of  Your  Majesty,  how 
often  we  have  seen  ourselves  accused  of  audacity  for  having  protested 
against  orders  obtained  from  the  King  by  the  artifices  of  his  Ministers  ! 

[1 15]  Let  us  dare  to  speak  the  whole  truth  to  Your  Majesty.  Orders 
have  been  presented  to  us  whose  falsity  was  apparent  on  their  face, 
and  others  in  which  it  was  evident  that  the  consecrated  name  had 
been  prostituted  to  uses  unworthy  of  the  King’s  attention.  And  when 
we  have  exposed  the  petty  vengeances,  the  petty  passions,  the  petty 
patronage,  for  the  gratification  of  which  these  orders  have  been  ob¬ 
tained,  we  have  been  told  that  to  doubt  that  an  order  signed  by  the 
King  was  actually  given  by  him  was  to  fail  in  respect  due  to  royalty. 
If  Your  Majesty  desires  that  we  should  formulate  and  prove  the  facts 
which  we  allege,  you  will  find  that  we  are  in  a  position  to  comply  with 
your  wishes. 

^[116]  These  same  Ministers,  moreover,  have,  during  the  past  cen¬ 
tury,  arrogated  to  themselves  jurisdiction  in  so  many  affairs  of  all 


I  12 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


descriptions  that  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  give  personal  attention  to 
them  all.  A  new  sort  of  intermediary  power  has  consequently  estab¬ 
lished  itself  between  your  Ministers  and  your  other  subjects,  which. is 
neither  that  of  the  governors  nor  of  the  Intendants  of  the  .provinces, 
but  that  of  Clerks,  persons  absolutely  unknown  to  the  State,  who  never¬ 
theless  speak  and  write  in  the  name  of  the  Ministers,  exercise  a  power 
as  absolute  and  as  irresistible  as  theirs,  and  are  even  safer  from  all 
investigation  because  they  are  so  much  more  insignificant. 

[117]  Thus  an  individual  without  patronage,  without  any  relations 
with  the  Court,  a  man,  for  example,  who  lives  quietly  in  his  own 
province,  may  be  the  recipient  of  an  order  of  the  greatest  harshness, 
without  knowing  either  by  whom  it  was  issued,  in  order  to  obtain  its 
revocation,  nor  the  reasons  for  its  issue,  in  order  to  present  his  defence. 
The  order  is  signed  by  the  King,  but  this  obscure  individual  well  knows 
that  the  King  has  never  so  much  as  heard  his  name.  The  signature  of 
the  King  is  certified  by  that  of  a  Minister,  but  he  is  equally  sure  that 
he  is  unknown  to  the  Ministers.  He  is  in  ignorance  whether  the  order 
has  been  obtained  by  the  Intendant  of  his  province,  or  whether  one 
of  his  enemies  has  found  access  to  some  Clerk  at  Versailles,  of  the  first, 
second  or  third  rank,  or  whether  it  is  one  of  those  blank  orders  which 
are  sometimes  given  to  the  various  authorities  in  the  provinces.  He 
knows  nothing,  and  he  remains  in  exile,  perhaps  even  in  irons. 

[118]  We  have  felt  it  necessary,  Sire,  to  give  Your  Majesty  some 
notion  of  the  different  kinds  of  despotism,  and  especially  of  the  differ¬ 
ent  forms  of  secrecy  in  vogue.  We  may  now  apply  these  observations 
to  the  three  direct  taxes,  the  faille ,  the  poll  tax  and  the  tax  of  the 
twentieth. 

[119]  The  faille,  the  oldest  of  the  direct  taxes,  is  levied  upon  the 
unprivileged  commoners  in  those  provinces  which  are  called  Pays 
d'  Elections,  that  is,  in  those  which  have  no  provincial  Estates,  and  as 
the  faille  is  a  personal  tax  if  is  paid  also  by  the  tenants  of  ecclesiastics, 
of  nobles,  and  of  members  of  the  privileged  classes.  Consequently 
this  tax  is  borne  at  present  by  almost  all  landowners. 

[120]  The  faille  has  been  increased  by  various  additions  called 
“  supplements,”  and  every  year  new  ones  are  added.  These  supple¬ 
ments  equal  at  present,  or  even  surpass,  the  principal  of  the  faille.  It 
is  maintained  that  the  principal  of  the  faille  has  not  been  augmented 
for  a  long  time ;  nevertheless  the  people  who  pay  the  tax  are  con¬ 
stantly  complaining  of  its  increase.  It  is  in  reality  only  a  question  of 


METHOD  OF  ASSESSING  THE  TAILLE. 


1  J3 

words ;  the  principal  is  not  augmented,  but  the  supplements  are  in¬ 
creased. 

[121]  We  must  explain  to  Your  Majesty  the  manner  in  which  each 
year  the  taille  and  its  supplements  are  imposed  and  assessed.  There 
are  four  different  operations. 

1.  The  warrant  f brevet]  of  the  taille  provides  for  its  imposition  upon 
all  the  Generalites.  When  it  is  desired  to  levy  a  sum  supplementary 
to  the  taille  upon  the  whole  Kingdom,  or  upon  a  particular  Generality 
it  is  by  this  warrant  that  it  is  imposed,  and  it  is  also  by  this  warrant 
that  the  total  sum  levied  upon  the  Kingdom  is  apportioned  among  the 
Genera lites.  The  warrant  of  the  taille  is  drawn  up  in  the  Council. 

2.  The  commissions  provide  for  the  imposition  of  the  tax  upon  the 
Elections .'  Consequently  when  a  sum  is  to  be  levied  upon  a  particular 
Election  it  is  imposed  by  means  of  the  commissions ,  and  it  is  also  by 
the  commissions  that  the  sum  imposed  upon  each  Generality  is  appor¬ 
tioned  among  the  Elections.  The  commissions,  like  the  warrant,  are 
drawn  up  in  Council. 

3.  The  act  by  which  the  tax  is  assessed  upon  each  parish  or  com¬ 
munity  is  called  the  departement.  Sums  which  it  is  sometimes  necessary 
to  raise  in  a  particular  parish,  are  imposed  in  this  way,  as,  for  example, 
when  a  house  must  be  built  for  the  priest,  or  when  the  community  has 
to  pay  the  costs  of  litigation  or  meet  other  expenses.  The  assessment 
among  the  parishes  of  the  sum  imposed  upon  the  Election  is  determined 
in  the  same  way.  The  departement  is  carried  out  in  the  province  itself, 
and  at  the  present  time  by  the  Intendant  alone,  without  appeal. 
The  Elus 1  2  and  other  persons  who  have  a  right  to  be  present  at  the 
assembly  which  makes  this  distribution  have  no  longer  a  deliberative 
voice,  and  the  Courts  can  no  longer  take  cognizance  of  what  goes  on 
there. 

4.  The  roll  of  the  taille  contains  the  assessment  upon  each  taxpayer, 
or,  what  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  the  apportionment  among  the  tax¬ 
payers  of  the  sum  imposed  upon  the  whole  parish  or  community.  The 
roll  of  the  taille  is  made  by  the  taxpayers  themselves,  that  is  to  say,  by 
those  who  are  in  turn  Assessors  and  Collectors.  Nevertheless  the 
Intendant  enjoys  the  right,  in  virtue  of  his  position  and  of  his  office. 

1  The  Election  was  the  name  applied  to  a  subdivison  of  the  Gineralitl,  as  well  as  to 
the  inferior  court  referred  to  in  paragraph  91. 

2  See  above,  paragraph  91. 

8 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


114 

of  assessing  a  taxpayer  whom  he  believes  to  have  been  favored  by  the 
Collectors.  He  has  also  a  right  to  send  Commissioners  into  the  parish, 
■who  call  the  inhabitants  together  and  have  the  roll  of  the  taille  drawn 
up  in  their  presence,  in  which  case  the  roll  is  called  role  if  office.  The 
duties  of  these  Commissioners  should  terminate  after  informing  the 
taxpayers  of  the  regulations  which  govern  the  drawing  up  of  the  rolls 
and  obliging  them  to  conform  to  these  regulations.  However,  in  the 
provinces,  the  authority  of  a  man  sent  by  the  Intendant  is  so  great 
that  these  Commissioners  draw  up  the  roll  as  they  like ;  and  this  is  so 
clearly  recognized  that  the  Intendants  often  provide  their  Commis¬ 
sioners  with  printed  instructions  indicating  the  rules  according  to  which 
they  wish  the  assessment  to  be  made.  However,  in  spite  of  the  assess¬ 
ments  made  by  the  Intendant  in  virtue  of  his  office,  and  the  roles 
if  office  made  by  the  Commissioners,  this  fourth  distribution  is  not,  after 
all,  so  completely  subject  to  arbitrary  authority  as  the  first  three,  for 
individuals  whose  rights  are  violated  may  have  recourse  to  legal  pro¬ 
ceedings. 

[122]  We  shall  now  proceed  to  consider  these  four  operations,  first 
as  to  the  imposing  of  the  tax  and  then  as  to  its  assessment.  As  regards 
the  imposition  of  the  tax  it  is  obvious  that,  although  the  Courts  do  not 
cease  to  maintain  that  their  voluntary  registration  is  necessary  for  the 
establishment  of  taxes,  although  this  maxim  is  regarded  by  the  Nation 
as  its  only  safeguard  since  it  has  lost  its  representatives,  and  although 
the  Kings  themselves  have  conceded  the  principle  in  hundreds  of 
instances,  new  sums  are  nevertheless  imposed  every  year  upon  the 
people  without  registration  and  by  acts  of  arbitrary  authority  such  as 
the  warrant  of  the  taille ,  the  commissions,  and  the  forms  observed  in 
the  departemeiii. 

[123]  If  it  is  necessary  to  give  Your  Majesty  some  notion  of  the 
abuses  which  may  result  from  this  arbitrary  method  of  taxation,  there 
is  a  recent  and  notorious  incident  which  we  may  select  as  an  example. 
Since  1771  sums  have  been  imposed  as  supplements  to  the  taille ,  which 
■were  deemed  necessary  both  for  the  indemnification  of  the  Magistrates, 
whose  offices  it  wras  desired  to  suppress,  and  for  the  payment  of  the 
officers  who  were  destined  to  form  the  new ‘tribunal.  To-day  the  old 
Magistracy  is  re-established  and  the  new  tribunals  have  been  abolished  : 
nevertheless  the  tax  continues. 

[124]  It  may  perhaps  be  thought  by  your  Council,  Sire,  that  the 
consequences  of  the  changes  made  during  these  four  years  still  entail 


METHOD  OF  ASSESSING  THE  TA1LLE. 


“5 

outlays  too  considerable  to  be  met  by  the  ordinary  revenues  of 
Your  Majesty ;  and  in  this  respect  these  recent  operations  may  be 
compared  to  a  war  that  has  given  rise  to  taxes  which  are  maintained 
some  time  after  peace  has  been  concluded  in  order  to  pay  the  debts 
contracted.  The  pretext  will  soon  disappear ;  may  we  hope  that  the 
tax  will  be  discontinued?  Yes,  Sire,  we  do  hope  so;  we  do  not  even 
permit  ourselves  the  least  doubt ;  but  we  must  confess  that  our  hope  is 
founded  only  upon  the  confidence  in  your  personal  justice  which  is  enter¬ 
tained  by  the  whole  Nation  ;  for  it  is  a  long  time  since  any  one  in  France 
could  harbor  the  hope  of  seeing  a  tax  abandoned  which  might  be  re¬ 
newed  every  year  by  a  secret  act  of  arbitrary  authority,  such  as  the  warrant 
for  the  taille.  And  if  Your  Majesty  would  have  a  report  made  on  all 
the  general  and  particular  taxes  which  are  levied  in  the  kingdom,  and 
which  have  likewise  been  established  by  arbitrary  power,  Your  Majesty 
would  perhaps  discover  that  the  greater  part  of  them  were  originally 
justified  by  momentary  needs  which  soon  disappeared,  and  yet  the  tax 
continued  to  be  levied. 

[125]  We  shall  proceed  now,  Sire,  to  consider  the  four  operations, 
one  after  the  other,  from  the  second  point  of  view,  that  of  their  assess¬ 
ment.  Let  us  begin  with  the  warrant  of  the  taille,  which  contains  the 
first  apportionment,  that  among  the  Generalites.  We  have  already 
said  that  this  is  drawn  up  by  the  Council  of  Finance.  But  Your 
Majesty  knows  that,  with  the  exception  of  the  Controller-General 
and  one  Intendant  of  Finance,  none  of  those  who  are  present  in  this 
Council  can  be  familiar  with  the  situation  of  the  provinces  or  with  the 
needs  of  the  State.  It  is  then  the  Minister  alone  who  determines 
every  year  both  the  amount  of  the  tax  and  its  first  apportionment. 
We  are  ignorant,  Sire,  and  all  France  is  ignorant,  upon  what  piin- 
ciples  this  Minister  bases  his  conclusions.  We  only  know  that  no  one 
has  noted  any  attempt  to  secure  information  as  to  the  condition  of  the 
provinces  previous  to  the  determination  of  the  amount  of  the  tax.  The 
warrant  for  the  taille  is  then,  in  reality,  an  act  of  arbitrary  authority, 
based  upon  no  sufficient  previous  knowledge,  and  relating  to  a  matter 
upon  which,  above  all  others,  the  Orders  of  the  Realm  should  be 
consulted. 

[126]  It  is  much  the  same  with  the  commissions,  which  establish 
the  second  apportionment,  since  they  are  determined  in  the  same 
Council  of  Finance,  and  consequently  in  accordance  with  the  will 
merely  of  the  Minister  and  Intendant  of  Finance.  There  is  neverthe- 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


1 16 

less  a  difference,  since  the  opinion  of  the  Intendant  of  each  province 
is  asked  before  the  commissions  are  sent  out.  The  fate  of  each  pro¬ 
vince  is,  therefore,  determined  by  the  report  of  a  single  Intendant. 
Now  this  Intendant  is  himself  forced  to  rely  upon  the  opinions  of  his 
subordinates,  for  he  cannot  familiarize  himself  with  the  conditions 
throughout  his  generalite. 

[127]  Moreover,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  Intendant  often  has  in¬ 
terests  opposed  to  those  of  his  province.  Indeed,  we  cannot  but  think 
that  the  Intendant  is  commonly  a  man  bent  on  improving  his  condition, 
that  he  is  in  constant  need  of  favors  at  Court,  and  that  he  cannot 
obtain  them  except  through  a  Minister, — whom  one  may  usually  hope 
to  gratify  by  aiding  him  to  derive  the  greatest  possible  results  from  the 
taxes.  It  is  also  clear  that  the  precarious  tenure  and  uncertain  posi¬ 
tion  of  these  officers  oblige  them  to  conciliate  all  those  persons  in 
their  province  who  enjoy  credit  at  Court. 

[128]  We  are  nevertheless  very  far  from  raising  any  doubts,  Sire, 
as  to  the  sincerity  of  the  opinions  which  the  Intendants  despatch  to 
your  Council.  We  do  not  doubt  that  they  have  the  necessary  zeal  and 
courage  to  defend  the  interests  of  the  province  which  is  confided  to 
their  care ;  we  believe,  too,  that  the  strictest  justice  dictates  the  account 
which  they  give  of  the  relative  resources  of  all  the  Elections  in  their 
generalite. 

[129]  It  must  be  urged,  however,  that  the  condition  of  the  people 
should  not  be  represented  to  you  by  the  Intendants  alone,  and  that  it 
is  surprising  that  neither  the  corporate  bodies  nor  private  individuals 
in  the  various  provinces  are  permitted  to  submit  memoirs  in  the  peo¬ 
ple  s  interests,  before  the  warrant  of  the  taille  and  the  commissions  are 
determined. 

[I3°]  We  observe  furthermore  to  Your  Majesty  that  this  warrant  of 
the  taille  and  these  commissions  are  not  only  acts  of  arbitrary  authority, 
but  they  are  also  executed  in  secret,  for  neither  the  warrant  of  the 
taille  nor  the  commissions  are  ever  printed  or  publicly  announced; 
the  commissions  are  simply  sent  to  the  Election,  which  must  conform 
to  them  in  making  the  third  apportionment,  that  of  the  departement. 
The  province  consequently  only  learns  its  fate  when  this  departement 
takes  place,  that  is  to  say,  when  all  is  irrevocably  determined.  It 
knows  nothing  of  the  fate  of  the  other  provinces,  for  nowhere  in  the 
kingdom  is  a  general  statement  to  be  found. 

C 1 3 1 3  TTus  not  only  are  the  provinces  judged  without  a  hearing 


ARBITRARY  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  TAXES.  II7 

when  the  warrant  of  the  taille  and  the  commissions  are  fixed,  but  it  is 
absolutely  and  physically  impossible  for  them  to  obtain  access  to  Your 
Majesty  in  order  to  protest  against  the  apportionment.  If,  in  fact,  a 
province  is  taxed  to  an  excessive  amount  for  imaginary  needs,  or  un¬ 
reasonable  expenditures,  it  does  not  hear  of  it  until  the  moment  when 
the  tax  is  to  be  raised.  If  this  same  province  has  been  unjustly  treated 
in  the  general  apportionment,  either  through  ignorance  of  the  prevail¬ 
ing  conditions,  or  by  reason  of  a  predilection  of  the  Minister  for  other 
provinces,  not  only  is  it  excluded  from  taking  any  measures  against 
the  injustice,  but  it  is  not  even  possible  for  it  to  know  that  such  in¬ 
justice  exists. 

[132]  This  secrecy,  Sire,  is  a  deliberately  conceived  system  ;  for  we 
must  remind  Your  Majesty  that  in  the  year  1768  the  Cour  des  aides 
decreed  that  each  Election  should  send  to  it  each  year ,  during  the 
week  succeeding  the  departement, .a  list  containing  the  total  amount  of 
the  taxes  to  be  apportioned  among  the  parishes .  This  statement  was 
to  specify  the  total  amount  of  the  taille  and  its  supplements ,  of  the  poll 
tax  ami  of  the  sums  which  are  added  to  these  impositions  at  the  rate 
of  so'  many  sous  in  the  fraud,  and  was  to  give  an  exact  account  of  the 
sums  assessed  each  year  upon  the  basis  of  the  tailles.  The  Cour  des 
aides  desired  this  general  account  simply  in  order  to  present  it  to  the 
King,  and  it  may  be  well  to  add  that  it  had  no  other  possible  use 
for  it,  for  duly  registered  laws  observed  for  more  than  a  century  do  not 
permit  the  Cour  des  aides  to  take  any  official  action  in  regard  to  what 
is  done  in  the  departement . 

IY33]  Would  you  believe,  Sire,  that  the  Administration  had  suffi¬ 
cient  influence  to  have  this  decree  annulled?  It  is  difficult  to  imagine 
under  what  pretext,  for  they  did  not  go  so  far,  probably,  as  to  say  ex¬ 
pressly  to  the  late  King  that  they  wished  to  prevent  any  one  from  ac¬ 
quainting  him  with  the  situation  of  his  people  :  neither  do  we  believe 
that  they  would  have  dared  advance  in  his  presence  the  barbarous 
maxim,  which  has  too  often  been  asserted,  that  the  people  can  easily 
bear  their  misfortunes  provided  the  Government  is  clever  enough  to 
conceal  them. 

[134]  Permit  us,  Sire,  one  last  reflection  upon  the  arbitrary  nature 
of  these  two  apportionments.  It  is  easy  to  conceive  that  the  Ministers 


1  One  of  the  subterfuges  of  the  Ancien  Regime  consisted  in  collecting  a  certain 
number  of  sous  in  addition  to  each  hvre  or  franc  of  the  original  tax. 


TRANSITIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


1 18 

who  loved  despotism  should  have  desired  to  arrogate  to  themselves, 
in  the  name  of  the  Council  of  Your  Majesty,  the  right  arbitrarily  to  im¬ 
pose  upon  the  people  whatever  amounts  they  saw  fit.  But  it  is  not 
easy  to  understand  what  interest  they  could  have  had  in  depriving  the 
people  of  a  voice  in  the  apportionment  of  the  burden ;  and  we  do  not 
believe  that  even  those  Ministers,  despotic  as  they  were,  would  have 
established  the  form  of  apportionment  which  exists  to-day  if  the  re¬ 
flections  which  we  have  just  made  to  Your  Majestv  had  been  presented 
to  them  in  all  their  simplicity. 

[*35]  Moreover,  since  we  have  undertaken  to  tell  Your  Majesty  all 
sorts  of  truths  with  no  reserve,  we  must  confess  that  our  predecessors 
were  doubtless  at  fault  in  not  exposing  this  system  of  secrecy  as  they 
should  have  done  when  it  was  first  introduced.  Even  at  that  time 
there  were  no  longer  either  Estates-General  or  provincial  Estates,  nor 
even  representatives  of  the  provinces  commissioned  by  the  people  to 
apportion  the  taxes.  This  apportionment  was  made  by  Judges  who 
had  been  substituted  for  the  representatives  of  the  Nation,  and  ap¬ 
peals  could  be  taken  from  the  decisions  of  these  Judges  to  the  Ccurs 
des  aides.  It  is  true  that  these  Magistrates  protested  against  the  change, 
but  their  efforts  ended  with  demanding  the  execution  of  the  existing 
laws,  that  is,  in  demanding  that  the  apportionment  should  be  made  by 
them  instead  of  by  the  Council.  Hence  these  protests  appeared  at 
the  time  to  deal  merely  with  a  question  of  jurisdiction,  a  personal  affair 
of  the  Courts  which  was  of  no  interest  to  the  general  public. 

[136]  If  these  Courts  had  vindicated  for  the  people  the  natural  right 
of  all  men  to  be  heard  before  being  judged,  if  they  had  insisted  "upon 
the  necessity  of  knowing  the  condition  of  the  provinces  before  impos¬ 
ing  a  tax,  if  they  had,  above  all,  made  known  to  their  Sovereigns  the 
difference  between  despotism  and  secrecy,  it  seems  to  us  that  the 
present  system  would  never  have  been  adopted  either  by  the  Sovereign 
or  by  the  chief  Ministers,  for  they  had  nothing  to  gain  by  it.  The 
subordinate  Administrative  Officials  are  the  only  ones  who  profit  by  the 
system,  since  by  means  of  it  they  are  able  to  render  themselves  in¬ 
dependent  of  a  higher  authority. 

[*37]  We  pass  now  to  the  third  process  of  apportionment,  that  made 
in  the  departe merit ,  between  the  parishes  or  communities  of  each  Elec¬ 
tion.  Formerly  this  apportionment  was  not  arbitrary  but  was  made  by 
the  E/us,  who  were  actually  elected  by  the  province.  .  However,  the 
assembly  made  up  of  the  E/us  must  not  be  assimilated  to  a  meeting  of 


ARBITRARY  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  TAXES. 


1  1  9 

the  provincial  Estates;  the  difference  between  them  is,  indeed,  very 
apparent.  The  provincial  Estates  grant,  or  refuse  to  grant,  the  don 
gratuit1 2 ;  they  regulate  all  parts  of  the  administration;  they  are  the 
defenders  of  the  rights  of  the  provinces,  and  these  rights  are,  in  general, 
those  whose  maintenance  was  guaranteed  to  the  province  at  the  time 
of  its  annexation  by  the  Crown.  The  duties  of  the  Elus  did  not  ex¬ 
tend  to  all  these  matters  :  they  acted  as  general  assessors  of  the  pro¬ 
vince  in  apportioning  the  tax  between  the  parishes  and  communities, 
just  as  in  each  parish  or  community  there  are  assessors  who  apportion 
among  the  individual  tax-payers  the  sum  imposed  upon  the  whole 
community. 

[138]  We  must  observe,  in  order  to  avoid  any  misunderstanding,  that 
these  former  Elys  also  exercised  that  function  which  is  still  retained 
by  those  who  now  bear  the  same  name,  the  function,  namely,  of 
Judges  in  the  tribunal  of  the  Election.  But  we  shall  not  consider 
them  here  under  this  aspect,  but  as  general  tax-assessors  of  the 
province. 

[139]  The  fact  that  this  office  of  general  tax-assessor  excited  the 
jealousy  of  the  Administration  explains  the  successive  blows  which  have 
been  dealt  at  national  liberty  in  this  respect.  In  the  first  place,  the 
real  Elus,  who  were  actually  chosen  by  the  people,  were  done  away 
with,  and  officers  appointed  by  the  government,  and  who  procure  their 
offices  by  purchase,  were  substituted  for  them.  In  the  second  place, 
the  Intendant  of  the  province  was  introduced  into  the  departement 2  and 
made  its  presiding  officer,  and  in  the  end  the  deliberative  functions  of 
the  Elus  and  of  all  who  enjoyed  the  right  of  being  present  in  the 
departement  were  suppressed.  Moreover,  the  Superior  Courts  were 
forbidden  to  take  cognizance  of  the  proceedings,  so  that  now  the  ap¬ 
portionment  made  in  the  departemetit  is  the  work  of  the  Intendant 
alone,  without  recourse  or  appeal. 

[140]  Your  Majesty  will  readily  observe  that  the  second  of  the 
above  changes  rendered  the  first  one  unnecessary.  It  is  easy  to 
understand  that  despotism  should  have  desired  to  suppress  the  real 

1  /.  e.,  the  lump  sum  paid  to  the  king  by  the  pays  d'  ttat  (that  is,  the  provinces 
which  retained  their  estates),  in  lieu  of  the  taxes  which  the  government  collected 
in  other  parts  of  the  realm. 

2 This  word  department ,  it  will  be  observed,  is  sometimes  used  in  the  sense  of  the 
act  which  apportioned  the  tax  among  the  various  parishes  of  the  Election;  sometimes 
it  means  the  assembly  which  made  the  apportionments. 


I  20 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


Elus  as  long  as  they  had  any  real  power.  But  now  that  the  Commis¬ 
sioner  of  the  Council 1  has  become  the  absolute  master  in  the  depart¬ 
ment,  and  no  one  else  has  more  than  an  advisory  voice  there,  no  farther 
reason  or  pretext  remains  for  refusing  to  accord  to  the  provinces  the 
right  of  sending  representatives  to  look  after  their  interests. 

[ r 4 r ]  Finally,  in  the  third  place,  a  new  move  was  made  in  1767, 
of  which  we  must  give  an  account  to  Your  Majesty.  In  that  year  the 
spirit  of  secrecy  reached  such  a  degree  that  it  seemed  desirable  that 
the  apportionment  made  in  the  departement  should  be  concealed  even 
from  those  who  had  the  right  to  take  part  in  it.  With  this  end  in 
view,  the  idea  was  conceived  of  making  two  warrants  for  the  taille, 
one  of  which  should  be  sent  to  the  departement,  while  the  other  was 
kept  secret  in  order  that  the  Intendant  alone  might  determine  its  ap¬ 
portionment  in  his  private  office.  The  first  warrant  dealt  only  with  the 
principal  of  the  taille  which,  it  was  argued,  never  varied,  and  upon 
which  it  -was,  therefore,  useless  to  consult  the  province.  For  the 
second  warrant  were  reserved  all  the  supplements,  all  the  new  assess¬ 
ments,  everything  which  is  subject  to  variation  from  year  to  year  :  in 
it  were  noted  even  the  reduction  of  the  supplements  of  the  taille 
granted  to  those  unfortunate  individuals  whose  misfortunes  make  it 
impossible  for  them  to  pay,  reductions  which  are  justifiable,  but  which 
nevertheless  ought  only  to  be  granted  to  those  who  can  really  claim 
them,  since  what  is  deducted  from  one  quota  is  added  to  the  others. 
Upon  all  this,  Sire,  the  Intendant  was  allowed  to  decide  by  himself, 
without  the  inconvenient  presence  of  those  who  took  part  in  the 
departement . 

[142]  The  Cour  des  aides  addressed  to  the  late  King,  in  the  year 
1768,  certain  Protests  in  which  this  system  of  the  two  warrants  was 
explained.  But  since  for  more  than  a  century  the  Cour  des  aides  has 
not  taken  legal  cognizance  of  the  proceedings  in  the  departement,  it 
could  only  enter  a  protest,  and  took  no  farther  action.  These  Protests 
were  probably  sent  by  the  late  King  to  the  Officers  of  the  Administra¬ 
tion,  that  is  to  the  very  persons  who  were  anxious  to  introduce  this  new 
secrecy  into  the  apportionment. 

[^3]  But  now  that  we  cherish  the  hope  that  Your  Majesty  is  willing 
to  listen  to  us,  we  testify  that  of  all  the  operations  undertaken  by 
despotism  there  is  none  in  which  the  fatal  spirit  of  secrecy  is  more 


1  An  official  designation  of  the  Intendant. 


ARBITRARY  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  TAXES. 


1  21 


manifest  than  in  this  system  of  the  two  warrants.  In  a  word,  since 
the  Elus  no  longer  have  a  deliberative  voice,  nor  indeed  any  power 
whatever,  in  the  departement,  we  cannot  conceive  any  honest  Reasons 
for  removing  such  witnesses. 

[144]  It  only  remains,  Sire,  to  speak  of  the  fourth  and  last  appor¬ 
tionment,  namely,  that  which  is  made  among  the  individual  tax-payers 
by  means  of  the  roll  of  each  parish.  When  the  regulations  which 
govern  the  faille  were  made,  despotism  had  not  yet  made  such  progress 
as  we  have  since  seen,  and  of  which  we  shall  speak  in  connection  with 
the  poll  tax  and  the  twentieth  :  no  one  then  supposed  that  arbitrary- 
authority  could  decide  the  fate  of  each  and  every  individual.  That 
authority  had  not  yet  obtained  complete  control  of  this  fourth  appor¬ 
tionment,  although  it  had  made  several  attacks  upon  it.  We  have 
already  mentioned  two  of  these  encroachments  :  the  one  consists  in  the 
custom  followed  by  several  Intendants  of  having  all,  or  almost  all,  of 
the  rolls  drawn  up  in  the  presence  of  Commissioners ;  the  other,  in  the 
reductions  granted  upon  the  simple  authority  of  the  Intendant. 

[145]  As  regards  the  rolls  of  the  Commissioners,  the  so-called  official 
rolls,  it  is  certainly  true  that  the  presence  of  a  Commissioner  in  an  as¬ 
sembly  of  country  people  is  too  imposing  either  to  leave  the  Collectors 
free  to  draw  up  their  roll  according  to  their  best  knowledge  and  belief, 
or  to  permit  individuals  who  believe  themselves  unjustly  treated  to 
defend  themselves.  This  disadvantage  was  foreseen  by  the  Cour  des 
aides  when  these  rolls  of  the  Commissioners  were  first  authorized.  It 
believed  that  they  should  only  be  made  at  rare  intervals,  and  upon 
extraordinary  occasions,  such  as,  for  example,  when  a  new  regulation 
concerning  the  making  of  the  rolls  had  been  enacted  and  needed  to 
be  explained  to  the  people  of  the  country  communities.  The  Court 
trusted  that  it  had  insured  this  by  forbiding  the  Commissioners  to 
-receive  anything  from  the  tax-payers;  it  inferred  that  these  commis¬ 
sions  would  not  be  frequent  when  they  were  not  profitable,  and  that 
the  Intendant  would  not  be  led  to  multiply  them  by  the  desire  to 
provide  places  for  his  prot6g£s;  nevertheless  in  several  generality 
everything  is  done  by  Commissioners,  and  certainly  they  must  be  well 
paid.  In  this  way  the  precautions  of  the  Cour  des  aides  have  been 
rendered  ineffectual.  It  does  not  appear  however  that  the  Intendants 
rely  upon  the  King  to  meet  these  expenses ;  probably  the  sum  destined 
for  this  purpose  is  levied  upon  the  parishes.  This  is  an  extortion  pro¬ 
hibited  by  law,  but  the  Intendant  is  able  to  perpetrate  it  with  impunity. 


122 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


since  the  amount  to  be  paid  by  the  parishes  is  determined  in  the  de- 
partement  where  he  is  master. 

[146]  As  to  the  reductions  granted  to  individuals  who  have  suffered 
losses,  we  have  already  observed  that  they  are  regarded  as  favors  due 
to  the  King’s  liberality,  and  they  are  described  as  such  by  the  Intend- 
ant  in  the  department.  For  if  they  are  not  really  favors,  and  if 
the  amount  which  is  deducted  from  one  individual’s  tax  is  to.  be  borne 
by  the  rest  of  the  inhabitants,  those  who  draw  up  the  tax  rolls  should 
be  the  ones  to  determine  the  reductions,  otherwise  a  reduction  becomes 
simply  a  gratuity  which  the  Intendant  grants  to  a  favorite,  and  for  which 
the  people  must  pay.  This  was  also  foreseen  by  the  Cour  des  aides, 
and  it  hoped  to  prevent  it  by  expressly  ordering  that  such  reductions 
and  exemptions  made  by  the  Intendant  should  not  in  any  case  be  re¬ 
charged  upon  other  taxpayers ;  but  the  Intendants  have  again  evaded 
this  enactment  by  arranging  the  matter  in  the  departement,  where  they 
have  entire  control.  As  we  have  already  observed,  they  have  taken 
care  to  have  all  such  reductions  entered  in  the  secret  warrant  in  order 
to  prevent  criticism  of  their  conduct. 

C 1 4 7 ]  In  reality,  any  reduction  granted  to  an  individual  is  not  a 
favor  but  an  act  of  justice,  and  often,  of  necessity :  for  in  a  case  where  fire 


or  storm  has  made  it  physically  impossible  for  an  individual  to  pay  his 
tax,  it  is  necessary  to  make  some  rebate.  These  reductions  should  not, 
therefore,  depend  upon  the  arbitrary  authority  of  the  Intendant,  and 


still  less  should  they  be  provided  for  in  a  secret  document  where  all 
sorts  of  injustice  may  be  concealed.  The  Cour  des  aides  exposed  and 
explained  all  these  schemes  and  the  resulting  abuses  in  its  Protest  of 
176S,  nor  has  justice  been  done  the  people,  for,  as  we  have  already 
observed,  it  was  referred  for  examination  to  the  authors  of  the  abuses 
which  it  denounced.  So  the  Intendants  are  still  at  liberty  to  grant 

favors  to  their  prot<§g£s  at  the  expense  of  the  people,  under  the  guise 
of  tax  reductions. 

C 1 4S]  There  are  still  other  violations  of  justice  and  infractions  of 
the  rules,  committed  in  drawing  up  the  rolls  of  the  taille.  Perhaps 
some  changes  should  be  made  in  the  existing  laws.  The  majorty  of 
your  Administrative  Officers  are  said  to  believe  this,  and  possibly  your 
Cour  des  aides  will  come  to  the  same  conclusion.  These  changes,  how¬ 
ever,  will  necessitate  long  discussions  between  Your  Majesty  and  your 
Ministers;  and  we  ask  Your  Majesty  if  you  will  not  immediately  do 
away  at  least  with  the  secrecy  of  the  first  three  apportionments.  We 


ARBITRARY  ASSESSMENT  OF  TIIE  TAXES. 


I23 


entreat  Your  Majesty  to  begin  by  asking  that  an  account  be  rendered 
him  of  the  Protest  presented  by  his  Cour  des  aides  in  1768.  You  will 
find  there  a  discussion  of  the  two  warrants  of  the  taille,  and  especially 
of  all  that  concerns  the  reductions,  and  we  shall  hope  that  as  soon  as 
these  explanations  are  presented  to  Your  Majesty,  this  whole  iniquitous 
system  of  secrecy  will  cease  to  exist. 

[149]  But  our  hopes  and  our  prayers  do  not  end  here:  we  farther 
beg  Your  Majesty  to  reorganize  those  provincial  assemblies  called  dl- 
partevients ,  by  investing  them  with  the  power  and  consequence  which 
they  have  not  enjoyed  for  a  century  past.  We  beg  that  all  the  taxes, 
without  exception,  which  are  levied  each  year  in  the  provinces  may  be 
there  considered — not  only  the  taille  and  its  supplements,  but  the  poll 
tax,  the  twentieth,  the  sums  which  are  levied  for  the  building  of 
presbyteries,  and  even  the  militia  and  the  corvee.  We  entreat  Your 
Majesty  to  ordain  that  all  these  taxes  shall  be  publicly  announced,  and 
that  the  apportionments  shall  be  made  and  the  rolls  published  in  time 
to  permit  those  who  believe  themselves  injured  to  invoke  your  justice. 

[ 1 5 °]  Finally,  Sire,  it  seems  to  us  time  to  bestow  upon  your  people 
the  right  which  they  formerly  enjoyed  of  choosing  representatives  to 
be  pYesent  in  the  assembly  where  the  fate  of  the  province  is  decided. 
We  have  already  said  that  the  presence  of  such  deputies  cannot  in  any 
way  suggest  an  analogy  between  the  assembly  of  the  defiartement  and 
the  provincial  Estates;  so  that  even  despotism  itself  need  not  take 
offense.  Neither  will  it  in  any  way  prejudice  the  position  of  the  official 
Elus,  who  will  lose  none  of  the  functions  which  are  at  present  attached 
to  their  office.1  Moreover  this  measure  would  not  necessitate  any 
change  whatever  in  the  provincial  assembly  called  the  departement :  it 
might  therefore  be  adopted  at  once,  without  any  expense,  and  without 
any  preparations.  We  are  not  proposing  to  Your  Majesty  an  innovation 
but  a  provision  of  the  ancient  constitution  of  the  Kingdom,  which  we 
only  ask  you  to  revive  by  granting  to  each  province  what  is  everywhere 
granted  to  individuals,  namely,  the  right  of  being  heard  before  being 
judged. 

[I5I]  The  former  Elus  were  done  away  with  because  as  assessors 
of  the  taxes  they  exercised  some  power,  and  the  Ministers  of  that 
period  wished  to  destroy  all  authority  which  did  not  emanate  from 

1  It  has  not  been  deemed  necessary  to  translate  the  note  which  the  Court  adds  upon 
this  technical  matter.  See  the  French  version  above,  p.  44. 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


I  24 

themselves  ;  but  now  that  the  Intendant  makes  the  assessment  upon  his 
own  authority  this  pretext  no  longer  exists  ;  and  while  the  King  has  not 
yet  done  justice  to  the  Nation  in  this  regard,  it  is  doubtless  because 
he  has  never  been  asked  to  do  so.  We  have  already  admitted  that 
the  Magistrates  have  always  failed  to  insist  upon  the  re-establishment 
of  institutions  which  were  outside  their  jurisdiction;  and  that  is  the 
reason  why,  when  a  preponderating  voice  in  the  departement  was 
given  to  the  Intendants,  the  Courts  did  not  call  attention  to  the  fact 
that,  since  that  despotic  measure  had  been  enacted,  there  was  no 
longer  any  excuse  for  refusing  to  grant  to  the  provinces  the  right  of 
choosing  their  Elus.  It  may  be  asked  what  purpose  the  mere  presence 
of  such  representatives  would  serve  if  they  possessed  no  real  power, 
but  is  it  not  well  known  that  the  simple  presence  of  a  person  of  con¬ 
sideration  constitutes  an  obstacle  to  the  perpetration  of  injustice?  The 
Administrative  Officials  of  the  previous  reign  certainly  recognized  this 
fact,  for  by  the  system  of  the  two  warrants  they  attempted  to  conceal 
their  operations  even  from  the  knowledge  of  the  official  Elus,  who 
certainly  would  not  offer  the  same  opposition  that  might  be  expected 
from  persons  chosen  by  the  provinces. 

[152]  Moreover,  real  representatives  could  hardly  be  refused  the 
right  of  recourse  to  Your  Majesty  when  their  protests  were  not  recog¬ 
nized  in  the  departement  where  they  possessed  no  authority.  They 
would  never  be  able  to  retard  the  execution  of  a  measure,  but  they 
might  exercise  the  right  which  all  your  subjects  should  enjoy,  and  they 
might  make  use  of  it  for  the  benefit  of  the  province.  We  would  farther 
point  out  to  Your  Majesty  that  even  if  these  representatives  chosen  by 
the  provinces  should  rarely  enter  protests  against  the  conduct  of  the 
Intendant,  and  even  if  those  protests  which  they  did  make  proved 
sometimes  to  be  unfounded,  it  would  not  follow  that  their  existence 
was  useless,  for  the  real  good  they  would  do  would  consist  in  the  evil 
which  their  presence  would  prevent. 

C1 53]  believe,  Sire,  that  should  Your  Majesty  consent  to  reslore 
to  the  provinces  their  former  representatives,  and  should  their  presence 
give  rise  to  no  well-founded  complaint  against  the  administration,  this 
in  itself  would  be  one  proof  of  the  value  of  their  existence;  and.jf,  in 
spite  of  the  infrequency  and  ineffectualness  of  their  complaints,  the 
administration  should  still  seek  pretexts  for  freeing  itself  from  this 
troublesome  criticism,  that  would  simply  make  the  proof  more  complete. 

[ 1 5 43  In  presenting  to  you  the  annoyances  connected  with  the  first 


THE  POLL  TAX. 


1  25 


two  apportionments,  which  are  determined  arbitrarily  in  your  Council, 
we  did  not  suggest  any  remedy,  for  the  reason  that  there  is  nobodv  in 
the  provinces  at  present  who  has  sufficient  knowledge  of  their  situation 
to  furnish  information  in  regard  to  them  to  the  Council.  But  when 
there  are  certain  citizens  within  the  limits  of  each  Election  who  attend 
the  assembly  of  the  departement  as  official  representatives,  and  when 
the  apportionment  of  the  sum  to  be  levied  upon  the  province  is  made 
in  their  presence,  they  will  be  prepared  to  furnish  instructive  infor¬ 
mation  ;  and  we  doubt  not  that  Your  Majesty  will  not  only  permit  but 
will  even  order  them  to  present  such  information  to  the 'Ministers  of 
Finance  and  to  those  who  compose  the  Council.  The  Intendants  will 
then  have  opponents,  and  the  people,  defenders. 

[155]  We  are  confident,  moreover,  Sire,  that  the  Intendants  who 
govern  your  provinces  at  present  will  not  fear  to  be  exposed  to  such 
criticism.  We  believe  that  both  they  and  the  Ministers  who  at  present 
compose  your  Council  ardently  desire  to  be  enlightened  and  guided  in 
that  most  important  operation,  the  apportionment  of  the  taxes,  which 
has  heretofore  been  performed  only  at  hap-hazard. 

[156]  The  two  other  taxes  of  which  we  desire  to  speak  to  Your 
Majesty  are  founded  upon  different  principles  from  those  which  govern 
the  taille.  As  we  have  already  observed,  the  tail/e  is  the  oldest  of  the 
direct  taxes  and  was  for  a  long  time  the  only  one.  It  was  instituted 
by  Charles  VII.  for  the  purpose  of  providing  for  the  pay  of  regular 
troops  (which  w-ere  established  at  that  period  in  almost  all  the  states 
of  Europe).  However,  as  the  Nobility  was  still  subject  to  feudal  mili¬ 
tary  service,  it  seemed  right  that  they  should  be  exempt  from  the  taille. 

[157]  But  during  the  following  centuries  military  service  fell  into 
oblivion,  and  the  Nobility  no  longer  served  the  State  except  in  the 
regular  paid  troops.  The  privileges  of  the  Nobility  came  to  be  less 
and  less  respected  during  this  period,  because  when  nobility  was 
attached  to  certain  purchasable  offices  it  fell  to  the  lot  of  the  wealthy. 
So  the  financial  administration  conceived  the  idea  of  infringing  upon, 
these  privileges,  though  at  first  only  indirectly.  The  most  important 
of  the  early  encroachments  consisted  in  taxing  the  commons  for  the 
land  which  the}''  leased  from  Nobles  and  other  exempted  persons. 
But,  finally,  Louis  XIV.,  during  his  later  wars,  created  two  taxes  to 
which  the  Nobility  and  those  otherwise  privileged  were  directly  sub¬ 
jected,  namely,  the  poll  tax1  and  the  tax  of  the  tenth. 

1  The  so-called  capitation  was  not  in  reality  a  poll  tax,  but  a  classified  income  tax. 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


T  26 

[158]  We  shall  not  dwell  long  upon  the  poll  tax,  for  we  feel  that 
anything  we  might  say  about  it  would  be  superfluous.  This  tax  is,  in 
fact,  so  objectionable,  under  whatever  aspect  it  is  considered,  that  Your 
Majesty’s  Ministers  cannot  but  be  convinced  of  its  evils.  It  was  es¬ 
tablished  at  that  unfortunate  period  when  every  expedient  was  seized 
upon  by  the  Government  without  examination.  In  1713,  when  peace 
was  made  after  an  unfortunate  war,  Louis  XIV.  did  not  feel  himself  in 
a  position  to  fulfill  the  promise  of  suppressing  it,  which  he  had  made 
to  his  people.  Since  then  the  fate  of  this  tax  has  been  like  that  of 
many  others :  a  vicious  tax  once  registered  has  been  retained,  instead 
of  substituting  for  it  a  more  reasonable  one,  which  would,  however, 
have  to  be  submitted  to  criticism  by  a  new  registration. 

[159]  Moreover,  the  arbitrary  character  of  this  tax  has  made  it 
more  popular  with  some  Administrative  Officials  than  any  of  the  other 
impositions.  This  character  is  so  maiked  that  the  surplus  from  the 
poll  tax,  the  amount  of  which  is  variable  and  uncertain,  is  entirely  at 
the  disposition  of  the  administration,  and  they  have  long  reserved  this 
sum  for  their  cherished  secret  expenditures. 

[160]  Your  Majesty  can  now  understand  why  the  obvious  disad¬ 
vantages  of  the  poll  tax  have  received  no  attention.  Your  Majesty  may 
be  told  that  any  surplus  which  the  poll  tax  yields  is  essential,  because 
it  is  the  only  fund  which  can  be  used  for  making  improvements  in  the 
provinces.  If  that  is  the  case,  Your  Majesty  should  inquire  what  means 
were  employed  for  this  purpose  before  the  poll  tax  was  established  in 
France. 

[16 1]  In  fact,  Sire,  not  only  is  the  poll  tax  fixed  by  a  single  man, 
not  only  are  the  rolls  secret,  but  those  who  are  charged  with  its  ap¬ 
portionment,  and  who  have  no  wish  to  make  it  arbitrary,  have  no  re¬ 
gulations  to  guide  them. 

[162]  formerly  a  nobleman  from  each  generalite  was  associated  with 
the  Intendant  in  drawing  up  the  lists.  This  formality  has  fallen  into 
desuetude,  and  there  is  little  cause  to  regret.it,  since  this  nobleman 
was  not  chosen  by  the  province,  but  was  appointed  by  the  government, 
and  at  the  instigation  of  the  Intendant,  so  that  he  was  simply  an  idle 
witness  of  the  latter’s  operations. 

1  lie  people  of  Prance,  from  the  Princes  of  the  Blood  down,  were  divided  into  twenty- 
two  classes,  those  in  the  first  class  paid  2000  livres,  those  in  the  twenty-second  class 
(soldiers,  servants,  etc.),  only  one  livre.  The  tax,  however,  soon  lost  all  semblance 
of  its  original  form  by  reason  of  exemptions,  commutations,  etc. 


THE  VICES  OF  THE  POLL  TAX. 


127 


[ 1 63]  There  are,  however,  certain  classes  of  citizens  whose  poll  tax 
is  not  arbitrarily  determined.  In  the  case  of  those,  for  example,  who 
are  subject  to  the  tail/e,  the  poll  tax  has  become  an  adjunct  of  the 
taillc.  Corporations  of  artisans  in  certain  large  cities  are,  moreover, 
permitted  to  apportion  the  tax  among  themselves  and  thus  remedy  its 
arbitrary  character.  But  what  law  or  regulation  determines  the  entire 
sum  to  be  imposed  upon  each  body  of  artisans?  We  know  of  no  such 
law,  and  it  is  more  than  probable  that  the  matter  rests  entirely  with 
the  Administrative  Officials. 

[164]  I  here  is  also  another  class  of  Your  Majesty’s  subjects  whose 
poll  tax  is  a  fixed  amount,  namely,  those  who  pay  by  having  a  part  of 
their  salaries  withheld.  But  although  this  may  not  be  arbitrary  it  is 
unjust,  since  the  poll  tax  is  not  a  tax  upon  real  property  affecting  only 
the  property  of  the  taxpayer,  but  a  personal  tax  which  should  be  pro¬ 
portionate  to  all  his  resources.  There  is  often  a  great  variation  in  the 
fortunes  of  those  who  hold  similar  offices,  nevertheless  they  must  all 
pay  the  same  poll  tax. 

[165]  For  all  those  who  pay  the  poll  tax  neither  through  the  reten¬ 
tion  of  part  of  their  salaries,  nor  by  contribution  as  members  of  an  as¬ 
sociation  or  guild,  nor  as  an  adjunct  to  the  faille,  the  tax  is  entirely 
arbitrary,  a  shameful  subjection  of  all  citizens  to  the  Officials  of  the  Ad¬ 
ministration.  Should  we  attempt  to  expose  to  Your  Majesty  all  the 
resulting  abuses,  we  fear  that  we  should  be  suspected  of  exaggeration. 
For  instance,  would  Your  Majesty  credit  it  if  we  asserted  that  the  In- 
tendants  had  been  known  to  boast  of  threatening  the  inhabitants  of 
their  generalites  with  doubling  the  amount  of  the  poll  tax  if  they  did 
not  consent  to  arrangements  which  these  Officials  doubtless  believed  to 
be  for  the  good  of  the  province,  but  which  nevertheless  they  had  no 
right  to  force  upon  the  citizens? 

[166]  It  is  impossible,  Sire,  to  demonstrate  the  truth  of  such  facts, 
since  one  of  the  chief  vices  of  the  tax  is  its  secrecy.  There  is,  how¬ 
ever,  one  abuse  which  is  committed  every  year,  and  which  is  of  so  seri¬ 
ous  a  nature  that  we  feel  obliged  to  inform  Your  Majesty  of  it ;  and  al¬ 
though  we  are  not  in  a  position  to  prove  it,  it  would  be  easy  for  Your 
Majesty  to  do  so. 

[167]  Will  you  not  deign,  Sire,  to  ascertain  whether  it  is  true  that 
in  many  towns  a  poll  tax  is  levied  upon  the  officers  of  justice  which  is 
greater  than  they  can  be  compelled  to  pay,  which  consequently  forces 
them  to  ask  favors  of  the  Intendant  and  so  puts  them  completely  in 


128 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


his  power?  And  who  are  the  victims  of  this  tyranny?  The  Judges 
•who  determine  the  fate  of  their  fellow-citizens,  whose  liberty  and  inde¬ 
pendence  it  is  therefore  most  necessary  to  preserve.  You  see,  Sire, 
what  are  the  results  of  arbitrary  and  secret  taxes,  and  to  what  length  a 
tyrant  will  go  who  is  sure  of  being  neither  watched  nor  criticised.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  if  the  Intendants,  without  being  deprived  of  any  of 
their  power,  were  simply  obliged  to  publish  the  rolls  of  the  poll  tax,  it 
would  be  impossible  that  every  Judge  should  be  taxed  each  year  to  an 
exorbitant  amount,  which  is  always  reduced,  except  when  the  Judge 
has  displeased  the  Intepdant. 

[  1 68]  We  shall  say  no  more  upon  the  subject  of  the  poll  tax.  We 
deem  it  necessary,  however,  to  assert  our  right  of  jurisdiction.  The 
poll  tax  is  one  of  the  regular  taxes,  and  should  therefore  be  sub¬ 
ject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  your  Cour  des  aides,  which  cannot  do  other¬ 
wise  than  claim  its  rights  under  all  circumstances ;  for  it  ought  never 
voluntarily  renounce  any  part  of  the  jurisdiction  which  has  been  given 
it  for  the  good  of  the  people  and  the  maintenance  of  justice. 

[169]  We  would  most  urgently  request  Your  Majesty  to  abolish  the 
poll  tax  altogether,  or  at  least  completely  to  revise  it,  for  it  is  an  in¬ 
exhaustible  source  of  injustice.  We  do  the  Municipal  Magistrates  of 
Paris  and  the  Intendants  of  the  provinces  the  justice  to  believe  that 
they  ardently  desire  to  be  relieved  from  this  fantastic  assessment,  which 
is  as  abhorrent  to  those  Magistiates  who  love  order,  as  it  is  dear  to  those 
who  desire  to  take  advantage  of  the  existing  system. 

[1 70J  \*  e  must  now  take  up  the  question  of  the  tax  of  the  twentieth, 
which  is  at  present  the  subject  of  the  most  vigorous  protests  on  the 
part  of  the  people,  for  it  had  always  been  regarded  as  an  extraordinary 
measure,  to  be  reserved  for  times  of  special  need,  until  the  absence  of 
the  Magistracy  offered  the  opportunity  of  making  it  a  permanent  tax. 
Y  e  should  be  open  to  the  just  reproach  of  the  whole  Nation,  Sire,  if 
we  did  not  do  all  in  our  power  to  induce  Your  Majesty  to  fix  a  term  to 
its  existence.  Even  if  it  be  true  that  it  was  necessary  to  continue  this 
tax  after  peace  was  concluded,  in  order  to  pay  the  war  debts,  the  people 
need  not  at  least  be  deprived  of  all  hopes  of  its  removal.  Why  afflict 
the  Nation  with  the  prospect  of  its  perpetuity? 

[171]  I  his  tax  has  been  renewed,  almost  without  interruption,  for 
torty  years;  and  Your  Majesty  knows  how  little  resistance  has  been 
made  to  each  of  the  renewals,  which  have  simply  offered  an  oppor¬ 
tunity  for  bringing  the  miserable  condition  of  his  people  to  the  atten- 


THE  TWENTIETHS. 


I  29 

tion  of  the  King ;  and  surely  they,  who  suffer  so  much,  should  not  be 
deprived  of  that  consolation.  "But  we  are  confident,  Sire,  that  under 
your  rule  the  protests  made  on  the  part  of  the  people  will  bring  some¬ 
thing  more  than  their  own  consolation. 

[172]  We  beseech  Your  Majesty  to  recall  what  we  have  but  just  said 
in  regard  to  the  poll  tax.  If  the  duration  of  that  tax  had  been  deter¬ 
mined  after  the  war  of  1701,  and  if  it  had  only  been  continued  by  suc¬ 
cessive  renewals,  there  might  have  come  a  favorable  moment  when  the 
Courts  could  have  exposed  its  abuses ;  and  in  any  case  the  Adminis¬ 
tration  would  not  have  ventured  into  such  excesses,  had  they  known 
that  at  each  renewal  their  conduct  would  be  subject  to  criticism. 

[ 1 7 3]  This  is  exactly  what  happened,  Sire,  in  the  case  of  the  twen¬ 
tieth  before  it  was  made  permanent.  In  1763  this  tax,  already  burden¬ 
some  enough  in  itself,  had  become  more  so  by  reason  of  the  inquisi¬ 
torial  methods  employed  in  levying  it,  and  when  the  time  came  to  renew 
it,  the  Parlement  of  Paris  attempted  to  put  an  end  to  these  methods  by  a 
provision  which  prohibited  augmenting  the  rates  of  1763.  This  action 
was  imitated  by  all  the  other  Courts  and  was  not  disapproved  by  the 
King.  But  this  amendment,  which  was  designed  to  remedy  the  abuse, 
was  displeasing  to  those  who  desired  to  perpetuate  it,  and  consequently, 
when  the  tax  was  renewed  during  our  absence,  the  amendment  was  not 
included  either  in  the  text  of  the  law  or  in  the  records  of  those  who 
had  taken  our  places. 

[174]  The  people  soon  felt  the  cruel  effects  of  the  re-establishment 
of  the  tax  without  the  amendment  of  1763.  Your  subjects  found  their 
taxes  raised  almost  immediately  without  any  reason  being  given  for  the 
sudden  increase,  and  new  investigations,  of  unexampled  severity,  were 
instituted  throughout  the  kingdom,  as  if  the  Administrators  wished  to 
avenge  themselves  for  the  constraint  under  which  they  had  suffered 
from  1763  to  1771.  If  we  may  venture  to  say  so,  Sire,  it  seemed  as  if 
they  wished  to  make  plain  to  the  people  all  that  they  had  lost  in  losing 
their  former  Magistrates. 

[175]  Matters  have  now  reached  a  point  where  the  perpetuity  of 
the  tax  is  perhaps  less  burdensome  to  the  people  than  the  despotism 
which  it  involves.  We  hope,  Sire,  that  Your  Majesty  will  deign  to 
occupy  yourself  with  this  matter,  for  we  believe  there  is  none  more 
worthy  of  your  attention.  The  real  nature  of  these  taxes  must  be  con¬ 
sidered,  and  we  shall  endeavor,  therefore,  to  elucidate  the  fundamental 
principles  of  this  department  of  the  administration. 

9 


130 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[176]  If  we  merely  asked  your  Majesty  to  fix  the  duration  of  the 
tax  of  the  twentieth,  we  should  only  need  to  invoke  your  love  for  your 
people ;  but  in  order  to  demonstrate  the  necessity  of  re-establishing  the 
amendment  of  1763,  or  of  substituting  for  it  some  equivalent  provision, 
it  is  necessary  to  give  Your  Maesty  a  clear  and  simple  idea  of  this  tax, 
which  has  existed  in  France  since  the  commencement  of  this  century, 
first  under  the  name  of  the  tenth,  and  later  under  that  of  the  twentieth, 
the  sou  pour  livre  of  the  tenth,  etc.;  and  to  render  this  account  in¬ 
telligible  we  must  return  to  first  principles  and  determine  the  true 
nature  of  real  taxes. 

[177]  A  real  tax  is  one  which  is  levied  upon  the  property  of  a 
subject  and  not  upon  his  person  :  accordingly  each  possession,  each 
bit  of  real  estate,  is  taxed  in  proportion  to  the  income  it  produces. 
When  it  is  necessary  to  establish  such  a  tax,  it  would  seem  that 
one  should  begin  by  determining  the  total  sum  which  the  King  desires 
to  obtain  from  his  people,  and  then  seek  the  form  of  apportionment 
and  collection  which  would  be  most  economical  for  the  King,  and 
which  would  expose  the  people  as  little  as  possible  to  arbitrary  power 
and  to  the  annoyances  which  inevitably  result  from  it. 

[ 1 7 S]  That  was  not,  however,  the  method  pursued  in  levying  the 
tenth  and  the  twentieths.  Every  individual  was  required  to  pay  into 
the  Royal  treasury  a  certain  part  of  his  income,  and  for  the  execu¬ 
tion  of  this  law  a  system  of  administration  has  been  developed,  partic¬ 
ularly  in  recent  years,  which  has  the  double  disadvantage  of  subjecting 
the  King  to  large  expenses  and  the  people  to  arbitrary  power.  In 
regard  to  this  method,  we  would  observe  to  Your  Majesty,  in  the  first 
place,  that  a  real  tax  of  which  the  total  sum  is  not  fixed  is  an  injustice 
to  the  Nation ;  and  in  the  second  place,  that  this  species  of  tax  is 
vicious  in  itself  because  it  necessarily  involves  both  expense  and  arbi¬ 
trariness. 

[179]  We  venture  to  observe  to  Your  Majesty  that  such  a  tax  is  an 
injustice  to  the  Nation,  because  it  violates  the  great  principle  that  a 
luler  should  never  exact  from  his  subjects  either  more  or  less  than  the 
necessities  of  the  State  demand.  If  a  tax  such  as  the  tenth  or  the 
twentieth  produces  less  than  is  required  by  the  State  it  is  necessary  to 
seek  other  resources,  and  there  are  certainly  those  to  be  found  which 
are  less  burdensome  to  the  people  than  a  direct  tax.  If,  on  the  con¬ 
tra.},  the  tentn  or  the  twentieth  produces  more  than  is  necessary  you 
can  hardly  doubt,  Sire,  that  this  surplus  is  employed  in  expenses  for 
which  it  would  have  been  unjust  to  levy  a  new  tax. 


QUESTION  OF  A  CADASTRE. 


131 

[180]  As  we  have  said,  this  kind  of  tax  is  necessarily  both  expensive 
and  arbitrary.  To  render  this  more  comprehensible  we  must  acquaint 
Your  Majesty  with  the  various  forms  of  apportionment  employed  in  the 
different  provinces  for  raising  those  taxes  of  .  which  the  total  amount  is 
fixed.  We  shall  examine  as  briefly  as  possible  their  respective  advan¬ 
tages  and  disadvantages,  and  it  will  be  easy  to  demonstrate  that  the 
apportionment  of  the  twentieth  combines  all  the  disadvantages.  It 
occasions  more  expense,  more  tyranny,  and  more  injustice  of  every 
kind,  than  any  other  form  of  apportionment,  and  the  amendment  of 
1763  was  a  necessary  remedy  for  abuses  which  had  become  unbearable. 

[181]  There  are  some  localities  where,  when  the  amount  of  the 
tax  has  been  determined,  the  inhabitants  are  permitted  to  apportion 
it  among  themselves.  There  are  others  where  a  cadastre  is  made,  that 
is,  a  fixed  valuation  of  all  the  property  of  the  tax-payers,  in  accordance 
with  which  the  amount  of  the  tax  is  apportioned  each  year  by  a  simple 
arithmetical  operation,  with  no  personal  interference  from  anybody. 
There  are  reasons  for  and  against  both  of  these  systems  of  assessment. 

[182]  It  may  be  said  in  favor  of  the  annual  apportionment  by  the 
tax-payers  themselves  that  it  does  not  involve  any  expense  and  does 
not  subject  the  people  to  any  tyranny  on  the  part  of  the  subordinate 
officials  sent  by  the  government.  It  may  be  urged,  too,  that  the  tax¬ 
payers  themselves  are  the  only  ones  who  can  make  a  just  apportion¬ 
ment;  for  there  is  no  farmer  who  does  not  know  perfectly  well  the 
value  of  his  neighbor’s  land,  and  it  is  impossible  that  a  stranger  should 
ever  acquire  so  exact  a  knowledge.  It  is  maintained  also  that  all 
cadastres  are  unfair,  that  they  are  admitted  to  be  so  in  the  provinces 
where  they  exist,  and  that  this  injustice  arises  either  from  the  fact  that 
the  cadastre  was  originally  made  by  those  who  were  incapable  of  doing 
it  well  because  they  were  strangers  to  the  parish,  or  from  the  fact  that 
since  the  cadastre  was  drawn  up  there  have  been  unexpected  variations 
in  the  value  of  property,  which  may,  and  often  do,  arise,  from  a  thou¬ 
sand  different  causes. 

[ 1  ^3]  The  partisans  of  the  cadastre  maintain  that' in  the  provinces 
where  it  exists  the  apportionment  is  neither  expensive  nor  arbitrary. 
They  admit  that  the  cadastre  is  drawn  up  in  the  first  instance  at 
enormous  expense  and  by  the  despotic  authority  of  the  Commissioners 
of  the  cadastre,  who  are  permitted  to  determine  the  fate  of  each  indi¬ 
vidual;  but  this  unhappy  period  once  passed,  they  maintain  that  the 
tranquility  of  the  people  is  forever  assured.  In  fact,  in  those  districts 


132 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


where  the  cadastre  prevails,  not  only  is  there  no  expense  and  no 
arbitrariness,  but  there  are  no  law-suits,  while  the  annual  apportionment 
by  the  tax-payers  is  an  inexhaustible  source  of  envy,  dispute  and 
division. 

[184]  To  the  objection  that  the  tax-payers  have  greater  reciprocal 
knowledge  of  their  possessions  than  a  strange  Commissioner  can  have, 
it  may  be  answered  that  they  have  also  personal  interests  and  passions 
which  prevent  fair  dealing.  It  is  claimed  that  all  this  is  avoided  by 
having  the  cadastre  drawn  up  by  a  Commissioner  who,  being  a  stranger 
to  the  parish,  can  have  no  other  interest  than  justice,  and  that  if  he 
lacks  local  information  he  can  acquire  it  by  listening  to  the  contra¬ 
dictory  statements  of  the  tax-payers,  whose  common  interest  gainsays 
individual  statements. 

[185]  It  is  claimed  also  in  favor  of  the  cadastre  as  against  the 
annual  assessment  by  the  citizens,  that  the  tax-payer’s  knowledge  of  his 
neighbor’s  possessions  can  only  be  of  use  to  the  inhabitants  of  a  single 
community ;  but  the  taxes  must  be  apportioned  also  among  the  com¬ 
munities  of  each  province  and  among  all  the  provinces  of  the  kingdom, 
and  it  is  asserted  that  these  apportionments  can  only  be  made  justly 
by  means  of  a  cadastre  and  by  government  Commissioners. 

[186]  It  may  be  well  to  observe  to  Your  Majesty  that  this  last  ob¬ 
jection  to  the  system  of  assessment  by  the  citizens  themselves  can 
only  hold  good  so  long  as  the  communities  and  provinces  have  no 
representatives,  for  if  they  had  representatives  there  would  be  nothing 
to  prevent  all  the  communities  from  assembling  through  their  deputies 
and  apportioning  among  themselves  the  sum  levied  on  the  province, 
just  as  the  inhabitants  of  a  community  apportion  among  themselves  the 
sum  levieo  upon  the  community.  Could  not  the  advantages  of  both 
systems  be  combined  by  having  the  cadastre  made  by  the  tax-payers 
themseives  instead  of  by  Commissioners?  After  it  was  once*  made 
there  would  be  no  farther  expenses,  no  arbitrariness,  no  law-suits ;  and 
since  it  would  have  been  made  by  those  who  are  personally  acquainted 
with  the  value  of  the  property  taxed,  and  w'hose  common  interest  con¬ 
sist;,  in  tieating  every  individual  with  justice,  there  is  reason  to  be¬ 
lieve  that  such  an  apportionment  would  be  more  just  than  any  other. 

[187]  This  kind  of  cadastre  would  have  the  farther  advantage  that 
when  variations  in  the  value  of  property  occurred  which  rendered  its 
revision  necessary,  the  community  would  itself  see  this  necessity  and 
might  proceed  to  make  the  revision  without  waiting  for  it  to  be  ordered 
by  the  government. 


QUESTION  OF  A  CADASTRE. 


133 


[188]  Finally,  in  drawing  up  the  cadastre  by  this  method,  all  the 
expenses,  which  are  now  so  great  as  often  to  prevent  the  employment 
of  this  form  of  apportionment,  would  be  saved.  The  cost  incident  to 
the  successive  sojourns  of  the  Commissioners  in  all  the  villages  would 
no  longer  exist,  and  we  believe  that  the  expense  of  surveying  might 
also  be  avoided.  We  can  understand  that  a  survey  is  necessary  for  a 
strange  Commissioner  who,  knowing  nothing  of  the  relative  value  of 
land,  could  otherwise  only  inform  himself  in  general  as  to  which  tracts 
were  good,  bad,  or  indifferent,  and  levy  the  tax  upon  each  piece 
according  to  the  acres  which  it  contains  and  which  he  supposes  to  be 
good,  bad,  or  indifferent  in  quality  :  but  the  country  people  themselves, 
who  have  a  direct  knowledge  of  the  value  of  each  piece  of  land,  would 
be  spared  this  labor  and  could  make  their  cadastre  without  a  pre¬ 
liminary  survey. 

[189]  We  may  say  even  more  :  the  cadastre  would  make  itself,  with¬ 
out  any  order  from  the  government,  provided  the  tax  to  be  apportioned 
among  the  citizens  were  a  real  tax,  a  tax  levied  upon  each  parcel  of 
land,  each  tract  being  definitely  designated.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
when  the  tax-roll  had  once  been  carefully  made  in  a  parish,  it  would 
contain  a  valuation  of  all  the  real  estate.  It  would  be  acknowledged 
that  the  roll  of  that  year  had  been  well  made,  since  the  inhabitants  of  a 
community  constitute  a  public,  and  a  public  never  refuses  to  recognize 
plain  facts.  This  tax-roll,  once  recognized  as  a  good  one,  would 
become  the  cadastre. 

[190]  Although  the  taille  is  apportioned  each  year  in  certain  districts 
by  the  citizens  themselves,  the  rolls  have  never  produced  a  cadastre, 
because  the  taille  is  not  a  real  tax.  It  is  not  levied  upon  each  piece 
of  property,  but  upon  all  the  resources  which  the  individual  possesses, 
the  amount  of  which  changes  from  year  to  year.  The  considerations 
of  trade  and  industry,  as  well  as  of  personal  privileges,  also  enter  into 
the  assessment.  So  that  a  commoner  who  is  subject  to  the  taille  may 
be  taxed  one  year  for  a  piece  of  property  which  the  next  year  may  be 
in  the  possession  of  a  person  exempt  from  the  taille,  and  thus  the  rolls 
of  one  year  are  of  no  use  in  succeeding  years. 

[191]  This  is  about  all  there  is  to  be  said  of  the  two  methods  of 
apportioning  a  tax  of  which  the  amount  is  fixed  in  advance.  Opinions 
differ  in  regard  to  them,  and  we  do  not  wish  to  espouse  any  one,  but 
simply  to  present  to  Your  Majesty  certain  indisputable  truths  bearing 
upon  the  subject.  Now  it  is  an  indisputable  truth  that  a  tax  like  the 


r3  4 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


tenth  or  the  twentieth,  which  does  not  consist  of  a  fixed  sum  to  be 
apportioned  but  in  which  a  certain  part  of  his  income  is  exacted 
from  each  individual,  involves  by  its  very  nature  more  inconvenience, 
more  expense  and  more  injustice  than  either  of  the  methods  of  appor¬ 
tionment  which  we  have  described.  We  propose  to  demonstrate  this 
to  Your  Majesty  and  subsequently  to  show  how,  in  France,  a  needless 
secrecy  has  been  added  to  the  inherent  vices  of  the  tax. 

[192]  We  have  observed  that  apportionment  by- the  citizens  them¬ 
selves  is  not  accompanied  by  expense  or  arbitrariness,  but  does  involve 
a  continual  resort  to  legal  processes :  and  that  in  the  system  of  the 
cadastre  there  is  no  expense,  no  arbitrariness,  and  no  law-suits,  when 
the  cadastre  is  once  completed,  but  that  the  making  of  it  involves  large 
expenditures  and  is  presided  over  by  arbitrary  authority,  unless  it  is 
made  by  the  tax-payers  themselves. 

[193]  In  the  case  of  the  twentieth,  an  accurate  collection  of  it 
involves  each  year  all  the  expense  which  would  be  involved  in  making 
a  cadastre ;  the  people  are  continually  subjected  to  the  same  arbitrary 
power  to  which  the  making  of  the  cadastre  subjects  them  for  a  limited 
period ;  and  finally,  there  are  continual  law-suits,  just  as  in  the  regions 
Tfiiere  the  apportionment  is  made  each  year  by  the  tax-payers  without 
producing  a  fixed  valuation. 

[194]  All  these  annoyances  connected  with  the  twentieth  are  due 
to  a  common  cause,  namely,  that  in  the  present  method  of  levying  this 
tax  there  is  an  interminable  dispute  between  the  King  and  every  indi¬ 
vidual  in  his  kingdom  in  regard  to  the  value  of  each  piece  of  land. 

[195]  In  order,  therefore,  that  the  tax  shall  be  satisfactorily  collected 
the  King  must  keep  a  man  in  every  village  to  look  after  his  interests. 
The  whole  of  France  must  be  covered  with  an  army  of  Clerks;  and 
although  the  number  of  these  Clerks  is  not  at  present  so  very  great,  it 
is  only  because  the  tax  has  never  yet  been  collected  with  the  strictness 
with  which  it  might  be,  and  certainly  will  be,  collected  some  day  unless 
Your  Majesty  provides  a  remedy  by  revising  the  law.  It  is  certain 
that  this  rigor  and  the  expenditures  that  it  involves  have  been  constantly 
on  the  increase  ever  since  the  tax  was  instituted,  except  during  the 
period  when  the  amendment  of  1763  was  in  force.  And  its  arbitrary 
character  is  as  perpetual  as  its  costliness,  for  it  is  impossible  that  the 
power  of  the  government  agents  should  be  other  than  arbitrary.  It  is 
said  that  the  Intendant  is  their  judge,  but  is  it  possible  that  the 
Intendant  should  be  qualified  to  decide  as  many  suits  as  there  are 


THE  ABUSES  IN  COLLECTING'  THE  TWENTIETHS.  1 35 

parcels  of  land  in  his  generality?  How  can  he  inform  himself  upon  all 
these  cases?  He  is  absolutely  obliged  to  depend  upon  the  subordinate 
officials,  and  they  become,  therefore,  the  real  judges  of  the  people. 

[196]  Can  it  be  doubted,  Sire,  that  the  government  rewards  each 
of  these  under  officials  whenever  he  succeeds  in  increasing  the  pro¬ 
duct  of  the  twentieth  in  his  locality?  Who,  in  fact,  would  be  willing 
to  expose  himself  gratuitously,  and  without  such  encouragement,  to  the 
hatred  of  an  entire  district?  It  is  then  certainly  true  not  only  that 
arbitrary  authority  presides  over  the  collection  of  the  tax,  but  that  the 
person  in  whom  this  authority  is  vested  has  an  interest  in  oppressing 
the  people.  Nevertheless  it  would  appear  that  the  inducements  to 
oppression  are  not  yet  sufficient  always  to  secure  the  interests  of  the 
government,  for  there  are  always  some  among  the  tax-payers  who  are 
able  to  offer  the  officials  still  more  powerful  inducements  to  treat 
them  with  leniency.  Condescend,  Sire,  to  consider,  in  this  connection, 
the  double  vice  of  arbitrary  taxes  :  the  weak  are  oppressed  on  the  pre¬ 
text  of  the  King’s  interests,  while  the  powerful  and  the  intriguing  are 
favored  against  the  King’s  interests. 

[197]  Finally,  we  assert  that  the  twentieth  cannot  fail  to  be,  like 
the  faille,  an  inexhaustible  source  of  litigation.  This  must  continue 
to  be  true  until  the  suit  of  the  King  against  all  the  tax-payers  of  his 
Kingdom  is  decided,  once  for  all,  by  making  a  cadastre  from  the 
rolls  of  the  twentieth.  But  we  fear,  Sire,  that  it  will  never  be  ter¬ 
minated  in  this  way,  or  at  least  only  very  gradually  and  very  imperfectly, 
for  the  following  reason,  which  Your  Majesty  must  certainly  find 
plausible. 

[”198]  It  is  admitted  that  only  the  inhabitants  of  a  district  can  have 
a  reciprocal  knowledge  of  the  value  of  their  property  and  that  the 
cadastre  can  be  well  made  only  by  them,  or  at  least  with  their  assist¬ 
ance.  In  accordance  with  this,  we  have  suggested  that  the  best 
method  of  obtaining  a  cadastre  is  to  delegate  the  task  to  the  commun¬ 
ity.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have  observed  that  if  a  Commissioner 
from  the  outside  be  charged  with  the  work,  he  may  receive  much  as¬ 
sistance  from  the  people  themselves,  since  it  is  for  the  general  interest 
that  the  operation  should  be  performed  as  justly  and  accurately  as 
possible,  and  since  the  declaration  of  any  individual  may  often  be 
contradicted  by  the  voice  of  the  community  at  large.  But  an  agent 
concerned  with  the  twentieth  has  no  means  of  obtaining  reliable  infor¬ 
mation,  because  no  one  has  any  interest  in  enlightening  him ;  on  the 


136 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  RKPR1NTS. 


contrary,  it  is  for  the  general  interest  to  deceive  him,  since  he  is  the 
common  enemy  of  the  whole  country. 

[199]  As  we  have  said,  the  vice  of  secrecy  has  been  added  unneces¬ 
sarily  to  the  disadvantages  springing  from  the  nature  of  the  tenth  and 
the  twentieth,  and  moreover  both  the  kinds  of  secrecy  which  we  defined 
above  are  present,  namely,  that  of  the  transactions  and  that  which 
conceals  the  persons  involved. 

[200]  As  to  the  secrecy  of  the  transactions,  we  have  already  shown 
Your  Majesty  that  the  ministry  has  made  every  effort  in  its  power  to 
prevent  the  rolls  of  the  twentieth  from  being  put  on  record,  which  is 
equivalent  to  admitting  that  they  desired  perfect  freedom  either  to 
grant  favors  or  to  commit  malversations. 

[201]  As  to  the  secrecy  of  the  persons  concerned,  Your  Majesty  must 
be  informed  of  the  change  which  was  introduced  during  the  last  ministry. 
Formerly  a  person  who  believed  himself  unfairly  treated  addressed 
himself  to  the  Intendant  of  the  province.  It  was  perfectly  understood 
that  the  Intendant  would  refer  the  matter  to  the  subordinate  official 
concerned,  but  at  least  the  Intendant,  the  official  and  the  tax-payer  all 
lived  in  the  same  province  where  the  property  in  question  was  situated. 
There  was,  therefore,  an  opportunity  for  a  thorough  discussion,  and  it 
was  possible  to  verify  the  facts  alleged  by  both  parties.  Under  the  last 
ministry  it  would  seem  that  the  Ministers  themselves  became  jealous 
of  the  authority  of  the  provincial  Intendants.  There  came  a  time 
when  those  who  complained  to  the  Intendant  were  told  that  now  they 
must  address  themselves  directly  to  the  King’s  Council — as  if  it  were 
possible  for  the  Council,  sitting  near  the  person  of  the  King,  to  decide 
upon  the  value  of  an  acre  of  vineiand  or  meadow  situated  at  the 
extremity  of  the  realm  !  What  redress  remained  under  such  a  system 
to  an  individual  who  had  been  made  the  victim  of  the  cupidity  or  dis¬ 
like  of  a  government  agent?  It  might  be  clear  that  the  injustice  from 
which  he  suffered  was  due  to  the  director  of  the  twentieth  :  never¬ 
theless  that  officer  might  reply  indifferently  that  he  was  not  responsible, 
that  the  tax-rolls  were  made  out  in  the  central  office,  and  that  those 
who  believed  themselves  too  heavily  taxed  had  only  to  make  the 
journey  to  Paris  in  order  to  present  their  grievances. 

[202]  1  his  is  not  an  abuse  of  long  standing,  Sire.  It  was  only 
introduced  under  the  last  ministry ;  we  believe  it  no  longer  exists 
under  the  present  one,  and  we  trust  that  it  will  not  reappear  during 
your  reign.  Still  Your  Majesty  should  know  that  it  has  existed,  in  order 


HISTORY  OF  THE  TWENTIETHS. 


137 


to  realize  the  excesses  to  which  the  spirit  of  despotism  and  secrecy 
may  lead. 

[203]  It  now  remains  for  us  to  explain  to  Your  Majesty,  first,  how 
it  happened  in  the  beginning  that  those  who  desired  to  establish  a  real 
tax  in  France  chose  the  form  of  the  tenth  and  the  twentieth,  in  spite 
of  the  disadvantages  of  which  we  have  been  treating  :  second,  why  the 
nature  of  the  tax  was  not  changed  when  experience  had  demonstrated 
the  abuses  of  which  it  was  susceptible  :  and  third,  what  was  the  effect 
of  the  amendment  of  1763  while  it  was  in  force. 

[204]  We  do  not  wish  to  slander  the  memory  of  the  Ministers  who 
conceived  and  established  the  tenth  in  the  year  1710.  The  country 
was  in  a  critical  situation  at  the  time,  and  the  administration  of  the  tax 
was  so  mild  in  the  beginning  that  its  disadvantages  were  not  felt.  It 
was  a  period  in  which  the  calamities  of  an  unfortunate  war  were  added 
to  that  of  famine.  There  was  no  question  of  fixing  a  certain  sum  to 
be  levied  upon  the  people,  but  only  of  obtaining  from  them  whatever 
they  were  able  to  give  ;  if  it  had  been  possible  to  levy  a  much  larger 
sum  than  the  tenth  produced,  it  could  have  been  utilized  for  the 
necessities  of  the  government,  which  were  real  and  urgent. 

[205]  But  at  first  the  principal  object  of  the  originators  of  the  tax 
was  that  it  should  be  borne  by  those  whose  resources  were  not  already 
exhausted  by  the  taille,  viz.,  by  the  Nobility  and  the  privileged  classes. 
The  land  of  the  majority  of  these  was  let,  and  the  leases  represented  its 
real  value,  because,  up  to  that  time,  there  was  no  motive  for  concealing 
it.  No  investigation  was  made,  therefore,  into  the  resources  of  each 
individual,  and  there  was  no  necessity  for  a  costly  administration.  Each 
person  made  his  declaration,  and  the  Intendant  acted  as  judge ;  this  he 
was  able  to  do  because  there  was  no  doubt  as  to  the  honesty  of  those 
declarations  which  were  based  upon  leases,  and  as  for  others,  they  were 
accepted  with  almost  no  examination. 

[206]  When  the  same  tax  was  imposed  in  1733,  at  the  commence¬ 
ment  of  a  war  of  aggression  and  after  twenty  years  of  peace;  when,  a 
few  years  later  (in  1741),  it  was  again  renewed  at  the  commencement 
of  another  war ;  and  particularly  when  the  tenth  or  the  twentieth  was 
continued  during  times  of  peace  in  order  to  pay  war  debts,  the  sum 
which  the  King  desired  to  obtain  and  which  was  demanded  by  the 
necessities  of  the  government  should  have  been  fixed  in  advance. 

[207]  But  this  was  not  done.  The  Ministers  wished  to  make  the 
tax  yield  as  large  a  sum  as  possible  and,  on  the  other  hand,  tax-payers, 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


US 

finding  that  their  quotas  were  based  upon  their  leases,  seized  all  possi¬ 
ble  means  of  eluding  the  tax,  such  as  false  leases,  bribery,  etc.  And  it 
was  at  this  period  that  the  government  established  those  inquisitorial 
methods  which  are  equally  odious  and  impracticable,  and  as  burdensome 
to  Your  Majesty  on  account  of  their  cost,  as  they  are  prejudicial  to  the 
people  by  reason  of  the  annoyances  which  accompany  them. 

[208]  This. would  have  been  the  time  to  return  to  the  true  principle 
of  real  taxes,  to  change  the  character  of  the  twentieth  altogether,  and 
substitute  for  it  another  real  tax  which  should  not  involve  perpetual 
expenses  of  administration  and  perpetual  despotism.  But  unfortunately 
there  were  other  interests  concerned  than  those  of  the  treasury,  namely, 
those  of  the  Administrative  Officials. 

[209]  It  is  in  fact  evident  from  the  sketch  we  have  just  given  that 
the  Administrative  Officials  in  this  department  of  the  government  have 
greater  power  than  in  any  other.  We  believe,  Sire,  that  even  in  the  coun¬ 
tries  where  the  people  are  subjected  to  the  most  absolute  despotism, 
and  where  the  will  of  a  minister  may  make  or  mar  the  destiny  of  a 
whole  province — even  in  these  countries,  we  believe  that  a  minister 
would  not  be  permitted  to  decide,  and  decide  by  himself,  the  fate  of 
every  individual  in  the  State.  Nevertheless  this  is  what  we  see  to-day 
in  France.  There  is  not  a  landed  proprietor  in  the  kingdom  who  is 
not  obliged  either  to  solicit  favors  from  the  agent  of  the  twentieth,  or 
to  fear  the  consequences  of  his  spite.  Now  it  is  not  in  human  nature 
that  a  person  who  is  invested  with  such  excessive  power  should  lay  it 
down  voluntarily;  should  that  ever  happen,  the  person  who  makes  this 
sacrifice  must  needs  be  endowed  with  extraordinary  virtues.  These  then 
are  the  reasons,  Sire,  why  the  tax  of  the  twentieth  exists  in  its  present 
form,  why  it  has  always  been  carefully  guarded,  and  why,  in  spite  of 
the  obvious  abuses  which  experience  has  demonstrated,  an  effort  has 
been  made  to  make  it  the  basis  of  all  the  other  taxes. 

[210]  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  only  a  general  protest  could 
serve  to  bring  about  the  reform  of  so  objectionable  a  tax  ;  and  in  1763 
there  was  such  a  protest.  It  must,  however,  be  admitted,  Sire,  that  the 
voice  of  the  public  did  not  make  itself  heard  so  promptly  and  vigorously 
as  it  should  have  done,  for  it  is  a  part  of  the  policy  of  despotism  espe¬ 
cially  to  favor  those  who  might  secure  a  public  hearing.  The  protest 
was  tardy  because  the  people  of  influnce  were  those  who  had  the  least 
to  complain  of  from  the  administration  of  the  twentieth ;  and  thj£ 
fact,  Sire,  merits  Your  Majesty’s  careful  attention. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  TWENTIETHS. 


139 


[21 1]  Finally,  in  1763,  the  Parlement  registered  an  extension  of  the 
twentieth  on  condition  that  as  /ong  as  the  first  and  second  twentieths 
existed  they  should  be  collected  in  accordance  with  the  existing  rolls,  the 
assessments  in  which  were  not  to  be  augumented ;  the  violation  of  this 
ordinance  to  be  punishable  by  special  penalties.  We  ought  not  to  conceal 
from  Your  Majesty  that  this  famous  clause  of  1763  completely  changed 
the  nature  of  the  assessment  of  the  tax  and  converted  it  into  a  cadastre. 
By  this  means  all  the  abuses  were  done  away  with,  and  the  conditions 
which  we  have  mentioned  as  necessary  to  the  establishment  of  a  real 
tax  were  obtained.  First,  the  sum  levied  bv  the  King  upon  the  people 
was  fixed ;  secondly,  the  despotism  of  the  officials  was  no  longer  to  be 
feared ;  thirdly,  those  officials  being  no  longer  necessary,  the  govern¬ 
ment  might  save  all  the  expenses  of  administration. 

[212]  This  amendment  was  not,  therefore,  open  to  criticism,  ex¬ 
cept  by  asserting  that  the  tax-rolls  of  1763  had  not  been  made  with 
sufficient  accuracy  to  justify  converting  them  into  a  cadastre.  But  this 
would  have  been  to  admit  that  the  work  performed  at  such  expense  for 
so  many  years  had  not  attained  its  object,  for  the  Administrative 
Officers  had  constantly  maintained  that  their  investigations  in  con¬ 
nection  with  the  twentieth  would  presently  result  in  a  valuation  of  all 
the  land  in  the'  kingdom,  which  would  render  future  assessments  at 
once  simple  and  just,  and  would  prevent  all  disputes.  If  this  result 
had  not  been  attained,  the  inference  was  that  the  method  employed  had 
been  bad  and  that  some  new  form  of  apportionment  must  be  devised. 

[213]  To  this,  however,  the  Administration  would  not  consent,  and 
consequently  they  had  to  content  themselves  with  secretly  complaining 
against  the  amendment  of  1763.  They  asserted  that  it  was  unjust  be¬ 
cause  it  permitted  the  continuance  of  unfair  assessments,  and  that, 
since  it  forbade  increasing  the  assessment  in  cases  where  it  had  been 
too  low,  it  made  it  impossible  to  diminish  it  where  it  had  been  too 
high.  But  as  long  as  the  former  Magistracy  existed,  they  did  not  ven¬ 
ture  to  propose  to  the  late  King  to  remedy  this  disadvantage  by  a  law 
contrary  to  the  amendment,  because  it  was  easy  to  foresee  that  the  reg¬ 
istration  of  such  a  law'  would  bring  about  a  discussion  w’hich  would  ex¬ 
pose  the  vices  of  the  system  of  apportionment  which  they  wished  to 
retain.  They  waited,  therefore,  for  an  auspicious  moment,  and  in  the 
meantime,  viz.,  from  1763  to  1771,  all  the  offices  and  all  the  Clerks 
which  the  amendment  had  seemingly  rendered  unnecessary  were  main¬ 
tained  at  the  King’s  expense.  Furthermore,  the  tax-rolls  were  still  left 


140 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


unrecorded,  although  this  amendment  rendered  a  record  of  them  more 
necessary  than  ever;  for  when  these  rolls  became  the  cadastre  of  the 
kingdom,  they  should  have  been  made  public. 

[214]  The  longed-for  moment  arrived  when  the  Magistracy  was  dis¬ 
solved.  The  twentieth  was  made  a  perpetual  tax,  without  the  amend¬ 
ment  of  1763  or  any  equivalent  clause:  this  occasioned  the  revival  of 
all  the  abuses  at  once,  and  furnished  an  excuse  for  the  institution  of 
those  inquisitorial  methods  from  which  the  people  have  suffered  for  the 
last  four  years. 

[215]  We  protest  first,  Sire,  against  the  perpetuity  of  the  tax,  and 
secondly,  against  the  abolition  of  the  amendment  of  1763  ;  and  we  en¬ 
treat  Your  Majesty  either  to  re-establish  it  or  to  substitute  for  it  some 
other  measure  which  would  produce  the  same  effects,  that  is,  which 
would  fix  the  total  sum  to  be  levied,  spare  Your  Majesty  a  costly  ad¬ 
ministration,  and  not  leave  the  whole  kingdom  in  subjection  to  the 
despotism  of  the  Administration  and  the  agents  of  the  twentieth. 

[216]  The  three  taxes  wfith  which  wre  have  been  dealing  are  the  only 
direct  taxes  which  are  levied  in  your  Kingdom  as  a  whole,  and  if  simi¬ 
lar  ones  are  levied  in  certain  provinces,  under  different  names,  we  do 
not  take  legal  cognizance  of  them,  nor  have  we  had  any  reason  for  in¬ 
vestigating  them.  We  have  also  mentioned  to  Your  Majesty  the  ex¬ 
actions  of  personal  service,  such  as  the  militia  and  the  corvee,  and  we 
shall  not  discuss  them  further.  We  do  not  doubt  that  if  there  are 
abuses  connected  with  them,  the  Ministers  who  preside  over  this  por¬ 
tion  of  the  administration,  and  in  whom  the  public  have  the  greatest 
confidence,  will  do  all  in  their  power  to  reform  them. 

[217]  The  lodging  of  troops  is  another  kind  of  service  demanded  of 
the  people,  of  which  the  Coni'  des  aides  does  not  take  legal  cognizance. 
We  protest  to  Your  Majesty  that  we  are  far  from  seeking  to  extend 
our  jurisdiction  at  this  juncture,  when  we  should  be  occupied  only  with 
the  interests  of  the  people ;  but  it  will  not  infringe  upon  the  rights  of 
any  authority  if  we  inform  Your  Majesty,  in  whom  resides  every  species 
of  authority,  of  what  goes  on  in  this  connection.  In  presenting  this 
account  of  the  taxes  to  you,  Sire,  we  can  not  leave  you  in  ignorance  that 
in  your  capital  and  under  your  very  eyes  an  assessment  is  levied  upon 
many  houses,  nominally  for  the  lodging  of  troops,  which  is  in  reality 
a  real  tax  imposed  upon  your  subjects  without  being  established  by  law 
and  without  any  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  public  of  the  regula¬ 
tions  which  govern  its  assessment.  We  know  that  the  product  of  this 


TYRANNY  OF  THE  ADMINISTRATION. 


41 


tax  is  destined  to  pay  for  the  lodging  of  the  troops,  which  is  a  military 
service,  but  that  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  for  permitting  the  military 
authority  to  control  its  apportionment.  When  the  taille  was  estab¬ 
lished  under  Charles  VII.,  it  was  destined  for  the  payment  of  troops, 
but  nevertheless  there  was  no  thought  of  establishing  it  without  any  ex¬ 
press  law,  nor  of  having  it  apportioned,  judged,  and  levied  by  the  troops 
themselves. 

[218]  We  do  not  know,  and  we  have  made  no  effort  to  inform  our¬ 
selves,  whether  similar  taxes  have  been  established  upon  similar  pre¬ 
texts  in  the  provinces ;  we  trust  that  Your  Majesty  will  yourself  in¬ 
vestigate  all  that  concerns  this  peculiar  exaction.  As  to  the  city  of 
Paris,  we  entreat  you  to  investigate,  first,  by  what  law  the  tax  which 
is  there  levied  was  originally  established?  secondly,  what  law  governs 
its  constant  increase?  thirdly,  by  whom  and  according  to  what  rule  the 
tax  is  levied  upon  each  house?  fourthly,  to  whom  may  a  house-holder 
address  complaints  in  regard  to  the  tax?  When  Your  Majesty  has 
satisfied  yourself  upon  these  points,  we  do  not  doubt  that  you  will  make 
known  your  intentions  by  means  of  a  public  law ;  for  the  public  has  a 
right  to  demand  a  knowledge  of  the  laws  to  which  it  is  to  be  subjected.' 


[219]  We  assure  Your  Majesty  that  it  is  not  our  desire  in  citing 
these  particular  facts  to  arm  your  severity  against  the  culprits,  but  it 
is  well  that  you  should  know  how  those  in  whom  arbitrary  power  is 
vested  have  conducted  themselves  during  the  period  uhen  they  believed 
themselves  free  from  the  censure  of  established  justice.  We  cannot 
but  regard  the  moment,  Sire,  when  despotism,  believing  itself  assured 
of  impunity,  shows  itself  openly,  as  an  auspicious  one  for  pointing  out 
to  the  King,  the  friend  of  justice,  the  excesses  with  which  we  are 
menaced. 

[220]  We  foresee.  Sire,  that  we  shall  be  accused  of  wishing  to  in¬ 
troduce  innovations  into  the  administration  when,  in  reality,  we  are  only 
turning  back  to  the  source  of  the  abuses,  and  proposing  to  Your  Majesty 
remedies  which  have  long  fallen  into  disuse,  such  as  having  the  taxes 
of  all  kinds  considered  in  the  departnnent  which  is  held  in  each  pro¬ 
vince,  or  of  admitting  to  this  dipartcvient  the  former  representatives 

1  [Note  by  the  original  editor.]  Here  again  there  is  a  gap  in  the  manuscript;  the 
passage  omitted  seems  to  have  dealt  with  the  vexations  caused  by  several  Ministers  and 
Supervisors  of  the  Finances. 


142 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


of  the  people,  who  have  been  ignored  for  several  centuries.  Your 
Majesty  should  therefore  clearly  understand  that  if  we  propose  what 
are  called  innovations,  but  which  are  really  only  the  re-establishment  of 
former  regulations,  it  is  because  the  progress  of  despotism  and  the  real 
innovations  which  it  is  constantly  introducing  render  a  return  to  sound 
principles  absolutely  necessary. 

[221]  We  dare  not  deceive  you,  Sire,  for  we  know  that  it  is  your 
desire  permanently  to  establish  the  happiness  of  the  Nation,  which  at 
the  moment  of  your  accession  demonstrated  its  devotion  to  you  with 
so  touching  a  confidence.  Your  efforts  must  not  be  restricted  to  the 
reformation  of  individual  abuses ;  you  must  attack  the  whole  system 
of  administration. 

[222]  We  know  that  Your  Majesty  loves  justice,  we  know  that  your 
present  Ministers  desire  to  promote  it.  But  so  long  as  the  welfare  o 
'your  people  is  founded  only  upon  your  personal  justice,  or  that  of  your 
Ministers,  it  will  prove  but  a  fleeting  blessing,  and  the  coming  genera¬ 
tion  will  behold  despotism  avenging  itself  upon  the  people  for  the  con¬ 
straint  which  it  has  suffered  during  your  reign.  The  period  of  this 
reign  should  therefore  be  utilized  to  establish  barriers  for  the  people 
against  despotism,  and  especially  against  secrecy  of  administration. 

I.22 3]  have  not  deemed  it  our  duty  therefore  to  protest  against 
particular  abuses ;  or  rather  we  have  only  used  them  as  illustrations  of 
the  general  system.  But  we  would  invoke  that  love  of  justice  which 
peculiarly  characterizes  Your  Majesty,  in  order  to  obtain  laws  which 
will  establish  the  permanent  welfare  of  your  kingdom  ,  such  laws  as  will 
enable  that  justice  which  fills  your  heart  to  survive  Your  Majesty  and 
to  make  itself  felt  by  our  most  distant  posterity. 

[224]  These  then,  Sire,  are  the  general  views  of  some  of  your  former 
Magistrates  who,  like  other  citizens,  have  been  witnesses  of  the  people’s 
misfortunes,  and  who,  having  devoted  their  lives  to  the  trial  of  law-suits 
arising  from  the  taxes,  have  had  peculiar  opportunities  for  observing 
some  of  the  causes  of  these  misfortunes.  We  present  these  reflections 
with  confidence,  for  we  know  that  the  sentiments  which  dictated  them 
will  recommend  them  to  Your  Majesty.  We  realize,  however,  that  in 
dealing  with  so  many  questions  we  may  have  fallen  into  some  errors. 
How,  indeed,  could  we  have  avoided  that,  since  the  Administrative 
Officials  have  so  long  been  endeavoring  to  envelope  themselves  in  an  im¬ 
penetrable  veil,  and  since  the  chief  vice  of  their  operations  is  the 
secrecy  which  makes  it  impossible  to  investigate  or  prove  anything? 


THE  GRIEVANCES  OF  l'HE  PUBLIC  SHOULD  BE  HEARD.  1 43 

We  should  have  but  ill  fulfilled  our  duty  if  we  had  permitted  the 
fear  of  being  mistaken  in  some  details  to  prevent  us  from  laying  before 
you  a  mass  of  important  and  incontestable  facts;  and  you,  Sire — if  we 
may  venture  to  say  so — will  fall  into  the  trap  set  for  you  by  the  ene¬ 
mies  of  your  people,  if  the  discovery  of  these  slight  mistakes  makes  you 
suspicious  of  the  truths  which  it  is  so  important  for  you  to  know. 

[225]  We  are  not,  moreover,  so  rash  as  to  suppose- that  others  than 
ourselves  cannot  further  enlighten  you.  We  shall  not  imitate,  Sire,  the 
guilty  presumption  of  those  Administrative  agents  who  for  more  than 
a  century  have  sought  to  keep  at  a  distance  from  the  throne  all  those 
who  might  be  able  to  enlighten  the  King,  as  if  the  truth  were  never  to 
reach  the  Ruler  except  through  them.  We  esteem,  Sire,  as  the  whole 
Nation  esteems,  the  Ministers  with  whom  Your  Majesty  has  surrounded 
yourself,  but  nevertheless  there  are  many  facts  which  you  will  never 
learn  either  from  the  Ministers  or  from  the  Magistrates. 

[226]  It  is  the  people  at  large  who  bear  the  burden  of  the  taxes, 
which  are  so  complicated  that  each  province,  each  association,  each 
profession,  is  subjected  to  some  particular  revenue  law,  and  has  its  own 
grievances  to  put  before  Your  Majesty.  It  is  not  right  that  a  single 
Minister  should  decide,  without  restraint,  upon  such  a  multitude  of 
cases,  and  it  is  equally  impossible  that  any  one  body  of  Magistrates 
should  alone  interpret  to  Your  Majesty  this  enormous  number  of  con¬ 
flicting  interests. 

[227]  The  strongest  proof  of  the  sincerity  of  our  zeal  which  we  can 
give  is  to  inform  you  in  what  cases  and  to  what  degree  you  must  be  on 
your  guard  against  the  Ministers  and  other  Administrators,  and  how 
you  can  shield  yourself  from  deception,  by  listening  to  the  representa¬ 
tions  of  others  than  the  Magistrates,  who  have  so  long  been  the  only 
persons  in  the  kingdom  who  exercised  the  right  of  protest,  and  who 
are  sometimes  incapable  of  fulfilling  that  important  function  in  all  its 
bearings. 

[228]  The  confidence  which  we  feel  in  the  present  administration 
shall  not  close  our  mouths.  On  the  contrary,  we  believe  that  we  should 
take  advantage  of  this  moment  when  Your  Majesty  is  surrounded  by 
the  most  learned  and  the  most  irreproachable  of  men,  and  we  hope 
that  they  will  unite  with  us,  and  that  they  will  desire  as  ardently  as 
ourselves  that  Your  Majesty  should  be  enlightened  as  to  their  exercise 
of  the  power  which  has  been  confided  to  them,  and  which  they  can 
have  no  wish  to  abuse. 


144 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


[229]  In  many  respects  certainly,  and  perhaps  in  most,  the  Minis¬ 
ters  cf  the  King  deserve  his  confidence  more  than  any  one  else,  for  it 
may  be  said,  in  general,  that  every  thing  which  affects  the  glory  of  his 
reign  affects  also  that  of  his  Ministers.  The  Sovereign  cannot  doubt 
that  they  take  the  sincerest  interest  in  the  success  of  his  arms,  the 
maintenance  of  his  authority  at  home,  and  his  dignity  and  consider¬ 
ation  among  foreign  powers. 

[230]  But  there  are  other  matters  in  which  the  interests  of  the 
Ministers  do  not  coincide  with  those  of  the  King  :  they  differ  widely, 
for  example,  when  the  people  are  subjected  to  slavery  by  the  tools  of 
the  Administration  upon  the  pretext  of  maintaining  the  royal  authority, 
or  when  the  Administration  is  extended  until  it  includes  the  most  insig¬ 
nificant  matters.  It  is  not  surprising  when  one  of  your  subjects  becomes 
a  Minister  that  he  should  be  flattered  by  the  pettiest  attribute  of  authority, 
that  he  should  everywhere  have  friends  to  favor  and  enemies  to  perse¬ 
cute,  and  that  his  pride  should  feed  upon  the  variety  of  attention  and 
homage  which  accompanies  a  multiplicity  of  powers.  But  a  King  is 
too  great,  too  powerful,  too  far  above  his  subjects,  to  be  moved  by 
these  petty  passions,  and  he  cannot  feel  his  authority  affected  except 
by  important  considerations. 

[231]  There  is  a  third  class  of  affairs  in  which  the  interests  of  the 
Ministers  not  only  differ  from  that  of  the  King,  but  are  absolutely  op¬ 
posed  to  it.  To  this  class  belong  all  questions  relating  to  the  introduc¬ 
ing  of  secrecy  into  the  Administration,  for  the  interest  of  the  King  is 
always  served  by  throwing  as  much  light  as  possible  upon  the  conduct 
of  his  Ministers,  while  such  light  is  by  no  means  always  welcome  to 
the  Ministers  themselves. 

[232]  There  is,  finally,  a  large  class  of  questions  in  which  the  in¬ 
terest  of  the  King,  although  opposed  to  that  of  the  Ministers,  coincides 
with  that  of  the  people,  while  all  persons  of  rank  and  consideration  in 
the  State,  all  wrho  are  privileged  to  approach  the  King  or  to  gain  his 
attention,  are  on  the  side  of  the  Ministers.  And  what  most  deserves 
your  attention  in  this  connection,  Sire,  what  is  worthy,  indeed,  of  be¬ 
ing  the  subject  of  your  most  profound  attention,  is  the  fact  that  the 
interests  of  the  Ministers  united  to  those  of  all  people  of  influence, 
almost  invariably  outweigh  that  of  the  King  and  the  people. 

[233]  We  have  already  called  attention  to  this  consideration  in  con¬ 
nection  with  the  twentieth  and  the  poll  tax.  These  two  taxes,  in  the 
administration  of  which  the  Ministers  and  their  subordinates  have 


DEMAND  FOR  THE  ESTATES  GENERAL. 


r45 


reserved  the  right  to  tax  your  subjects,  or  arbitrarily  to  modify  their 
taxes  at  will,  have  given  rise  to  a  despotism  in  France  which  is  at  once 
odious  and  shameful  to  a  free  nation.  This  despotism  is  contrary  to 
the  real  interests  of  Your  Majesty,  and  even  to  the  fiscal  interests,  which 
the  despots  are  always  ready  to  sacrifice  to  personal  considerations ; 
but  it  is  most  serviceable  to  persons  of  position  and  consideration,  for 
they  are  always  treated  with  favor  by  the  Ministers,  the  Intendants,  and 
the  other  despots  in  this  department  of  the  government. 

[234]  The  excessive  expenditures  furnish  another  example*,  Pro¬ 
positions  are  constantly  being  made  for  restricting  them,  and  everybody 
applauds  these  proposals  in  theory ;  but  when  it  comes  to  putting  them 
into  execution  all  the  Ministers  and  those  controlling  the  expendi¬ 
tures  refuse  to  carry  them  out,  and  they  are  supported  in  this  refusal  by 
all  the  influences  of  the  Court  and  even  of  the  capital ;  for  it  is  always 
the  people  of  influence  who  benefit  by  the  favors  of  the  Ministers. 

[235]  Still  another  example  is  the  abuse  of  lettres  de  cachet  granted 
to  individuals.  Every  person  of  any  authority  in  the  kingdom  con¬ 
siders  it  his  right  to  ask  for  them.  And  we  Magistrates,  who  regard 
ourselves  as  the  representatives  of  the  people,  but  who  still  belong  to 
that  favored  class  who  have  access  to  the  Ministers,  must  we  not  re¬ 
proach  ourselves  with  never  having  protested  energetically  enough 
against  this  abuse? 

[236]  In  regard  to  all  these  questions,  Sire,  there  are  necessarily 
two  parties  in  the  kingdom ;  all  those,  on  the  one  hand,  who  are 
privileged  to  approach  their  Sovereign,  and  on  the  other,  the  rest  of 
the  Nation.  Consequently  a  King  who  loves  justice  must  seek  his 
motives  in  his  own  heart,  and  enlightenment  in  the  hearts  of  the  Nation. 

[237]  But  how  can  any  communication  be  established  between  the 
King  and  the  Nation  which  shall  not  be  intercepted  by  those  who  sur¬ 
round  the  King?  Once  more,  Sire,  we  must  not  disguise  the  truth.  The 
simplest  and  most  natural  means,  and  at  the  same  time  the  most  con¬ 
formable  to  the  constitution  of  this  Monarchy,  would  be  to  listen  to  the 
voice  of  the  Nation  itself  assembled,  or  at  least  to  permit  assemblies 
in  each  province.  To  tell  you  otherwise  were  cowardly ;  you  must  not 
be  left  in  ignorance  that  the  unanimous  wish  of  the  Nation  is  to  obtain 
either  the  Estates-General  or,  at  least,  the  provincial  Estates. 

[238]  But  we  well  know  that  for  more  than  a  century  the  jealousy 
of  the  Ministers,  and  perhaps  of  the  courtiers  as  well,  has  constantly 
opposed  these  national  assemblies,  and  if  France  is  ever  so  happy  as  to 

10 


146 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


have  Your  Majesty  pronounce  in  favor  of  such  assemblies,  we  foresee 
that  formal  difficulties  will  still  be  raised.  Such  difficulties  can  easily 
be  surmounted  if  Your  Majesty  desires  it ;  they  cannot  constitute  a  real 
obstacle  to  the  realization  of  the  ardent  desires  of  the  people  you  love. 
It  is,  however,  possible  that  they  may  postpone  for  a  period  the  re¬ 
establishment  of  the  longed-for  Estates;  in  the  meantime,  is  there 
no  other  avenue  by  which  the  petitions  of  the  people  may  reach  the 
King  who  is  waiting  to  hear  them  ? 

[239]  We  do  not  speak  now  in  a  language  strange  to  you,  Sire.  At 
the  time  of  your  accession,  all  Europe  knew  that  the  first  wish  of  Your 
Majesty  was  to  facilitate  the  approach  of  all  your  subjects  to  your 
throne,  and  that  you  made  it  a  rule  to  receive  all  the  petitions  which 
were  presented  to  you.  But  the  secrecy  in  the  Administration  con¬ 
stantly  opposes  the  mutual  desire  of  the  Monarch  and  the  Nation  to 
come  to  an  understanding,  and  has  neutralized  that  first  wish  of  a  young 
King,  which  was  so  important  to  the  people  whom  he  was  to  govern. 

[240]  You  receive  petitions,  Sire,  from  all  your  subjects ;  but  the 
crying  abuses  can  never  be  laid  before  you  because  there  is  no  record 
in  existence  of  the  transactions  of  the  government.  In  order,  then, 
that  Your  Majesty  should  be  enlightened  by  the  petitions  which  you  re¬ 
ceive,  it  is  necessary  that  the  operations  of  the  Administration  should 
no  longer  be  secret,  and  that  all  acts  of  authority  issued  in  your  name 
should  be  made  known  both  to  the  public  at  large  and  to  the  individuals 
who  are  chiefly  affected.  It  is  necessary  also  that  the  motives  of  these 
acts  should  be  made  public,  and  that  each  act  should  bear  the  name 
of  the  person  from  whom  it  emanates,  who  should  be  held  respon¬ 
sible  for  the  use  which  he  makes  of  his  authority.  Otherwise  the 
petitions  presented  to  the  King  will  serve  but  little  purpose,  and  abuses 
of  authority  will  remain  unknown  and  unpunished. 

[241]  \ou  receive  petitions  from  all  your  subjects;  but  they  are 
only  permitted  to  invoke  your  justice  in  their  personal  affairs,  and  con¬ 
sequently  associations,  provinces,  and  even  the  State  itself  are  without 
defenders.  Therefore,  until  Your  Majesty  shall  have  re-established  the 
Estates,  there  should  at  least  be  deputies  from  each  province,  chosen 
by  the  province  itself,  who  would  perform  for  Your  Majesty  and  your 
inner  Council  one  of  the  functions  which  the  Procureurs-giniraux 
fulfill  m  the  Courts— that  of  defending  the  interests  of  the  public,  and 
particularly  of  the  province  they  represent.  This  institution  would  not 
necessarily  involve  an  assembly  of  Estates  in  each  province.  As  we 


FUTILITY  OF  PETITIONS. 


M7 


have  already  observed,  a  distinction  was  formerly  made  between  the 
pays  (TEtats  and  the  pays  cT Elections,  for  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
latter  elected  representatives,  they  had  no  Estates;  and  there  is  nothing 
to  prevent  the  re-establishment  of  this  old  usage.1  The  Council  has 
been  forced  by  obvious  necessity  to  summon  commercial  deputies  from 
each  province.  Are  the  interests  of  commerce  the  only  ones  in  which 
the  province  should  be  represented? 

[242]  You  receive  petitions  from  all  your  subjects;  but  you  cannot 
be  unaware,  Sire,  that  the  majority  of  your  subjects,  and  particularly 
those  who  most  need  your  protection,  are  absolutely  incapable  of  in¬ 
voking  it,  for  they  have  not  the  necessary  intelligence  for  drawing  up 
a  memoir,  nor  the  necessary  means  for  getting  it  drawn  up  by  others, 
nor  the  necessary  facilities  for  getting  it  into  the  hands  of  Your  Majesty. 
And  what  resource  have  those  who  languish  in  prison,  and  who  are  not 
likely  to  be  permitted  to  escape,  when  it  is  foreseen  that  the  first  use 
that  they  will  make  of  their  liberty  will  be  to  implore  your  justice? 
The  representatives  of  each  province  should  therefore  be  especially 
authorized  to  constitute  themselves  the  defenders  of  the  poor,  the 
weak,  and  the  oppressed,  and,  above  all,  of  prisoners,  just  as,  in  the 
established  system  of  justice,  the  Procureurs  and  Avocats-generaux  are 
the  natural  defenders  of  the  absent  and  the  incapacitated,  of  minors, 
and,  in  a  word,  of  all  those  who  cannot  defend  themselves. 

[243]  You  receive  petitions  from  all  your  subjects;  but  there  is  one 
important  fact  which  we  venture  to  bring  to  your  attention  because  it 
is  hardly  possible  that  the  experience  of  one  year  should  already  have 
demonstrated  it,  and  that  is,  that  this  right  of  the  individual  to  appear 
before  the  King  in  person  is,  in  reality,  utterly  illusory ;  for  it  is  impossi¬ 
ble  that  Your  Majesty  should  decide  justly  and  with  a  knowledge  of  the 
facts  upon  all  the  complaints  and  demands — often  unwarranted  enough 
— of  several  millions  of  persons. 

[244]  Consequently  these  petitions  must  be,  and  are,  referred  to 
the  different  departments  of  the  administration ;  which  means,  Sire, 
that  each  petition  is  referred  to  precisely  that  person  against  whom 
it  is  directed.  For  no  one  appeals  to  Your  Majesty  until  he  has 
exhausted  all  the  other  resources,  and  is  obliged  to  complain  against 
the  Minister  himself.  But  we  have  made  plain  that  there  are  very 

1  The  Court  develops  certain  details  of  its  plan  in  a  note,  which  may  be  found  in 
the  French  original,  p.  67  sq.  above. 


148 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


important  cases  in  which  the  whole  Ministry,  and  even  all  those  who 
surround  the  person  of  Your  Majesty,  have  interests  directly  contrary 
to  those  of  Your  Majesty  and  of  the  Nation. 

[245]  Since  it  is  essential  that  Your  Majesty  should  avail  yourself 
of  the  knowledge  and  experience  of  the  Nation  at  large,  would  it  not 
be  possible  for  the  Nation  itself  to  examine,  in  the  first  instance,  all 
these  petitions  and  then  to  indicate  by  vote  which  ones  deserve  Your 
Majesty’s  personal  attention? 

[246]  Here  we  must  pause,  Sire.  We  have  dared  to  assert  that 
the  recourse  of  all  your  subjects  to  the  King  in  person  is  ineffec¬ 
tual  and  illusory,  because  it  is  an  obvious  fact,  of  which  Your  Maj¬ 
esty  must  yourself  certainly  be  convinced.  But  if  we  should  go  so 
far  as  to  propose  allowing  public  protests  against  the  abuses  of  the 
administration,  we  should  be  accused  of  audacity.  All  the  enemies  of 
public  liberty,  and  especially  all  those  who  are  privileged  to  speak  in 
your  name,  would  assert  that  we  wished  to  submit  the  acts  of  Your 
Majesty  himself  to  public  criticism.  Such  an  objection  is  calculated 
to  impose  the  most  respectful  silence  upon  us..  Nevertheless  we  ask 
your  permission,  Sire,  to  give  you  an  account  of  what  goes  on  before 
our  eyes  in  the  administration  of  contentious  justice. 

[247]  A  party  who  appears  in  a  Sovereign  Court  has  the  right  to 
print  and  publish  a  memoir  of  his  case,  and  if  he  is  appealing  from  the 
decision  of  an  inferior  tribunal,  the  printed  memoir  is  necessarily  a 
criticism  of  that  tribunal.  We  are  aware  also  that  individuals  who 
appeal  to  Your  Majesty  himself  against  a  decision  of  a  Sovereign  Court 
by  a  petition  for  reversal,  revision,  or  otherwise,  enjoy  the  same  right, 
and  that  memoirs  signed  by  an  Avocat  au  Conseil  or  by  private  indi¬ 
viduals  are  printed  and  published,  which  contain  criticisms  of  the  deci¬ 
sions  of  the  Sovereign  Court  by  which  they  believe  themselves  wronged. 

[248]  We  know,  Sire,  that  the  publication  of  these  memoirs  does  not 
enjoy  unanimous  approval.  It  is  even  said  that  there  are  some  among 
the  Magistrates  who  consider  it  an  abuse,  and  who  maintain  that 
memoirs  should  only  be.  used  for  the  instruction  of  the  judges  who  have 

to  decide  the  case,  and  that  the  public  should  not  be  made  the  judge 
of  the  Courts. 

[249]  As  f°r  ourselves,  Sire,  we  always  have  believed,  and  always 
shall  believe,  that  we  are  responsible  to  Your  Majesty  and  to  the  Nation 
for  the  justice  we  mete  out  to  individuals ;  and  if  there  are  some 
Magistrates  who  think  otherwise,  we,  who  have  warned  Your  Majesty 


ADMINISTRATION  SHOULD  BE  SUBJECT  TO  PUBLIC  CRITICISM.  149 

to  challenge  the  testimony  of  the  Ministers  when  they  defend  the 
secrecy  of  administration, — we  must  admit  that  you  must  also  challenge 
that  of  the  Judges  who  oppose  the  publication  of  memoirs. 

[250]  It  is,  in  fact,  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  judicial  system 
in  France  that  its  operations  should  be  public.  All  suits  should 
naturally  be  argued  before  the  audience  of  the  general  public,  and  to 
take  the  -public  to  witness  by  means  of  public  memoirs  is  simply  to 
increase  this  audience.  It  may  be  objected  that  the  profusion  of  these 
printed  memoirs  is  a  novelty  of  recent  origin ;  but  the  charge  of  inno¬ 
vation  does  not  constitute  a  sufficient  objection,  since  there  are  desirable 
novelties,  and  if  we  had  rejected  all  innovations  we  should  still  be  living 
under  the  empire  of  ignorance  and  barbarism.  However,  we  believe, 
Sire,  that  this  institution,  far  from  being  a  dangerous  innovation,  is  only 
the  re-establishment  of  the  old  judicial  procedure  in  this  Kingdom,  and 
that  it  may  perhaps  be  derived  from  the  original  constitution  of  the 
Monarchy.  This  observation,  Sire,  is  not  unworthy  of  your  attention. 

[251]  A  long-established  Monarchy,  particularly  one  which  was 
founded  in  centuries  of  ignorance,  and  which  has  maintained  its  exist¬ 
ence  until  a  period  of  unexampled  enlightenment,  must  have  experi¬ 
enced  revolutions  of  many  kinds.  In  considering  the  history  of  this 
Nation  under  this  aspect,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  progress  of  enlighten¬ 
ment  has  given  rise  to  an  immense  difference  between  the  customs 
and  the  laws  of  different  periods. 

[252]  In  the  times  of  our  earliest  ancestors,  all  contracts  and  agree¬ 
ments  between  men  were  verbal,  and  faith  in  the  testimony  of  witnesses 
took  the  place  of  documents,  which  no  one  would  have  known  how  to 
draw  up.  The  laws  themselves  were  but  ill-formulated  and  often  con¬ 
sisted  in  vague  traditions  which  left  everything  to  the  interpretation 
of  the  judge. 

[253]  This  arbitrary  justice  was  subject  to  the  most  heinous  abuses, 
and  it  was  doubtless  their  enormity  which  led  to  the  adoption  of  the 
simplest  and  most  qfficacious  remedy,  namely,  publicity.  The  Kings 
themselves  administered  justice  to  the  Nation,  in  the  Assembly  of  the 
Champ  de  Mars,  with  a  dignity  and  authority  unknown  to  modern 
times,  and  the  great  Nobles  followed  the  King’s  example  and  rendered 
justice  in  the  presence  of  the  people,  each  in  his  own  territory. 

[254]  It  must  be  remembered  that  in  this  first  period  the  adminis¬ 
tration  was  not  yet  divorced  from  contentious  justice;  both  were 
exercised  by  the  King  himself  with  the  aid  of  public  opinion.  The 


translations  and  reprints. 


150 

redoubtable  rulers  of  that  period  permitted  public  complaint  to  be 
made  to  them  of  the  conduct  of  their  Ministers.  They  did  not  fear  the 
humble  petitions  of  those  who  came  to  implore  their  aid,  and  they  endeav¬ 
ored  to  secure  themselves  against  the  deceptions  of  those  who  attempted 
to  interpose  their  doubtful  authority  between  the  King  and  the  people. 

[255]  In  the  following  period  it  became  customary  to  write  down 
the  enactments  which  determined  the  condition  and  the  obligations 
of  men,  and  a  code  of  written  law  came  into  existence,  to  which  all 
decisions  had  to  conform.  This  period,  which  may  be  called  that  of 
Writing,  had  great  advantages  over  the  preceding  one,  since  the  rights 
of  citizens  now  rested  upon  a  permanent  foundation,  and  they  might 
hope  to  be  judged  henceforth  by  the  law  itself  instead  of  by  the 
caprices  of  their  fellowmen. 

[256]  The  new  judicial  system  nevertheless  involved  difficulties  un¬ 
known  to  previous  centuries.  There  was  now  a  body  of  definite  laws, 
but  the  study  of  them  had  become  so  complicated  that  no  one  who 
did  not  devote  himself  entirely  to  it  could  perform  the  functions  of  a 
judge,  or  even  administer  understanding^  his  own  affairs.  A  new 
order  of  citizens  arose  in  the  State,  namely  the  lawyers,  some  of  whom 
took  the  place  of  the  Nobles  in  their  function  of  judges,  while  others 
undertook  to  secure  the  rights  of  private  individuals  and  of  the  Nation, 
the  greater  part  of  which  was  still  in  a  condition  of  profound  ignorance 
and  so  was  forced  to  repose  a  blind  confidence  in  them. 

[257]  The  administration  of  justice  also  became  less  public  than  in 
the  earlier  period.  Each  tribunal  still  held  its  public  sessions,  but 
w  enever  the  details  of  a  case  required  the  examination  of  documents, 
the  judges  made  such  examination  in  secret  deliberations,  so  that  their 
conduct  was  no  longer  wholly  open  to  public  criticism. 

[258]  We  must  observe,  moreover,  that  it  was  during  this  period  that 
administration  was  separated  from  contentious  justice.  Lawsuits,  and 
particularly  appeals,  had  multiplied  to  such  an  extent,  and  jurispru¬ 
dence  had  become  so  profound  a  science,  that  it  was  no  longer  possible 
for  the  King  and  the  Nobles  to  administer  justice  in  person.  The 
Kings  therefore  confided  this  function  to  the  Magistrates,  lawyers,  and 
graduates,  while  they  reserved  to  themselves  the  administration,  and  as 
it  was  exercised  by  means  of  royal  letters  instead  of  the  public  procla¬ 
mations  of  earlier  times,  everything  was  done  in  the  secrecy  of  the 
King’s  cabinet.1 

'  It  may  be  worth  while  to  observe  that  it  was  in  this  second  period  that  the  Gov- 


PUBLICITY  OF  JUDICIAL  PROCEDURE. 


151 

[259]  Finally  there  came  a  third  period,  which  we  shall  call  the 
Age  of  Printing,  in  which  the  printing-press  has  multiplied  the  benefits 
of  writing  and  obviated  its  inconveniences.  Learning  has  been  diffused 
by  printing ;  the  written  laws  are  to-day  known  to  every  one,  and  every 
one  may  apply  them  to  his  own  affairs.  The  legal  profession  has  lost 
that  superiority  which  general  ignorance  once  gave  to  it.  The  Judges 
may  themselves  be  judged  by  an  intelligent  public,  and  such  criticism 
is  far  more  severe  and  far  more  just  when  it  is  made  quietly  and 
deliberately  by  reading  the  printed  page,  than  when  opinion  is  at  the 
mercy  of  a  tumultuous  assembly. 

[260]  The  art  of  printing  has  then  given  to  writing  the  same  publicity 
which  in  earlier  times  invested  the  spoken  word  in  the  presence  of  the 
assembled  Nation.  But  it  has  required  several  centuries  for  the  dis¬ 
covery  of  that  art  to  produce  its  full  effect.  It  has  taken  a  long  time 
for  the  whole  Nation  to  acquire  the  taste  and  the  habit  of  informing 
itself  by  reading,  and  for  the  education  of  persons  skillful  in  the  art  of 
expressing  themselves,  who  can  lend  their  services  to  the  public  and 
take  the  place  of  those  who,  endowed  with  natural  eloquence,  were 
able  to  gain  the  ears  of  our  fathers  in  the  Chanip  rfe  Mars ,  or  in  the 
early  Courts. 

[261]  But  that  moment  has  arrived,  Sire.  Your  subjects  already 
enjoy  its  benefits  in  the  regular  system  of  justice,  where  the  custom  of 
interesting  and  instructing  the  public  by  printed  memoirs  has  been 
established ;  and  Y'our  Majesty  may  ordain  that  those  of  your  subjects 
who  have  complaints  to  make  against  the  administration  may  enjoy 
the  same  privilege  and  the  same  advantage. 

[262]  It  would  seem  that  recourse  to  your  Ministers  against  an 
Intendant  or  a  provincial  Commandant  might  be  as  public  as  the 
appeal  to  a  superior  from  an  inferior  court.  And  since  a  citizen  is 

ernment  first  found  it  possible  to  do  without  the  Estates.  Up  to  that  time  the  Kings 
had  been  absolutely  obliged  to  assemble  the  people  to  make  known  their  commands. 
The  Ministers  straightway  found  means  of  making  these  assemblies  more  and  more 
infrequent,  since  they  desired  to  remove,  as  far  as  possible,  all  critics  of  their  admin¬ 
istration,  and  they  soon  found  it  so  convenient  to  labor  in  seclusion  that  they  sought 
to  thicken  the  veil  in  which  they  had  enveloped  themselves.  It  was  therefore  the  age 
of  Writing  which  gave  birth  to  that  secrecy  of  administration  in  France  which  has 
made  such  progress  from  the  period  of  the  suppression  of  the  Estates-General  up  to 
the  present  time;  and  if  its  growth  has  been  fostered  during  the  age  of  Printing,  it  is 
because  the  recourse  to  printed  complaints  against  the  administration  has  so  far  been 
forbidden. 


!52 


TRANSLATIONS  AND  REPRINTS. 


permitted  to  appeal  publicly  to  Your  Majesty  by  means  of  printed 
memoirs,  against  the  decisions  rendered  in  your  name  by  the  Superior 
Courts, — tribunals  long  held  in  veneration,  and  composed  of  a  large 
number  of  Magistrates,  whose  decisions  are  only  reached  after  long 
discussion  and  by  a  plurality  of  votes — why  may  not  that  citizen  pro¬ 
test  with  the  same  publicity  against  other  acts  of  authority  also  done 
in  your  name,  but  which  are  the  work  of  a  single  man,  and  w'hich  are 
conceived  in  secret  and  with  no  preliminary  discussion? 

[263]  The  difference,  it  is  said,  is  that  every  one  knows  that  Your 
Majesty  never  holds  your  courts  of  justice  in  person,  whereas  one  can 
never  know  whether  the  acts  of  authorty  which  emanate  from  your 
cabinet  are  your  own  work  or  not.  The  Ministers  long  ago  adopted  a 
policy  which  is  calculated  always  to  shield  their  persons ;  the  name  of 
\  our  Majesty,  with  which  they  clothe  their  acts,  and  a  signature  which 
resembles  yours  and  which  may  not  be  questioned  without  failing  in  the 
respect  due  to  Your  Majesty,  have  sufficed  to  put  into  one  and  the 
same  class  the  acts  which  represent  Your  Majesty’s  personal  desires 
anu  those  of  which  you  know  nothing.  The  consequence  is  that  your 
oppressed  subjects  always  fear  that  they  may  seem  wanting  in  respect 
vhen  they  complain  of  injustice,  and  are  never  sure  that  in  invoking 
the  supreme  power  they  may  not  be  offending  against  it.  These  are 
tiie  resuits,  Sire,  of  keeping  secret  the  responsible  official, — one  of  the 
evils  of  the  general  system  which  we  have  described  to  Your  Majesty. 

[264]  France  enjoys  the  happiness  of  having  a  ruler  whose  first 
v  *s.i  is  for  enlightenment,  and  who  desires  to  enable  all  his  subjects  to 
invoke  his  personal  justice  against  all  abuses  of  authority.  But  when 
\  our  Majesty  has  been  convinced  by  the  representations  of  others,  and 
by  your  own  experience,  that  this  recourse  is  impossible  on  account  of 
the  almost  infinite  number  of  petitions  to  which  it  gives  rise,  and  that 
the  only  means  of  providing  that  the  voice  of  the  people  shall  pene¬ 
trate  to  the  King  is  to  permit  every  citizen  to  call  on  the  public  as  a 
witness  (as  he  may  already  do  in  the  tribunals  of  established  justice),— 
even  then,  our  opponents  believe  that  they  can  still  confront  our  zeal 
■with  an  insuperable  obstacle  and  impose  silence  upon  us  by  pronouncing 
the  revered  name  of  Your  Majesty.  They  would  leave  a  thousand 
cases  of  injustice  forever  unpunished  and  shielded  from  all  protest,  so 
that  it  would  be  impossible  ever  to  expose  them  to  you,  all  for  the 
sake  of  the  imaginary  fear  that  an  occasion  might  sometime  arise  in 
which  an  order  which  emanated  from  Your  Majesty  himself  should  be 


CRITICISM  OF  GOVERNMENT  OFFICIALS  SHOULD  BE  PERMITTED.  1 53 

treated  with  too  little  respect :  as  if  there  could  be  any  doubt  of  the 
extreme  circumspection  which  will  always  be  exercised  by  those  who 
address  petitions  to  you,  as  well  as  by  those  who,  in  virtue  of  their 
position,  are  commissioned  to  draw  up  and  sign  these  petitions. 

[265]  However,  Sire,  since  this  fear,  chimerical  as  it  is,  has  been 
given  expression,  since  our  opponents  take  advantage  of  the  personal 
respect  due  to  Your  Majesty,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  insist  farther; 
we  must  leave  this  matter  in  the  hands  of  Your  Majesty.  We  have 
reminded  you  of  the  example  of  those  early  Kings  who  did  not  feel  their 
authority  endangered  by  the  liberty  of  their  subjects  to  implore  their 
aid  in  the  presence  of  the  assembled  Nation.  It  is  for  you  to  judge, 
Sire,  whether  your  power  will  be  weakened  by  imitating  Charles  the 
Great,  that  proud  Ruler,  who  laid  such  great  stress  upon  the  preroga¬ 
tives  of  the  crown.  If  you  will  follow  his  example,  you  may  still  reign 
over  a  nation  which  shall  be  in  its  entirety  your  Council,  and  you  will  find 
its  resources  far  greater  than  he  did,  because  you  live  in  a  far  more 
enlightened  century. 

[266]  Deign  to  reflect,  Sire,  that  on  the  day  when  you  accord  to 
your  subjects  this  precious  liberty,  it  may  be  truly  said  that  an  alliance 
has  been  concluded  between  the  King  and  the  Nation  against  the 
Ministers  and  the  Magistrates ;  against  the  Ministers,  if  ever  there  are 
any  so  perverse  as  to  desire  to  conceal  the  truth  from  you,  against  the 
Magistrates,  if  ever  there  are  any  so  ambitious  as  to  claim  the  exclusive 
privilege  of  telling  you  the  truth. 

These,  Sire,  are  the  very  humble  and  very  respectful  protests  pre¬ 
sented  to  Your  Majesty  by 

Your  most  humble,  most  obedient, 
most  faithful  and  most  loving 
Servants  and  Subjects  who  hold 
your  Cour  des  aides . 

In  the  Cour  des  aides , 

Paris,  May  6,  1775. 


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